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NECESSITY, NAMING, AND THE EXISTENCE OF ĪŚVARA

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0. Prolegomena

This dissertation is about the arguments that an eleventh-century Buddhist intellectual named Ratnakīrti used to criticize the beliefs of his Nyāya interlocutors regarding the existence of a God-like being called "Īśvara."[1] In what follows, I want to show how three sets of philosophical arguments about epistemic necessity, semantic value, and ontology underlie and inform a centuries-long religious debate about the nature and existence of Īśvara. In trying to critically explain these arguments, however, I am committed to moving beyond the usual historical and philological task of restating, in English, complex arguments formulated in Sanskrit. I am committed to viewing these arguments as containing real philosophical possibilities and, as a result, to inquiring into their validity. To some extent then, this dissertation is also about the outcome of Ratnakīrti's debate with the Naiyāyikas and the more general philosophical and

[1]Ratnakīrti (c. 1000-1050) was a Buddhist intellectual who lived and worked in the monastic and educational complex of Vikramaśīla in the first half of the eleventh-century. For what little historical information is known about Ratnakīrti and for more on his dates and those of his contemporaries see Thakur (1975), Bühneman (1980a), Kajiyama (1966), Mimaki (1976), Woo (1999), and the references contained therein.

The term "Nyāya" refers to a 'Hindu' philosophical system that is based on the Nyāya-sūtra and its commentaries. Philosophers working within this tradition are referred to as Naiyāyikas. Throughout this dissertation the terms "Nyāya" and "Naiyāyikas" will be used to refer to the intellectuals whom Ratnakīrti considers to be his interlocutors. Moreover, whenever phrases such as "according to the Naiyāyikas" are used, what is being referred to is the Nyāya viewpoint as reported by Ratnakīrti. Although Ratnakīrti's characterizations of Nyāya philosophy are generally fair and accurate, this work will not concern itself with demonstrating that this is so. Instead, it will concern itself with Ratnakīrti's Naiyāyikas and their arguments.

theological content of his arguments. In addition, this project seeks to develop a strategy through which scholastic texts composed by philosophers working in Sanskrit can be studied in an historically and philologically responsible yet philosophically and theologically informed manner. Given that scholarship on Ratnakīrti and his Nyāya interlocutors is still in its very early stages, I have tried in this work to balance the historical and philological methods that are necessary for accurately interpreting Sanskrit philosophical texts with the philosophical and theological concerns that motivate my own (and Ratnakīrti's) interest in the material. In my view, this dissertation will not be successful if either Ratnakīrti's arguments are misinterpreted or their philosophical significance is not brought into view. In introducing this dissertation, I want to begin by discussing my project's immediate intellectual context and what I hope will be its eventual location in the English speaking academy. I also want to identify the materials that will be used in the dissertation and describe a methodological strategy for dealing with them. My introduction will conclude with a brief outline of the dissertation as a whole.

1.0 Comparative Philosophy of Religions

This dissertation is, in many ways, an intellectual descendant of the "Toward a Comparative Philosophy of Religions" conference series that took place at the University of Chicago from 1986-1992. The nine international conferences in this series brought together philosophers, theologians, historians of religion, anthropologists, and area specialists to try and define and practice what came to be

called the "Comparative Philosophy of Religions."[2] The work that has since been published by SUNY press in the "Toward a Comparative Philosophy of Religions" series points to the variety of ways in which this project has been understood.[3] I understand this dissertation to be another attempt at defining and practicing the comparative philosophy of religions and thus at reconceiving the relationships between the disciplines of philosophy, religion, and area studies. A consideration of the eventual location of such a project within the English speaking academy will point to the specific interpretation of the "Comparative Philosophy of Religions" assumed in this work.

1.1 Disciplinary Location

One way of describing this project with respect to contemporary disciplinary boundaries is to suggest that its questions belong (primarily) to philosophy, its texts (primarily) to South Asian studies, and its intellectual context (primarily) to religion. This description is, of course, a contingent feature of the contemporary English speaking academy and is based, in part, upon a conception of these disciplines that this project seeks to undermine. Rather than view this project as "interdisciplinary," however, and thereby suggest that it does not have a proper academic home, I think it is more appropriate to consider it "trans-disciplinary;" that is, as a project which by

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[2]Summary reports of the first six conferences can be found in Bantly (1990).

[3]See, for example, Reynolds and Tracy eds., (1990), Reynolds and Tracy eds., (1994), Clooney (1992), Clooney (1998), Griffiths (1994), and Cabezon (1994). Although not a part of the SUNY series see Griffiths (1983), Neville ed., (2001), Neville ed., (2001a), Neville ed., (2001b), Clooney (2001), and Ram-Prasad (2001).

taking up questions (primarily) associated with one academic department (i.e., philosophy), using materials (primarily) associated with another (i.e., South Asian studies), and embedding itself in an intellectual context (primarily) associated with a third (i.e., religion), seeks to create a work which is of interest and use to those working in each of these disciplinary areas. It is in this sense that a "trans-disciplinary" project, unlike an "inter-disciplinary" one, can be said to properly belong to more than one academic discipline. It is what a trans-disciplinary project draws from its various disciplines that determines whether it is one in the comparative philosophy of religions. With respect to this project, for example, the designation "comparative" indicates that material that is conventionally associated with more than one academic discipline (or sub-discipline) will be brought together. More specifically, material will be drawn from philosophy, South Asian studies, and the religion sub-specialties of Buddhist and Hindu studies. The designation "philosophy" indicates that questions, methods, and vocabulary conventionally associated with work done in departments of philosophy will be central to the project. In this case, what are central are technical philosophical discussions in epistemology, semantics, and ontology, and a style of reading and writing that is often associated with the work of professional philosophers. Finally, the designation "religion" indicates that the intellectual context within which this dissertation's central questions will be pursued is conventionally understood as being a part of the study of religion. Here, the context is defined by my project's focus on theological beliefs regarding the existence of a God-like being called "Īśvara" and its more implicit concern with the extent to which Sanskrit philosophical texts can provide a basis for future constructive work in Hinduism, Buddhism, and the philosophy of religion.

1.2 Intended Audience(s)

I intend this project to be of interest and use to at least four groups of people who generally locate themselves in the three different disciplinary areas referred to above. I hope, for example, that both the style and the technical details of Ratnakīrti's arguments against the Naiyāyikas will be of interest to contemporary philosophers. Ratnakīrti's arguments revolve around questions of epistemic necessity, semantic value, and ontology and thus overlap in interesting ways with many contemporary philosophical discussions in epistemology, the philosophy of language, the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of religion. Since it is often of philosophical value to see how philosophers working in very different contexts and idioms have thought about similar (or seemingly similar) issues, a critical study of Ratnakīrti's arguments may be of use to others working on similar questions. I also hope that this project will make it possible for philosophers unfamiliar with Sanskrit philosophical material to develop a more accurate conception of "Indian Philosophy." It is remarkable that even today there are very few resources available to provide non-specialists with useful knowledge of the philosophical form and content of Sanskrit philosophical texts. Secondly, I hope that by focusing on a specific debate about the applicability of philosophical arguments to beliefs in the existence of Īśvara, theologians and philosophers of religion will develop a broader perspective on the theological possibilities of Hinduism(s) and Buddhism(s) and will come to better appreciate the kind of philosophical support that can be provided for specific Hindu and Buddhist doctrines. Thirdly, I hope that by pointing to the normative dimension of Ratnakīrti's

debate with the Naiyāyikas, historians of religion will be reminded of the importance of intellectual practices to the study of religion and of the normative dimensions of the South Asian materials that they study. Finally, I hope that Sanskritists, Buddhologists, and specialists in 'Hindu' philosophical systems will benefit from the study of a neglected group of texts, authors, and concerns.

2.0 Materials and Methods

2.1 Materials

The textual material that is needed for this work can be divided into four groups: Group I consists of Ratnakīrti's written work; Group II consists of the texts directly referred to by him; Group III consists of texts, commentaries, and secondary sources indirectly helpful for understanding and interpreting Ratnakīrti's arguments and those of his Nyāya interlocutors; and Group IV consists of the contemporary philosophical and theological literature that I have found helpful in interpreting and writing about Ratnakīrti's arguments. What follows is a brief description of these four groups of materials.

Group I: Ratnakīrti's extant work consists of 10 "essays:" [1] "The Refutation of Arguments for Establishing Īśvara [īśvarasādhanadūṣaṇa, (ISD)];" [2] "An Inquiry into Inference-Warranting Relations [vyāptinirṇaya, (VN)];" [3] "The Proof of Exclusion [apohasiddhi, (AS)];"[4] "The Doctrine of Multi-faceted Non-duality [citrādvaitaprakāśavāda, (CAPV)];" [5] "The Refutation of Other Mental Continua [santānāntaradūṣaṇa (SD)];" [6] "A Treatise on the Accepted Instruments of

Warranted Awareness [pramāṇāntarbhāvaprakaraṇa, (PAP)];" [7] "A Proof of Omniscience [sarvajñasiddhi, (SS)];" [8] "The Refutation of a Proof of Abiding Entities [sthirasiddhidūṣaṇa, (SSD)];" [9] "The Proof of Momentary Destruction, Negative Concomitance [kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi, vyatirekātmikā, (KSV)];" and [10] "The Proof of Momentary Destruction, Positive Concomitance [kṣaṇabhangasiddhi, anvayātmikā, (KSA)]." These texts were edited and published as the "Buddhist Nyāya Works of Ratnakīrti" by the K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute in 1957 and again in 1975.[4] This dissertation is based, primarily, on the first three essays, each of which is translated in Appendix B. Selected passages from essay 4, essay 6, essay 8, essay 9, and essay 10 will also be discussed. These passages will be translated in footnotes to the text. The essays and passages that are translated in the Appendix and footnotes are important to this work since in addition to describing Ratnakīrti's critique of the Nyāya argument for the existence of Īśvara (essay 1), they also describe and further develop the philosophical resources on which his critique depends. This is particularly so with essay 2, in which epistemic necessity is discussed and essay 3, in which Ratnakīrti discusses semantic value. Of these three essays, only "The Proof of Exclusion [apohasiddh]" and "An Inquiry into Inference-warranting Relations [vyāptinirṇaya]" have been previously translated into English, French, or German.[5] Of the remaining seven essays, there are two English translations of "The Refutation of Other Mental

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[4]For editions of all ten essays see Thakur (1957) and Thakur (1975). For editions of AS, see Shastri (1910) and Sharma (1969); KSA, see Shastri (1910) and Woo (1999); KSV, see Shastri (1910) and McDermott (1970); SS, see Bühneman (1980a) and Goodman (1989); SSD, see Mimaki (1976).

[5]For a translation of the *Apohasiddhi*, see Sharma (1969). Unfortunately, Horst Lasic's excellent edition and German translation of Ratnakīrti's *Vyāptinirṇaya* was received too late to be made use of in this work. See Lasic (2000).

Continua [santānāntaradūṣaṇa],"[6] there is both a German and an English translation of "A Proof of Omniscience [sarvajñasiddhi],"[7] a French translation of the "The Refutation of a Proof of Abiding Entities [sthirasiddhidūṣaṇa],"[8] and an English translation of both "The Proof of Momentary Destruction, Negative Concomitance [kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi, vyatirekātmikā]" and "The Proof of Momentary Destruction, Positive Concomitance [kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi, anvayātmikā]."[9] Important parts of "A Treatise on the Accepted Instruments of Warranted Awareness [pramāṇāntarbhāvaprakaraṇa]" are included in Mokṣākaragupta's "The Language of Reasoning [tarkabhāṣā, (MTBh)]," for which there is also an English translation.[10] Unfortunately, there are neither commentaries on nor Tibetan translations of Ratnakīrti's work. The secondary literature is also very limited.[11]

Group II: Throughout his work, Ratnakīrti refers to and quotes from the work of Buddhist, Mīmāṃsā, and Nyāya authors. Since there are no extant commentaries on Ratnakīrti's own work, it is often helpful to refer to the texts to which he refers in his writing. Consulting these texts is important for recovering the specific contexts in which the cited passages originally occurred and for providing clues as to why they

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[6]More specifically, there are two 'free translations' of the *Santānantaradūṣanam*. See Kajiyama (1965: 435-420) and Wood (1991: 149-159).

[7]Bühnemann (1980a) and Goodman (1989).

[8]Mimaki (1976).

[9]McDermott (1969) and Woo (1999).

[10]Kajiyama (1966).

[11]See, for example, Sharma (1969), Ruegg (1970), McDermott (1970), McDermott (1972), Steinkellner (1972), Mimaki (1976), Bühneman (1980a), Bhattacharya (1986), Goodman (1989), Lasic (2000), Woo (2000), and Woo (2001).

were referred to and used by Ratnakīrti in the first place. These texts are also important since they often contain earlier versions of the arguments and counter-arguments discussed by him. Among such texts, the most important Buddhist texts are the essays written by Ratnakīrti's teacher Jñānaśrīmitra and the work of Dharmakīrti and his commentators.[12] The most important Mīmāṃsā texts are those of Kumārilabhaṭṭa and his commentators and Vācaspatimiśra's commentary on Maṇḍanamiśra's *Vidhiviveka.*[13] The most important Nyāya texts are the *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* of Bhāsarvajña and Vācaspatimiśra's commentary on the Nyāya-sūtras.[14]

Group III: The texts in this group are not directly referred to by Ratnakīrti and in some cases post-date his work. These texts are relevant to this study since they often indicate how the ideas discussed in Ratnakīrti's texts were interpreted and used by other Buddhist and Nyāya intellectuals. These discussions are often helpful in interpreting difficult passages and for gaining new insights into the significance of certain arguments. As with the texts in Group II, I intend to use these texts primarily as reference tools. It is well beyond the scope of this project to treat any of this material in any detail. Particularly useful, in my view, are sections of the *Nyāyasūtra* corpus,[15] Udayana's *Ātmatattvaviveka* and *Nyāyakusumāñjali*,[16] Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasaṃgraha*

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[12]For the work of Jñānaśrīmitra see JNA. For the work of Dharmakīrti and his commentators see NB, NBT, NBTT, PV1, PV2, PV3, PV4, PVin1, PVin 2, PVinT, PVV, PVSV, PVSVT, VN, HB, and HBT.

[13]For the work of Kumārila and his commentators see SV, SVT, SVV, NR. See too NRM, RVP, and PrP. For the *Vidhiviveka* see VV and for Vācaspatimiśra's commentary see NKan.

[14]See NBhū and NVTT.

[15]Especially see NBh, NV, NVTT, and NVTTP ad NS [1.1.4-1.1.5; 2.1.55; 4.1.19-4.1.21].

[16]See ATV and NKu.

and its commentary by Kamalaśīla,[17] Mokṣākaragupta's *Tarkabhāṣā*,[18] the "Īśvarānumāna" section of Gaṅgeśa's *Tattvacintāmaṇi*,[19] and Keśavamiśra's *Tarkabhāṣā*.[20] In addition to the Sanskrit material, there is a great deal of secondary literature in English, French, and German in which sections of these texts are discussed. This literature helps to explain the history of Buddhist-Nyāya debates and also contains detailed discussions of very specific philosophical issues in Buddhist and Nyāya philosophy. When relevant, this material will be referred to in a footnote.

Group IV: This group includes both contemporary philosophical literature devoted to arguments for and against the existence of God and contemporary work on selected problems in epistemology, the philosophy of language, and the philosophy of mind. This material is particularly useful for developing a philosophical vocabulary in which to discuss the arguments that are central to this project. As with the Group III material discussed above, this material will also be referred to in footnotes to the text.

2.2 Method

There are two methodological principles that will guide my use of this material. The first, which may be called "multiple contextualization," describes how the textual

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[17]See TS and TSP.

[18]See MTBh.

[19]See Vattanky (1984).

[20]See KTBh.

material will be understood and interpreted. The second, "rational reconstruction," explains how this material will be discussed and presented.

2.2.1 Multiple Contextualization

"Multiple contextualization" refers to the variety of intellectual contexts in which Ratnakīrti's work could be interpreted. There are two such contexts that will be considered in this work.[21] The first is the intellectual world in which Ratnakīrti's work was produced. This includes, not only the world of Buddhist scholasticism, but also the worlds of its Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā, and Jaina interlocutors. In this project, this context will be defined by the texts to which Ratnakīrti explicitly and implicitly refers; that is, the texts that make up the first two groups of texts described above. The effort of trying to understand Ratnakīrti's arguments as a part of this context recognizes the importance of trying to understand the arguments as they were understood by Ratnakīrti and the other Sanskrit philosophers of his time. It requires thinking along with Ratnakīrti and his interlocutors in the technical vocabulary and style of Sanskrit philosophy, in understanding the intellectual space in which they produced their work, and in trying to understand their own philosophical concerns.[22] This is primarily an historical and philological mode of inquiry through which I hope to guard against

[21]There are, of course, many different ways in which "intellectual contexts" can be individuated. For example, someone could choose to interpret Ratnakīrti's work in the context of just his teacher's work, in the context of Buddhist philosophy in South Asia, in the context of its reception by subsequent Nyāya and Buddhist philosophers, or in the context of contemporary philosophy of religion. My choice of contexts reflects my own interests in the material and my view of the state of the field.

[22]For some recent examples that set the standards for such work see Dunne (1999), Katsura (1996), Kellner (1997), Krasser (1999), Lasic (2000), and Tillemans (2000). For a clear statement of this approach to the study of Sanskrit philosophers see Hayes (1988: 2).

"anachronistically transposing and unsystematically imposing concepts of modern semantics and philosophy, which have originated in the course of particular historical developments, on modes of thought that evolved in quite different historical circumstances, and which have therefore to be interpreted in the first place in the context of their own concerns and the ideas they themselves developed."[23] Careful historical and philological work is necessary since given the state of the field it is still too easy for one's interpretation of a Sanskrit text to be so shaped by contemporary concerns that one's reading of it would be unrecognizable and therefore unacceptable to the original producers and consumers of the text being considered.[24] It is equally important, however, to recognize that as works of philosophy and theology, the texts being considered in this dissertation are more than just artifacts of someone else's philosophical and theological past. In my view, therefore, it is not sufficient to view them as such. The danger of doing so is to allow lively and important philosophical and theological arguments to be reduced to conversations about the meanings of technical terms and concepts and similarly to reduce the diverse and varied history of these arguments to exercises in intellectual archaeology, where one's primary task is to uncover layers of argument and counter-argument until their "origin" is discovered.

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[23]Ruegg (1986: 236).

Halbfass (1992: 15) similarly says, "Nor should we use Indian and other texts (...) as mere occasions for the employment and display of the "latest achievements" in logic and epistemology. Clarity and precision are indispensable; yet they have to be pursued with caution and discretion. Analysis and the search for conceptual precision can be obtrusive and interfere with the task of translating and understanding, and with our obligation to respect the Indian tradition in its own context and dimensions. A certain well-tempered vagueness may, indeed, be a hermeneutic virtue."

For other examples of such caution and criticism see Bronkhorst (1989) and Franco (1997).

[24]In my view, the danger of not being sufficiently grounded in the texts themselves is that what is (potentially) unique about Sanskrit philosophy and the work of Sanskrit intellectuals will be lost.

As mentioned above, such work is necessary, but, in my view, it is far from sufficient. In recognition of its necessity, however, I have tried in this work to provide philological support for my interpretation of Ratnakīrti's arguments by providing translations of the texts being interpreted and by noting, in the footnotes, the sections of text that I believe support my interpretation. Since in this work my primary interest is in Ratnakīrti's arguments, and not the historical context in which they were produced, I have noted to a lesser extent the historical precedents of the arguments being considered and have virtually ignored any discussion of the historical context and background of Ratnakīrti's debate with the Naiyāyikas.[25] For example, rather than begin with a discussion of previous Buddhist and Nyāya debates about the nature and existence of Īśvara, I have chosen in Chapter 1 to begin as Ratnakīrti does, by directly introducing the Naiyāyikas' inferential argument. I have chosen to do so, in part, because much of the "historical work" has been done elsewhere.[26] In addition, two forthcoming publications promise to focus more closely on these aspects of Buddhist and Nyāya debates about the nature and existence of Īśvara.[27] In my view,

[25]Oetke (1993: 196): "(...) I regard it as unavoidable to carry out philosophically oriented studies on Non-European philosophies in combination with philological investigations at the present stage of research but on the other hand deny that the historical-philological perspective must be *guiding* for all investigations of this kind. In particular, there seems to be no compelling reason why *all* questions which might be of interest from a philological-historical point of view have to be dealt with in studies whose primary aim lies elsewhere."

[26]For example, Jacobi (1923), Glasenapp (1954), Bechert ed., (1966), Chattopadhyaya (1969), Bhattacharya (1961), Chemparathy (1965), Oberhammer (1965), Chemparathy (1968), Gonda (1968), Chemparathy (1969), Chemparathy (1969a), Chemparathy (1972), Hayes (1988), Vattanky (1984), Jackson (1986), Carman (1994), Bronkhorst (1995), Van den Bossche (1998), Clooney (1998), Clooney (1997), Cabezon (1999), Griffiths (1999), and Clooney (2001).

[27]I am referring to Helmut Krasser's forthcoming work on the philosopher Śaṅkarananda and to Kyo Kano's study of the "Īśvaravādasaṃkṣepadūsaṇa" section of JNA.

moreover, it is the philosophical aspects of this debate that have been most neglected and in need of study.

In addition to the intellectual context described above, I will also interpret Ratnakīrti's arguments in the light of subsequent work by both Sanskrit and contemporary Euro-American philosophers. This work is the second intellectual context through which Ratnakīrti's work will be viewed: It is defined by the third and fourth group of texts described above. Understanding Ratnakīrti's arguments as a part of this broader philosophical context is intended to highlight the normative nature of his work. As this dissertation will make clear, Ratnakīrti's texts (and those of his interlocutors) contain philosophical arguments which are supposed to be both valid and sound. While his work may be of only historical interest to many students of Sanskrit philosophy, it is certainly the case that it was not merely of historical interest to Ratnakīrti or his interlocutors. Ratnakīrti and his interlocutors clearly considered themselves to be arguing for positions that could be supported by persuasive, if not demonstrative, arguments. We do the tradition a great disservice if we do not consider these arguments with the same philosophical seriousness with which they were offered. In my view, it is therefore necessary that we also reflect philosophically on the arguments that are made by both Ratnakīrti and his interlocutors. And although it will not be sufficiently argued for here, it is also my view that such philosophical reflection should be a necessary part of the more historical and philological task of accurately interpreting and understanding Ratnakīrti's texts.[28] In a broader philosophical context it becomes

[28]Oetke (1993: 197) claims that "(...) it is not merely desirable but even imperative to bring philosophy in general, and therewith also modern Western philosophy, into play when studying Non-European philosophical tradition –at least if it is granted that investigations of foreign philosophical or religious doctrines are worthwhile at all. This is, however, not meant in the sense that reference to the

possible, for example, to develop new perspectives on Ratnakīrti's arguments, to more easily discover hidden and suppressed premises, to see more clearly what is at stake, and to better appreciate the consequences of his views.[29] In my opinion, it is almost impossible to accurately describe Sanskrit philosophical arguments in English, for example, without an awareness of philosophical vocabulary in English. It is for this reason that those of us who are interested in Sanskrit philosophical texts are justified in using contemporary philosophical vocabulary and theories to describe and think about Sanskrit philosophy. In making use of such vocabulary my primary intention is to bring out the philosophical structure of the arguments being considered, irrespective of whether these arguments have parallels in contemporary philosophical theory. As will become clear in the substantive chapters of this work, some of these arguments have such parallels while others do not. In addition, the use of such vocabulary makes it possible to see what is explicitly philosophical about Ratnakīrti's arguments; that is, to see both those aspects of the arguments that reflect contingent features of Ratnakīrti's intellectual world and those that reflect more general philosophical concerns.

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background of Western philosophy is indispensable in every single case of investigation but means that the study of Indian or other Non-European philosophy as a whole cannot be profitably carried out unless it is related in some way to the subject-matter of philosophy and even to the most recent developments of Western thought. One reason for this lies in the fact that in the same manner as also in other fields of study *competence in the respective subject matter* is more essential for research in the field than it seems to have been widely assumed in Oriental Studies."

Taber (2001: 74), in a review of Kellner (1997) remarks "(...) while her interpretive study provides an accurate account of the details of the debate between Śāntarakṣita and Kumārila, one misses the big picture. What is really going on here? What is at stake? Why would Kumārila and Śāntarakṣita take up the positions that they do? In order to see that one must understand their positions in relation to other doctrines of their systems, and one must also, at least to some extent, reflect philosophically on the problem of non-being itself."

[29]Halfbass (1992: 14) interestingly suggests that the proper use of contemporary philosophical resources can function as a "microscope" for viewing Indian texts and traditions.

In choosing to interpret Ratnakīrti's work in this way, however, I am only taking a preliminary step towards fulfilling what I take to be the promise of projects in the comparative philosophy of religion; which is, to make responsible judgements about the success (or failure) of the arguments being studied and to use such judgements to inform one's own constructive work.[30] Such work will, in my view, help to situate the work of Sanskrit intellectuals in the life of the academy by treating it as containing genuine philosophical insights, thus making it possible for students from a variety of disciplines to learn from Sanskrit philosophers in some of the same ways in which we currently learn from Euro-American ones. As mentioned above, however, this dissertation takes only a few preliminary steps in this direction by bringing together a historical and philological reading of the material with philosophical reflection. My purpose in interpreting Ratnakīrti's work in the broader intellectual context described here is simply to make possible an historically and philologically responsible yet philosophically sensitive and informed interpretation of Ratnakīrti's arguments against the Naiyāyikas argument for the existence of Īśvara. And although, while reading and writing about Ratnakīrti's work, I have participated in his philosophical project by taking his arguments and conclusions seriously and by making judgements as to their success and failure, I have chosen not to include my preliminary judgements in this work. A final evaluation of Ratnakīrti's arguments and the constructive work that I believe should accompany such evaluations is, unfortunately,

[30]There is a great deal of skepticism about both the possibility and desirability of such work. See, for example, Bronkhorst (1993) in which he reviews Oetke (1988).

beyond the scope of this project. What is presented here, however, is a necessary part of such a project and one that I hope will contribute to such work in the future.

2.2.2 Rational Reconstruction

While the methodological principle of multiple contextualization informs my understanding and interpretation of the textual material, the principle of rational reconstruction will guide its presentation. Instead of presenting an English version of Ratnakīrti's arguments by systematically reproducing them exactly as they appear in his Sanskrit texts, I will discuss the textual material by reconstructing it and highlighting those features of the arguments that are most relevant to his critique. In some cases, this will require bringing together texts which are temporally or topically distant from each other and selecting and highlighting only some of Ratnakīrti's arguments, while ignoring and reconstructing others. For example, while Ratnakīrti's remarks on the nature of epistemic necessity are, in his own work, directly applied to the problem of Īśvara, his remarks on semantic value are discussed more fully in other contexts and are only indirectly applied by him to this problem. In my work, however, these remarks will be brought together in order to explain dimensions of Ratnakīrti's critique of the Nyāya arguments that he himself does not choose to discuss. This kind of constructive re-presentation of Ratnakīrti's views is designed to facilitate a philosophical description of Ratnakīrti's arguments that is faithful to the texts and his own intellectual concerns and yet meaningful to those who do not have a detailed knowledge of Sanskrit philosophy. It is worth noting, that such a rational reconstruction is not unprecedented in Sanskrit philosophy. In fact, the style of

Sanskrit philosophy is such that the sort of rational reconstruction described here is pervasive. For example, in his "Language of Reasoning [tarkabhāṣā]," the Buddhist scholastic Mokṣākaragupta includes Ratnakīrti's arguments on epistemic necessity, semantic value, and ontology in his discussion of the Naiyāyikas'argument for the existence of Īśvara.[31] In addition, large parts of Ratnakīrti's own work can be easily viewed as a rational reconstruction of the work of his teacher Jñānasrīmitra.[32]

3.0 Outline

In addition to this Introduction, my dissertation is divided into two parts, each containing two chapters. Following Part 2, there is also a short Conclusion and an Appendix of figures and translations. In the first part of my dissertation, I focus on Ratnakīrti's interpretation and critique of the Naiyāyikas' most important inferential argument for the existence of Īśvara. More specifically, in Chapter 1, I introduce the technical vocabulary within which Sanskrit theories of inferential reasoning were developed and offer an interpretation of Nyāya epistemology. My intention in doing so is to develop a technical vocabulary and philosophical framework within which to discuss Ratnakīrti's treatment of the Nyāya argument. In Chapter 2, I use this vocabulary and framework to present Ratnakīrti's critique of the Naiyāyikas' inference. The underlying argument in both Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 is that in addition to the Naiyāyikas' argument for the nature and existence of Īśvara, the target of Ratnakīrti's critique is the epistemological theory that supports nearly all forms of

[31] MTBh [39.06-46.07].

[32] For an excellent illustration of this compare Lasic (1999) with Lasic (2000).

Nyāya religious reasoning. Part 1 concludes with a brief discussion of the philosophical issues on which any evaluation of the outcome of Ratnakīrti's debate with the Naiyāyikas will depend. Part 2 builds on the work done in Part 1 by discussing aspects of Ratnakīrti's thought that he himself does not directly apply to the problem of Īśvara. In Chapter 3, for example, I discuss his theory of exclusion [apoha] in order to uncover some of the philosophical resources that he implicitly relies on in his critique. In addition, I argue that his theory of exclusion [apoha] is best understood as a theory of conceptual content and that when viewed as such it provides a basis for an argument against the existence of Īśvara to which Ratnakīrti only alludes. Chapter 4 attempts to reconstruct Ratnakīrti's "view of the world" in order to show that there is no room in his ontology for an Īśvara-like entity. This too is an argument that Ratnakīrti does not make directly. The dissertation concludes with some brief remarks about why it still is important to think about Īśvara. Appended to the dissertation are two figures and a translation of the texts discussed in the body of the work. The two figures are intended to aid the reader in reading the dissertation, especially Chapter 2 and Chapter 4. My translations of Ratnakīrti's texts are intended to enable the reader to more easily evaluate my interpretation of his arguments and to better understand the philosophical context in which the passages that I discuss are found in Ratnakīrti's own work.

PART 1. EPISTEMOLOGY

Chapter 1
Nyāya Epistemology: An Argument for the Existence of Īśvara

0. Introduction

Ratnakīrti's disagreement with the Naiyāyikas regarding the nature and existence of Īśvara is expressed in a philosophical language and style that is common to much of Sanskrit philosophy. The technical terms and concepts used in this philosophical language were generally shared by Hindu, Buddhist, and Jain intellectuals even though their precise interpretations were often (if not always) highly contested.[1] This is particularly true for the terms and concepts used in the various theories of inferential reasoning [anumāna] current in "medieval" India. As a result, it was often through discussions of specific technical terms and concepts that Sanskrit philosophers chose to express their views on more general philosophical and theological problems. The Naiyāyikas most important argument for the existence of Īśvara is expressed, for example, in the form of an inferential argument which Ratnakīrti claims is not correct. Ratnakīrti's critique of this argument relies on the philosophical vocabulary that he shared with other Sanskrit philosophers and consists in a series of arguments that focus on very specific and seemingly trivial logical and epistemological issues. Familiarity with the philosophical language and style of Sanskrit logic and epistemology reveals, however, that Ratnakīrti and his interlocutors used this technical language to discuss very

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[1] See, for example: (i) Nyāya *Tarkabhāṣā* of Keśavamiśra, KTBh (1934); (ii) Jaina *Tarkabhāṣā* of Yaśovijaya, YTBh (1938); and (iii) Buddhist *Tarkabhāṣā* of Mokṣākaragupta, MTBh (1988), Kajiyama (1966). Also see Matilal (1986: 22-26; 35-38).

basic philosophical differences.[2] Without an understanding of this language it is, therefore, almost impossible to appreciate and understand even the general character of Sanskrit philosophy of religion let alone the specific details of inter-religious debates between Buddhist and Nyāya philosophers. This part of my dissertation is concerned with the epistemological aspects of Ratnakīrti's critique of Nyāya inferential arguments for the nature and existence of Īśvara.[3] In focusing on such arguments it seeks to provide an introduction to the language and style of Sanskrit epistemology and a window on to one way in which how the philosophy of religions was interpreted and practiced in medieval India. More specifically, in the next two chapters I hope to illustrate the extent to which epistemological issues influenced the content of inter-religious debates between Buddhist and Nyāya philosophers of religion by showing that in addition to Nyāya arguments for the nature and existence of Īśvara the target of Ratnakīrti's critique is the epistemological theory that supports nearly all forms of Nyāya religious reasoning. This chapter, Chapter 1, provides an interpretation of Nyāya epistemology and an analysis of the Nyāya argument for the nature and existence of Īśvara. Chapter 2 presents the central features of Ratnakīrti's critique of this argument as it is presented in his "Refutation of Arguments for Establishing Īśvara [Īśvarasādhanadūṣaṇa]." It concludes with some preliminary remarks regarding the outcome of Ratnakīrti's debate with the Naiyāyikas.[4]

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[2]The term "Sanskrit logic and epistemology" refers to what is often called "discourse about the instruments of knowledge, "discourse about warranted-modes of awareness," " or "pramāṇavāda" philosophy. See Steinkellner (1982: 1; 1994: 213) for the use of the term "pramāṇavāda."

I am using the term more specifically to refer to the language, style, and content of philosophical arguments that have to do with theories of inferential reasoning [anumāna].

[3]On my use of the term, "epistemological" refers to the range of issues that are used to define "epistemology" or the theory of knowledge. "Epistemology" can be understood, for example, in terms of the following three questions: (1) What is knowledge? (2) What can we know? (3) How do we know what we know? See Greco (1999:1).

[4]This text, RNA [32.01-57.16], is translated in Appendix B.

1. Interpreting Nyāya Epistemology

Sanskrit epistemology is concerned, most generally, with warranted modes of awareness [pramāṇa].[5] As a result, Sanskrit epistemological theories can be characterized and often differentiated in terms of the number and nature of the modes of awareness that they take to be warranted.[6] This is especially so for the Nyāya and Buddhist theories that inform Ratnakīrti's work. Naiyāyikas and Buddhists, for example, not only disagree on the number of warranted modes of awareness [pramāṇa] but also on the proper interpretation of the terms "warrant," "mode," and "awareness." As an introduction to the Naiyāyikas argument for the existence of Īśvara it is useful, therefore, to consider how they interpret these terms. Their interpretation is also significant since it describes the epistemological theory within which their inferential arguments are presented and defended.[7]

1.1 The Theory of Event-Makers

[5]I intend the term "mode" to be neutral to the interpretations of "pramāṇa" as either an instrument [pamīyate anena iti pramāṇam] or a state [pramīyate iti pramāṇam] of awareness. By referring to pramāṇa(s) as "warranted modes of awareness" I am seeking a term that applies to the diverse interpretations of "pramāṇa" found in Sanskrit sources.

[6]For Ratnakīrti's discussion of this issue see RNA [PAP: 96-105] and Kajiyama (1966: 30-38).

[7]My interpretation of "the Nyāya" theory of epistemology is based on Keśavamiśra's *Tarkabhāṣā* [KTBh: 1934] and Ratnakīriti's own presentation and discussion of the theory [RNA: 1975].

The KTBh is an introductory text or "handbook" of Nyāya philosophy. It was composed in the latter half of the 13th century, but, reflects the viewpoint of an earlier period of Nyāya thought. It represents a point of view that is not, for example, overly influenced by the "new school" of Nyāya. The general theoretical framework discussed in this text is, therefore, closer to the viewpoint of Ratnakīrti's Naiyāyikas than that discussed in other such texts e.g., Anambhaṭṭa's *Tarkasaṃgraha* [TS: 1976]. It provides, therefore, a convenient "baseline" interpretation of Nyāya epistemology and, in my view, reflects the general viewpoint of the specific Naiyāyikas discussed by Ratnakīrti. I have supplemented the KTBh discussion when necessary. The account of Nyāya epistemology discussed in the following section is not, therefore, the theory of any particular Naiyāyika. Instead, it is a reconstruction and interpretation that is primarily based upon the KTBh.

The background theory within which Naiyāyikas (and Buddhists) articulate what they mean by "warranted mode of awareness [pramāṇa]" is the Sanskrit grammatical theory of "event-makers [kāraka]."[8] This grammatical theory provides a conceptual vocabulary for developing a general theory of Events [kriyā] and does so by describing six semantic relations [kāraka] between the nouns in a given sentence and the Event [kriyā] expressed by the main verb of that sentence.[9] This is important for Nyāya and Buddhist epistemology since both Naiyāyikas and Buddhists understand warranted awareness [pramā, pramāṇa] to be a mental Event [kriyā] that is denoted by the verb "to know [pra+√mā]." Of the six semantic relations or "semantic roles" [kāraka] described in the

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[8]For the Grammarians description of this theory see the "*Kārakāhnika*" of Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* [MBh: 1.4.23-ff] and the "*Kārakaprakaraṇa*" of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita's *Siddhāntakaumudī* in Bhattacharya (1974). For the Naiyāyikas' use of this theory see NBh (1996), NV (1997), NVTT (1996), NVTTP (1996) ad NS 2.1.15-2.1.16. See also Biardeau (1964: 30-ff), Cardona (1974: 231-ff), Ganeri (1999: 51-72), Kiparsky and Staal (1969), and Matilal (1985: 372-389).

* It is interesting (and important) to note that while contemporary epistemologists often appeal to ethical, metaphysical, psychological, semantic, or social-scientific theories when interpreting epistemological concepts, Sanskrit philosophers almost always appeal to grammatical ones. For more on "background theories" in contemporary epistemology see Zagzebski (1999).

[9]The "six semantic relations" are: 1. kartṛ [Agent]; 2. karman [Patient, Object]; 3. karaṇa [Instrument]; 4. sampradāna [Target]; 5. apādāna [Donor]; 6. adhikaraṇa [Place]. For the description of these relations as "semantic" consider Cardona (1974: 231) who writes "Things are *kārakas* when they play certain roles in the accomplishment of an action. A thing may be classified in one way if it functions in a certain way with respect to any activity at all; or it may belong to a certain *kāraka* class if it functions in a given way with respect to a particular activity; and a *kāraka* classification may apply only if a certain action is denoted by particular items."

Vātsyāyana in is *Nyāyabhāṣya* (NBh ad NS 2.1.16) explains: "(...) *kāraka* words apply through the incidence of some ground or the other. In 'The tree stands (there)', the tree is the agent because it has 'independence' with regard to the matter of standing. In '(He) sees the tree', the tree is 'ardently desired' through the action of seeing (by the Agent) and hence it is the object (...). In '(He) sprinkles water for the tree', the tree is intended to be the 'beneficiary' of the action of sprinkling, and hence is the *saṃpradāna* 'beneficiary' or 'recipient' (...). In this way it is neither the thing itself nor the action itself that is the *kāraka*. What then? *When a thing is a participant in an action or when it is endowed with a special functional activity, it becomes a kāraka.*" Translated in Matilal (1990: 43), quoted in Ganeri (1999: 52).

theory, three are especially important for Nyāya and Buddhist epistemology. These are the Patient [karman], the Agent [kartṛ], and the Instrument [karaṇa].

1.1.1 Analyzing Events

As a general introduction to the theory of "event makers [kāraka]," consider the sentence "Devadatta cuts the tree with an axe."[10] In this sentence, the **Event [kriyā]** is the action denoted by the verb "to cut." The Naiyāyikas analyze this Event [kriyā] as being constituted by two sub-events; an intermediary or functioning event [vyāpāra] and a final or culminating event [phala]. The final or *culminating event [phala]* is, in this case, the cutting of the tree. This is the event about which we are most interested. It is helpful, therefore, to think of it as the final effect [phala] of the action expressed by the verb. Since the tree is the locus of this final effect [phala], it is said to be the **Patient [karma]** of the Event [kriyā]. The *functioning event [vyāpara]* is an intermediary event in the causal chain that begins with the Agent's [kartṛ] action [kṛti] and culminates in the final effect [phala].[11] This event is usually represented by the initial contact [saṃyoga] of the axe with the tree.[12] According to the Naiyāyikas, the **Agent [kartṛ]**

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[10] KTBh [1934: 13-14]; this example is also referred to at RNA [34.06-34.16] but in a different, though related, context.

My discussion of the theory of "event makers" is indebted to the proposals of Pietroski (1998) and his analysis of agency, thematic roles, and actions. The relevance of Pietroski's proposals to Nyāya epistemology have been discussed by Ganeri (1999: Chapter 2).

[11] Ganeri (1999: 56)

[12] Functioning event: tajjanyas tajjanako 'vāntaravyāparaḥ | yathā kuṭhārjanyaḥ kuṭhāradārusaṃyogaḥ kuṭhārajanyacchidājanakaḥ | "The functioning intermediary is what is produced by 'x' and produces 'y'. Just as the contact of an axe with a tree is produced by the axe and produces a cutting which is produced by the axe." [KTBh: 15 n. 1]

Usually "vyāpara [functioning intermediary]" is defined as: tajjanyatve sati tajjanyajanakaḥ: "That which produces 'y' given that it has the property of being produced by 'x'." Given this definition, the

of an Event [kriyā] is the one who performs the action [kṛti] that is the first member in the causal chain that culminates in the final effect [phala] of the Event [kriyā]. This action [kṛti] is sometimes described as an "effort" or "trying" [prayatna] that is motivated by a specific desire [icchā] of the Agent [kartṛ]. It is also described as what instigates [pra+√yuj] the Event [kriyā]. In the above sentence, the Agent [kartṛ] is Devadatta. According to the Naiyāyikas, the **Instrument [karaṇa]** is the cause *par excellence* [sādhakatama] of the Event [kriyā].[13] It is usually represented by the axe. On this view, the Instrument [karaṇa] (i.e., the axe) is the cause whose functioning [vyāpāra] (i.e., contact with the tree) culminates in the final effect [phala] (i.e., the cutting of the tree) of the Event [kriyā]. On this interpretation, the Instrument [karaṇa] is closely associated with the functioning event [vyāpara] and, in an important sense, it is the Instrument [karaṇa] that has it.[14] An Instrument [karaṇa] can be described, therefore, as a cause

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functioning intermediary is that which produces the culminating effect, the cutting of the tree, given that it has the property of being produced by the Instrument, the axe. See, for example, [KTBh: 137].

[13]The phrase *"par excellence"* is interpreted in various ways. Some Naiyāyikas, for example, maintain that an instrument [karaṇa] is the cause that finally produces the event [phalopādhāyakam kāraṇam: The cause which seizes the effect; phalāyogavyavacchinna-kāraṇam: The cause which is excluded from non-contact with the effect]. Given this interpretation, the contact of the axe with the tree would be the Instrument in the above example. See NK [s.v. karaṇa], KTBh [1934: 113], Matilal (1985b: 373)], and Ganeri (1999: 61).

[14]There are at least three different Nyāya views regarding the Instrument [karaṇa]. See Matilal (1985: 372-378).

(1) The first view, which is usually associated with the older Nyāya school [prācīnanyāya], is that the Instrument is the cause *par excellence* of the Event. They describe the Instrument as follows: kiṃ punaḥ karaṇaṃ | sādhakatamaṃ karaṇam | atiśayitaṃ sadhakaṃ sādhakatamaṃ prakṛṣṭaṃ kāraṇamity arthaḥ | "What is the Instrument? It is the most effective Instrument. "Most effective" is the pre-eminent effective thing. It is the most excellent cause [KTBh: 3.10-3.11]" It is also explained that what makes the cause "pre-eminent" and "most excellent" is that it "possesses the functioning intermediary " (KTBh: 137 where it is said, in the notes, that the term "pre-eminent [atiśaya]" means "possesses the functioning [vyāparavat]: vyāparavat-kāraṇaṃ karaṇam: "The Instrument is what possesses the functioning.")

(2) The Second view, which is usually associated with the new Nyāya school [navyanyāya], is that the Instrument is "that which is excluded from a non-connection with the culminating effect [KTBh: 137; phalāyogavyavacchinna];" "[KTBh: 137; "that which does not produce the relevant effect with delay

[kāraṇa] whose functioning just is the intermediary event [vyāpāra] that culminates in the final effect [phala]. Given this conceptual vocabulary, the Naiyāyikas argue that the Event [kriyā] denoted by the verb in the sentence "Devadatta cuts the tree with an axe" has the following form: The Event [kriyā] denoted by the verb "to cut" is constituted by an intermediary event 'e' (i.e., the axe's contact with the tree) and a culminating event 'f' (i.e., the cutting of the tree) such that Devadatta is the Agent of 'e' and the tree is the Patient of 'e' and the culminating event 'f' is a cutting-event and the intermediary event 'e' culminates in 'f' and the axe is the Instrument whose functioning culminates in 'f'.[15]

1.1.2 Knowing Events

The conceptual framework provided by the theory of event makers is directly applied by the Naiyāyikas to the mental event denoted by the verb "to know [pra+√mā]."[16] Consider, for example, the sentence "Devadatta knows 'p' by means of 'I'." In this sentence, the **Event [kriyā]** is the state of awareness denoted by the verb "to know [pra+√mā]." According to most Sanskrit philosophers, it is states of awareness [jñāna]

[yadvilambāt prakṛtakāryānutpādaḥ; This same idea is expressed in the text at KTBh: 12.06]; and "the cause which seizes hold of the culminating effect "phalopādhāyakakāraṇam [Matilal (1985: 373)]." On this view the functioning intermediary is itself the Instrument. In the context of our example, this means that the contact of the axe with the tree and not the axe would be the instrument.

(3) The third view seems to be the view of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa who argues that the entire causal complex that produces the culminating effect is the Instrument. Jayanta thus rejected previous approaches to the problem by rejecting the distinction between a "most excellent" cause and subsidiary or contributing causes. See Matilal (1985: 376) and for a much fuller treatment of Jayanta's views, Shah (1992: 20-26) and NM [25-28].

[15]Although cumbersome, this way of describing the Event is supposed to make clear the various components of its definition and also make it easier to compare my discussion with that of Pietroski (1998).

[16]See KTBh [14].

(rather than beliefs) that are the primary objects of epistemic analysis.[17] Knowing-events are understood in terms of two sub-events; an intermediary or functioning event [vyāpara] and a culminating event [phala]. The *culminating event [phala]* is the warranted awareness [pramiti] of 'p' where 'p' is the object or content [viṣaya] of that state of awareness. As such, 'p' is taken to be the locus of the culminating event [phala] and is, therefore, the **Patient [karma]** of the Event [kriyā]. The *functioning intermediary [vyāpāra]* of the Event [kriyā] is associated with the Instrument [karaṇa] 'I' and is an intermediary in the causal chain that begins with an action of an Agent [kartṛ] and culminates in the final effect [phala]. A more specific description of the intermediary event [vyāpara] will depend upon the nature of the specific Instrument [karaṇa]. For the Naiyāyikas, for example, there are four **Instruments [karaṇa]** whose functioning [vyāpāra] could culminate in the final effect [phala] of warranted awareness [pramiti]. In addition to inferential reasoning [anumāna], the Naiyāyikas argue that perception [pratyakṣa], verbal testimony [śabda], and comparison [upamāna] are also accredited Instruments for warranted awareness.[18] Associated with each of them is a somewhat different functioning intermediary [vyāpāra]. The **Agent [kartṛ]** of the Event [kriyā] is, as before, Devadatta. With this conceptual vocabulary, the Naiyāyikas

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[17]See Heil (1999: 44-48, in Dancy and Sosa, eds., (1999)) for an account of "belief" and Mohanty (1992: 134-135; 1999: 196-200, in Dancy and Sosa, eds., (1999)) for a discussion of the differences between "beliefs" and "awareness [jñāna]."

Although I will not argue for it here, I understand the verb "to believe" to mean "to think with assent." See Zagzebski (1999: 93 n. 4). For the Naiyāyikas, the phrase "states of awareness [jñāna]" refers to a much broader range of mental events that include (i) dreams [svapnajñāna] (which are usually classified as a memory awareness that is not in accordance with its object [ayathārtha-smṛti]), (ii) memory [smṛti], (iii) awareness produced through "counterfactual reasoning" [tarka]; (iv) mislocation (or misapprehension) [viparyaya], and (v) doubt [saṃśaya] (these three states of awareness (iii-v) are classified as presenting-awareness that is not in accordance with its object [ayathārtha-anubhava]) and (vi) warranted awareness [pramā]. See KTBh [127]. Also see section 1.2 below.

[18]The Instrument [karaṇa] of inferential reasoning will be discussed in detail in 1.5.1.

interpret the Event [kriyā] denoted by the verb "to know [pra+√mā]" as follows: They say that this Event [kriyā] is constituted by an intermediary event 'e' and a culminating event 'f' such that Devadatta is the Agent of 'e' [pramātṛ] and 'p' is the Patient (or object) of 'e' [prameya] and warranted awareness is the culminating event 'f' [pramiti] and the intermediary event 'e' [vyāpāra] culminates in 'f' [phala] and 'I' is the Instrument [pramāṇa] whose functioning is 'e'.

This analysis describes the (general) form or structure of the knowing-event [pramā] by identifying a set of event-making components, by defining the relevant relationships between them, and by explaining how they come together to constitute the Event [kriyā]. This is important since it reveals the broadly causal structure of Nyāya epistemology. As the above paraphrase suggests, on the Nyāya view, the Event [kriyā] and the Instrument [karaṇa] are distinct objects that are related to one another as effect and cause. It is the aetiology (or causal history) of a state of awareness that determines whether or not a state of awareness [jñāna] is a knowing-event [pramā]. This analysis of a knowing-event [pramā] is, however, incomplete since it only describes its form or general structure. A more complete analysis would require (at least) a detailed account of "warranted awareness [pramiti]" and "functioning Instrument [pramāṇa]." An account of the Nyāya interpretation of these terms is especially important since it will help us to further interpret Nyāya epistemology and in more familiar terms such as "knowledge" and "justification."

1.2 Knowledge as Warranted Awareness

According to the Naiyāyikas, there are two types of awareness [jñāna]: Presenting-awareness [anubhava] and Memory (or representing-awareness) [smṛti]. It is important to note that for the Naiyāyikas every state of awareness [jñāna] is intentional [arthaprakāśa] and is understood to be either in accordance with its object (or content) [yathārtha] or not in accordance with its object (or content) [ayathārtha].[19] The Nyāya position is also that the object (or content) of awareness is distinct from awareness itself.[20] According to them, knowledge is warranted awareness [pramā] or presenting-awareness that is in accordance with its object [yathārthānubhava]. Presenting-awareness [anubhava] is usually defined negatively as any state of awareness that is not a memory state of awareness [smṛti]. Memory states of awareness [smṛti] are described as states of awareness in which the intentional object is one about which we were already aware or as states of awareness that are produced from mental impressions alone [saṃskāramātrajanyam].[21] When used in the context of presenting-awareness [anubhava] the phrase "in accordance with its object [yathārtha]" describes a state of awareness that is not produced through suppositional reasoning [tarka] and in which there is neither doubt [saṃśaya] nor error [viparyaya].[22] A presenting-state of awareness

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[19]arthaprakāśo buddhi: "Awareness manifests an object" and sarvaṃ jñānam arthanirūpyam arthapratibaddhasyaiva tasya manasā nirūpaṇāt (...): "All awareness is marked by an object since it is available to the mind only if it is connected with an object." See KTBh [86, 94.09-10] and Potter (1984).

[20]This refers to the idea that awareness is facet-less (i.e., mental-representation-less) [jñānaṃ nirākāram]. KTBh [94.07-08] explains: sarvaṃ ca jañānaṃ nirākārameva | na tu jñāne 'rthena svasya ākāro janyate (...) | "Moreover, all awareness is facet-less and it is not the case that, in awareness, an object produces a facet of itself."

[21]KTBh [94, 128]

[22]Although Naiyāyikas identify 11 different varieties of "tarka," KTBh discusses only one of them; the variety called reasoning to "an object that is defeated by a warranted mode of awareness [pramāṇabādhitaviṣaya]." My translation of "tarka" as "suppositional reasoning" is intended to capture this use of the term.

that is in accordance with its object [yathārthānubhava] is also described more positively as a state of awareness that is produced by a functioning Instrument. According to the Naiyāyikas, a "functioning Instrument" must be one of the four accredited Instruments mentioned above. It must also be non-defective [aduṣṭa]. Let us refer to a non-defective, accredited Instrument as a "well-functioning Instrument." A knowing-event [pramā], then, is any state of awareness that is in accordance with its object [yathārthānubhava] and is produced by a well-functioning Instrument [pramāṇa-ja]. Since on the Nyāya view a well-functioning Instrument [pramāṇa] necessarily produces a presenting-state of awareness that is in accordance with its object [yathārthānubhava], the knowing-event can be described, more simply, as any state of awareness that is produced by a well-functioning Instrument. For the Naiyāyikas, then, "knowledge" just is warranted awareness; that is, a presenting-state of awareness that is in accordance with its object [yathārthānubhava] or, equivalently, any state of awareness that is produced by a well-functioning Instrument.

KTBh discusses "suppositional reasoning [tarka]" at KTBh [101.11-102.10], "doubt [saṃśaya]" at KTBh [97.05-97.10], and "error [viparyaya]" at KTBh [94.01-94.03].

"Tarka [suppositional reasoning]" is defined in KTBh as: tarko 'niṣṭaprasaṃgaḥ | sa ca siddhavyāptikayor dharmayor vyāpyāṅgīkāreṇa aniṣṭavyāpakaprasañjanarūpaḥ. "Suppositional reasoning is reasoning to an undesired consequence. And it has the form of reasoning to an undesired pervader (e.g., the absence of smoke) by (provisionally) accepting the pervaded (e.g., the absence of fire) when pervasion between the two properties is known."

The idea is that if there were the absence of the pervaded (e.g., fire) in the subject locus of an inference as an opponent claims then there would also have to be the absence of the pervaded (e.g., smoke). But, there is not the absence of the pervaded. Thus, the opponent's supposition is incorrect. One reason why the Naiyāyikas cosider this to be "awareness that is not in accordance with its object [aythārtha]" is that the provisionally accepted awareness that the pervader is absent is known by the person entertaining it to be incorrect. Other Sanskrit philosophers, however, consider this awareness to be "in accordance with its object [yathārtha]." For more on "tarka" see Davis (1981).

"Saṃśaya [doubt]" is defined in KTBh as: ekasmin dharmiṇi viruddhanānārthāvamarśaḥ saṃśayaḥ | "Doubt is the awareness of there being, in different ways, incompatible properties in a single locus."

"Viparyaya [error] is defined in KTBh as: viparyayas tu atasminstadgrahaḥ | "And error is grasping 'x' when there is non-'x'."

This analysis reveals two further features of Nyāya epistemology. In addition to its broadly causal structure, for example, Nyāya epistemology is a form of "Reliabilism." According to Reliabilism, knowledge is any belief that is both true and reliably produced.[23] In the context of Nyāya epistemology, we might say that on this view knowledge is a state of awareness that is in accordance with its object [yathārtha] and is produced by a well-functioning Instrument. Notice, however, that for the Naiyāyikas, there cannot be a state of awareness that is both produced by a well-functioning Instrument and not in accordance with its object. This is because the property "being produced by a well-functioning Instrument" entails that such a state of awareness will be "in accordance with its object."[24] This is what allows for the simplified description that knowledge is, for the Naiyāyikas, any state of awareness that is produced by a well-functioning Instrument.

As with most other versions of Reliabilism, Nyāya-reliabilism is also "Externalist" with regard to knowledge. This means that it is not a part of the Nyāya view of knowledge

[23] According to reliabilist theories of knowledge, what makes a true belief an instance of knowledge is that it was formed by a reliable truth-producing process e.g., sense perception. According to reliabilist theories of justification, what makes a belief justified (or warranted) is that it was formed by a reliable truth-producing process. In most versions of reliabilism, it is not necessary that the reliability of "the process" be cognitively accessible to the agent. As a result, reliabilism is usually taken to be a form of externalism. See Zagzebski (1998: 617-622) in Craig ed., (1988).

[24] Zagzebski (1999: 99-104) argues that it is a desiderata of any definition of knowledge that there not be a "gap" between the truth component of knowledge (for the Naiyāyikas, the "in accordance with its object [yathārtha]" component) and the element that is added to it in the definition of knowledge, for example, justification (for the Naiyāyikas, the element, "being produced by a well-functioning Instrument [pramāṇaja]"). She argues that closing this gap is the only way to avoid Gettier counter-examples. Entailment of truth by the second element is, she suggests, one way in which this gap could be closed.

that one "know that one knows."[25] In order to satisfy such a requirement, one would have to know either that the state of awareness in question is a presenting-state of awareness that is in accordance with its object [yathārthānubhava] or that the Instrument that produced a particular state of awareness is well-functioning. All that is required for warranted awareness [pramā], however, is that a state of awareness be a presenting-state of awareness that is in accordance with its object [yathārthānubhava] or, equivalently, that it be a state of awareness that is produced by a well-functioning Instrument. There is nothing in the Nyāya account of warranted awareness [pramā] that requires that one actually know, for example, that the Instrument that produced it is well-functioning.

1.3 The Nyāya Account of Justification, part I

Related to Nyāya externalism about knowledge is the issue of "iterative awareness;" that is, the issue of whether and how one "knows that one knows" or, for the Naiyāyikas, "is aware that one's awareness is warranted."[26] For convenience, let us stipulate that while warranted awareness [pramā] has to do with knowledge, iterative awareness has to do with justification.[27] For the Naiyāyikas, justification is a "criterion" rather than a condition for knowledge; that is, it is a test for determining whether or not a state of

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[25]In this context the term "externalism" lables the idea that having a state of awareness 'x' does not entail the awareness of having that state of awareness 'x'. A state of awareness that is "external to" or different from 'x' is necessary for such awareness. The Nyāya view is, therefore, opposed to what is usually referred to as the "KK-thesis" [Hintikka (1962)]. According to the Nyāya view, "(...) if K1 is knowledge of the object 'O' at time t1, K1 itself is not known at t1. K1 can be known, and is usually known, by another cognition K2 ocurring at the succeeding moment t2." See Mohanty (1999: 197) in Dancy and Sosa, eds., (1999).

[26]This use of "iterative awareness" is a modification of Klein (1993: 101), in Kvanig ed., (1993).

[27]The issue of "iterative awareness" is widely discussed in Sanskrit philosophy and has to do with much more than what I am calling "justification." What I am calling "justification" has to do with Matilal's T7 and T8. See Matilal (1986: 141-179) and Mohanty (1966: 9-ff).

awareness is warranted.[28] It is not itself a necessary condition for that state of awareness to be warranted.[29] For the Naiyāyikas, then, justification is about specifying and satisfying criteria through which one can determine whether or not an Instrument of awareness is well-functioning. It is, therefore, an epistemic practice that is, most directly, a property of the Agent [kartṛ] and only derivatively a property of an Instrument [karaṇa] and the state of awareness produced by it. Warranted awareness [pramā] is, then, both necessary and sufficient for knowledge.[30] Let us refer to the criterion mentioned above as defining an Instrument's [karaṇa] "Acceptability Conditions (A)."[31] If it has been determined by an Agent [kartṛ] that an Instrument's [karaṇa] acceptability conditions have been satisfied, let us stipulate that that Instrument [karaṇa] has been justified. A justified Instrument [karaṇa] is, therefore, one that has been determined to be well-functioning and is, therefore, well-functioning.[32] Although some of these acceptability

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[28]"By a criterion, I mean a test for whether some item has some property that is not itself a logically necesseary condition of that item having that property." Sartwell (1992; 174).

[29] "Epistemic justification is therefore in the final analysis only an instrumental value, not an intrinsic one" Bonjour (1985: 8). Also see Sartwell (1992: 174).

[30]Matilal (1985: 70-72; 1986: 138-140), Ganeri (1999: 66 n. 26), and Sartwell (1991; 1992).

This may imply that the Nyāya view is an example of "simple reliabilism," which also maintains that reliability is both necessary and sufficient for knowledge. One well known problem with simple reliabilism is that it does not rule out, as instances of knowledge, beliefs that are accidentally produced by reliable processes or faculties. See Plantinga (1993a), Zagzebski (1996), and Zagzebski (1998: 620), in Craig ed. (1998). In my view, the Nyāya theory should not be considered a version of simple reliabilism since built into their theory that reliability is necessary and sufficient for knowledge is also an account of what makes a process reliable *in the right way* .

[31]This terminology is derived from Oetke (1994: 849) and Oetke (1991: 471).

[32]There are two "levels" at which this determination takes place. Arguments about whether a particular Instrument (such as a particular case of sense perception) is justified usually presuppose arguments about whether that type of Instrument, e.g., sense perception, is an accredited Instrument of warranted awareness. Unlike the Naiyāyikas, for example, Buddhists argue that only perception [pratyakṣa] and inferential reasoning [anumāna] are such Instruments. In their view, verbal testimony [śabda] and comparison [upamāna] are reducible to inferential reasoning [anumāna]. Since both Naiyāyikas and Buddhists agree that inferential reasoning [anumāna] is an Instrument of warranted awareness, however,

conditions provide a general account for what it means for an Instrument [karaṇa] in general to be well-functioning they are for the most part Instrument [karaṇa] specific. For example, the Naiyāyikas defend their inferential argument for the existence of Īśvara by showing that the Instrument [karaṇa] used to produce the awareness that Īśvara exists satisfies a set of acceptability conditions that are specific to that kind of Instrument [karaṇa]. Ratnakīrti's critique of the Naiyāyikas argument focuses on showing that they have not satisfied these acceptability conditions and that they, in principle, cannot do so. On this interpretation, Ratnakīrti's debate with the Naiyāyikas is about the justification of the Instrument [karaṇa] used to produce the awareness that Īśvara exists. The Naiyāyikas claim that they have justified the Instrument [karaṇa]. Ratnakīrti argues that they have not done so and cannot do so. Although the Nyāya theory of justification will be discussed in greater detail in section 2.2, it is worth noting here that it has the "internalist" requirement that one satisfy a set of conditions called "Acceptability Conditions (A)." Justification is, therefore, an epistemic practice since it is through the practice of satisfying these conditions that an Instrument [karaṇ] is determined to be well-functioning and therefore justified.

1.4 Summary

As mentioned above, Sanskrit epistemology is concerned with warranted modes of awareness [pramāṇa]. Since on the Nyāya interpretation "warranted" means well-functioning and "mode" means Instrument, the Naiyāyikas understand epistemology to be concerned with well-functioning Instruments of awareness [pramāṇa]. As discussed

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their arguments focus on the acceptiblity conditions for that type of Instrument and on whether the acceptability conditions that are specific to it have been satisfied.

above, their view of knowledge or warranted awareness [pramā] is broadly causal, reliabilist, and externalist. What is most important for this Chapter, however, is their approach to justification since it is through arguing that the Instrument [karaṇa] used to produce the awareness that Īśvara exists is well-functioning that they defend their argument for the existence of Īśvara. Before turning to the Naiyāyikas specific argument for the existence of Īśvara, therefore, it is useful to consider, in some detail, how the Naiyāyikas describe the Instrument [karaṇa] of an inferentially produced knowing-event [anu+√mā].

1.5 Inferential Reasoning

1.5.1 The Instrument of Warranted Inferential Awareness

Inferential reasoning [anumāna] has been referred to as the Instrument [karaṇa] of an inferentially produced knowing-event [anu+√mā]. More precisely, however, the Naiyāyikas identify the Instrument [karaṇa] of this event with what is, strictly speaking, a component of inferential reasoning [anumāna]. This component is called the "special consideration of the inferential reason [liṅgaparāmarśa]."[33] This is a technical term that is itself defined in terms of two other technical terms, "special consideration [parāmarśa]" and "inferential reason [liṅga]." "Special consideration [parāmarśa]" is also called the "third awareness [tritīyajñāna] of the inferential reason [liṅga]." The standard

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[33]KTBh [120.08-20.10]. Although somewhat infelicitous, I have chosen to translate "parāmarśa" with "special consideration" for two reasons: First, there is a long history of using the term "consideration" in the translation of this term. See, for example, Athalye (1974: 279, "consideration [of the sign]"), Ingalls (1951: 30, 32, "consideration [of the middle term]"), Varadachari (1977: 669, "consideration [of the mark]) in K. Potter ed. (1977), and Matilal (1977: 459, "synthetic consideration"). Secondly, by using the term "special" I hope to have marked that according to the Naiyāyikas it is not consideration as such.

example that is used by the Naiyāyikas to illustrate what this means is the inference of fire on a mountain from the presence of smoke. In this example, the **Event [kriyā]** being analyzed is an inferentially produced knowing-event [anu+√mā] whose *culminating effect [phala]* is the inferential awareness [anumiti] that there is fire on that mountain. The inferential reason [liṅga] is said to be smoke or the awareness of smoke. The **Instrument [karaṇa]** of the Event [kriyā] is the special consideration [parāmarśa] or third awareness [tritīyajñāna] of the inferential reason [liṅga]. The reason why the term "special consideration [parāmarśa]" is described as a "third awareness [tritīyajñāna]" is that the Event [kriyā] is usually analyzed in terms of three distinct awarenesses of the inferential reason [liṅga]. And it is only the third awareness [tritīyajñāna] of the inferential reason [liṅga] that is taken to be the Instrument [karaṇa] of the Event [krīyā]. Consider the following scenario: (1) Devadatta works in a kitchen with a wood burning stove and repeatedly observes that wherever he sees smoke he sees fire. He observes, therefore, that smoke is pervaded by fire and commits this concomitance between smoke and fire to memory. This awareness of smoke in the kitchen is the first of his three awarenesses of smoke; (2) Sometime later, on a weekend camping trip, Devadatta wonders if there is fire on a nearby mountain after noticing that there is smoke there. This is his second awareness of smoke; (3) After recalling the previously observed concomitance of smoke and fire, Devadatta again has an awareness of smoke. On this occasion, his awareness is that the smoke on the mountain is pervaded by fire. This awareness of smoke, which is his "third awareness [tritīyajñāna]" of it, immediately results in the awareness that there is fire on that mountain. It is this awareness that is called the "special consideration of the inferential reason [liṅgaparāmarśa]" and is, strictly speaking, the Instrument [karaṇa] of an inferentially produced knowing event.

An Instrument [karaṇa] of an Event [krīyā] was previously defined, however, as "a cause [kāraṇa] whose functioning [vyāpāra] culminates in the final effect [phala]." [34] As described here, however, special consideration [parāmarśa] is itself the Instrument [karaṇa]. According to this interpretation, the Instrument [karaṇa] of the cutting-event described earlier would be the contact [saṃyoga] of the axe with the tree. Earlier, however, the axe was interpreted as being the Instrument [karaṇa] and more specifically as the "cause [kāraṇa] component" of the Instrument [karaṇa]. Its contact [saṃyoga] with the tree was interpreted as its "functioning [vyāpāra] component." On this "two component" interpretation of an Instrument [karaṇa], an Instrument is "a cause that has a functioning [vyāpāravat kāraṇaṃ karaṇam]."[35] The interpretation of the Instrument [karaṇa] as the "special consideration of the inferential reason [liṅga-parāmarśa]" follows what may be called the "single component" interpretation. The term "special consideration of the inferential reason [liṅga-parāmarśa]" can be reinterpreted, however, in accordance with the two component view so that the inferential reason [liṅga] is the cause [kāraṇa] component of the Instrument [karaṇa] and its special consideration [parāmarśa] the functioning [vyāpāra] component. An Instrument [karaṇa] of inferential awareness [anumāna] is, therefore, a cause [kāraṇa] i.e., the inferential reason [liṅga] whose functioning [vyāpāra] i.e., whose special consideration [parāmarśa], produces the culminating effect [phala] i.e., warranted inferential awareness [anumiti]. This modified interpretation is the one that I will follow in discussing the Naiyāyikas argument.[36]

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[34] See: 1.1.1.

[35] KTBh [137] quoted in 1.1.1.

[36] See: 1.1.1.

1.5.2 Inferential Contexts

Naiyāyikas (and Buddhists) notice that there are two different inferential contexts in which an inferential reason [liṅga] can function as an Instrument [karaṇa]. In one context, the Instrument [karaṇa] is used to produce an inferential awareness for oneself. This inferential context is called "inferential reasoning for one's own sake [svārthānumāna]."[37] Since the inferential process within which the inferential reason [liṅga] is the Instrument [karaṇa] is internal to the Agent [kartṛ], this process is sometimes said to have the nature of awareness [jñānātmaka]. In the second context, the Instrument [karaṇa] is used to produce an inferential awareness in another person. This inferential context is called "inferential reasoning for the sake of another [parārthānumāna]."[38] Since, in this case, the inferential reason [liṅga] is being used to convince someone else of what has already been inferred by oneself, the inferential process needs to be made explicit to that other person. It is said, therefore, that this process has the nature of language [śabdātmaka]. More specifically, it is described as a compound sentence [mahāvākya] consisting of five parts [pañcāvayava]. This compound sentence [mahāvākya] is the standard form in which Naiyāyikas present inferential arguments that are designed to convince others of what they themselves have already

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[37]svayam eva mahānasādau viśiṣṭeṇa pratyakṣeṇa dhūmāgnyor vyāptiṃ gṛhītvā parvatasamīpaṃ gatas tadgate cāgnau saṃdihānaḥ parvatavartinīm avicchinnamūlām ambhralihāṃ dhūmalekhāṃ paśyan dhūmadarśanāc codbuddhsaṃskāro vyāptiṃ smarati yatra dhūmas tatrāgnir iti tato 'trāpi dhūmo 'stīti pratipadyate | tasmād atra parvate 'gnir apy astīti svayam eva pratipadyate tat svārthānumānam | "Having grasped by just oneself (and) through a special perception the concomitance between smoke and fire in a kitchen, someone who has gone to the mountains, sees on the mountain an unbroken line of smoke touching the clouds (and) wonders if there is fire present there. From seeing the smoke, a mental impression arises (and) he remembers the concomitance (relation), "Where there is smoke there is fire." Then, he realizes "Here too, there is smoke." Therefore, he realizes just for himself that "On this mountain, there is fire too." That is inferential reasoning for one's own sake." See KTBh [25.07-26.03].

[38]For a critical discussion and overview of these two inferential contexts see Prets (1992) and Tillemans (1984).

inferred to be the case.[39] It is, therefore, the form of the Naiyāyikas' inference for the existence of Īśvara and the kind of inferential argument that they defend in their work. What follows is an introduction both to Ratnakīrti's discussion of this argument and to the philosophical language and style in which it was presented and defended by his Nyāya interlocutors.

2. The Nyāya Argument for the Existence of Īśvara

Ratnakīrti's "Refutation of Arguments for Establishing Īśvara [īśvarasādhanadūṣaṇa]" begins with a long introductory section in which he sets out the Nyāya position.[40] Here, he presents their most important argument for the existence of Īśvara and describes, in some detail, their defense of it. He does so by providing what could be described as a Buddhist perspective on the long history of Buddhist-Nyāya debates on this issue: He reherses, for example, many of the arguments offered by his Buddhist predecessors; he quotes, at length, the responses given by numerous Nyāya authors; and, in some cases, he furthers an argument on behalf of his Nyāya opponents.[41] The purpose of this section of his essay is to present his opponent's position and to highlight the issues that he takes to be most important for a successful defense (and critique) of it. It is important to note that although Ratnakīrti refers to and reproduces the views of specific Naiyāyikas,

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[39](i) This mountian possesses fire [parvato 'yam agnimān]; (ii) On account of smoke [dhūmavattvāt]; (iii) Whatever possesses smoke possesses fire, like a kitchen [yo yo dhūmavān sa so 'gnimān yathā mahānasaḥ]; (iv) And this (mountain) is like that [tathā cāyam]; (v) Therefore, it is so [tasmāt tathā]. See KTBh [26.06-26.10].

[40]RNA [32.07-40.16]

[41]For a discussion of these debates see Bhattacharya (1961), Chemparathy (1972), Hayes (1988), Jackson (1985), Van Den Bossche (1998), and Vattanky (1978).

his discussion does not exclusively reflect the views of any one of them. Ratnakīrti's opponent can be described, therefore, as a Naiyāyika whom he rationally reconstructs from the long history of Buddhist-Nyāya debates. What follows, then, is an introduction to this Naiyāyika's argument as it is understood and interpreted by Ratnakīrti.

2.1 Inferring the Existence of Īśvara: An Informal Description

The Naiyāyikas argument for the existence of Īśvara is usefully interpreted as a version of the so-called "cosmological argument."[42] As with other versions of this argument, the Nyāya version can also be understood as having two parts.[43] In the Nyāya version, the first part of the argument seeks to prove that the world [jagat] was constructed by an intelligence-possessing maker [buddhimat-kartā]. The second part argues that this maker has the qualities that identify him to be the God-like entity called "Īśvara." These qualities include being single [eka], omnipresent [vibhu], omniscient [sarvavid], and eternal [śāsvata].[44] As with more familiar versions of this argument, relatively more attention is devoted to Part 1. In Ratnakīrti's text, for example, issues pertaining to Part 2 are usually discussed only in the context of defending Part 1. This is, therefore, how the two parts of the argument will be discussed in what follows. My initial description

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[42]For a "history" of the cosmological argument see Craig (1980). For a modern discussion see Rowe (1975).

[43]See Rowe (1997: 331) in Taliaferro and Quinn eds., (1997): "Within the philosophy of religion, a cosmological argument is understood to be an argument from the existence of the world to the existence of God. Typically, such arguments proceed in two steps. The first step argues from the existence of the world to the existence of a first cause or necessary being that accounts for the existence of the world. The second step argues that such a first cause or necessary being has, or would very likely have, the properties associated with the idea of God."

[44]RNA [32.07-32.12]

of the argument, as a version of the cosmological argument, has been very informal and, for the most part, neutral to the epistemological contexts within which it is usually described, defended, and critically assessed. The Naiyāyika's description of the argument is, however, presented more formally in the technical vocabulary of Sanskrit philosophy and in the distinctive form in which only Naiyāyikas present inferential arguments. Understanding this distinctively Nyāya form of the argument is, therefore, essential for understanding Ratnakīrti's critique of it.

2.2 Inferring the Existence of Īśvara: A More Formal Description

When the Naiyāyikas are asked how Īśvara is proved, Ratnakīrti writes that "they present this argument [sādhana]:

(i) The object being discussed [vivādādhyāsita] (i.e., the world [jagat]) is caused by an intelligence-possessor [buddhimaddhetuka].

(ii) On account of (its) being an effect [kāryatva].

(iii) Whatever is an effect [kārya] is caused by an intelligence-possessor [buddhimaddhetuka], just as a pot.

(iv) And this (world [jagat]) is an effect [kārya].

(v) Therefore, it (i.e., the world [jagat]) is caused by an intelligence-possessor [buddhimaddhetuka]."[45]

It is understood that the "intelligence-possessor" referred to in the argument will later be shown to be Īśvara.

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[45]RNA [32.14-32.18]: vivādādhyāsitaṃ buddhimaddhetukam | kāryatvāt | yat kāryaṃ tad buddhimaddhetukam iti | yathā ghaṭaḥ | kāryaṃ cedaṃ | tasmād buddhimaddhetukam iti |

This five-part inference is the standard form in which Naiyāyikas (and not Buddhists) present their inferential arguments. Each step in the argument is interpreted as a verbal expression that is a separable part of the compound sentence [mahāvākya] that, strictly speaking, constitutes an inference-for-another [parārthānumana]. This compound sentence [mahāvākya] can be interpreted as a conjunction of the five verbal expressions that are the five steps of the argument. The purpose of the argument is to produce for (or in) another the warranted awareness that the world [jagat] is caused by an intelligence-possessor [buddhimaddhetuka].[46] In order to interpret the argument, it is helpful to first describe it in terms of its five steps and the **five technical terms** that constitute them.

The first step in the argument states what the person presenting the argument has already inferred to be the case through an inference-for-oneself [svārthānumāna].[47] The term "the object being discussed [vivādādhyāsita]" marks the **subject of the inference [pakṣa]** which, in this case, is the world [jagat]. The subject of an inference [pakṣa] is generally defined as "a property possessor about which there is doubt regarding the property to be proved [sandigdhasādhyadharmā dharmī].[48] More simply, it is that about

[46]This begs the question of the relationship between these verbal expressions and the states of awareness that are supposed to be produced upon hearing and understanding them.

[47]This step is named the "Hypothesis [Pratijñā]." It is defined as: sādhyadharmaviśiṣṭadharmīpratipādakaṃ vacanaṃ pratijñā. "The Hypothesis is a statement which explains that the property possessor is characterized by the property which is to be proved [KTBh: 100.10]." This step is also described as: sādhyavattvena pakṣavacanam. "The statement that the subject of the inference has the property to be proved [SP]."

[48][KTBh: 34.12]

*The terms "property" and "property possessor" will be interpreted on the "property-location" model developed by Matilal (1998: 19; 143-165). This model interprets the terms "property [dharma]" and "property possessor [dharmin]" as it is used by Sanskrit philosophers. Briefly, Matilal's model recognizes that the relationship between "property" and "property possessor" is much broader than the subject predicate relationship with which it is usually compared. For example, properties [dharma] include qualities (e.g., color; shape), attributes (e.g., motion of a body), universals (e.g., cow-ness, fire-

which there is some kind of a doubt or disagreement. In this case, the doubt or disagreement is about whether the world [jagat] is caused by an intelligence-possessor [buddhimaddhetuka]. The term, "caused by an intelligence-possessor [buddhimaddhetuka]" is what is to be proved [sādhya]. It is also described as the **property to be proved [sādhya-dharma]** and thus expresses (in part) what is supposed to be inferred by the other person.[49] The term "on account of being an effect [kāryatva]" is called the "**inferential reason [hetu, liṅga]**." As mentioned above, this is the Instrument [karaṇa] of the knowing-event that is supposed to be produced through the five-steps of the argument. The <u>second step</u> of the argument is interpreted as asserting that the inferential reason [hetu] is present in the subject of the inference [pakṣa]. It is often said that this step asserts that "the inferential reason [hetu] is a property of the subject [pakṣadharmatā]."[50] The <u>third step</u> of the argument states the inference-warranting relation called "**pervasion [vyāpti]**" and also provides an **example [dṛṣṭānta]** of where this relation is instanced.[51] The example, in this case, is a "positive example." It is defined as "a property possessor in which the property to be

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ness), general terms (e.g., fire) and individuals (e.g., a pot) and property possessors[dharmin] are any locus in which such properties can be present.

[49]See Mohanty (1992: 104-ff) and Nieuwendijk (1992: 411).

This term is variously described in Ratnakīrti's text (e.g., "intelligent-maker," intelligence-possessor," "intelligent cause," "person," etc.)

[50]The term "Hetu [Inferential Reason]" is usally used to name this step of an inferential argument while the term "liṅga [inferential reason]" is used to name the inferential reason. Since Ratnakīrti uses the term "hetu [inferential reason]" to refer to the inferential reason, I will not follow the usual Nyāya convention. When I refer to step (ii) of an inferential argument, however, I will capitalize the term ie., Hetu.

Given this, this step is named the Inferential Reason [Hetu]. It is defined as: liṅgapratipādakaṃ vacanaṃ hetu. "The Inferential Reason [Hetu] is the statement which explains the inferential reason [KTBh: 101.01]. This step is also described as: liṅgasya pakṣadharmatvavacanaṃ hetu. "The Inferential Reason [Hetu] is the statement that the inferential reason is a property of the subject of the inference [SP]."

[51]This step is named the "Example [udāharaṇa]." It is defined as: savyāptikaṃ dṛṣṭāntavacanam udāharaṇam. "The Example is a statement of the example and pervasion [KTBh: 101.03]."

proved has been clearly ascertained [niścitasādhyadharmā dharmī]." In order to function as an example, however, the locus cited must be one about which both the proponent of the argument and the "beneficiary" of the argument agree. The fourth step of the inferential argument is similar to step (ii) in that it too is one in which the presence of the inferential reason [hetu] in the subject of the inference [pakṣa] is expressed. This step is interpreted, however, as expressing the special consideration [parāmarśa] or third awareness [tritīyajñāna] of the inferential reason [hetu]. Step (ii) expresses that the inferential reason [hetu] is a property of the subject of the inference [pakṣadharmatā]. Step (iv) expresses that the inferential reason [hetu] that is a property of the subject of the inference is pervaded by the property to be proved [pakṣadharmatā]. It represents, in other words, the functioning [vyāpāra] component of the Instrument.[52] The fifth step of the argument states the conclusion of the inference and expresses the culminating effect [phala] of the Event [kriyā].[53] By following the steps of this argument, a person is supposed to conclude that the world [jagat] has an intelligence-possessing maker.[54]

The structure of the argument may (initially) seem unnecessarily complex since, for example, from the perspective of first order predicate logic steps (ii) and (iii) alone could

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[52]This step is named the "Application [upanaya]." It is defined as: pakṣe liṅgopasaṃhāravacanam upanayanaḥ. "The Application is a statement which brings together the inferential reason in the subject of the inference [KTBh: 101.04]." It is also (more helpfully) described as: parāmarśatvavacanam upanayaḥ. "The Application is a statement of consideration [SP]." The phrase "This is like that [tathā cāyam]" is the standard form in which this step is usually expressed. "Like that [tathā]" refers to the inferential reason's being pervaded by what is to be proved and "this" refers to the subject of the inference.

[53]This "Conclusion [nigamana]" is defined as: sādhyopasaṃhāravacanaṃ nigamanam. "The Conclusion is a statement which sums up what is to be proved [KTBh: 101.10]."

[54]"Following" the steps requires hearing and (properly) understanding, in sequence, the five verbal expressions that constitute the argument.

yield, by *modus ponens*, the conclusion expressed in step (v).[55] Rival Sanskrit philosophers also considered the Nyāya argument to involve too many steps and argued variously that steps (i), (iv), and (v) were unnecessary. The Buddhists, for example, thought that these two steps alone were jointly necessary and sufficient for an inference for another.[56] That the Naiyāyikas chose to retain their five part inferential structure in opposition to such critics reveals that their theory of inferential reasoning is interestingly different from those of their Buddhist critics and more contemporary approaches. What most Sanskrit philosophers agreed upon, however, was the importance of steps (ii) and (iii). These two steps can, for example, be interpreted as constituting the Instrument [karaṇa] of inferential awareness, as it is interpreted by the Naiyāyikas. Step (ii), the step in which the inferential reason [hetu] is stated, can be interpreted as the "cause component" of the Instrument [karaṇa] and step (iii) --as a necessary part of step (iv)-- can be interpreted as the "functioning [vyāpara] component." It is not surprising, therefore, that disagreements about this and almost all inferential arguments focused on the nature of the Instrument [karaṇa]. Since, on my interpretation, it is the inferential reason [hetu] that has the functioning [vyāparavat], I have identified it as the Instrument [karaṇa].

2.3 The Nyāya Account of Justification, part II

According to the Naiyāyikas, an inferential reason [hetu] must have five characteristics [pañcarūpāṇi (P)] if it is to be a well-functioning Instrument of inferential awareness

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[55]See Mohanty (1992: Chapter 4).

[56]See Kajiyama (1966: 72-75) and Mookherjee (1975: 356-ff).

[anumiti-karaṇa].[57] Without even one of these characteristics, the inferential reason being considered is said to be a non-reason [ahetu] or one that only appears to be an inferential reason [hetvābhāsa].[58] The Naiyāyikas further describe such reasons as being defective [duṣṭa] and identify five specific defects that prevent them from being well-functioning Instruments [karaṇa] of awareness. These five "defects of an inferential reason [hetvābhāsa (H)]" are loosely linked with the absence of at least one of the five characteristics [pañcarūpāṇi].[59] Determining that a particular Instrument of inferential awareness is well-functioning, then, requires determining that none of the five possible defects apply to the inferential reason [hetu] that defines it. Earlier, this was referred to as satisfying a set of "acceptability conditions (A)" for the Instrument [karaṇa]. According to the Naiyāyikas, the satisfaction of a set of acceptability conditions determines that an inferential reason [hetu] is not defective and therefore that the Instrument [karaṇa] defined by it is well-functioning and justified. Justifying an instrument in this way is also how the Naiyāyikas defend the inferential argument of which it is a part. In order to understand how the Naiyāyikas defend their argument for

[57]KTBh [1934: 31.10-33.07; 156-ff]: tāni pañcarūpāṇi tu pakṣadharmatvaṃ sapakṣe sattvaṃ vipakṣād vyāvṛttiḥ abādhitaviṣayaṃ asatpratipakṣatvam ceti. "Moreover, these five characteristics are; (P1) 'being a property of the subject of the inference'; (P2) 'being present in a similar case'; (P3) 'being excluded from dissimilar cases'; (P4) 'having an undefeated object'; (P5) 'not having a rival.'"

These five characteristics are, strictly speaking, only required for inferential reasons that have both positive and negative concomitance (with the property to be proved) [anvaya-vyatirekī hetu]. Those that have only positive concomitance [kevalānvayī] require P1, P2, P4, and P5. Those that have only negative concomitance [kevalavyatirekī] require P1, P3, P4, and P5. Since the inferential reason in the Naiyāyikas argument is of the first type, I will only consider "inferential reasons that have both positive and negative concomitance (with the property to be proved) [anvaya-vyatirekī hetu].

[58]KTBh [1934: 34; 159], KTBh [1934: 34.05; 158: "hetuvad ābhāsate"]

[59]For a useful survey of the different Buddhist and Nyāya accounts of these "defects" see Gokhale (1992: especially Chapter 5-6).

the existence of Īśvara it is necessary, therefore, to first consider why the Naiyāyikas believe that justifying the Instrument [karaṇa] is sufficient for justifying the argument.

2.3.1 Acceptability Conditions

Although the five defects referred to above are defined as defects of an inferential reason [hetvābhāsa], they can be usefully divided into three groups of accceptibility conditions that are individuated according to how they relate to the argument as a whole. "Acceptability Conditions (A)" are, then, the conditions that must be satisfied if an inferential argument is to be justified. Since acceptability conditions are defined in terms of the defects of an inferential reason [hetvābhāsa (H)], determining that an acceptability condition has been satisfied requires determining that the defects of the inferential reason [hetvābhāsa] that define it do not apply. By showing that none of the five possible defects apply to a particular inferential reason [hetu], then, the Naiyāyikas are able to show that the acceptability conditions for the argument as a whole have been satisfied and, therefore, that both the inferential reason [hetu] i.e., the Instrument [karaṇa] and the argument defined by it are justified. The Naiyāyikas account of justification can be described, therefore, in terms of the three sets of acceptability conditions (A), the five characteristics of an inferential reason (P), and the five associated defects (H). A pre-requisite for an interpretation of the Nyāya account of justification is, therefore, a discussion of these epistemic concepts and their interrelationships.

2.3.1.1 A1: Performance Conditions

The first set of acceptability conditions may be called "Performance Conditions (A1)."[60] These conditions have to do with whether an inferential argument is presented correctly; that is, whether there are the requisite number of steps, whether the terms of the argument are satisfactory, etc. Strictly speaking, this condition is not necessary since if the second and third sets of acceptability conditions are satisfied A1 will also be satisfied.[61] This may account for why only one such condition is usually specified even though, in principle, there could be conditions for every step and term of an inferential argument. The performance condition most often specified and discussed is defined in terms of the first characteristic of an inferential reason (P1) which is that an inferential reason [hetu] must be known to be a property of the subject of the inference [pakṣadharmatvam]. An inferential reason [hetu] that lacks this property is said to be "unestablished [asiddha] (H1)."[62] This defect has at least three subtypes which are individuated in terms of the different ways in which an inferential reason [hetu] may not be a property of the subject of the inference [pakṣa].[63] The acceptability condition (A1), however, is defined in terms of just the first major subtype (H1a) called "unestablished in the subject of the inference [āśraya-asiddha]." An inferential reason [hetu] is said to have this defect when the subject of the inference [pakṣa] in which it is supposed to be a property is known not to exist.[64] Although this subtype of the defect is defined in terms

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[60]Oetke (1994: 849)

[61]Oetke (1994) also makes this point.

[62]KTBh [35.07-38.04], [104.02-113.01]

[63]KTBh [105.08]: āśraya-asiddha (H1a), KTBh [105.09-107.02]; svarūpa-asiddha (H1b), KTBh [107.03-110.05] - there are four sub-types; vyāpyatva-asiddha (H1c), KTBh [110.07-113.02] - there are two sub-types. H1c will be discussed in Chapter 2.

[64]KTBh [106.01] gives the following definition. Df (H1a), tatra yasya hetor āśraya nāvagamyate sa āśrayāsiddhaḥ. "An inferential reason which is known to not have a subject-locus is (called)

of the inferential reason [hetu] it is, more easily understood as a necessary condition for the subject of an inference [pakṣa]: It specifies that the subject of an inferential argument [pakṣa] must be known to exist. The absence of defect H1a is most usefully interpreted, therefore, as a performance condition (A1) of the argument.

2.3.1.2 A2: Instrument Conditions

The second set of acceptability conditions are "Instrument Conditions (A2)" or the "triple conditions [trairūpya (T)]" of an inferential reason.[65] These three conditions are defined in terms of defects associated with the first (P1), second (P2), and third (P3) characteristics of an inferential reason [hetu]. The presence of these defects directly prevents an inferential reason from being a well-functioning Instrument of awareness since each one directly prevents the special consideration [parāmarśa] or third awareness [tritīya-jñāna] that is its functioning [vyāpāra]. For example, an inferential reason [hetu] cannot be well-functioning without the functioning intermediary [vyāpāra] that directly results in its culminating effect [phala], inferential awareness [anumiti]. This functioning intermediary [vyāpāra] is the special consideration [parāmarśa] or third awareness [tritīya-jñāna] of the inferential reason and is (primarily) represented in step

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unestablished in the subject." Ex (H1a), gaganāravindaṃ surabhi | aravindatvāt | sarojāravindavat. "A sky-lotus (p) is fragrant (s) on account of being a lotus (h) like a water-lotus."

[65]The secondary literature on the "triple conditions" is extensive. See, for example, Katsura (1983; 1986), Nenninger (1992), Oetke (1994, and the numerous references contained therein), and Tachikawa (1971).

In my discussion of these conditions, I will follow the "epistemic" rather than the "ontic" interpretation and also, in its "strongest version." See Oetke (1994: 846) where he describes the strongest version of the epistemic interpretation of the conditions as follows: (T1') The inferential reason must be known to occur in the subject of the inference; (T2') It must be known that the inferential reason occurs together with the property to be proved in some locus other than the subject-locus of the inference; (T3') It must be known that the inferential reason does not exist in any dissimilar locus and there is a locus in which neither the inferential reason nor the property to be proved are present.

(iv) of the inferential argument. There are two necessary components of this functioning represented by step (ii), the first awareness of the inferential reason (in which it is known to be a property of the subject of the inference [pakṣadharmatva]), and step (iii), the "second" awareness of the inferential reason (in which it is shown to be one of the terms in the inference-warranting relation of pervasion [vyāpti]). Interestingly, it is towards the satisfaction of the three instrument conditions that the Naiyāyikas direct most of their attention and where Ratnakīrti chooses to direct his criticism.

The first of the three triple-conditions (T1) is defined in terms of the second major subtype (H1b) of the defect, unestablished [asiddha]. This subtype is called "unestablished in itself [svarūpa-asiddha]" and applies to an inferential reason that is itself known not to be present in the subject of the inference.[66] The presence of this defect directly prevents the inferential reason from being a well-functioning Instrument [karaṇa] since without being a property of the subject of the inference [pakṣa] an inferential reason [hetu] will not possess one of the necessary components for its functioning [vyāpāra]. Since H1b blocks step (ii), it blocks the proper functioning of the Instrument and defeats the argument.

The second triple-condition (T2) is defined in terms of the second characteristic (P2) of an inferential reason [hetu]: An inferential reason [hetu] must be known to exist in a similar case [sapakṣe sattvam]; that is, a locus other than the subject of the inference in which what is to be proved [sādhya] is also present. An inferential reason [hetu] that

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[66]KTBh [107.03-110.05] gives the following definition. Df (H1b): yo hetur āśraye naivāgamyate saḥ svarūpāsiddha ucyate. "An inferential reason which is known not to be itself present in the subject-locus is said to be 'unestablished in itself'."

lacks this property is said to be "opposed [viruddha] (H2)."[67] More precisely, the presence of this defect is defined in terms of an inferential reason [hetu] that is known to be pervaded by the absence of what is to be proved. This establishes that the inferential reason [hetu] is not present in a single similar case [sapakṣa] and that it is present in at least one dissimilar cases [vipakṣa].[68] An inferential reason [hetu] with this defect is said to be "opposed [viruddha]" since it proves what is opposed to what is to be proved [sādhya-viparyaya]. It directly prevents, therefore, the functioning of the Instrument since it undermines the second sub-component of its functioning [vyāpāra] i.e., pervasion [vyāpti], by establishing that the inferential reason [hetu] is not known to occur together with what is to be proved [sādhya] in some locus other than the subject locus [pakṣa] of the inference and that it is present in a dissimilar case. A second defect associated with the absence of this characteristic (P2) is a subtype of the defect known as inconclusive [anaikāntika] (H3).[69] This subtype is called "uncommon [asādhāraṇa]" (H3b) since an inferential reason [hetu] with this defect is known only to be present in the subject of the inference; it is excluded from all similar [sapakṣa] and dissimilar [vipakṣa] cases.[70] These two defects (H2, H3b) prevent an inferential reason [hetu] from being a well-functioning Instrument since their presence establishes that the

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[67]See RNA [33.21]. KTBh [113.04-113.08] gives the following definition. Df (H2): sādhyaviparyayavyāpto hetuḥ viruddhaḥ. "An inferential reason that is pervaded by what is opposed to the property to be proved is 'opposed'." Ex (H2): śabdaḥ nityaḥ | kṛtakatvāt. "Sound (p) is permanent (s) on account of being an effect (h)."

[68]The presence of this defect also shows that T3 cannot be satisfied.

[69]KTBh [113.10-115.02] gives the following two definitions. Df.1 (H3): savyabhicāraḥ. "That which deviates (from the property to be proved);" Df.2 (H3): sādhyasaṃśayahetuḥ. "An inferential reason for which there is doubt about (its concomitance with) the property to be proved." Note: "deviates" and "doubt" are technical terms. See 3.2.2.

[70]KTBh [114.07-114.10] gives the following definition. Df (H3b): yaḥ sapakṣavipakṣābhyāṃ vyāvṛttaḥ pakṣe eva vartate saḥ. "One that is excluded from similar and dissimilar cases and is present only in the subject of the inference."

inferential reason [hetu] is not present in a single similar case [sapakṣa]. The presence of this defect blocks step (iii) by showing that the positive form of pervasion [anvaya] is not known.

The third triple-condition (T3) is defined in terms of the third characteristic of an inferential reason (P3): An inferential reason [hetu] must be known to be excluded from (all) dissimilar cases [vipakṣād vyāvṛtti]. An inferential reason that lacks this property is also said to be a subtype of the defect, "inconclusive [anaikāntika] (H3)." This subtype is called "common [sādhāraṇa]" (H3a) since an inferential reason [hetu] with this defect is known to be present in the subject of an inference [pakṣa], a similar case [sapakṣa], and a dissimilar case [vipakṣa].[71] The presence of this defect prevents the inferential reason [hetu] from being well-functioning since it defeats the inference-warranting relation of pervasion [vyāpti] by showing that there is a locus in which what is to be proved [sādhya] is absent but in which the inferential reason [hetu] is present. A third subtype (H3c), which is called "not universal [anupasaṃhārin]," applies to inferential reasons in which both the second (P2) and the third (P3) characteristics are absent.[72] The presence of these defects block step (iii) by showing that the negative form of pervasion [vyatireka] is not known.

2.3.1.3 A3: Argument Conditions

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[71] KTBh [113.09-114.01] gives the following definition. Df (H3a): pakṣasapakṣavipakṣavṛttiḥ. "One that is present in the subject of the inference, a similar case, and a dissimilar case."

[72] This subtype is not discussed in the KTBh, but, is discussed at RNA [36.21-36.23].

The third set of acceptability conditions are "Argument Conditions (A3)." These conditions have to do with factors that are external to the argument itself but nevertheless defeat it. They are defined in terms of the fourth (P4) and fifth (P5) characteristics of an inferential reason. The fourth characteristic of an inferential reason (P4) is that an inferential reason must be known not to have a rival inferential reason that proves the absence of what it seeks to prove. An inferential reason that lacks this property of "not having a rival" has the defect called "equal in scope [prakaraṇasama] (H4)."[73] The fifth characteristic of an inferential reason (P5) is that its final effect must be known not to be contradicted by another well-functioning Instrument such as perception. An inferential reason [hetu] that lacks this property has the defect called "too late [kālātyāpadiṣṭa] (H5)."[74] It is interesting to note that an inferential reason [hetu] with these defects could satisfy all three of the Instrument conditions and still not produce a warranted state of awareness. Although satisfying the Instrument conditions (A2) may be necessary for determining that an Instrument [karaṇa] is well-functioning, it is clear that it is not sufficient.

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[73]KTBh [39] gives the following definition. Df.1 (H4): prakaraṇasamas tu sa eva yasya hetuḥ sādhyaviparītasādhakaṃ hetvāntaraṃ vidyate. "Equal in scope is an inferential reason for which there is another inferential reason that proves the negation of the property to be proved (by it)." KTBh [115.03-116.08] gives the following: Df.2 (H4): yasya pratipakṣībūtaṃ hetvāntaraṃ vidyate saḥ prakaraṇasamaḥ | saḥ satpratipakṣaḥ. "That for which there is another inferential reason that is a rival is called 'equal in scope' which is, one for which there is a rival." Note: "rival" is a technical term. The text defines it as: sādhya-viparīta-sādhakaṃ samānabalam anumānāntaraṃ pratipakṣa ity ucyate. "A rival is said to be another inferential argument of equal strength that proves the opposite of the property to be proved."

For a very interesting discussion of this see Oetke (1994b).

[74]The term "kālātyāpadiṣṭaḥ" literally means "that which was pointed out long after its time." KTBh [117.01-118.11] gives the following definition. Df (H5): yasya pratyakṣādipramāṇena pakṣe sādhyābhavaḥ paricchinnaḥ saḥ kālātyāpadiṣṭaḥ | sa eva bādhitaviṣayaḥ ity ucyate. "That for which it has been determined, through perception etc., that the property to be proved is absent in the subject of the inference is "too late." That is also said to be "that which is defeated"."

3.0 Defending the Nyāya Argument

The Naiyāyikas defend their argument for the existence of Īśvara by showing that none of the five defects discussed in section 2.0 apply to the inferential reason "on account of being an effect [kāryatvāt]." In so doing, they satisfy the three sets of acceptability conditions and justify both the Instrument and the argument. In his presentation of the Nyāya argument, Ratnakīrti's Naiyāyikas follow this procedure by systematically showing that none of the five defects apply to the inferential reason [hetu] being considered.[75] They focus their effort, however, on showing that the "Instrument Conditions (A2)" have been satisfied.[76] Ratnakīrti similarly focuses on these conditions when he argues against the Naiyāyikas argument.[77] What follows, therefore, is both a discussion of the Naiyāyikas attempt at satisfying the Instrument Conditions (A2) of the inferential reason [hetu] "on account of being an effect [kāryatvāt]" and an introduction to the issues that frame Ratnakīrti's critique. My discussion will focus, more specifically, on how the Naiyāyikas show that neither H2 nor H3a apply to this inferential reason [hetu]. This selectivity is warranted since it is their discussion of these two defects that introduces the issues on which Ratnakīrti (primarily) bases his critique.

3.1 Satisfying A2.1, H2

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[75]See RNA [32.19-39.01]. For H1, RNA [32.22-33.20]; H2, RNA [33.21-36.20]; H3, RNA [36.21-38.13]; H4, RNA [38.14-38.18]; H5, RNA [38.19-38.13].

[76]See RNA [33.21-38.13].

[77]Ratnakīrti's arguments will be discussed, in detail, in Chapter 2.

As discussed earlier, the presence of the defect called "opposed [viruddha (H2)]" blocks the functioning [vyāpara] of an inferential reason [hetu] and thus prevents it from being a well-functioning Instrument of awareness.[78] In order to justify the Instrument "being an effect [kāryatva]," therefore, the Naiyāyikas must show that its functioning [vyāpāra] is not blocked by defects such as H2. Ratnakīrti's Naiyāyikas address this issue by first describing the defect and then explaining why it does not apply to the inferential reason [hetu] in their argument. They say:

"It is well-known that an (inferential reason) that exists in only dissimilar cases proves what is opposed to what is to be proved through its pervasion with what is opposed to what is to be proved; (and that it) is named 'opposed [viruddha]' (...). But, this (inferential reason, 'being an effect') is not like that since it is observed to really exist in a similar case such as a pot for which a maker is well-known."[79]

The reason why the inferential reason [hetu] "being an effect [kāryatva]" is not opposed [viruddha] is, according to the Naiyāyikas, because it is known through observation to be present in a similar case [sapakṣa] such as a pot. Since it is well-known that pots are effects and that they have an intelligent maker (they are observed to be made by potters), the Naiyāyikas reason that both parties must agree that pots are a similar case [sapakṣa]. Given this, it must also be accepted that the inferential reason [hetu] is not present in just dissimilar cases [vipakṣa] and therefore that it is not defective because of the presence of H2. To illustrate this further, the Naiyāyikas choose to defend their position against an opponent who insists that the presence of an inferential reason [hetu] in a pot-locus is not sufficient for showing that it is not defective because of the presence of H2.

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[78]See 2.3.1.2.

[79]RNA [33.21-33.24]: tathā hi yo vipakṣa eva vartate sa khalu sādhyaviparyayavyāpteḥ sādhyaviruddhaṃ sādhayan viruddho 'bhidhīyate | {yathā nityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvād iti}| na cāyam tathā, prasiddhakartṛkeṣu ghaṭādiṣu sapakṣeṣu sadbhāvadarśanāt |

3.1.1 Three Reasons

An opponent provides three related reasons why the Naiyāyikas position is not tenable. He explains that,

[a] "(...) what is to be proved is an omniscient cause. In this case, pervasion is not apprehended in even a dream. Since potters etc., are not omniscient, the example does not have what is to be proved (and therefore is not a proper example or a similar case).

[b] Moreover, the inferential reason is opposed since in the case of pots etc., the pervasion of 'being an effect' with 'having a non-omniscient cause' is apprehended.

[c] It is (also) not correct that the scope of the inferential reason is an intelligent-cause-in-general and that the special characteristic, 'being an omniscient cause,' is proved as a result of it even though it is not within its scope."[80]

The opponent reasons that if what is to be proved [sādhya] is that the world has an intelligent maker who is Īśvara then the Naiyāyikas must show that the inferential reason [hetu] is present in a locus which is known to have Īśvara (or an Īśvara-like entity) as its cause. Since Īśvara is by definition omniscient, the opponent argues that this locus must be known to have an omniscient maker as its cause. This issue is supressed in the Naiyāyikas statement of the inferential argument and in their description of what is to be proved [sādhya] as an "intelligent maker." As mentioned earlier, in order for a locus to be a similar case [sapakṣa] both parties must agree that the property to be proved [sādhya] is present there. The Naiyāyikas example of a pot, however, is now not a similar case [sapakṣa] since, as the opponent implies, neither party would agree that potters are omniscient (passage [a]). As a result, the presence of the inferential reason [hetu] in such a locus does not show that H2 does not apply to it. The opponent

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[80] RNA [33.26-33.29]: sarvajñapūrvakatve tu sādhye vyāptiḥ svanpe 'pi nopalabdhā | dṛṣṭāntaś ca sādhyahīnaḥ, kulālādīnām asarvajñatvāt | viruddhatā ca hetor asarvajñapūrvakatvenaiva kumbhādau kāryatvasya vyāpter upalabdheḥ | na copalabdhimatpūrvakatvamātraṃ sādhanaviṣayaḥ, tadviśeṣasya tu sarvajñapūrvakatvasya atadviṣayasya api tataḥ siddhir iti sāmpratam |

continues by arguing that not only have the Naiyāyikas not shown that the inferential reason [hetu] is present in a similar case [sapakṣa], but, their example suggests that the inferential reason [hetu] is pervaded by what is opposed to what is to be proved [sādhya-viparyaya] (passage [b]). After all, it is well-known that potters are non-omniscient. The opponent insists, therefore, that the inferential reason [hetu] is opposed [viruddha]. The problem, as the opponent sees it, is that an inferential reason [hetu] must have within its scope [viṣaya] the specific characteristics [viśeṣa] or properties in terms of which what is to be proved [sādhya] is defined (passage [c]). This requires attention to exactly what it is that is being proved, the scope of the inferential reason [hetu], and whether or not what is to be proved [sādhya] is within its scope. In this case, the opponent argues that the inferential reason [hetu] should prove not just an intelligent maker, but, an intelligent maker who has the special characteristic [viśeṣa] of being omnisicient [sarvajñatva]. The inferential reason [hetu] 'being an effect' is opposed, [viruddha] according to the opponent, since this special characteristic [viśeṣa] of what is to be proved [sādhya] is not within its scope and a characteristic that is opposed to it, 'being non-omnisicient [asarvajñatva],' appears to be pervaded by it. The example cited by the Naiyāyikas is, therefore, not a similar case [sapakṣa] and so the presence of the inferential reason [hetu] in it cannot show that H2 does not apply. The opponent concludes, therefore, that the inferential reason [hetu] is defective and cannot be a well-functioning Instrument of awareness.

3.1.2 Being a Property of the Subject

The Naiyāyikas first respond to this series of arguments by explaining how in non-controversial inferential arguments an inferential reason [hetu] does have special

characteristics [viśeṣa] of what is to be proved [sādhya] within its scope. They then show why the inferential reason [hetu] 'being an effect' and the property to be proved [sādhya] by it are similar to the terms in non-controversial inferences. According to the Naiyāyikas, this analysis shows both that the example cited by them is a similar case [sapakṣa] and that the inferential reason [hetu] 'being an effect [kāryatva]' can have the property 'being omniscient [sarvajñatva]' within its scope. From this they conclude that H2 does not apply to their inferential reason [hetu]. They explain that:

An inference definitely takes special characteristics as its object. This is because, although pervasion is between general-terms, since the inferential reason is a property of the subject of the inference there is, with respect to a possessor of what is to be proved, the inference of a general-term which includes special characteristics. If this were not the case there would be the unwanted consequence of the failure of all inferential arguments.[81]

Consider the inference of fire from smoke mentioned earlier.[82] In the inference-warranting relation [vyāpti] in that argument, as the Naiyāyikas now tell us, the inferential reason [hetu] is the term 'smoke-in-general' and the property to be proved [sādhya] is the term 'fire-in-general.' Included within the scope of these "general terms" are their necessary characteristics such as 'being caused by fire' (in the case of smoke) and 'having the capacity to burn' (in the case of fire).[83] The purpose of the inference, however, is not to prove that there is fire-in-general, but, that there is fire-on-the-mountain.[84] One way to interpret this is to insist that the object of the inference includes

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[81]RNA [33.32-34.05]: {ucyate}| sāmānyamātravyāptāv apy antarbhāvitaviśeṣasya sāmānyasya pakṣadharmatāvaśena sādhyadharmiṇy anumānāt viśeṣaviṣayam anumānaṃ bhavaty eva | itarathā sarvānumānocchedaprasaṅgāt |

[82]See 1.5.1.

[83]For more on "general terms" see Chapter 3.

[84]Matilal (1968); NV (1996), NVTT (1996), NVTTP (1996) ad NS 1.1.5 and NS 2.1.46.

a special, though contingent, characteristic of fire-in-general; the characteristic of 'being on the mountain.' The issue, then, is whether or not the inferential reason 'smoke-in-general' is able to prove this and if so, how. It is important to note that the Naiyāyikas identification of a kitchen as a similar case [sapakṣa] shows that in order for a locus to be a similar case [sapakṣa] it is only necessary that the "generic form" of the property to be proved [sādhya] i.e., fire-in-general be known to be present there.[85] It is not necessary, for example, for 'fire-on-the-mountain' to be present there. H2 does not apply to the inferential reason [hetu] 'smoke-in-general,' therefore, because it is present in a similar case [sapakṣa]; that is, a locus in which the "generic form" of the property to be proved [sādhya], 'fire-in-general,' is also known to be present. Although both terms in the inference-warranting relation [vyāpti] are general terms [sāmānya], the Naiyāyikas argue that an inferential reason [hetu] can have within its scope [viṣaya] a special characteristic [viśeṣa] of what is to be proved [sādhya]. More importantly, they argue this special characteristic [viśeṣa], 'being on the mountain,' may not characterize the "generic form" of what is to be proved [sādhya] as it is present in the similar case [sapakṣa] They reason that since it is known that the inferential reason [hetu] 'smoke-in-general' is pervaded by fire (step (iii)) and that it is a property of the subject of the inference; that is, that it is present on the mountain (step (ii)), it is also known that the 'fire-in-general' that is concomitant with it must also be present on the mountain.[86] It isn't just fire-in-general that is inferred, but, fire that has the special characteristic [viśesa] of 'being present on that mountain.'[87] Given this, the Naiyāyikas argue that an

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[85]See 1.5.

[86]KTBh [33.09-34.02]

[87]Matilal (1968: 152): dharmaviśiṣṭadharmy anumeyaḥ. "What is to be inferred is a property possessor that is characterized by a property."

inferential reason [hetu] must have at least one special characteristic [viśeṣa] of what is to be proved [sādhya] within its scope: the characteristic of being a property of the subject of the inference [pakṣadharamatā]. If this were not the case, they assert that inferential reasoning would be impossible. This approach to showing that special characteristics [viśeṣa] of what is to be proved [sādhya] can be within the scope of the inferential reason [hetu] is significant for the Naiyāyikas discussion of H2 since it explains how an inferential reason [hetu] that is present in a similar case [sapakṣa] that is defined by the "generic form" of what is to be proved [sādhya] could have a "specific form" of it within its scope.

The Naiyāyikas also maintain, however, that an inferential reason [hetu] can have more than this one special characteristic [viśeṣa] within its scope. They argue, for example, that an inferential reason [hetu] can also have within its scope those special characteristics [viśeṣa] of what is to be proved [sādhya] that are implied by its having the special characteristic [viśeṣa] of being present in the subject of the inference. In responding to the opponent, the Naiyāyikas apply this reasoning to their inference for the existence of Īśvara. They insist, for example, that the subject of their inference [pakṣa], the earth etc., is such that only an omniscient maker could have created it. Although the general form of what is to be proved [sādhya] is 'an intelligent-maker-in-general,' it is known that in virtue of its being a property of the subject of the inference, this intelligent-maker-in-general has the property of 'being the maker of the earth etc.' This implies, according to the Naiyāyikas, that the maker must be omniscient since only such a maker could create an effect such as the earth.[88] This line of reasoning is relevant to showing

[88]This point is not simply asserted, but is argued for. See RNA [56.14-56.25].

that H2 does not apply to the inferential reason [hetu] 'being an effect [kāryatva]' since it enables the Naiyāyikas to claim both that a pot-locus is a similar case (since both the inferential reason [hetu] and what is to be proved [sādhya] are known to be present there) and that an inferential reason [hetu] has those special characteristics within its scope that are implied by the property to be proved [sādhya] being a property of the subject of the inference. The first part shows that H2 does not apply to their inferential reason [hetu] and the second part shows why the opponent's objection to their identification of a pot-locus as a similar case [sapakṣa] does not either.

3.1.3 H2 Summary

There are, then, three issues that are raised in the Naiyāyikas discussion of A2.1, each of which has to do with various aspects of what is to be proved [sādhya]. The first issue, for example, has to do with the proper description of what is to be proved [sādhya]: Is it an intelligent-maker-in-general or an omniscient maker? Related to this is the question of whether it is possible to establish the inference-warranting relation [vyāpti] once the proper description of what is to be proved [sādhya] has been determined. A second issue has to do with whether the example [dṛṣṭānta] cited in the inferential argument is in fact a locus to which the pervasion relation [vyāpti] between the inferential reason [hetu] and the property to be proved [sādhya] applies; that is, is it a similar case [sapakṣa]. A third issue has to do with how the scope of the inferential reason [hetu] relates to what can be proved and, more specficially, with how special properties [viśeṣa] of what is to be proved [sādhya] can be established.

The Naiyāyikas address each of these issues and claim to satisfy A2.1 by showing that H2 does not apply to the inferential reason "on account of being an effect [kāryatvāt]." They show this by identifying a similar case [sapakṣa] in which the inferential reason [hetu] is present and then defending their identification of it against an opponent who argues that it is not a suitable example. To "show" that H2 does not apply to their inferential reason [hetu], therefore, the Naiyāyikas rely on processes that are "internal" to the Agent e.g., identifying a similar case [sapakṣa] (through recalling previously perceived loci); appealing to features of their theory of inferential reasoning; and determining (through implication) the special characteristics [viśeṣa] that are entailed by what is to be proved [sādhya] being a property of the subject of the inference [pakṣadharmatā]. In determining this they also explain how an inferential reason [hetu] that is known to be pervaded by a "generic form" of the property to be proved [sādhya] has a specific form of it within its scope. By showing, in this way, that H2 does not apply to their inferential reason [hetu], the Naiyāyikas argue that they have satsified A2.1.

3.2 Satisfying A2.2, H3a

The Naiyāyikas discussion of the defect, inconclusive [anaikāntika (H3)], focuses on the subtype called "common [sādhāraṇa, (H3a)]."[89] The presence of this subtype blocks the functioning [vyāpāra] of the Instrument by affecting its pervasion [vyāpti] sub-component in one of two ways.[90] It either "defeats" it by identifying a locus in which

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[89]RNA [36.26-38.13]

[90]See Section 2.3.1.2.

the inferential reason [hetu] is present but the property to be proved [sādhya] is absent, or it "undermines" it by raising doubt about whether the inferential reason [hetu] is excluded from all dissimilar cases [vipakṣa].[91] In the first case, the defect is detected through the identification of a specific locus (i.e., a dissimilar case [vipakṣa]) that serves as a "counter-example" to the general rule of concomitance [vyāpti]. In the second case, it is detected in a lack of certainty about pervasion [vyāpti] and, more specifically, about the contraposed [vyatireka] form of it.[92] In this case, it is the possibility (rather than the identification) of a dissimilar case [vipakṣa] that explains why the defect applies. The Naiyāyikas assert, however, that H3a does not apply to their inferential reason [hetu] since it is known that the inferential reason [hetu] is excluded from all dissimilar cases [vipakṣa]. This rules out a counter-example and also eliminates doubt [sandeha] regarding the possibility of one.[93] They choose to defend this assertion through critically engaging an opponent. It is through this exchange that they try and show that the Instrument Condition (A2) that is defined in terms of defect H3a, A2.2, is satisfied.

3.2.1 A Dissimilar Case

An opponent argues that H3a applies to the inferential reason [hetu] 'being an effect [kāryatva]' by proposing a counter-example to pervasion [vyāpti]; that is, by identifying

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[91] The first of these "two ways" should not be confused with defect H2 which applies to an inferential reason [hetu] that is known to be pervaded by the opposite of what is to be proved [sādhya-viparyaya]. Although the same locus may be used to illustrate each of these defects (i.e., H2, H3a) the reason why it is used will differ. With respect to H2 such a locus may be referred to by someone who argues that the inferential reason being considered is pervaded by the opposite of what is to be proved, while with respect to H3a it may be referred to by someone who argues that it just is a locus in which the inferential reason is present but the property to be proved is not. The issue of whether or not the inferential reason is pervaded by the opposite of the property to be proved need not arise.

[92] The "contraposed" form of pervasion [vyāpti] is expressed, in this context, as the exclusion of the inferential reason [hetu] from loci in which what is to be proved [sādhya] is not present.

[93] RNA [37.12-37.16]

a locus in which the inferential reason [hetu] is known to be present but in which the property to be proved [sādhya] 'having an intelligent maker' is known to be absent. The locus proposed by the opponent is growing grass. The opponent says:

In seeing grass, growing without the activity of a person, people will definitely not accept the inference-warranting relation, 'effects-in-general (i.e., all effects) are caused by a person (i.e., an intelligent-maker)'.[94]

According to the opponent, growing grass is a dissimilar case [vipakṣa] since it is a locus in which the inferential reason [hetu] 'being an effect' is known to be present and the property to be proved [sādhya] 'having an intelligent maker' is known to be absent. Given this counter-example, the inference-warranting relation [vyāpti] is defeated. And since one of the sub-components necessary for its functioning [vyāpāra] is defeated, the inferential reason [hetu] is shown to be defective and cannot be a well-functioning Instrument of awareness. The opponent concludes, therefore, that since A2.2 has not been satisfied neither the Instrument nor the argument is justified.

The Naiyāyikas respond to this by questioning whether growing grass is a dissimilar case [vipakṣa]. They argue that the criteria the opponent relies on to determine that it is, is too rigid since its application would invalidate even well-known and non-controversial inferences. The issue, then, is whether or not the locus, growing grass, is a "genuine defeater" of the inference-warranting relation [vyāpti] and therefore of the functioning [vyāpāra] component of the Instrument. The Naiyāyikas argue that:

If this were so, then even well-known inferences would be offered a handful of water (and thereby given their last rites). This is because even when pervasion is being

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[94]RNA [36.26-36.27]: {nanu} puruṣavyāpāram antareṇa tṛṇādīn anudayamānān avalokayan lokaḥ kāryamātraṃ puruṣapūrvakam iti vyāptim eva na pratipadyata {iti cet} |

determined in such cases, it is possible to say that "Seeing smoke without (seeing) the activity of fire --(because) it is in a far away place filled with lions etc. or seeing a pot without (seeing) the activity of a person --(because) it was made earlier, people will not even admit the inference-warranting relations 'smoke-in-general (i.e., all smoke) is caused by fire' or 'pots-in-general (i.e., all pots) are caused by a person'."[95]

The opponent's reason for considering growing-grass to be a dissimilar case [vipakṣa] is that even though it is seen to grow from seeds, for example, and is known, therefore, to be an effect, it is not seen to have a person as its cause. It is, therefore, a dissimilar case [vipakṣa] since it is known to be an effect and is known not to be caused by a person or any intelligent-maker. The Naiyāyikas respond to this by arguing that non-observation is not (always) an appropriate criteria for determining whether a property is present in a particular locus. Even in well-known inferences, for example, the inferential reason [hetu] e.g., smoke, may be observed to be present in a locus in which the property to be proved [sādhya] e.g., fire, is not. In a passage immediately following this one, for example, it is explained that such a locus is not a genuine defeater since the non-observation of fire may be due to its being "spatially remote [deśa-viprakṛṣṭa]" i.e., "in a far away place."[96] Similarly, a pot may be observed without observing its maker. Here too, however, the well-known pervasion [vyāpti] between a pot and a maker is not defeated since, in this case, the maker may be "temporally remote [kāla-viprakṛṣṭa]." The Naiyāyikas argue that the maker of growing-grass may also be remote [viprakṛṣṭa]. Unlike fire or the potter, however, the maker of growing-grass is said to be "essentially remote [svabhāva-viprakṛṣṭa]" which means that relative to a normal observer this maker is, by its very nature, unobservable. Non-observation is not, therefore, suitable for

[95]RNA [36.27-36.31]: evam tarhi prasiddhānumānasthitir api dattajalāñjaliḥ | tatrāpi hi vyāptipratītikāla eva vyāghrādiparyākulātidurgapradeśe vahnivyāpāram antareṇa dhūmaṃ puruṣavyāpāraṃ vinā pūrvaṃ siddhaṃ ghaṭaṃ vā vilokayan loko dhūmamātram vahnipūrvakam iti vyāptim eva na pratipadyata iti vaktuṃ śakyatvāt |

[96]RNA [37.01-37.04]

determining its absence. In order for a locus to be a genuine defeater, then, it is not sufficient to identify one in which the inferential reason [hetu] is observed to be present and the property to be proved [sādhya] is observed to be absent since this property may be either spatially, temporally, or essentially remote [deśa-kāla-svabhāva-viprakṛṣṭa].[97] Not recognizing the significance of the "theory of remoteness" to the identification of genuine defeaters will, the Naiyāyikas argue, result in the identification of "genuine" defeaters even for the pervasion [vyāpti] sub-components of Instruments in well-known inferential arguments. The significance of this is that by not admitting that a maker of growing grass could be "essentially remote [svabhāva-viprakṛṣṭa]" the opponent would be relying on an approach through which even well-known inferential arguments would be invalidated. The criteria used to identify growing-grass as a genuine defeater is, therefore, too rigid and so is not an effective way of showing that H3a applies. As a result, the opponent has not, according to the Naiyāyikas, shown that the pervasion [vyāpti] component of the inferential reason [hetu] has been defeated. There is no reason, therefore, to question their initial assertion.

3.2.2 Deviation

At this point, the opponent chooses to concede the point and raises a new, though related, set of objections.[98] These objections have to do with doubt [sandeha] about whether the inferential reason [hetu] is known to be excluded from (all) dissimilar cases [vipakṣād vyāvṛtti (P3)]. They agree that growing grass may not be a genuine defeater,

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[97] For more on the "theory or remoteness" and related issues see Katsura (1992), Kellner (1997: n. 165; 1999) in Katsura ed. (1999), Steinkellner (1967a), and Tillemans (1995). This issue is also discussed in Chapter 2.

[98] RNA [37.12-38.13]

but, insist that the Naiyāyikas theory of inference-warranting relations [vyāpti] does not rule out the possibility of there being a different one.[99] This possibility is referred to as the possiblity of deviation [vyabhicāra]; that is, the possibility that an inferential reason [hetu] will deviate from the pervasion [vyāpti] rule according to which it is known that where the inferential reason [hetu] is present the property to be proved [sādhya] is present (positive concomitance [anvaya]) and that where the property to be proved [sādhya] is absent the inferential reason [hetu] is absent (negative concomitance [vyatireka]).[100] In the opponent's view, since the Naiyāyikas cannot rule out the possibility of deviation [vyabhicāra], there could be a locus that deviates from the rule. Such a locus would be a genuine defeater for the pervasion component [vyāpti] and therefore for the functioning [vyāpāra] of the Instrument. The doubt that this generates is significant enough that, in their opinion, it undermines pervasion by specifically undermining the negative concomitance [vyatireka] between the two terms. Their worry is that there may be a locus in which property to be proved [sādhya] is absent but the inferential reason [hetu] is known to be present. The issues raised in this discussion have to do with certainty, the nature of pervasion, its scope, and the method of determining it.

The initial exchange is as follows:

[Opponent] Non-deviation is not ascertained through mere observation and non-observation in similar and dissimilar cases since there is not a non-deviation rule for (inferential reasons that are) neither of the same nature (as what is to be proved) nor are

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[99] This theory will be discussed in Chapter 2.

[100] "Deviation (or wandering)" is a technical term that will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2. Briefly: A property H deviates from a property S just in case H is located somewhere S is not. See Ganeri (1999: 68).

produced from it. So, since there is doubt about its exclusion from dissimilar cases 'being an effect' is a non-inferential reason.

[Naiyāyika] About this it is said: There is no doubt about the exclusion of the inferential reason from dissimilar cases since an effect-cause relationship, which is proved through apprehension and non-apprehension, is proved for an effect and an intelligence-possessor, like it is for smoke and fire.[101]

The opponent begins by stating that the rule of non-deviation [avyabhicāra-niyama] only applies to two sorts of relations: Those in which the two terms are "of the same nature" and those in which the two terms are related as "effect and cause." Let us refer to these as the identity-mode [tādātmya] and the production-mode [tadutpatti] of pervasion [vyāpti].[102] The opponent further asserts that in the Naiyāyikas theory, the inference-warranting relation [vyāpti] is neither of these two types and so is not a relation for which deviation [vyabhicāra] can be ruled out. There is, therefore, doubt about the exclusion of the inferential reason from dissimilar cases [sandigdha-vipakṣa-vyāvṛtti]. The Naiyāyikas respond, however, by asserting that the two terms in the inference-warranting relation [vyāpti] for the existence of Īśvara are related as effect and cause just like the two terms in the inference of fire from smoke. They assert further that the relation is established, in part, through the apprehension [upalambha] of the inferential reason [hetu] in a finite number of loci in which what is to be proved [sādhya] is also present and the non-apprehension [anupalambha] of it in a finite number of loci in which what is to be proved [sādhya] is absent; just like in the inference of fire from smoke. The

[101]RNA [37.12-37.16]: {syād etat}| na sapakṣāsapakṣayor darśanādarśanamātreṇa avyabhicāraniścayaḥ, atadātmano 'tadutpatteś cāvyabhicāraniyamābhāvāt | tad idam kāryatvaṃ sandigdhavipakṣavyāvṛttikatvena asādhanam | atra ucyate nāsti vipakṣād hetor vyāvṛttisandehaḥ, dhūmānalayor iva kāryabuddhimator upalambhānupalambhasādhanasya karyakāraṇabhāvasya siddhatvāt |

[102]The secondary literature on these two modes of pervasion is extensive. See, for example, Kajiyama (1989), Katsura (1986a, 1992), Lasic (2000), Steinkellner (1971; 1974), Hayes and Gillon (1995), Hayes (1987), Geokoop (1967), and Wada (1990).

opponent's argument is, therefore, irrelevant since, according to the Naiyāyikas, the non-deviation rule [avyabhicāra-viyama] is known to apply to the inference-warranting relation [vyāpti] in their argument for the same reasons as it is known to apply to the inferential reason [hetu] in very well-known and non-controversial inferential arguments such as the inference of fire from smoke.

3.2.2.1 Scope

The opponent chooses, at this point, to accept the Naiyāyikas claim that the inference-warranting relation is an effect-cause relation and that, in general, such relations can be established through apprehension and non-apprehension [upalambhānupalambha]. The opponent instead directs his attention to showing how the scope of the terms in well-known inference-warranting relations [vyāpti] is different from the scope of the terms in the inference-warranting relation [vyāpti] in the Naiyāyikas' argument. According to the opponent, the significance of this is that given the scope of the inferential-reason [hetu] that is required for the Naiyāyikas' inference it is not possible, given their own criteria, for them to determine pervasion [vyāpti] through apprehension and non-apprehension [upalambha-anupalambha]. The opponent says:

"Only a specific class of effects is proved to be caused by it (i.e., an intelligence-possessing maker), not effects-in-general. Just as, it is not ascertained that (a property) such as 'being a thing,' which is present in smoke etc., is produced from fire."[103]

[103]RNA [37.17-37.18]: kāryaviśeṣasyaiva tadutpādasiddhir na kāryasāmānyasya, yathā dhūmādivartino vastutvāder nānalādijanyatvaniścaya iti {cet}|

The inference-warranting relation [vyāpti] in the Naiyāyikas argument is "Whatever is an effect is caused by an intelligence-possessor, just as a pot."[104] In other words, the terms of the relation are 'effects-in-general' i.e., all effects, and an 'intelligence-possessor' i.e., an intelligent-maker. In the passage cited above, however, the opponent implies that in the inference-warranting relation [vyāpti] between smoke and fire, the relation is between a specific class of effects [kārya-viśeṣa] and its cause.[105] The relation is not with effects-in-general [kārya-mātra].[106] It is, moreover, only specific classes of effects [kārya-viśeṣa] that can be shown through apprehension and non-apprehension [upalambha-anupalambha] to be caused by an intelligent-maker. The Naiyāyikas view that the inference-warranting relation [vyāpti] in their argument for the existence of Īśvara is an effect-cause relation that can be determined through apprehension and non-apprehension [upalambha-anupalambha] requires (at least) that the scope of the inferential reason [hetu] be restricted to specific, observable classes of effects. If the scope of the inferential reason [hetu] is not suitably restricted then, as the opponent points out, even (unobservable) properties of smoke such as 'being a thing' could be taken to be pervaded by fire. Since both parties agree that pervasion is between 'smoke' and 'fire' and not between 'smoke-and-all-of-its-properties' and 'fire,' the opponent presses the Naiyāyika to explain how the pervasion relation [vyāpti] between 'effects-in-general' and an 'intelligence-possessor' can be determined. The Naiyāyikas response is to provide an example. They say:

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[104]See 2.1.

[105]That this, and what follows, is implied by the passage is clear from the Naiyāyikas response to it and the subsequent discussion of the passage later in the text. See Chapter 2.

[106]See 3.1.2.

(...) just as an effect such as a piece of cloth is observed to have a material cause, another effect whose material cause is unobserved is also established as having a material cause on account of being an effect. Similarly, that very effect cloth etc. is observed to have a maker. Therefore that whose maker is not observed is also established as having a maker on account of being an effect. This is because the positive and negative concomitance of a maker with an effect is like that of a material cause. (...) Therefore, just as it is not possible to doubt that there could be an effect without a material cause since a material cause-in-general produces an effect-in-general, similarly, it must not be doubted that there could be an effect without a maker since there isn't a distinction in proving that a maker-in-general produces an effect-in-general.[107]

The Naiyāyika's approach is to again compare the inference-warranting relation [vyāpti] in their inference to a non-controversial case, here, the relation between an effect such as a piece of cloth and its having a material (or primary) cause [upādāna-kāraṇa]. Although the pervasion relation [vyāpti] is determined through the observation of a specific class of effects [kārya-viśeṣa] and those effects having a material cause, both parties agree that the relation is more general and that it applies to effects-in-general. On the basis of this causal relation it is possible to infer that effects whose material cause has not been observed have a material cause. From the observation of specific classes of effects [kārya-viśeṣa] such as pieces of cloth, pots, etc., it is similarly possible, the Naiyāyikas maintain, to determine an effect-cause relation between effects-in-general and an unobserved maker. In choosing to respond to the opponent in this way, the Naiyāyikas again direct their attention to how the inference-warranting relation [vyāpti] is determined and why the opponent's worry regarding the scope of the inferential reason [hetu] in their argument is not significant since it is equally applicable to the inferential reason [hetu] in well-known inferential arguments.

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[107]RNA [37.20-37.26]: yathā hi kāryaṃ vastrādy upādānavad dṛṣṭaṃ, kāryāntaram apy adṛṣṭopādānam upādānavat kāryatvādy upasthāpyate tathā tad eva kāryaṃ vastrādi dṛṣṭakartṛkam ity adṛṣṭakartṛkam api kāryatvāt kartṛmad vyavasthāpyate | upādānasyeva kartur api karyeṇānukṛtānvayavyatirekatvāt | {tanmātranibandhanatvāc ca sarvatra kāryakāraṇavyavahārayoḥ}| tasmād yathā kāryaṃ ca syān nirupādānaṃ ceti na śakyam āśaṅkituṃ, kāryamātrasya upādānamātrād utpādasiddheḥ tathā ca bhaved akartṛkaṃ ceti nāśaṅkanīyaṃ kāryamātrasya kartṛmātrād utpādasiddher aviśeṣāt |

3.2.2.2 The Awareness of Being Produced

The opponent is not convinced by the comparison, however, and insists that pervasion [vyāpti] can only be determined for specific classes of effects [kārya-viśeṣa] and their causes. In rephrasing the objection, however, the opponent specifies the property that he believes limits the scope of the "proper" inferential reason [hetu].

> You may say anything, still, there is not the inference of an intelligence-possessor from effects-in-general. On the contrary, it is only from specific effects from the observation of which there could be the awareness of having been made even for one who did not observe (its) production.[108]

The inferential reason [hetu] is limited, according to the opponent, to those classes of effects that could be observed to be the products of an intelligence-possessing maker. This is meant to distinguish between effects such as pots and buildings, for which pervasion [vyāpti] with a maker has been (and can be) observed and those such as grass and trees, for which it has not (and cannot). The opponent suggests that the inferential reason should be limited to just this specific class of effects i.e., those with the property of "being effects from the observation of which there could be an awareness of having been made." The pervasion relation [vyāpti] that can be established through apprehension and non-apprehension is not, as the Naiyāyikas assume, between 'effects-in-general' (i.e., all effects) and 'having an intelligence-possessing maker' but between 'specific-effects' and 'having an intelligence-possesing maker.' What makes such effects "specific," moreover, is the special characteristic [viśeṣa] of "being effects from which

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[108]RNA [37.27-37.29]: {nanu} brūyā nāma kiñcit | tathāpi na kāryamātrād buddhimad anumānam, api tu kāryaviśeṣād eva | yaddarśanād akriyādarśino 'pi kṛtabuddhir syāt |

there could be an awareness of having been made [kṛta-buddhi]." Given this, the opponent claims that the Naiyāyikas inferential reason [hetu] is inconclusive [anaikāntika] since pervasion [vyāpti] can only be established for this specific class of effects [kārya-viśeṣa] and not for effects-in-general. The presence of H3a is detected, therefore, in the opponent's doubt about being able to establish the pervasion relation [vyāpti] as it is understood by the Naiyāyikas. The basis for this doubt is that the scope of the unrestricted form of the inferential reason 'being an effect-in-general' includes classes of effects about which it cannot be known through observation whether they have an intelligence-possessing maker. These "effects" could be observable objects such as grass and trees or unobservable properties of observable objects such as 'being a thing.' Given the Naiyāyikas view that pervasion [vyāpti] is established through apprehension and non-apprehension [upalambha-anupalambha], the opponent argues that there will always be (epistemically significant) doubt about pervasion [vyāpti]. The opponent concludes, therefore, that the Naiyāyikas have not shown that H3a does not apply.

The Naiyāyikas defend their inferential reason [hetu] from this argument by first providing an analysis of the limiting phrase "an awareness of having been made [kṛta-buddhi]." They then try and show that based on their analysis there is no interpretation of it that undermines the pervasion [vyāpti] component of the Instrument in their argument. They ask:

Moreover, what is this awareness of having been made? Is it the determination that the activity of something else was needed? Or is it the ascertainment of coming from a person i.e., being made by a person?[109]

[109]RNA [37.30-37.32]: api ca kā punar īyaṃ kṛtabuddhiḥ, kim apekṣitaparavyāpārāvasāyo 'tha puruṣakṛtam etad iti pauruṣeyatvaniścaya iti |

According to the Naiyāyikas, it is necessary to further analyze the terms in the phrase "an awareness of having been made [kṛta-buddhi]." On their view, the opponent could either mean that an effect that has this characteristic is an effect about which it has been determined that its production is dependent upon the activity of something other than itself [apekṣitaparavyāpāra] or that it has been made by a person [puruṣa-kṛta]. The first interpretation, which specifies what it means for something to be "made [kṛta]," applies equally well to effects such as pots and the earth since both parties would agree that 'being an effect' is (at least) 'being something whose production is dependent upon something other than itself.'[110] Both the Naiyāyika and the opponent also agree that the class of effects that includes pots and the class that includes the earth are effects in this sense. There is not, therefore, a relevant distinction between these two classes of effects. As a result, the Naiyāyikas reason that this cannot be the opponent's interpretation of the limiting property since it does not distinguish between what the opponent takes to be the problematic case and the well-known one. The second interpretation further considers the term "awareness [buddhi]" and, according to the Naiyāyikas, needs to be specified further still. The Naiyāyikas suggest that the awareness that an effect "has been made by a person [puruṣa-kṛta]" is either the awareness of someone who knows the pervasion relation [vyāpti] between 'being an effect' and 'made by a person' (i.e., an intelligent maker) or of someone who does not.[111] They argue further that for someone who knows the relation there will definitely be the awareness of an intelligent maker from an effect-in-general and so this cannot be what the opponent has in mind. For someone who does not know the pervasion relation

[110]RNA [38.01]

[111]RNA [38.03]

[vyāpti], however, they concede that the inference is impossible. On this criterion, however, even well-known inferences would be suspect since it is never the case that someone who does not know pervasion [vyāpti] can know, through inferential reasoning, what is to be proved [sādhya].

According to the Naiyāyikas, there are two problems with the opponent's argument. The first is that the characterstic that the opponent claims is necessary for limiting the scope of the inferential reason [hetu] does not limit it in the manner required by him. The second is that the opponent's worry about establishing pervasion between general terms [sāmānya] through apprehension and non-apprehension [upalambha-anupalambha] is not epistemically significant since after considering well-known inferences it is clear that pervasion [vyāpti] can be established between general terms [sāmānya] and through this method. The Naiyāyikas conclude from this that A2.2 has been satisfied since their assertion that the inferential reason [hetu] is known to be excluded from all dissimilar cases [vipakṣa] has not been shown to be incorrect and the opponent's attempts at showing that the pervasion [vyāpti] component has been undermined have not been successful. H3a does not therefore apply, in their view, to the inferential reason [hetu] "on account of being an effect [kāryatvāt]."

3.2.3 H3a Summary

While the issues raised in the Naiyāyikas discussion of A2.1 had to do with various aspects of what is to be proved [sādhya], the issues raised here have to do with the inferential reason [hetu]. There are two specific issues that are raised. The first concerns the problem of "deviation [vyabhicāra]" and whether the inferential reason [hetu] is

known to actually deviate from what is to be proved [sādhya], to possibly deviate from it, or to not deviate from it in any locus in which it is present. In discussing this issue, the Naiyāyikas focused their attention on the criteria for identifying a "counter-example" and the significance of the "theory of remoteness [viprakṛṣṭa]" for this identification. The second issue has to do with the scope of the inferential reason [hetu-viṣaya] and the related issue of how pervasion [vyāpti] is supposed to be established. Most central to this discussion is the nature of pervasion [vyāpti] and whether or not given the proper description of the inferential reason [hetu] apprehension and non-apprehension [upalambha-anupalambha] is an adequate method for establishing it. The Naiyāyikas discussion of A2.2 also shows, then, how issues having to do with the inferential reason [hetu] are closely linked with those having to do with pervasion [vyāpti].

In order to "show" that H3a does not apply to the inferential reason [hetu] "on account of being an effect [kāryatvāt]," the Naiyāyikas again appeal to factors that are "internal" to the Agent [kartṛ]. Unlike their treatment of H2, however, the Naiyāyikas show that H3a does not apply by defending their assertion that the inferential reason [hetu] is known to be excluded from all dissimilar cases [vipakṣa]. The general framework for showing that H3a does not apply is therefore broadly "defeasible."[112] In responding to an opponent's attempts at defeating this assertion, the Naiyāyikas appeal to the "theory of remoteness

[112] The general defeasibility theory holds "that S knows that p only if there is not a true proposition such that if it is added to S's beliefs, S would not be justified in believing that p." As Klein (1996: 114) also points out, this version of the theory is "too strong" since it "excludes too many cases." He proposes, therefore, a "corrected version" of the theory according to which "a belief p is warranted for S just in case p is properly grounded and there is no genuine defeater of S's belief that p." In describing the difference between what he calls "genuine" and "misleading" defeaters he makes a distinction between an "initiating defeater" and an "effective defeater." He explains: "A proposition d is an *initiating defeater of S's belief that p* and d' is an *effective defeater of S's belief that p* iff d is the first proposition in an inference chain C such that the last member of C, d' is suchthat when d' is added to S's beliefs, p is not justified. (...) an initiating defeater d is *genuine* just in case it is true and there is some inference chain C to an effective defeater d and there are no false propositions in C." See Klein (1996: 117).

[viprakṛṣṭa]," in order to discuss how the absence of a property in a particular locus should not be determined; to comparisons with well-known and therefore paradigmatic inferences, to show that the opponent's arguments are such that even well-known inferences would be invalidated by them; and to conceptual analysis that exposes internal inadequacies in the opponent's account of the limiting property "an awareness of having been made [kṛtabuddhi]."

3.3 Characterizing the Nyāya Account of Justification

The Naiyāyikas effort at satisfying A2.1 and A2.2 by showing that H2 and H3a do not apply to the inferential reason "on account of being an effect [kāryatvāt]," provides a framework for further interpreting their theory of justification. As mentioned earlier, according to the Naiyāyikas, justification is an epistemic practice that is directed towards the satisfaction of a set of acceptability conditions. It is a practice through which an Agent [kartṛ] determines whether or not the Instrument [karaṇa] that produced a particular state of awareness is well-functioning and therefore whether the state of awareness that is produced by it is warranted. An Agent [kartṛ] can determine this either for herself or can enable someone else to determine it by showing her that the acceptability conditions for the Instrument [karaṇa] in question have been satisfied. 'Being justified' is, therefore, a property that is conferred upon a well-functioning Instrument [karaṇa] by an Agent [kartṛ] and, in my view, is best thought of as a "criterion" rather than a condition for an Instrument to be well-functioning and the state of awareness that is produced by it to be warranted. Since justification is the result of an Agent's [kartṛ] epistemic practice it is helpful to think of it as a property of an Agent [kartṛ] and only derivatively a property of the Instrument [karaṇa] or the state of

awareness that is produced by it. Describing the Nyāya theory in this way associates it with "virtue epistemology," a class of epistemological theories that analyze basic epistemic concepts such as justification (or knowledge) in terms of properties of persons rather than, for example, properties of beliefs.[113] Since knowledge or warranted awareness [pramā] is the result of a well-functioning Instrument [karaṇa], the Nyāya account of knowledge is helpfully viewed as a form of (process) reliabilism.[114] Justification, however, is external to this process and, in my view, is best interpreted on the model provided by virtue epistemology.

As I have described it, justification has to do with an Agent [kartṛ] **determining** that an Instrument [karaṇa] of awareness is well-functioning. "Determining" this requires **satisfying a** set of acceptability conditions (A) that are specific to the Instrument [karaṇa] in question. For the Instrument [karaṇa] in inferential arguments, these conditions are defined in terms of potential defects (H) of the inferential reason [hetu]. An Agent [kartṛ] can satisfy the acceptability conditions and thereby determine that an Instrument [karaṇa] of inferential awareness is well-functioning by **showing** that none of the potential defects apply to the inferential reason [hetu] that defines it. "Showing" functions, therefore, as the epistemic practice most central to the Nyāya account of justification. How one goes about showing that a defect does not apply to a particular inferential reason [hetu], however, depends (in part) upon the nature of the defect. With respect to H2 and H3a, the practice of showing is based on processes that are, for the

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[113]For contemporary discussions of virtue epistemology see Greco (1990; 1993), Sosa (1980; 1991: 191), and Zagzebski (1996).

[114]Some versions of contemporary reliabilism (about knowledge) are also classified as forms of virtue epistemology. See, for example, Greco (1992) and Kvanig (1992).

most part, "internal" to the Agent [kartṛ]; that is, that are accessible to the Agent [kartṛ] through "armchair reflection."[115] Some of these processes, such as the recollection of observed states of affairs, supervene on non-epistemic "facts" about the world e.g., that pots are made by intelligent makers, while others supervene on more epistemic processes e.g., comparison with well-known and paradigmatic inferences.[116] It is important to note, however, that the context for the Naiyāyikas argument for the existence of Īśvara is an inference-for-another [parārthānumāna]; a context that requires, at least rhetorically, that the Naiyāyikas be able to show another Agent [kartṛ] that H2 and H3a do not apply to the inferential reason [hetu] being considered. Built into their account of showing in this inferential context is, therefore, an "externalist" requirement that they appeal to processes that are acceptable to this other Agent [kartṛ]. Showing is not, therefore, simply a matter of "armchair reflection" since the processes that are acceptable to this other Agent [kartṛ] are not available through introspection alone. Characterizing the epistemic practice of showing will depend, therefore, not only upon the nature of the defect but also upon the particular dialogical context in which it is being shown that that defect does not apply. This further complicates any characterization of the Nyāya account of justificaton by adding, at least formally, a "contextualist" dimension to the practice.[117] The qualifying phrases "at least rhetorically" and "at least

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[115]On my use of the term, "internal" refers to what is commonly known as 'Access Internalism' which is "the view that only what is cognitively accessible to the subject in some strong fashion can have any bearing on justification. (...) Strong cognitive access to a fact is variously conceived; the most common version is that the fact be ascertainable by the subject just by reflecting on the matter." Alston (1998: 822) in Craig, ed., (1998). Externalist views generally deny that strong cognitive access is based on reflection alone.

[116]Sosa (1991: 181)

[117]"Contextualism"in epistemology denotes a variety of views according to which epistemic concepts such as knowledge and justification are in some way relative to context. Consider, for example, DeRose (1999: Chapter 8) in Greco and Sosa, eds.(1999).

formally" are added to highlight the fact that the dialogical demands of the Nyāya account are secondary to what is primarily a version of (access) Internalism. In fact, the externalist element is, at least in Ratnakīrti's presentation of the Nyāya position, primarily a narrative device. While the general framework of the Nyāya account of justification -- **showing** leading to **satisfaction** leading to **determination** leading to **justification** -- will be invariant between different Instruments of inferential awareness [pramiti-karaṇa], the specific arguments for how it is known that a particular defect does not apply to a particular Instrument will vary considerably. This feature of the Nyāya account makes any single characterization of the Nyāya account unnecessary.

4.0 Conclusion

As I have presented it, the Naiyāyikas argument for the existence of Īśvara is most directly an argument about whether H2 or H3a apply to the inferential reason [hetu] "on account of being an effect." The argument is, therefore, about whether the inferential reason [hetu] is a well-functioning Instrument of awareness; whether the inferential argument [anumāna] of which it is a part is justified; and whether the state of awareness that is produced by it is known to be warranted. Through critical engagement with an

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"(...) "contextualism" refer to the position that the truth-conditions of knowledge ascribing and knowledge denying sentences (sentences of the form "S knows that P" and "S doesn't known that P" are related variants of such sentences) vary in certain ways according to the context in which they are uttered. What so varies is the epistemic standards that S must meet in order for such a statement to be true." DeRose (1999:187).

"We can construe contextualism regarding *justification* as an analogue of what we're calling contextualism about knowledge: According to the contextualist about justification, the standards of justified belief that a subject must meet in order to render true a sentence describing a belief of hers as justified vary with context." DeRose (1999:189). In addition to DeRose, other well known statements of contextualism can be found in Lewis (1979, 1996), Unger (1994) and Williams (1991).

opponent, Ratnakīrti's Naiyāyikas consider and reject a series of arguments through which an opponent argues that they either have not satisfied or cannot satisfy the Instrument Conditions A2.1 and A2.2 that are defined by the defects H2 and H3a. Both the issues that are raised by the opponent and the Naiyāyikas responses provide the basis for Ratnakīrti's critique. In his critique, which will be discussed in Chapter 2, Ratnakīrti builds upon the opponent's insights by developing them into a series of arguments that are not only about the Naiyāyikas argument for the existence of Īśvara, but also about the Nyāya theory of justification that is used to defend it.

Chapter 2
Ratnakīrti's Critique

0. Introduction

Ratnakīrti's Naiyāyikas defended their argument for the nature and existence of Īśvara by showing that none of the possible defects of the inferential reason, "on account of being an effect [kāryatvāt]," applied to it. They concluded, therefore, that this inferential reason [hetu] was a well-functioning Instrument for the inferential awareness of Īśvara. Interestingly, in responding to their arguments, Ratnakīrti does not consider each defect in sequence and then argue that it does or does not apply to their inferential reason [hetu]. Instead, he reorganizes the Naiyāyikas' presentation of the material and discusses the issues raised in their defense of the argument under three more general section headings. There is, for example, a *Section on Pervasion* [vyāpti], in which he discusses the nature of inference-warranting relations and how such relations can be established; a *Section on the Inferential Reason* [hetu], in which he discusses its proper scope; and finally a *Section on the Property to be Proved* [sādhya], in which he discusses the special characteristics [viśeṣa] of the property to be proved that can and cannot be proved through inferential reasoning.[1] In each of these sections, Ratnakīrti brings together those aspects of the Naiyāyikas' defense that have to do with the topic being considered and then, in that context, discusses their arguments that specific defects such as H2 or H3a do not apply.[2] His response to the Naiyāyikas' discussion of a particular

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[1] *Section on Pervasion*, RNA [40.17-50.20]; *Section on the Inferential Reason*, RNA [50.21-54.04]; *Section on the Property to be Proved* [54.05-57.10].

[2] H2 is the defect called "Opposed [viruddha]" and H3, the defect called "Inconclusive [anaikāntika]. See Chapter 1, Sections 2.3.1.2, 3.1, and 3.2.

defect is, therefore, often distributed throughout the three sections. For example, his discussion of H2 is primarily in the *Section on the Property to be Proved* [sādhya] while his discussion of H3a is distributed throughout the *Section on Pervasion* [vyāpti] and the *Section on the Inferential Reason* [hetu]. In each of these sections, Ratnakīrti seeks to undermine not only the Naiyāyikas' argument for the existence of Īśvara but also the epistemological theory that supports all such inferential arguments. More specifically, his two targets are the Nyāya theory of inference-warranting relations [vyāpti]; that is, their account of the pervasion sub-component of the Instrument of inferential awarenes and their theory of justification. In discussing his arguments I will follow the order of Ratnakīrti's critique, but, will selectively focus on those aspects of his discussion that are most relevant to H2 and H3a. Since H3a is considered first, I will begin in section 1.4 with Ratnakīrti's discussion of it as it is presented both in the *Section on Pervasion* [vyāpti] and the *Section on the Inferential Reason* [hetu]. H2 will be considered in section 3.0. Before turning to Ratnakīrti's specific discussion of H3a, however, it will be helpful to first consider his description of the Nyāya theory of inference-warranting relations [vyāpti] (section 1.2) and his general critique of it (section 1.3). This rather lengthy discussion is necessary for appreciating both the force of his more specific arguments and their broader philosophical significance.

1. The Section on Pervasion

Ratnakīrti begins the critical part of his "Refutation of Arguments for Establishing Īśvara [īśvarasādhanadūṣaṇa]" with a long section in which he argues that none of the known methods for establishing inference-warranting relations [vyāpti] can be used to establish pervasion between effects-in-general [kārya-mātra] and an intelligent-maker [buddhimat-

(kartā)].[3] This is true, he argues, not only for the method favored by the Naiyāyikas but for all of the methods about which he is aware.[4] Included in this discussion are also more general remarks about the sorts of relations that can be inference-warranting and the methods that are adequate for establishing them. It is helpful to divide Ratnakīrti's remarks in this section into three groups: The first group is directed towards criticizing the Naiyāyikas' analysis of the nature of inference-warranting relations [vyāpti]; the second focuses on showing that the method that the Naiyāyikas propose for establishing such relations is inadequate; and the third extends these critiques to the pervasion sub-component [vyāpti] of the Instrument in the Naiyāyikas' argument for the existence of Īśvara. The first two groups of remarks will be discussed together in section 1.3 and will provide the background for the third group of remarks which will be discussed, in detail,

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[3] See RNA [40.17-57.10], Part II of his "Refutation of Arguments for Establishing Īśvara [īśvarasādhanadūṣaṇa]." This section of text is translated in Appendix B.

[4] Ratnakīrti considers four alternatives: Alternative 1, RNA [40.24-43.29]; Alternative 2, RNA [43.30-45.29]; Alternative 3, [45.30-49.12]; and Alternative 4, [49.13-50.04]. Ratnakīrti explains that Alternative 3 is the Naiyāyikas' view. My discussion focuses on this section of text. In my view, this list of alternatives is intended to exhaust the "candidate accounts."

The four alternatives are listed at RNA [40.19-40.23]: sā ca gṛhyamāṇā kiṃ, kāraṇakāryamātrayor iva viparyayabādhakapramāṇabalād grāhyā | yad vā 'gnidhūmayor iva viśiṣṭānvayavyatirekagrahaṇapravaṇaviśiṣṭapratyakṣānupalambhābhyāṃ boddhavyā | uta svavyavasthayā sapakṣāsapakṣayor bhūyodarśanād darśanādarśanābhyāṃ prtayetavyā | āhosvit sapakṣāsapakṣayoḥ sakṛd darśanādarśanābhyām jñātavyeti catvāro vikalpāḥ | "And how is that (pervasion) grasped? There are four possibilities: (1) It is grasped by a warranted mode of awareness that disproves the presence (of the inferential reason) in dissimilar cases, like in the (inference-warranting) relation between a cause and an effect-in-general; (2) It is known by a specific perception and non-perception which seeks to grasp a specific (instance) of positive and negative concomitance, like in the (inference warranting) relation between smoke and fire; (3) It is known by numerous observations (of the inferential reason) in similar cases and non-observations in dissimilar cases, as per your position; or (4) It is known by single observation (of the inferential reason) in a similar case and non-observation in a dissimilar case.

Alternatives (2) and (3) are also discussed in Ratnakīrti's "Inquiry into Inference-Warranting Relations [vyāptinirṇaya]." For example, Alternative (2), which describes Ratnakīrti's view, is introduced at RNA [VN: 106.01-106.02] and Alternative (3), which is attributed to the Naiyāyikas, is discussed at RNA [VN: 106.24-108.02; 109.27-111.24]. Interestingly, Ratnakīrti makes use of the similarities between the Nyāya position and the (Bhāṭṭa) Mīmāṃsā position to support his criticism of Alterntive (3). For his criticism of
this position see RNA [VN: 106.02-106.12; 108.23-109.12]. Much of Ratnakīrti's discussion of Alternative (3) parallels his discussion in his VN.

in sections 1.4-3.3. A useful way of initially thinking about all of these issues, however, is in terms of what I will call "epistemic necessity."

1.1 Epistemic Necessity

As discussed in Chapter 1, an inference-warranting relation [vyāpti] is a component of an Instrument of inferential awareness [anumiti-karaṇa].[5] More specifically, it is one of the two sub-components of its functioning [vyāpāra].[6] This "pervasion [vyāpti]" sub-component is defined in terms of the second (T2) and third (T3) "Instrument Conditions (T)" and so is closely associated with defects such as H2 and H3a. In order for an Instrument to be well-functioning, this sub-component must not be <u>defeated</u> or <u>undermined</u> by either defect. An inference-warranting relation is said to be "defeated" by defect H3a, for example, when a locus is identified in which the inferential reason [hetu] is known to be present and the property to be proved [sādhya] is known to be absent. Let us refer to this as $H3a_1$. In such cases, T3 is defeated. Defect H2 also defeats an inference-warranting relation since in directly showing that an inferential reason [hetu] is pervaded by the absence of the property to be proved [sādhya] it also shows, indirectly, that the inferential reason is present in at least one dissimilar case. Let us refer to H2 as a "direct defeater " of T2 and an "indirect defeater" of T3.[7] It is important to note that as I have interpreted them T2 and T3 are only defined by their

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[5]See Chapter 1, Section 2.3.1.2.

[6]The other sub-component is defined in terms of T1 which states that an inferential reason must be known to be present in the subject of the inference [pakṣadharmatva]. The defect associated with T1 is H1b. See Chapter 1, Section 2.3.1.2.

[7]See Chapter 1, Section 2.3.1.2.

direct defeaters.[8] An inference-warranting relation is "undermined" by defect H3a when there is doubt about the exclusion of the inferential reason [hetu] from (all) dissimilar cases [vipakṣa]. Let us refer to this as $H3a_2$. Only a relation that is neither defeated nor undermined may be a sub-component of a well-functioning Instrument of inferential awareness. For the Naiyāyikas, let us stipulate that when it is known that none of the defects that could affect the pervasion sub-component of an Instrument apply to it, the pervasion sub-component of that Instrument is known to have "epistemic necessity" and is, therefore, "necessary enough" to be the pervasion sub-component of a *well-functioning* Instrument.[9] This means that a pervasion sub-component is inference-warranting only when the relation between its two terms; that is, the inferential reason [hetu] and the property to be proved [sādhya], is known to be epistemically necessary.[10]

In what I am calling his first set of remarks, Ratnakīrti discusses the Nyāya theory of inference-warranting relations and argues that the conditions in terms of which these relations are defined are too weak to define epistemic necessity. For convenience, let us refer to the conditions in terms which such relations are defined as "Pervasion Conditions." In his second set of remarks, Ratnakīrti argues that the method that the Naiyāyikas propose for satisfying the Pervasion Conditions and determining epistemic necessity is inadequate.[11] He concludes, therefore, that given their own criteria the Naiyāyikas are unable to determine whether or not a proposed relation is epistemically

[8]More precisely, T2 is defined in terms of H2 and H3b and T3 in terms of H3a and H3b.

[9]This condition will be modified, slightly, in Section 1.2.

[10]See Section 1.3.1.

[11]See Section 1.3.2.

necessary. Before turning to Ratnakīrti's critical remarks, however, it is important to consider his description of the Nyāya theory.

1.2 A "Natural-Mode" for Pervasion; The Nyāya Theory.

Ratnakīrti chooses to describe the Nyāya theory of inference-warranting relations [vyāpti] by quoting a number of passages from the work of the Naiyāyikas, Vācaspatimiśra and Trilocana. His description, which presupposes that T2 and T3 state necessary conditions for pervasion, focuses on the Naiyāyikas' account of the nature of inference-warranting relations, their analysis of Pervasion Conditions other than T2 and T3, and their position on how all such conditions can be satisfied. As a way of providing a context for Vācaspatimiśra and Trilocana's remarks, Ratnakīrti first provides a quick summary of their view. He says:

> [a] (...) the connection [pratibandha] (between an inferential-reason and the property to be proved) is known from repeated observations and non-observations [bhūyo-darśaṇa-adarśaṇa]. But, that connection is not taken [grahītavya] to be a causal one [tadutpatti], but rather, as one that is natural [svābhāvika]. And such (a connection) is definitely known through observation and non-observation.[12]

Ratnakīrti then supports this description by specifically referring to the work of Vācaspatimiśra and Trilocana. He says:

> [b] Vācaspati has stated the matter in this way: "We do not say that (the inferential reason) 'being an effect [kāryatva]' brings about inferential awareness [gamakatva] because it is observed in similar cases [sapakṣa] and (not observed) in dissimilar cases [asapakṣa]. Rather, (we say that) it is because of a natural connection [svābhāvika-pratibandha]. And that (connection) is definitely known, in the manner to be stated, by

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[12]RNA [45.30-45.33]: {nanu} bhūyodarśanādarśanābhyāṃ pratibandhaḥ pratīyata {iti tṛtīya evāsmākaṃ pakṣaḥ}| kevalaṃ sa pratibandho na tadutpattilakṣaṇo grahītavyaḥ | kin tu svābhāvikaḥ | sa eva darśanādarśanābhyāṃ pratīyate |

observations (of the inferential reason) in similar cases and non-observations (of it) in dissimilar cases. (...) It is correct that (when) the natural connection [svābhāvika-pratibandha] of one (thing) with another (thing) is known to be (epistemically) necessary [niyata], the one (thing) is indeed the inferential reason [gamaka] and the other relata [sambandhī], what is to be proved [gamya].

To explain [tathā hi]: There is a natural relation [saṃbandha svābhāvika] of smoke with fire but not of fire with smoke. This is because it (i.e., fire) is perceived [upalabhyante] even without smoke. If fire is put together with [anubhavati] wet fuel, however, then it is related with smoke. But, (this) relation of fire (with smoke) is clearly brought about by the additional condition [upādhi], wet fuel, and is not natural. Therefore, it is not (epistemically) necessary [niyata]. On the other hand [tu], the relation of smoke with fire is natural. This is because an additional condition [upādhi] is not seen (and) deviation [vyabhicāra] is not observed anywhere."[13]

[c] Vācaspati also said this: "It is (...) just a sense faculty that is assisted by latent cognitive impressions which were produced by numerous observations that grasps the natural relation of smoke with fire. This is just like (the repeated observations of a jeweler that enable him to determine) that a real jewel is different from an artificial one."[14]

[d] This point [artha] was again stated by Trilocana.: "(...) the warranted mode of awareness that removes doubt about the (presence of) the inferential reason [hetu] in dissimilar cases [vipakṣa] is just a perception [pratyakṣa], called non-apprehension [anupalabdhi]. This is (also) the means for ascertaining the absence of an additional

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[13]RNA [45.32-46.13]: vācaspatiḥ prāha | na sapakṣāsapakṣayor darśanābhyām kāryatvasya gamakatvam api tu svābhāvikapratibandhabalād iti brūmaḥ | sa eva tu sapakṣāsapakṣayor darśanādarśanābhyāṃ vakṣyamāṇena krameṇa pratīyate iti tadupakṣepo 'pi yuktaḥ | tena yasyāsau svābhāvikapratibandho niyataḥ siddhaḥ sa eva gamako gamyaś cetaraḥ sambandhīti yujyate |

tathā hi dhūmādīnāṃ vahnyādibhiḥ saha sambandhaḥ svābhāviko na tu vahnyādīnāṃ dhūmādibhiḥ | te hi vinā dhūmādhibhir upalabhyante | yadā tv ārdrendhanasambandham anubhavanti tadā dhūmādibhiḥ saṃbadhyante | tasmād vahnyādīnām ārdrendhanādy upādhikṛtaḥ sambandho na tu svābhāvikas tato na niyataḥ | svābhāvikas tu dhūmādīnāṃ vahnyādibhiḥ sambandhaḥ, tadupādher anupalabhyamānatvāt | kvacid vyabhicārasyādarśanāt |

Parallel passages to RNA [46.04-46.11] can be found at RNA [VN: 106.24-107.05] and NVTT [135.08-135.14].

[14]RNA [47.01-47.02]: vācaspatināpīdam uktam abhijātamaṇibhedatattvavad bhūyodarśanajanitasaṃskārasahāyam indriyam eva dhūmādīnāṃ vahnyādibhiḥ svābhāvikasaṃbandhagrāhīti yuktam iti ||

Parallel passages to RNA [47.01-47.02] can be found at RNA [VN: 107.23-107.24] and NVTT [136.22-136.23]. Also see SV [anumāna, 12], SVK [3. 16, 14-15], and RNA [46.21-46.23].

condition which has met the requirements for apprehension [upalabdhi-lakṣaṇa-prāpta]. This is how a relation is proved to be natural [svābhāvika]."[15]

These passages describe the Nyāya theory of inference-warranting relations [vyāpti] by characterizing the relation as "natural [svābhāvika]" (passaage [a], passage [b]); by identifying what appear to be two further conditions for pervasion, the absence of an "additional condition [upādhi]" and the absence "deviation [vyabhicāra]" (passage [b]); and by proposing a method through which it can be known that the Pervasion Conditions have been satisfied (passage [c], passage [d]). What follows is a brief discussion of each of these.

1.2.1 Natural Relations

Vācaspati explains that the relation or "connection [pratibandha]" between an inferential reason [hetu] and a property that is proved by it [sādhya] is not epistemically necessary simply because the two terms are repeatedly observed together in similar cases [sapakṣa] and not observed together in dissimilar cases [asapakṣa] (passage [b]). Rather, it is because there is a "natural connection [svābhāvika-pratibandha]" between them.[16] It is this non-epistemic relation that is taken to underwrite genuinely inference-warranting relations and their epistemic necessity. The patterns of observation [darśana] and non-

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[15]RNA [46.27-46.31]: trilocanena punar ayam arthaḥ kathitaḥ -bhūyodarśanena bhūyodarśanasahāyena manasā tajjātīyānāṃ saṃbandho gṛhīto bhavati | ato dhūmo 'gniṃ na vyabhicarati | tadvyabhicāre 'py upādhirahitaṃ sambandham atikrāmet | hetor vipakṣaśaṅkānivartakaṃ pramāṇam upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptopādhivirahaniścayahetur anupalambhākhyaṃ pratyakṣam eva | tataḥ siddhaḥ svābhāvikaḥ sambandhaḥ | {tathehāpīti svamataṃ vyavasthāpitam iti} ||

A parallel passage to RNA [46.27-46.31] can be found at RNA [VN: 106.19-106.23].

[16]For a discussion of this theory see Oberhammer (1964), Oberhammer (1965) and Vattanky (1984: 76-79).

observation [adarśana] are, according to the Naiyāyikas, epistemic facts that, like epistemic necessity, are supervenient upon this natural relation [saṃbandhaḥ svābhāvikah]. In addition, as Ratnakīrti explains, such relations are not identical to causal relations and so should not be interpreted in terms of the earlier proposed "production-mode [tadutpatti]" of pervasion. Although the class of natural relations may include causal ones, it is clear that it also includes those that are not (passage [a]).[17] For example, consider Vācaspati's example of the jeweler (passage [c]). In this standard example, traditional instruction in gemology, including repeated observations of genuine and fake rubies, is said to result in the identification of a distinguishing characteristic for genuine rubies i.e., "rainbow-like lustre [indradhanurākārajyoti]."[18] Partly on the basis of having observed this characteristic in genuine rubies (T2) and not having observed it in any fake ones (T3), an experienced jeweler is supposed to be able to determine whether a particular stone is a genuine ruby or a fake. According to the Naiyāyikas, his observations [darśana] and non-observations [adarśana] must also be supplemented with the non-observation of an "additional condition [upādhi]" and the non-observation "deviation [vyabhicāra]" (passage [b], passage [c]).[19] It is on the basis of all of these observations and non-observations that a jeweler can infer that a particular stone (the subject of the inference [pakṣa]) is a genuine ruby (the property to be proved [sādhya]) because it has rainbow-like lustre (the inferential reason [hetu]). According to the

[17]See NB, NV, and NVTT ad NS 1.1.5 and NS 2.1.37-2.1.38 where, for example, the following inferential arguments are discussed: (1) The prediction of rain from seeing a rising cloud (or from seeing ants scurrying about carrying their eggs); (2) An inference of rain from seeing a full and swiftly flowing river; and (3) An inference of movement from seeing the moon at one place at one time and at a different place at a different time. For another example, see Section 1.4.1.1.

[18]Ratnakīrti explains this point about "traditional instruction" in gemology and specifies the defining characteristic "rainbow-like lustre" at RNA [48.14-48.10]. This section of text is quoted and discussed in Section 1.3.

[19]Additional conditions [upādhi] will be discussed in Section 1.2.2.2 and deviation [vyabhicāra] in Section 1.2.2.1

Naiyāyikas, what accounts for the epistemic necessity of the inference-warranting relation [vyāpti] in this argument is that the terms of the relation are known to be naturally related.

1.2.2 Pervasion Conditions

In addition to T2 and T3, Vācaspati suggests that natural relations [svābhāvika-sambandha] must meet two further conditions that are defined in terms of the non-observation of an "additional condition [upādhi]" and the non-observation of "deviation [vyabhicāra]" (passage [b], passage [d]). In so far as these conditions are described as necessary conditions for natural relations they are also necessary conditions for epistemic necessity and so for the pervasion sub-components of well-functioning Instruments of inferential awareness. It is helpful, therefore, to think of the presence of either an additional condition [upādhi (U)] or deviation [vyabhicāra (V)] as a defeater of both pervasion and epistemic necessity and their absence as a necessary condition for both. Interestingly, according to the Naiyāyikas, U and V are understood to be defeaters of T3 and deviation [vyabhicāra], which is also understood be a defeater of T2, is specifically identified with each of the three sub-types of the defect called "inconclusive" (H3).[20] Given this, it is important to consider whether U and V define Pervasion Conditions that are distinct from T2 and T3.

1.2.2.1 Deviation

[20]Since H3c is not discussed in KTBh, deviation is only identified with H3a and H3b. My discussion, however, will include H3c since it is mentioned in RNA. This does not constitute a significant departure from KTBh since what is philosophically significant is that H3 can be completely described in terms of deviation and deviation in terms of H3. See below.

In my view, deviation [vyabhicāra] should not be interpreted as defining a distinct Pervasion Condition since, according to the Naiyāyikas, "deviation" is a technical term that specifically refers to a property that is shared by H3a, H3b, and H3c; that is, the three sub-types of the defect called "inconclusive (H3) [anaikāntika]."[21] More specifically, "deviation [vyabhicāra]" is usually defined in terms of an epistemological rule which states that in order for an inferential reason [hetu] to be well-functioning it must be known to be present in similar cases [sapakṣa] (T2) and excluded from (all) dissimilar cases [vipakṣa] (T3). This rule is sometimes referred to as the "rule of non-deviation [avyabhicāra-niyama]."[22] "Deviation [vyabhicāra]" is specifically defined by the violation of this rule which, it is important to note, is itself defined by T2 and T3.[23] The property that is shared by H3a, H3b, and H3c may be thought of, therefore, as the property of 'being a non-deviation rule violator.' Deviation can be helpfully interpreted, therefore, as a pervasion-defeating property that is shared, in different

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[21]KTBh [105.04-105.05] explains the relationship between "deviation [vyabhicāra]" and the defect called "inconclusive [anaikāntika (H3)]" as follows: evaṃ yatra vyabhicārādayas tathābhūtās te 'naikāntikāḥ. "In this way, where instances of [ādyas] deviation that are like that, the (defect) is inconclusive." KTBh [113.11] states that another name for the defect called "inconclusive [anaikāntika]" is "deviating [savyabhicāra]:" sādhyasaṃśayahetur anaikāntikaḥ savyabhicāra iti vocyate. "An inferential reason that results in doubt about the property to be proved may be called either 'inconclusive' or 'deviating'."

[22]See Chapter 1, Section 3.2.2, where RNA [37.12-37.16] is discussed. The term "non-deviation rule [avyabhicāraniyama] is used there.

[23]KTBh [114.10-115.02] describes "deviation [vyabhicāra] as follows: vyabhicāras tu lakṣyate | saṃbhavatsapakṣavipakṣasya hetoḥ sapakṣavṛttitve sati vipakṣād vyāvṛttir eva niyamo gamakatvāt | tasya ca sādhyaviparītāvyāptasya tanniyamābhāvo vyabhicāraḥ | "Now, deviation is defined. The rule is that an inferential reason, for which a similar and dissimilar case is possible, is well-functioning [gamakatva] only (when) it is excluded from dissimilar cases (T3) while being present in a similar case (T2). 'Deviation' is the absence of this rule for an inferential reason that is not pervaded by the absence of what is to be proved."

Note: The phrase 'for an inferential reason that is not pervaded by the absence of what is to be proved' is added to prevent H2 from being classified as a sub-type of H3.

ways, by H3a, H3b, and H3c.[24] The requirement that deviation must not be observed in order for a relation to be natural and have epistemic necessity is, therefore, equivalent to the requirement that H3a, H3b, and H3c not apply to the inferential reason being considered; that is, that T2 and T3 be satisfied. The "non-observation of deviation," then, refers to the non-observation of this property and is equivalent to showing that these three defects do not apply to an inferential reason.[25] It is this "equivalence" that accounts for the assimilation of deviation [vyabhicāra] into H3 and supports the idea that the non-observation of deviation [vyabhicāra] should not be interpreted as a Pervasion Condition that is distinct from the satisfaction of T2 and T3.

1.2.2.2 Additional Conditions

Interestingly, since the presence of an additional condition [upādhi] is often defined as a sub-type of the defect called "unestablished (H1)," it too can be described as a defect of an inferential reason.[26] However, the Naiyāyikas do not identify the presence of an

[24]For example, H3a (i.e., the defect called "common [sādhārana]") possesses the property 'being a non-deviation rule violater' because although it is present in a similar case (T2) it is also known to be present in a dissimilar case; that is, it is known to violate T3. Similarly, H3b (i.e., the defect called "uncommon [asādhāraṇa]") violates the non-deviation rule because it is known not to be present in a similar case; that is, it is known to violate T2, or in a dissimilar case; that is, it is known to satisfy T3. H3c (i.e., the defect called "not-universal [anupasaṃhārin]") violates the rule by violating both T2 and T3. What individuates these three defects is how the property that they share is instantiated in a particular case.

[25]As mentioned earlier, "deviation" can also be used to refer to a locus or property-possessor in which 'U' is present. On this use of the term, the 'non-observation of deviation' refers to the non-observation of a locus of deviation.

[26]KTBh discusses H1 and its three main subtypes at KTBh [35.07-38.04; 104.05-113.03]. Both sections associate one sub-type of H1c with additional conditions.

KTBh [110.06-111.07] defines H1c, the defect called "unestablished in being pervaded [vyāpyatvāsiddha]" as follows: vyāpyatvāsiddhas tu sa eva yatra hetor vyāptir nāvagamyate | sa dvividhaḥ | ekaḥ sādhyenāsahacaritaḥ | aparas tu sopādhikasādhyasaṃbandhī . "But where the pervasion of an inferential reason is not known there is indeed (the defect), unestablished in being pervaded. It is of two sorts. The first is (defined by an inferential reason which is) not (known to be) accompanied by

additional condition [upādhi] with the defects that define T2 and T3. This suggests that there is not "closure" with respect to the satisfaction of T2 and T3; that is, that although it may be known that T2 and T3 are satisfied it may not be known that an additional condition [upādhi] is absent; that is, that U is satisfied.[27] In contrast, there is closure with respect to deviation [vyabhicāra]; that is, if it is known that T2 and T3 are satisfied it is known that deviation [vyabhicāra] is absent; that is, that V is satisfied.[28] It is helpful, therefore, to consider the absence of an additional condition [upādhi] as a Pervasion Condition that is distinct from T2 and T3. Before considering the significance of this to the Naiyāyikas' account of epistemic necessity it may be helpful to consider the Nyāya account of additional conditions [upādhi] in greater detail.

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the property to be proved and the other is one which is (known to be) related to the property to be proved through an additional condition."

KTBh [36.07-36.08] also describes the two sub-types of H1c: vyāpyatvāsiddhas tu dvividhaḥ | eko vyāptigrāhakapramāṇābhāvāt | aparas tūpādhisadbhāvāt. "Unestablished in being pervaded is of two sorts. The first is due to the absence of a well-functioning Instrument of awareness that grasps pervasion and the other is due to the presence of an additional condition."

Note: An example of the first sub-type of "unestablished in being pervaded" is an inference of the momentariness (s) of sound (p) from its existence (h). In this case, the pervasion of the inferential reason is said to be unknown because there is not a well-functioning Instrument of awareness that can prove its pervasion with the property to be proved. See KTBh [110.08-111.01].

[27]The Naiyāyikas do not classify inferential reasons with additional conditions as being defective because of either H2 and H3. As a result, H1c cannot be taken to be a direct defeater of either T2 or T3. This does not mean, however, that H1c cannot be related toT2 or T3. For example, although the Naiyāyikas insist that because H1c is not a direct defeater of T2 or T3 it is not equivalent to H2 or H3, it is still possible for H1c to be interpreted as an indirect defeater of T3.

[28]My use of the term "closure" is related to (though not identical with) the standard use of the term. For example, knowledge is generally said to be "closed" under logical implication in cases in which an S who knows that p and also knows that p entails q is assumed to know that q. For the Naiyāyikas, there is non-closure with respect to the satisfaction of U; that is, although an Agent may know that T2 and T3 are satisfied and that the satisfaction of T2 and T3 entails the satisfaction of U, she is not assumed to know that U is satisfied. There is, however, closure with respect to the satsifaction of V; that is, an Agent who knows that T2 and T3 are satisfied and knows that the satisfaction of T2 and T3 entails the satisfaction of V, is assumed to know that V is satisfied. For more on "closure" and "non-closure" see Nozick (1981: 172-185; 197-217).

Vācaspati introduces the idea of an additional condition [upādhi] by pointing to an asymmetry in the relation of fire and smoke, namely, that the relation of smoke (the inferential reason) with fire (the property to be proved) is natural [svābhāvika] while the relation of fire (the inferential reason) with smoke (the property to be proved) is not (passage [b]). It is explained that this asymmetry is due to the presence of the additional condition [upādhi], contact with wet fuel [ārdrendhanasaṃyoga].[29] According to the Naiyāyikas, an additional condition [upādhi] is a property without which a proposed inferential reason [hetu] will not be pervaded by a property that is supposed to be proved by it [sādhya]. More accurately, such a property is said to be a non-pervader [avyāpaka] of the proposed inferential reason [sādhana] and a pervader [vyāpaka] of the property that is to be proved [sādhya].[30] The presence of such a property 'U' indirectly defeats T3 by (directly) showing that the epistemic necessity between a proposed inferential reason and property to be proved is contingent upon an additional condition [upādhi]. In so doing, it indicates that there are loci in which the inferential reason is present but the

[29]This is the standard example of such a condition. In the inference of fire from smoke, for example, the inference-warranting relation is "wherever there is smoke there is fire (yatra yatra dhūmas tatra tatra vahniḥ)." This relation is generally agreed to be epistemically necessary and according to the Naiyāyikas an example of a relation that is "natural." In the inference of smoke from fire, however, the proposed inference-warranting relation is "wherever there is fire there is smoke (yatra yatra vahnis tatra tatra dhūmaḥ)." As stated, however, this relation is neither epistemically necesssary nor natural since, for example, it may be known that it does not satisfy T3 since it is known that a red-hot iron ball is a dissimilar case in which the inferential reason is known to be present. Fire(-in-general) is not, therefore, a well-functioning Instrument for the inferential awareness of smoke. It is important to note, however, that although "fire (in-general)" violates T3 it is not said, in this context, to be defective because of H3a. Instead, in this context, it is recognized that when fire-in-general is in contact with wet fuel (ārdrendhanasaṃyoga), fire can be a well-functioning Instrument for the inferential awareness of smoke. The pervasion sub-component of this well-functioning Instrument, however, is not "wherever there is fire there is smoke (yatra yatra vahnis tatra tatra dhūmaḥ)" but "wherever there is fire in contact with wet fuel there is smoke (ārdrendhanasaṃyoge sati yatra yatra vahnis tatra tatra dhūmah)." According to the Naiyāyikas, this shows that the relation of fire with smoke is not natural because it is brought about by an additional condition [upādhi], contact with wet fuel (and not because of H3a). For other examples see KTBh [111, 229] and Bhattacharya (1976: 257-262).

[30]KTBh [37.08-37.09]: sādhyavyāpakatve sati sādhanāvyāpaka upādhir iti upādhilakṣaṇam. " An additional condition is 'a pervader of the property to be proved that is a non-pervader of the inferential reason.' This is the defining characteristic of an additional condition."

property to be proved is not; that is, it indirectly indicates that the inferential reason is known to be present in at least one dissimilar case [vipakṣa]. Like H2, the presence of such a property is helpfully thought of as an indirect defeater of T3 but (unlike H2) a direct defeater of the pervasion sub-component [vyāpti] of the proposed Instrument. As implied in the passages quoted above, it is the absence of such a property (or defeater) that is a necessary condition for pervasion and epistemic necessity. As Trilocana explains, this condition is satisfied by the non-observation of 'U' (passage [c]).[31] Interestingly, the Naiyāyikas do not associate the presence of 'U' with either defect H2 or H3a and therefore with either T2 or T3.[32] Instead, as mentioned earlier, it is usually identified with a sub-type of the defect called "unestablished (H1)." This sub-type is defined as "one in which being pervaded is not established [vyāpyatvāsiddha] (H1c)" and is said to apply to an inferential reason which is "related to the property to be proved (only) through an additional condition [upādhi]."[33] The significance of this for an interpretation of the Nyāya theory of epistemic necessity is two-fold. Firstly, it reveals that even though T2 and T3 state necessary conditions for epistemic necessity they are not sufficient. It is also necessary to show that an additional condition is [upādhi] absent; that is, that H1c does not apply. Let us refer to this as Pervasion Condition, U.[34] Secondly, it shows that there is not closure with respect to the satisfaction of T3; that is, that although it may be known that an inferential reason [hetu] is excluded from (all) dissimilar cases, it must still be shown, through non-apprehension, that an additional

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[31] The satisfaction of the Pervasion Conditions is discussed in Section 1.2.3

[32] On my interpretation, this is because 'U' is not a "direct defeater" of either T2 or T3. It is a direct defeater of pervasion itself; that is, the conjunction of T2 and T3.

[33] See earlier note: "sopādhikasādhyasaṃbandhī (hetuḥ)."

[34] "U" refers to Pervasion Condition U and "'U'" to property 'U'.

condition [upādhi] is absent. Although it indirectly defeats T3, property 'U' defines a separate Pervasion Condition. Interestingly, in addition to being a defeater of pervasion, property 'U' is also said to be an "effecting condition [prayojaka]" for the proposed relation.[35] This feature of property 'U' indicates that given its presence, a proposed inferential reason [hetu] would be naturally related to the property that is supposed to be proved by it [sādhya]. In other words when 'U' is conjoined to the proposed inferential reason [hetu], the conjunction of 'U' and the proposed inferential reason is naturally related to the property to be proved [sādhya].

The following example (passage [b]) illustrates both features of property 'U.' Suppose that someone proposes to infer the presence of smoke, which in this case is the property to be proved [sādhya], from the presence of fire, the inferential reason [hetu]. She insists that the relation between the inferential reason, fire, and the property to be proved, smoke, is a natural relation [svābhāvika-sambandha] and that as a result it has epistemic necessity. She also claims to have satisfied both T2 and T3. According to the Naiyāyikas, however, this is not sufficient for determining epistemic necessity since in addition to satsifying T2 and T3 it is also necessary to know that there is not an additional condition [upādhi]. Moreover, according to the Naiyāyikas, it can be shown that this relation is not epistemically necessary. One way this is determined is through detecting the presence of the additional condition [upādhi], "contact with wet fuel [ārdrendhanasaṃyoga]." It is noticed, for example, that a property 'U,' contact with wet fuel, is present everywhere the proposed property to be proved, smoke, is also present. From this, the Naiyāyikas conclude that 'U' is a pervader of the property to be

[35]KTBh [22.01]: prayojakaś copādhir ity ucyate. "It is said that an additional condition is an effecting condition." KTBh [37.08]: projakam upādhir iti yāvat. "The sense is that an additional condition is an effecting condition."

proved [sādhya-vyāpaka]. If the relation between the proposed inferential reason, fire, and the property that is supposed to be proved by it, smoke, is indeed natural, 'U' should also be a pervader of the proposed inferential reason, fire. This is due to the reflexivity and transitivity of the pervasion relation. It is noticed, however, that there are loci in which the proposed inferential reason, fire, is not co-present with 'U.' As an example of such a locus, the Naiyāyikas often point to a red-hot bar of iron. This is a locus in which the proposed inferential reason, fire, is present, but, the property 'U' is not. Thus, 'U' is also known to be a non-pervader of the proposed inferential reason [sādhana-avyāpaka]. As a result, its presence defeats the natural-ness of the proposed relation and its supposed epistemic necessity. In addition, since the relation between the inferential reason conjoined with 'U'; that is, fire which is in contact with wet fuel, and the property to be proved, smoke, is natural and has epistemic necessity, 'U' is an "effecting condition" for the proposed relation. This means that it is only in virtue of 'U' that the relation is epistemically necessary.

Given this, it should be clear why the Naiyāyikas do not consider the presence of an additional condition [upādhi] to be equivalent to defect H3a and why I have described property 'U' as defining a separate Pervasion Condition. Defect H3a is defined in terms of an inferential reason [hetu] which is known to be present in at least one dissimilar case [vipakṣa]. T3 is, therefore, directly defeated by the presence of H3a as is the proposed inference-warranting relation. The presence of property 'U,' however, does not defeat a proposed inference-warranting relation by directly identifying a dissimilar case in which the proposed inferential reason is known to be present. Instead, it does so indirectly through the identification of a property 'U.' In the above example, if the red-hot iron bar were directly cited as a dissimilar case in which the inferential reason is known to be

present, H3a would defeat the relation. As discussed above, however, the counter-example to the proposed pervasion relation is discovered indirectly through directly detecting the presence of an additional condition [upādhi], contact with wet fuel [ārdrendhanasaṃyoga]. It is the presence of the additional condition that is the defeater and not the presence of the counter-example.

1.2.3 Satisfying T2, T3, and U

In order for a relation to be natural and to have epistemic necessity, then, it is necessary (and sufficient) that it meet three Pervasion Conditions; T2, T3, and U. It is through the satisfaction of these conditions that a relation is known to be natural and therefore epistemically necessary. Without an account of how these conditions can be satisfied, however, the Naiyāyikas will not be able to explain how it can be known that such conditions obtain. As Trilocana therefore explains, according to the Naiyāyikas there is an accredited Instrument of warranted awareness [pramāṇa] that enables one to know that there is neither deviation [vyabhicāra] nor an additional condition [upādhi] (passage [d]). This Instrument is a form of sense perception that is called "non-apprehension [anupalambha]" by him (passage [d]) and "non-observation [adarśana]" by Vācaspati (passage [c]). It is through this type of perception that the absence of 'V' and 'U' is said to be known.[36] According to the Naiyāyikas, the first two conditions, T2 and T3,

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[36] In more familiar descriptions of the Nyāya view, "non-apprehension [anupalabdhi]" is not said to be another name for "sense percetion [pratyakṣa]" even though non-apprehension [anupalabdhi] is understood to be a sub-type of perception and not a distinct Instrument for warranted awareness. According to the Naiyāyikas, absences are perceived as a result of the various sense faculties being related to them through what they call a 'characterized-characteristic relation [viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇa-bhāva]' (of which there are five sub-types). For example, in a statement such as "there is no pot on the floor," what is characterized [viśeṣya] is the floor, the characteristic [viśeṣaṇa] is the absence of a pot. See KTBh [18.03-19.01; 47.11-52.02].

can be satsified through the non-apprehension or non-observation of deviation (property 'V' [vyabhicāra]) and the third, U, through the non-observation or non-apprehension of an additional condition (property 'U' [upādhi]). As Vācaspati also explains (passage [c]), together with observations of the inferential reason in similar cases and non-observations in dissimilar cases these non-observations make possible a final observation through which the natural-ness of a relation and its epistemic necessity are directly grasped. According to Vācaspati, numerous observations of the inferential reason in similar cases and non-observations in dissimilar cases is necessary but not sufficient for determining, for example, that the relation between the inferential reason "having rainbow-like luster" and "being a genuine ruby" is natural and has epistemic necessity. In addition to these observations and the non-observation of 'V' and 'U' there must be a "final observation" in which it becomes apparent to the apprentice that the two properties are naturally related. The epistemic necessity between the two terms is itself grasped, therefore, through this final observation which is conditioned by mental impressions that were produced from all of the previous observations and non-observations described

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KTBh [18.10-19.01] summarizes this as follows: tad evam saṃkṣepataḥ pañcavidhasambandhānyatamasambandhasambaddhaviśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvalakṣaṇena indriyārthasannikarṣeṇābhāva indriyeṇa gṛhyate | "So, briefly, an absence is grasped by a sense faculty through the contact relation between the sense faculty and a sense object. This (contact relation) is a 'characteristic-characterized relation' that can be associated with any one of the other five types of (contact) relations.

More importantly, for our purposes, KTBh [48.02-48.03] describes the relationship between sense perception [pratyakṣa], non-apprehension [anupalabdhi], and suppositional reasoning [tarka]: yad yatra ghaṭo 'bhaviṣyat tarhi būtalam iva adrakṣyad ity ādi tarkasahakārinānumpalambhasanāthena pratyakṣeṇaiva abhāvagrahaṇāt {kim abhāvapramāṇeṇa}| "Absence is just grasped by perception which is accompanied by non-apprehension and assisted by suppositional reasoning; that is, 'If a pot were present (on the floor) it would be observed just like the floor (is observed)'."

It is interesting that Ratnakīrti does not choose to focus on the role that suppositional reasoning plays in the Nyāya theory. KTBh describes the important role that suppositional reasoning plays at KTBh [22.08-22.09]: tato darśanābhāvān nāstīti tarkasahakāriṇānupalambhasanāthena pratyakṣeṇaivopādhyabhāvo 'vadhāryate | "Thus, the absence of an additional condition is determined through perception which is assisted by suppositional reasoning and non-apprehension." This passage is quoted in context below.

above (passage [d]). This final observation is also understood by the Naiyāyikas to be an instance of perception and so is also considered to be a warranted mode of awareness.[37] According to the Naiyāyikas, then, in addition to the observation of the inferential reason in similar cases and its non-observation in dissimilar cases, the "final observation" also requires the non-observation of an "additional condition [upādhi]" and a locus of "deviation [vyabhicāra]."[38]

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[37]Kajiyama (1966: 97 n. 59) notes Vācaspati's disagreement with Trilocana about this. According to Trilocana, it is mental-perception that grasps concomitance. According to Vācaspati, concomitance is either grasped by any of the other sub-varieties of sense-perception or by another Instrument of warranted awareness. For an oblique reference to this see RNA [107.22-107.26].

[38]Much of this is also discussed in KTBh [20.06-25.05]. Consider the following, KTBh [21.05-23.02]: tena bhūyodarśanena dhūmāgnyoḥ svābhāvikaṃ saṃbandham avadhārayati yatra dhūmas tatrāgnir iti | yady api yatra yatra maitrītanayatvaṃ tatra tatra śyāmatvam apīti bhūyodarśanaṃ samānam avagamyate tathāpi maitrītanayatvaśyāmatvayor na svābhāvikaḥ saṃbandhaḥ kintv aupādhika eva | śākādyannapariṇāmasyopādher vidyamānatvāt | tathā hi | śyāmatve maitrītanayatvaṃ na prayojakaṃ kintu śākādyannapariṇatibheda eva prayojakaḥ | prayojakaś copādhir ity ucyate | na ca dhūmāgnyoḥ saṃbandhe kaścid upādhir asti | asti cet yogyo 'yogyo vā | ayogyasya śaṅkitum aśakyatvād yogyasya cānupalabhyamānatvāt | yatropādhir asti tatropalabhyate | yathāgner dhūmasaṃbandha ārdrendhanasaṃyogaḥ | (hiṃsātvasya cādharmasādhanatvena saha saṃbandhe niṣidhatvam upādhiḥ) | maitrītanayatvasya ca śyāmatvena saha saṃbandhe śākādyannapariṇatibhedaḥ | na ceha dhūmāgnisāhacarye kaścid upādhir asti | yady abhaviṣyat tadā 'drakṣyat | tato darśanābhāvān nāstīti tarkasahakāriṇānupalambhasanāthena pratyakṣeṇaivopādhyabhāvo 'vadhāryate |

tathā ca sati upādhyabhāvagrahaṇajanitasaṃskārasahakṛtena bhūyodarśanajanitasaṃskārasahakṛtena sāhacaryagrāhiṇā pratyakṣeṇaiva dhūmāgnyor vyāptir avadhāryate | tena dhūmāgnyoḥ svābhāva eva saṃbandhaḥ | na tv aupādhikaḥ | svābhāvikaś ca saṃbandho vyāptiḥ |

"The natural relation of smoke with fire, "wherever there is smoke there is fire," is determined through numerous observations (of the inferential reason in similar cases and its non-observation in dissimilar cases). Although numerous observations that 'Maitrī's sons have dark (skin) color' occur in that way, still, the relation between 'being Maitrī's son' and 'being dark skinned' is not natural. Rather, it is definitely brought about by an additional condition since the additional condition 'consumption of vegetarian food etc.' is known. To explain: 'Being Maitrī's son' is not an effecting condition for 'being dark skinned', rather, the effecting condition is definitely '(being) a particular effect of vegetarian food.' It is said, moreover, that an additional condition is an effecting condition. In the relation of smoke with fire, moreover, there are no additional conditions. (This is because) if there were (an additional condition) it would either be capable or incapable (of being observed). Since it is not possible to have doubt regarding one that is incapable (of being observed) and since there is the non-observation of one that is capable (of being observed). Wherever there is an additional condition it is apprehended (e.g., 'contact with wet fuel' in the relation of fire with smoke (...) and 'a particular effect of vegetarian food' in the relation of 'being Maitrī's son' with 'being dark skinned'). Now, in this case, with respect to the concomitance of smoke with fire, there is not an additional condition. If there were (an additional condition) it would have been observed. It is known, therefore, that because of its non-observation it does not exist.

1.2.4 Summary

For Ratnakīrti's Naiyāyikas, then, epistemic necessity is grounded in inference-warranting relations that they call "natural [svābhāvika]." Such relations can be defined in terms of three Pervasion Conditions (T2, T3, U) which are satisfied through a set of observations, most importantly the non-observation of deviation [vyabhicāra] and an additional condition [upādhi]. This natural relation [svābhāvika-sambandha] is the central element in the Nyāya theory of inference-warranting relations and epistemic necessity.

1.3 Ratnakīrti's General Critique

Ratnakīrti focuses his criticism of this theory on the Naiyāyikas' description of this relation and their proposed method for showing that its defining conditions can be satisfied. As Ratnakīrti sees it, the Nyāya theory of inference-warranting relations is such that their supposed epistemic necessity; that is, the necessity conferred upon such relations by the Nyāya theory, is not "necessary enough" for them to be genuinely inference-warranting.[39] In addition, he argues that the Naiyāyikas cannot show that the

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Thus, the absence of an additional condition is determined through perception that is assisted by suppositional reasoning and non-apprehension. Now, given this, the pervasion of smoke with fire is determined by perception itself which grasps their concomitance through the assistance of the cognitive impressions produced by grasping the absence of an additional condition and the assistance of the cognitive impressions produced by numerous observations. Thus, the relation of smoke with fire is indeed natural and not brought about by an additional condition. And pervasion is a natural relation."

For more on suppositional reasoning [tarka] see Chapter 1, Section 1.2.

[39]"Epistemic necessity" is indexed to a set of Pervasion Conditions, as they are defined in a particular theory. It is meaningful, therefore, to speak of epistemic necessity as a kind of necessity that is "conferred upon" inference-warranting relations by a particular theory. The phrase "genuinely inference-warranting" refers to those relations that a particular philosopher takes to be inference-warranting.

Pervasion Conditions for such relations are ever satisfied. Although he does not choose to do so, it is useful to interpret Ratnakīrti's critical remarks in two parts, based upon whether his criticism is primarily directed towards how this class of relations is defined or how its defining conditions, the three Pervasion Conditions, are supposed to be satisfied. These general remarks are important since they support many of his specific arguments against the inference-warranting relation in the Naiyāyikas' argument for the existence of Īśvara.

1.3.1 Critical Remarks 1, Defining Natural Relations

According to Ratnakīrti, the Naiyāyikas' claim that epistemic necessity is grounded in relations described as "natural" is not convincing since even if there were such relations they would be too general to be genuinely inference-warranting. Informing Ratnakīrti's analysis is a view referred to earlier according to which there are only two possible modes of pervasion; a "production-mode [tadutpatti]" which is based upon a causal relation and an "identity-mode [tādātmya]" which may be described in terms of an identity-relation (perhaps a relation of "token-identity"). According to this view, all genuinely inference-warranting relations must be instances of either the production-mode [tadutpatti] or the identity-mode [tādātmya] of pervasion. [40] More specifically,

[40] As mentioned earlier, the secondary literature on these two modes of pervasion is extensive. Katsura's (1992: 224-225) summary of the two modes of pervasion may be helpful: "When there are two different items x and y, if and only if x is the result (kārya) of y, the observance of x can make us infer the existence of y, for the domain of the result is naturally pervaded by that of the cause. And when x and y represent two conceptually distinguished properties (svabhāva) of one and the same item in reality, the observance of x makes us infer the existence of y in the same item, provided that the domain of x is regarded as the domain of y in our common sense."

By the phrase "token-identity," I mean the following: Two items are token identical when, considered as types they are distinct e.g., the properties 'having weight' and 'being 10 grams,' but when considered as tokens (or "tropes" e.g., a 'thin property' such as the taste of just this apple and not another apple) they are identical. For example, for a particular 10 gram object the two tropes 'having weight' and 'being 10

when the relata in such genuinely inference-warranting relations are identified as being "different from" or "other than" each other they are said to be related through the production-mode of pervasion.[41] When the two are "non-different from" each other, they are said to be related through the identity-mode.[42] Only relations in which the

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grams' are non-different from each other. Under certain conditions i.e., when the extension of the property
functioning as the inferential reason e.g., 'being 10 grams,' is included in the extension of the property functioning as the property to be proved e.g., 'having weight,' a relation of "token-identity" seems to model the identity-mode of pervasion.

[41]The standard example of an inference-warranting relation in which the two terms are "different-from" each other is the pervasion relation between smoke and fire. Ratnakīrti explains that this relation is the paradigmatic example of the "production-mode [tadutpatti]" at RNA [VN:106.01-106.02]: {iha} dahanādinā dhūmader arthāntarasya vyāptis tadutpattilakṣanā | sā caviśiṣṭānvayavyatirekagrahaṇapravaṇaviśiṣṭapratyakṣānupalambhasādhaneti nyāyaḥ | "The pervasion relation of fire with smoke, an entity that is different (from fire), is defined by the production-mode. And, the rule is that (the production-mode of pervasion) is established by a specific perception and non-perception that seeks to grasp a specific (instance) of positive and negative concomitance.

In the production-mode of pervasion, an inferential reason is a property whose presence in a particular locus <u>causally necessitates</u> the presence in that locus of the property to be proved. In such inferences, epistemic necessity is identified with causal necessity. In his *Tarkabhāṣā*, Mokṣākaragupta expands this to include other species of "causal relations" such as relations in which both the inferential reason and the property to be proved are effects of the same causal complex. See MTBh [28.02-28.15]

Recently, there has been a lively discussion on the production-mode of pervasion in the secondary literature. This discussion has focused both on how it can be known that two items are related as effect and cause and why an effect-cause relation that is established for two items in a particular locus can be generalized. Much of the discussion has focused on the work of Dharmakīrti. See, for example, Gillon (1991), Inami (1999), and Lasic (1999).

For more on Ratnakīrti's view see, for example, RNA [KS: 72.11], RNA [SSD: 125.22-125.24], and RNA [VN: 110.32-111.04]: asmākaṃ tu pratyakṣānupalabdhau pariganitasaṅkhyāv eva, yad āhuḥ - prāgadṛṣṭau kramāt paśyan vetti hetuphalasthitim | dṛṣṭau vā kramaśo 'paśyann anyathā tv anavasthitir iti ||. As Ratnakīrti suggests in this passage (and discusses more explicitly elsewhere in his work), on his view there are a finite number of perceptions and non-perceptions that are needed to establish that two items are related as effect and cause. Once it has been established in a single locus that the two terms are so related, the relation can be generalized beyond the sample locus for which the relation was established. For a discussion of the debate over whether 3 or 5 observational events are needed to determine whether two items are related as effect and cause see Inami (1999), Kajiyama (1963), Lasic (1999), Mimaki (1976: 164-167), Mookherjee (1975: 67-69), and Woo (1999: 179-182).

[42]The standard example of an inference-warranting relation in which the two terms are "non-different from" each other is the pervasion relation between 'being a Śimśapa(-tree)' and 'being a tree.' At RNA [KS: 69.24] Ratnakīrti refers to this example and explains that the two terms have "different exclusions [vyāvṛtti-bheda]." This suggests that when considered as types the two terms are different from each other as suggested in my interpretation of the identity-mode of pervasion as a relation of "token-identity." This interpretation is also suggested at MTBh [28.16-28.09]. For more on the identity-mode of

relata are different and non-different in the manner specified by the two modes of pervasion are supposed to be epistemically necessary. This is, of course, not the Nyāya position since although the class of natural relations [svābhāvika-sambandha] includes relations that can be described in terms of these two modes of pervasion, it explicitly includes those that cannot.[43] The issue for Ratnakīrti is whether the Naiyāyikas have shown that there is such a class of relations and that such relations should be considered inference-warranting and epistemically necessary.

Against the Nyāya theory, Ratnakīrti first argues that given their account of such relations there could be natural relations [svābhāvika-sambandha] and therefore epistemic necessity between any two things. Such a concept of epistemic necessity would, he explains, be too weak for such relations to be considered genuinely inference-warranting. He says,

> If there could be a natural relation between one (thing) and another (thing) which is not its cause, everything could be related with everything. And in this way, everything could be inferred from everything.[44]

On this reading, the Naiyāyikas' insistence that the class of natural relations includes those that are not causal suggests that what really defines a relation as "natural" is just that the two relata are in some way "other than" each other. Natural relations [svābhāvika-sambandha] are, therefore, nothing but 'in-some-way-other-than' relations.

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pervasion see, for example, Steinkellner (1971), Katsura (1986), Steinkellner (1991), Katsura (1992), and Dunne (1999).

[43]See Section 1.2.1.

[44]RNA [46.14-46.16]: syād etat| anyasyānyena sahakāreṇa cet svābhāvikaḥ sambandhe bhavet, sarvaṃ sarveṇa sambadhyeta | tathā ca sarvaṃ sarvasmād gamyeta |

Parallel passages to RNA [46.12-46.16] can be found at RNA [VN: 107.16-107.17] and NVTT [136.03-136.04].

And since any two things could be 'in-some-way-other-than' each other any one thing could be, in principle, inferred from any other thing. The Naiyāyikas insist, of course, that this is not the case and argue that just like causal relations, natural relations [svābhāvika-sambandha] are also constrained by the nature of things. In other words, they reason that just as the production-mode [tadutpatti] of an inference-warranting relation is supposed to be grounded in the way in which some things that are "other than" each other are causally related in the world, the proposed "natural-mode" is grounded in the way in which certain things that are "other than" each other are naturally related in the world.[45] Ratnakīrti argues, however, that this position can only be maintained if, like causal relations, natural relations could be properly defined and then proven to exist through an accredited Instrument of warranted awareness.[46] Since the Naiyāyikas have neither provided a defining characteristic for such relations nor shown through an accredited Instrument that such relations exist, he reasons that a characteristic such as "other than" must define the relation. Given this, Ratnakīrti argues that such relations are too general to be genuinely inference-warranting. His point is that the Naiyāyikas' theory that epistemic necessity is supervenient on such relations results in it being too weak to account for only genuinely inference-warranting relations; that is, for the pervasion sub-components in only well-functioning Instruments of awareness.

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[45]RNA [46.16-46.19]: athānyac ced anyasya kāryaṃ kasmāt sarvaṃ sarvasmān na bhavaty anyatvāviśeṣāt | tataś ca sa evātiprasaṅgaḥ | yady ucyate svabhāvā na paryanuyojyāḥ* | tasmād anyatvāviśeṣe 'pi kiñcid eva kāraṇaṃ kāryaṃ ca kiñcid iti** |

Parallel passages to RNA [46.16-46.19] can be found at RNA [VN: 107.17-107.20], *PVSV [84.19-84.20], **TSP [195.10-195.14], and NVTT [136.04-136.076].

[46]RNA [47.22-47.26]

Ratnakīrti also builds on this line of reasoning by arguing that the Naiyāyikas have not even shown that there are any natural relations [svābhāvika-sambandha]. He says,

(...) there is no object [artha] that is (both) denoted by (the term) "natural relation" [svābhāvika-sambandha-vācya] (and) established through a warranted mode of awareness. This is because a defining characteristic has not been established [asiddhatvam] for it. And it is not the case that when a thing [vastu] is established by fiat [pratijñāsiddha] an unwanted consequence cannot be discussed. This is because there would be the unwanted consequence that by merely agreeing to it having that nature everyone would be victorious everywhere.[47]

According to Ratnakīrti, what the Naiyāyikas call "natural relations" have neither been clearly defined nor proven to exist through an accredited Instrument of warranted awareness. As a result, the presence of such relations just amounts to wishful thinking on their part. The existence of so called "natural relations" can, it seems, only be stipulated and not proved. And if stipulation is accepted as a method for establishing inference-warranting relations [vyāpti], Ratnakīrti claims that anyone could stipulate that the relation between a proposed inferential reason and the property to be proved by it is of such and such a type and therefore genuinely inference-warranting. In such a case, epistemic necessity would be grounded in a stipulative definition and would not supervene on non-epistemic facts as required by the Nyāya theory. The result would be that by creative stipulation "everyone would be victorious everywhere."

In support of his point that there are not any "natural relations [svābhāvika-sambandha]," Ratnakīrti also argues that the inference-warranting relation that enables a jeweler to

[47]RNA [47.28-47.31]: na caivaṃ svābhāvikasaṃbandhaśabdavācyo 'rthaḥ pramāṇasiddhaḥ kaścid asti, tallakṣaṇasyāsiddhatvāt | na ca pratijñāsiddhe vastuny atiprasaṅgo nābhidhātavyaḥ, sarveṣāṃ sarvatra tadrūpābhyupagamamātreṇa vijetṛtvaprasaṅgāt |

detect the presence of a real jewel from a fake is not an instance of a natural relation as suggested by Vācaspati. He explains that,

(...) due to a tradition of instruction a defining characteristic such as 'rainbow-like lustre [indradhanur-ākara-jyoti]' is clearly ascertained, with effort, as belonging to a ruby. But, the defining characteristic of a natural relation is created by your imagination [sva-kalpita-racita]. It is not ascertained by a warranted mode of awareness on account of which there could be a situation [vyavasthā] like this, even for it.[48]

The relation between the inferential reason, '(having) rainbow-like lustre,' and the property to be proved, 'being a ruby,' is established by showing that the two terms are related as *definiens* and *definiendum*. In other words, the inferential reason [hetu] is shown to be a defining characteristic of the property to be proved [sādhya]. Although it is not stated here, the relation between the two terms is an example of the identity-mode [tādātmya] of pervasion.[49] This relation does not, therefore, support the Naiyāyikas' claim that there is a separate natural-mode for pervasion. As Ratnakīrti explains, in this case, a particular stone is known to be a ruby only because it is known to have the defining characteristic of a ruby. If a defining characteristic for so called "natural relations" were known and it could also be shown that a particular relation has this defining characteristic then the presence of such relations would also be known. Since such a characteristic has not been specified, however, there is not a good reason to suppose that there is such a class of relations at all.[50]

[48]RNA [48.14-48.19]: abhijātamaṇibhedatattvaṃ tu parisphuratīti yuktam | tasya hy upadeśa paramparāto māṇikyvat tenāpi kaṣṭenendradhanurākārajyotir ādikaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ niścitam | na caivaṃ svābhāvikasaṃbandhalakṣaṇaṃ tvayā svakalpitaracitam api pramāṇena niścitam | yenāsyāpi tādṛśī vyavasthā syād iti yatkiñcid etat |

[49]Note that when considered as "types" the two properties are distinct, but when considered as tokens or "tropes" they are identical.

[50]In addition to this argument, Ratnakīrti argues at RNA [48.04-48.07] that, on conceptual grounds, such relations cannot be defended: kiṃ ca svābhāvikasambandha iti ko 'rthaḥ | kiṃ svato bhūtaḥ

1.3.2 Critical Remarks 2, Determining Pervasion

Another set possibilities considered by Ratnakīrti is that although there may not be, strictly speaking, a single defining characteristic for natural relations [svābhāvika-sambandha] it may nevertheless be possible that the presence of such relations could be established through observation [darśana] and non-observation [adarśana].[51] The method used for establishing them would thus become their *de facto* defining feature. For example, as both Vācaspati and Trilocana imply, natural relations could be defined as relations for which there is neither the observation of an additional condition [upādhi] nor deviation [vyabhicāra].[52] The defining characteristic of such relations could therefore be the property, 'being a relation for which there is the non-observation of a contingent condition [upādhi] and deviation [vyabhicāra].' Given the Naiyāyikas' interpretation of "non-observation," natural relations would be those relations that have the property, 'being a relation for which there is the absence of a contingent condition

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svahetuto bhūto 'hetuko veti trayaḥ pakṣāḥ | na tāvad ādyaḥ pakṣaḥ, svātmani karitravirodhāt | dvitīyapakṣe tu tadutpattir eva saṃbandho mukhāntareṇa svīkṛta iti na kaścid vivādaḥ | ahetukatve tu deśakālasvabhāvaniyamābhāvaprasaṅgād ity asaṅgataḥ svābhāvikaḥ sambandhaḥ || "Moreover, what is a "natural relation?" What does it mean? Is it produced by itself, produced from its own causes, or is it uncaused? These are the three possibilities. Now then, it is not the first option since causing one's own nature is a contradiction. But if it is the second option there isn't a disagreement since the relations is accepted as the production-mode (but) with a different look. And if it is uncaused there is the unwanted consequence of the absence of temporal, spatial, and essential specificity. So, a relation which is 'natural' does not follow."

[51]This possibility is mentioned at RNA [48.20-48.21]

[52]It is important to note that this is only implied in the passages quoted by Ratnakīrti. Although Vācaspati does describe a natural relation as a "relation that does not have an additional condition [anaupādhikasambandha]," the relationship between natural relations [svābhāvika-sambandha], additional conditions [upādhi] (and suppositional reasoning [tarka]), and deviation [vyabhicāra] (and non-observation [anupalabdhi]) is not as clear as Ratnakīrti implies. See, for example, the notes to Section 1.2.2 and Section 1.2.3.

and deviation.'[53] Although such a relation would be, by definition, "natural, " Ratnakīrti argues that according to the Naiyāyikas' own theory a proposed relation could never be shown to be so. This is because, according to him, non-observation cannot rule out the presence of an additional condition [upādhi] or deviation [vyabhicāra] as the Naiyāyikas suppose. Despite Trilocana's assertion that non-apprehension is a form of perception and therefore a warranted mode of awareness for coming to know the absence of 'U' and 'V', Ratnakīrti argues that this cannot be case. According to him, therefore, it is not possible for the Naiyāyikas to show that a proposed relation is natural and has epistemic necessity. If this is indeed the case, Ratnakīrti recognizes that the Naiyāyikas will never be able to show that a particular inferential reason is a well-functioning Instrument and so will never be able to justify any of their inferential arguments. The following passages contain two of Ratnakīrti's most important arguments. He writes,

[a] (...) "The relation of smoke etc., with fire etc., is natural [svābhāvika] because an additional condition [upādhi] is not observed for it (and) because deviation [vyabhicāra] is not observed anywhere." This is its definition, as stated by you. But [ca] this is not proved [asiddha] since by the word 'additional condition' what is meant [abhidhātavyam] is that an entity in addition to [arthāntaram] (the relation's) own (two relata) [svataḥ] is required. But this additional entity [arthāntaram] is not necessarily observable [dṛśyatāniyata]. Since it is also possible for it to be unobservable i.e., spatially, temporally, and essentially remote [deśa-kāla-svabhāva-viprakṛṣṭa]. And therefore, there could be an additional condition [upādhi] which is not seen [upalakṣyate] even in the relation of smoke with fire. So, how is it that from non-observation --on account of which a natural relation is proved-- it definitely does not exist?[54]

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[53]This is clear from the following passage from KTBh [21.05-23.02] which was also quoted earlier.

(The Naiyāyikas say:) "In the relation of smoke with fire, moreover, there are no additional conditions. (This is because) if there were (an additional condition) it would either be capable [yogya] or incapable [ayogya] (of being observed). Since it is not possible to have doubt regarding one that is incapable (of being observed) and since there is the non-observation of one that is capable (of being observed) {...} | Now, in this case, with respect to the concomitance of smoke with fire, there is not an additional condition. If there were (an additional condition) it would have been observed. It is known, therefore, that because of its non-observation it does not exist."

[54]RNA [47.03-47.10]: tathā hi, svābhāvikas tu dhūmādīnāṃ vahnyādibhiḥ saṃbandhaḥ tadupādher anupalabhyamānatvāt | kvacid vyabhicārasyādarśanād iti tvayaivāsya lakṣaṇam uktam | etac cāsiddham |

And,

[b] What is the meaning of "By not observing deviation there is non-deviation?" Is it because deviation [vyabhicāra] is unobserved [adarśana] that there is non-deviation [avyabhicāra] or because of the absence of deviation [vyabhicārābhāva]?" If it is the first alternative there may or may not be deviation. (...) If it is the second alternative, then, how is the absence of deviation known [jñāta]? One may say [iti cet]: "From non-observation." Is this non-observation-in-general [adarśanamātra] or the non-observation of an observable [dṛśyādarśana]? The first is impossible since it is not possible to say that although there is non-observation [adarśana] deviation --like the deviation (in the character) of a female Brahmin who died a long time ago-- does not exist. This is also because even if there were unobstructed non-observation [āhatyādarśana], deviation could be observed after a very long interval. Moreover, the second is impossible. This is because, if the total causal complex for observing deviation exists, deviation will be observed somewhere, sometime, and by someone. But if the total causal complex for observing (it) does not exist, either because the other causal factors are weak [vaikalya] or because it occurs at a different place or time, deviation will not be observed. This is because there could be the absence of (its) having satisfied the conditions for being apprehensible [upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptatva-abhāva]. Therefore, given the absence of the total causal complex for apprehending it, even if deviation exists there could be the non-apprehension of deviation.[55]

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yataḥ, upādhiśabdena svato 'rthāntaram evāpekṣaṇīyam abhidhātavyam | na cārthāntaraṃ dṛśyatāniyatam, adṛśyasyāpi deśakālasvabhāvaviprakṛṣṭasya saṃbhavāt | tataś ca dhūmasyāpi hutāśena saha sambandhe syad upādhiḥ, na copalakṣyata iti katham adarśanān nāsty eva yataḥ svābhāvikasaṃbandhasiddhiḥ ||

Parallel passages to RNA [47.03-47.10] can be found at RNA [46.08-46.09], RNA [VN: 109.32], and NVTT [135.09-135.14].

[55]RNA [48.28-49.08]: vyabhicārādarśanād avyabhicāra iti cet | nanu vyabhicārādarśanād avyabhicāra iti ko 'rthaḥ | kiṃ vyabhicārādarśanād avyabhicāraḥ, vyabhicārābhāvāt vā | prathame pakṣe vyabhicāro bhavatu mā vā vyabhicārādarśanād {evāvyabhicāra iti niṣnātaṃ paṇḍitam }| atha dvitīyaḥ pakṣaḥ | tadā vyabhicārābhāvaḥ kuto jñātaḥ | adarśanād iti cet | tat kim adarśanamātraṃ dṛśyādarśanaṃ vā | prathamam aśaktaṃ | na hy adarśane 'pi vyabhicāro nāstīty abhidhātuṃ śakyate, cirakālanaṣṭbrāhmaṇīvyabhicāravat | āhosvity adarśane 'py aticirakālavyavadhānena vyabhicāradarśanāt | dvitīyaṃ cāsambhavi, kvacit kadācit kenacid vyabhicāradarśanasāmagryāṃ satyāṃ vyabhicāradarśanāt | darśanasāmagryabhāve tu pratyayāntaravaikalyāt deśakālāntaravartitvād vā vyabhicārasya sarvaṃ praty upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptatvābhāvāt* | tasmāt saty api vyabhicāre tadupalambhasāmagryabhāvād vyabhicārānupalambhaḥ |{prakārāntareṇa vā tadutpattilakṣanenāvyabhicāre vyabhicārānupalambha ity ubhayathāpi vyabhicāropalambhanivṛttir astu | tvayā tu yad avyabhicārapratipattinibandhanaṃ darśanādarśanam upavarṇitaṃ tatpārthivatvādau vyabhicārād dhūme 'pi nāvyabhicāranibandhanam iti dhūmo 'pi tvanmate nāśvāsabhājanam iti prasaktam |}

Parallel passages can be found at RNA [VN: 110.02-110.06]. Unlike the other passages quoted in this section, this passage is from Ratnakīrti's discussion of Alternative 2 and not Atlernative 3. The similarity between the two positions on the point being discussed justifies the use of this passage here.

Ratnakīrti first argues that the Naiyāyikas' account of how natural relations are established cannot even account for epistemic necessity in the paradigmatic inference of fire from smoke. His argument is based on his view that the non-observation of an additional condition (passage [a]) and deviation (passage [b]) cannot prove the absence of either of them. As a result, he concludes that the Naiyāyikas cannot even show that T3 and U are satisfied for well-known inferences. In the passages quoted above he argues that this is the case regardless of whether non-observation is interpreted as "non-observation-in-general [adarśanamātra]" or the "non-observation of an observable [dṛśyādarśana]" (passage [b]).[56] In the context of Ratnakīrti's remarks, "non-observation-in-general [adarśanamātra]" refers to non-observation that is indifferent to whether the unobserved object is an "unobservable [adṛśya]" or an "observable [dṛśya]." As Ratnakīrti explains, an "unobservable [adṛśya]" object is one that is spatially, temporally, or essentially remote [deśa-kāla-svabhāva-viprakṛṣṭa] (passage [a]).[57] And although he does not explain this here, it is understood that "remoteness [viprakṛṣṭa]" is defined relative to a particular kind of observer. For example, although a ghost [piśāca] is said to be essentially remote [svabhāva-viprakṛṣṭa] for a normal

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*As Kellner (1999:197) notes, there are two ways of interpreting the phrase "having satisfied the conditions for being apprehensible." Śākyabuddhi (PVT [9a6f]) interprets this to mean all of the conditions or causal factors that are different from the object itself (pratyayāntara). For a close parallel to this view see PVSVT [21.22-21.24] as quoted in Kellner (1999: 197 n. 11). Dharmottara (NBT [101.7-101.10]) interprets this to mean the complete causal complex that is necessary for perception (janikā sāmagrī). For Dharmottara, this complete causal complex includes both the 'additional causal factors' and the 'object itself.'

[56]There is a long history of Buddhist arguments about "non-observation in general." See Section 1.4.1.2, for references to Īśvarasena's use of non-observation in general.

[57]"Unobservable [adṛśya] objects are usually defined as those that are spatially, temporally, or essentially remote [deśa-kāla-svabhāva-viprakṛṣṭa] (e.g., the spatially distant Mt. Meru MTBh [30.18], the future emperor Śaṅkhā (NB [2.27], PVSV [16.15], VN [6.5], MTBh [30.18]) or a ghost (DhP [107.30], RNA [146.18], MTBh [30.19])). It is also important to note that these three "degrees " of remoteness are always indexed to a specific type of Agent.

human observer, it is not essentially remote for another ghost.[58] Similarly, an "observable [dṛśya]" object is one that is, relative to a particular kind of observer, neither spatially, temporally, nor essentially remote. It is an object that, if present, would be immediately and inevitably observed.[59] Ratnakīrti explains that non-observation in general cannot prove that an object such as 'U' or 'V' is absent since that object may have been observable only in the distant past or may be observable only in the distant future (passage [b]). As he mentions in passage [a] it is always possible, for example, that because of remoteness an additional condition [upādhi] is present but unobserved. Ratnakīrti also explains that the non-observation of an observable [dṛśyādarśana] cannot prove that 'U' or 'V' is absent since even if 'U' or 'V' is not spatially, temporally, or essentially remote, the total causal complex necessary for observing it may not be complete e.g., there may not be enough light or the observer may not be paying attention (manaskāra).[60] As a result, even if deviation [vyabhicāra] were present there could be the non-observation of it. According to Ratnakīrti, then, the Naiyāyikas cannot satisfy their own Pervasion Conditions and so cannot even show that the pervasion sub-components of well-known inferences have epistemic necessity. Their theory has an inherent weakness.

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[58]For references to this example see RNA [146.18], DhP [107.30], and VNV [19.27]. For a more detailed account of "observable [dṛśya]" see Kellner (1999: 202).

[59]See Kellner (1999: 196 n. 7) for references to Dharmakīrti's use of this expression. Kellner notes, for example, that at Pvin2 [16.12-17.07] and PVSV [102.02-102.11] Dharmakīrti explains that "remote" objects are those that do not inevitably and immediately result in awareness for a particular kind of agent at a particular spatio-temporal location. This suggests that an "unobservable [adṛśya]" object is one that cannot be observed by a particular kind of Agent because the object in question is spatially, temporally, or essentially remote. The idea is that if such an object were not remote in any of these ways, it would be observed.

[60]This example is from Kellner (1999:197) who is following Śākyabuddhi (PVT [9a6f]). See, Katsura (1992:228) for a similar analysis.

Ratnakīrti also asks whether non-deviation is supposed to be due to the non-observation of deviation [vyabhicāra-adarśana] or the absence of deviation [vyabhicāra-abhāva] (passage [b]). This question can also be generalized to include the absence of an additional condition [upādhi]. The issue is whether epistemic necessity is supposed to supervene on an epistemic fact, non-observation, or a non-epistemic fact, absence [abhāva]. If it is supposed to supervene of the epistemic fact then given that this fact is based on non-observation there will always be possibility that there was deviation in the past or that deviation will be observed in the future (passage [b]). From non-observation, therefore, one can only conclude that there may or may not be deviation. As a result, if epistemic necessity is supposed to supervene on the epistemic fact of non-observation the necessity will be too weak to account for only genuinely inference-warranting relations; that is, there will always be "epistemically significant doubt."[61] If it is supposed to supervene on the non-epistemic fact then because this non-epistemic fact cannot be known epistemic necessity cannot be known. The reason given for this is that non-observation cannot establish the absence of an object since it may be that an object is present but the complete set of causal conditions necessary for its observation is not.

1.4 H3a in The Section on Inference-Warranting Relations

This general criticism of the Nyāya theory of inference-warranting relations is also reflected in Ratnakīrti's more specific discussion of why he believes that the Naiyāyikas cannot show that H3a does not apply to the inferential reason in their argument for the existence of Īśvara. As discussed earlier, H3a blocks the functioning of an Instrument by affecting its pervasion sub-component [vyāpti] in one of two ways: It either defeats it,

[61]The concept of "epistemically significant doubt" will be discussed in Section 1.4.1.

through the identification of a locus in which the inferential reason [hetu] is present but the property is to be proved [sādhya] is absent ($H3a_1$) or it undermines it by raising doubt about whether the inferential reason is excluded from (all) dissimilar cases ($H3a_2$).[62] In their defense of the inferential reason "on account of being an effect [kāryatvāt]" the Naiyāyikas appealed to the theory of remoteness [viprakṛṣṭa] to argue that the opponent's criteria for identifying a locus of deviation [vyabhicāra] was such that it would rule out even well-known inferences. From this, they concluded that the counter-example proposed by the opponent, growing grass, was not a suitable example of deviation [vyabhicāra].[63] Let us refer to this as "Argument 1." They also argued that there is not epistemically significant doubt about the exclusion [vyāvṛtti] of the inferential reason [hetu] from (all) dissimilar cases [vipakṣa] since the inference-warranting relation [vyāpti] in their argument is as epistemically necessary as the ones in well-known inferences e.g., the inference of fire from smoke.[64] Let us refer to this as "Argument 2." Moreover, as Trilocana has asserted, on the Nyāya view a special type of perception called "non-apprehension [anupalabdhi]" is able to remove doubt about the absence of an inferential reason from (all) dissimilar cases.[65] Given this, there cannot be epistemically significant doubt about its exclusion. The final argument considered by the Naiyāyikas was the opponent's argument that given the generality and scope of the inferential reason, "effects-in-general [kārya-mātra]," its pervasion could never be established. According to the opponent, pervasion could only be established for a more

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[62]See Chapter 1, Section 2.3.1.2 and 3.2 and Chapter 2, Section 1.1.

[63]See Chapter 1, Section 3.2.1.

[64]See Chapter 1, Section 3.2.2.

[65]See 1.2 passage [d]; the notes to 1.2.3, where the relationship between perception, non-apprehension, and suppositional reasoning is discussed; and 1.4.1, where this alternative is discussed in detail.

restricted version of the inferential reason. This was supposed to reveal that the original inferential reason was inconclusive [anaikāntika]. The Naiyāyikas' response to this was to show that this demand is either unnecessary or unreasonable.[66] Let us refer to this as "Argument 3." Ratnakīrti returns to each of these arguments in the critical sections of his essay; he discusses the first two in the *Section on Pervasion* (1.4.1 and 1.4.2) and the third one in the *Section on the Inferential Reason* (2.0). My discussion will follow this order. Interestingly, in the *Section on Pervasion* he begins with Argument 2. In each of these sections, Ratnakīrti returns to issues that he raised in his general discussion of the Nyāya theory of inference-warranting relations [vyāpti].

1.4.1 The defect called "Doubt about the exclusion of the inferential reason from dissimilar cases ($H3a_2$)."

1.4.1.1 A Restatement of Argument 2

Ratnakīrti begins his analysis of Argument 2 by restating the Nyāya position. He writes:

[a] Vācaspati says: There is not even the defect of the inferential reason called 'doubt about (its) exclusion from (all) dissimilar cases.' How is it refuted? To explain: Only an inferential reason which was observed in a dissimilar case does not prove what was intended (...) But how could one that was not observed in a dissimilar case, even though it was searched for with great effort, not prove what is to be proved (...)?

[b] (If this were the case) the ghost of doubt, to whom an opportunity is given by overstepping the limits of common sense, would be released. Nowhere, would she not exist. Thus, one could not act anywhere. This is because every object would somehow be a locus of doubt; because doubt which does not have an object [anartha-śaṅkā] is a cause for the wise to stop acting; and finally, because of observing death even when there is the use of nutritious food and drink.

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[66] See Chapter 1, Section 3.2.2.1, 3.2.2.2.

[c] Therefore, for someone who protects the practices of those who follow warranted modes of awareness, there should be doubt only in accordance with observation and not (in accordance with) what was not previously observed.[67]

According to Vācaspati, the defect called "doubt about the exclusion (of the inferential reason) from (all) dissimilar cases [sandigdha-vipakṣa-vyāvṛtti ($H3a_2$)]" cannot apply to an inferential reason [hetu] that has never been observed in a dissimilar case [vipakṣa] (passage [a]). As he suggests, it is only a previous observation that can serve as the basis for the assertion that there is now doubt about the exclusion of the inferential reason from (all) dissimilar cases (passage [c]).[68] Vācaspati asks, therefore, how not observing (i.e., the non-observation of) an inferential reason in a dissimilar case can lead to epistemically significant doubt about its exclusion from (all) such cases (passage [a]). Vācaspati's analysis is grounded in a Nyāya theory of what constitutes epistemically significant doubt. According to this theory doubt [saṃśaya] is a state of awareness that, like all states of awareness, must have an object. More specifically, this object must be a specific property-possessor [dharmī] about which there is doubt regarding whether it possesses a particular property [dharma].[69] In the case of T3, the property-possessor

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[67] RNA [42.08-42.17]: [a] atra vācaspatiḥ prāha, sandigdhavipakṣavyāvṛttikatvaṃ nāma hetuodoṣa eva na bhavati | tat kathaṃ nirasyate | tathā hi ya eva vipakṣe dṛṣṭo hetuḥ sa eva {prameyatvādivad} abhimataṃ na sādhayet | yas tu mahatāpi prayatnena mṛgyamāṇo 'sapakṣe nopalakṣitaḥ sa kathaṃ sādhyaṃ na sādhayet | {avaśyam śaṅkayā bhāvyaṃ niyāmakam apaśyatām |} [b] iti tu dattāvakāśā laukikamaryādātikrameṇa saṃśayapiśācī labdhaprasarā na kvacin nāstīti nāyaṃ kvacit pravarteta | sarvasyaivārthasya kathañ cic chaṅkāspadatvād{arśanāt}* | anarthasaṅkāyāś ca prekṣāvatāṃ nivṛttyaṅgatvāt | antataḥ snigdhānnapānopayoge 'pi maraṇadarśanāt | [c] tasmāt prāmāṇikalokayātrām anupālayatā yathādarśanaṃ śaṅkanīyaṃ, na tv adṛṣṭam api |

Parallel passages to RNA [42.08-42.17] can be found at RNA [VN: 107.11-107.13], NVTT [135.17-135.22] ad NS 1.1.5, PV 1.326cd, Pvin 2.45cd, NBT 14.01, and PVT fragment 9, Steinkellner (1980: 290). *In support of this decision see NVTT [135.19].

[68] For Vācaspati, then, $H3a_2$ is dependent on $H3a_1$. My "temporal" interpretation of passage [a] is not explicitly endorsed by Vācaspati.

[69] In a passage that parallels passage [c] Vācaspati explains, at RNA [VN: 107.10-107.13]: tasmāt prāmāṇikalokayātrām anupālayatā yathādarśanam eva śaṅkanīyam na tv adṛṣṭapūrvam api | viśeṣasmṛtyapekṣa eva saṃśayo nāsmṛter bhavati | na ca smṛtir ananubūtacare bhavitum arhati || "Therefore, for those who protect the practices of those who follow the warranted-modes of awareness

would be the dissimilar locus [vipakṣa] in which the exclusion [vyāvṛtti] of the inferential reason [hetu] is said to be in doubt.[70] Vācaspati would agree that if such a property-possessor were observed there could be epistemically significant doubt about whether a particular property is absent or present in it. The awareness that there is some as yet unobserved and unidentified property-possessor in which a property is supposed to be absent or present is not, however, an example of doubt that is epistemically significant. Epistemically significant doubt must, he argues, be based on the prior observation of a specific property-possessor. Vācaspati argues that if epistemically significant doubt is supposed to be based on the non-observation of a specific property-possessor "the ghost of (paralyzing) doubt would be released" (passage [b]), resulting in inactivity for those who choose to act rationally i.e., "in accordance with warranted awareness (passage [c])." For example, if pervasion [vyāpti] could be undermined by $H3a_2$ without actually observing a dissimilar locus in which there is doubt about the absence or presence of an inferential reason, there would always be epistemically significant doubt about whether an inferential reason is excluded from all dissimilar cases (T3). As a result, rational people could never base their actions on inferentially produced states of awareness. After all, Vācaspati reasons, they would never know whether some as yet unobserved locus will undermine the awareness on which their potential action is based. From such

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there should be doubt only in accordance with observation and never (in accordance with) what was not previously observed. For doubt definitely depends upon a specific memory and does not exist when there isn't memory. And memory cannot exist for an object which was not (previously) experienced." For more on the Nyāya theory of doubt see KTBh [97.05-98.10].

[70]It is important to note that in passage [a] Vācaspati says that the object that must be observed in order for there to be doubt is the inferential reason. Here, I am suggesting that the object that needs to be observed is the locus. This is not inconsistent since according to the Naiyāyikas the role of property and property-possessor are "interchangeable" in such cases. For example, in this case, there is supposed to be doubt about the absence an inferential reason from a dissimilar locus. According to Naiyāyikas, the property [dharma] could either be the inferential reason or the absence of a dissimilar locus and the property-possessor [dharmin] could either be the dissimilar locus or the absence of the inferential reason.

considerations Vācaspati concludes that the opponent's original argument that there is epistemically significant doubt about the exclusion of the inferential reason from dissimilar cases [sandigdha-vipakṣa-vyāvṛtti ($H3a_2$)] is based on an untenable theory of doubt and should, therefore, be dismissed.

Before responding to Vācaspati's remarks about the theory of doubt that underlies his argument that $H3a_2$ applies to the inferential reason, Ratnakīrti responds to Trilocana and Vācaspati's claim that non-apprehension [anupalabdhi] and non-observation [adarśana] can prove that an inferential reason is excluded from (all) dissimilar cases (T3). This is important for Ratnakīrti's response to Vācaspati since if the Nyāya claim is correct there should not be doubt about the satisfaction of T3.

1.4.1.2 Ratnakīrti on Non-Observation

Ratnakīrti responds to Trilocana and Vācaspati's claim by adding to his earlier arguments for why non-apprehension [anupalabdhi] and non-observation [adarśana] cannot prove that an inferential reason is excluded from (all) dissimilar cases.[71] For convenience, he uses the term non-observation [adarśana] to refer to both.[72] He writes,

> [a] Now [tad], this is nothing but idle banter [pralāpa-mātra] since the negative concomitance [vyatireka] of an inferential reason which was searched for in dissimilar cases, even with great effort, is not proved by non-observation alone [adarśanamātra].
>
> [b] To explain: What is meant by "the inferential reason is not apprehended in dissimilar cases?" Is it, "the absence of a warranted mode of awareness to apprehend it [tadupalambhaka-pramāṇa-nivṛtti]?" A warranted mode of awareness [pramāṇa] is the

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[71] See 1.3.2.

[72] For a list of synonymous expressions see Kellner (1999).

effect of the object of that mode of awareness [prameya]. This is because of the rule [nyāya] that "There is no object [viṣaya] without a cause [akāraṇam]." And [ca], it is not the case that the absence of a cause is apprehended when there is the absence of the effect. This is because there is the apprehension of fire even when smoke is absent [nirdhūma]. But if the existence of an object of a warranted mode of awareness [prameya-sattā] were pervaded by the existence of that warranted mode of awareness, then this would be correct. However [kevalam], this very pervasion is not possible since there would be the unwanted consequence that everything would be observed by everyone. So, negative concomitance is not proved by non-observation alone[adarśanamātra].

[c] As it was said: "(If you say it is proved by) the non-observation of everyone then there (will be) doubt. (And if you say) it is non-observation of oneself (then) there is deviation [vyabhicāra]. For example, although a blade of grass in a small hole on the Vindhyā mountains is not seen, it exists." This is because with respect to proximate times [arvācīnaṃ prati] all dissimilar cases are not observed.[73]

Vācaspati had argued that the non-observation of an inferential reason in dissimilar cases was sufficient for showing that the defect called "doubt about the exclusion of the inferential reason from (all) dissimilar cases [sandigdha-vipakṣa-vyāvṛtti ($H3a_2$)]" did not apply. According to Ratnakīrti, however, this implies that non-observation can prove that the inferential reason is never present in such cases. In other words, it implies that non-observation can establish the epistemic necessity of negative concomitance [vyatireka]; that is, that it can prove that the inferential reason is not present in any locus in which the property to be proved is not present (passage [a]).[74] In these passages,

[73]RNA [42.24-43.03]: [a] tad etat pralāpamātram | na hi mahatāpi prayatnena vipakṣe mṛgyamāṇasya hetor adarśanamātreṇa vyatirekaḥ sidhyati* | [b] tathā hi vipakṣe hetur nopalabhyata ity anena tadupalambhakapramāṇanivṛttir ucyate | pramāṇaṃ ca prameyasya kāryam, nākāraṇaṃ viṣaya iti nyānyāt | na ca kāryanivṛttau kāraṇanivṛttir upalabdhā, nirdhūmasyāpi vahner upalambhāt | yadi punaḥ pramāṇasattayā prameyasattā vyāptā syāt, tadā yuktam etat | kevalam īyam eva vyāptir asaṃbhavinī, sarvasya sarvadarśitvaprsaṅgāt | tan nādarśanamātreṇa vyatirekasiddhiḥ | [c] yathoktaṃ sarvādṛṣṭiś ca sandigdhā svādṛṣṭir vyabhicāriṇī | vindhyādrirandhradūrvāder adṛṣṭāv api sattvataḥ || iti sakalavipakṣasyārvācīnaṃ praty adṛśyatvāt |

*See RNA [42.09] and MTBh [43.05-43.15].

[74]Steinkellner (1969: 84) attributes this view to Īśvarasena. For Steinkellner's reconstruction of Īśvarasena's view from HB [28*-35*] see Steinkellner (1988). As Steinkellner (1991: 310) has argued, Dharmakīrti argues against Īśvarasena's idea that negative concomitance can be established by non-observation in general. Ratankīrti's arguments are, to some extent, related to these.

Ratnakīrti argues that this cannot be the case. He bases his argument on the Nyāya view that warranted awareness [pramā] is the culminating effect of a causal complex that includes the object (or Patient) of that state of awareness (passage [b]).[75] In this case, the proposed state of awareness is the awareness that the inferential reason is not present in a dissimilar case. The proposed Instrument is non-observation. The Nyāya argument is that because there is the non-observation that the inferential reason is present in a dissimilar case (in this case, the inferential reason [hetu] and "cause") there is the warranted awareness that the inferential reason is not present in a dissimilar case (in this case, the property to be proved [sādhya] and "effect"). The non-observation of the Patient (or state of affairs) 'x' is supposed to result in the warranted awareness that not 'x.'

Ratnakīrti begins his analysis of this argument by interpreting "non-observation" to mean the absence of an Instrument that proves that an inferential reason is present in a dissimilar case (passage [b]).[76] Implicit in his interpretation is the idea that since observation is supposed to be a form of perception, non-observation must be the absence of this form of perception. He thus interprets the non-observation of an object (or state of affairs) 'x' as the absence of an Instrument that can prove that object (or state of affairs) 'x.' Moreover, for Ratnakīrti, warranted awareness [pramā] itself is the Instrument of warranted awareness [pramāṇa].[77] For him, therefore, the absence of an Instrument that

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[75]See Chapter 1, Section 1.1.2.

[76]This has interesting parallels with the Mīmāṃsā discussion of whether there is separate Instrument for coming to know absences. See, for example, Kellner (1999).

[77]This is in contrast with the Nyāya view which was discussed in Chapter 1. According to the Naiyāyikas, the term "warranted mode of awareness [pramāṇa]" is interpreted as meaning "by means of this there is warranted awareness [pramīyate anena iti pramāṇam]." The "this" being referred to is the Instrument. See, NM [31.05, 31.13, 38.15, 72.11]. According to Buddhists like Ratnakīrti, however, the term "warranted mode of awareness [pramāṇa]" is interpreted to mean "it is warranted awareness

proves some object 'x' just is the absence of a warranted state of awareness that 'x.' The object (or state of affairs) 'x' that is a component of the causal complex that produces this effect is, for the Naiyāyikas, the absence of the inferential reason from dissimilar cases. In their view, then, it is because there is not a warranted mode of awareness that proves that the inferential reason is present in a dissimilar case that they know with epistemic certainty that the inferential reason is not present in a dissimilar case. According to Ratnakīrti, however, this is an illegitimate inference from a cause to an effect. In his view, the inference requires that the absence of the effect (the awareness that 'x') prove the absence of a cause (a state of affairs 'x'). That such an inference is illegitimate is clear from the well-known example of the "inference" of smoke from its cause fire. Ratnakīrti agrees, however, that if the object of a warranted mode of awareness (the cause) were pervaded by the presence of the warranted mode of awareness that proves it (the effect), the inference would be legitimate. He reasons, however, that this pervasion is not possible since it would result in the absurd consequence that everyone would have knowledge of every object (passage [b]). He concludes from this that because there is always the possibility of an unobserved dissimilar locus, non-observation cannot prove negative concomitance and therefore cannot show that $H3a_2$ does not undermine pervasion (passage [c]). Now that he has shown that non-observation cannot be used to satisfy T3, he returns to the issue of whether there is epistemically significant doubt about it; that is, whether $H3a_2$ applies to the inferential reason "on account of being an effect."

(pramīyate iti pramāṇam)." The "it" being referred to is the Instrument which is warranted awareness itself. The reason for this is that the Instrument (i.e., the "pramāṇa") and its culminating effect (i.e.,the "pramiti" or "pramāṇaphala") are assumed to be non-different. This means that the culminating effect of an Instrument's functioning is nothing but the Instrument itself. See MTBh [1.06-1.12; 22.17-23.06] and Dunne (1999: 77-19) who refers to PV3.213-215 and PV3.306-320.

1.4.1.3 Ratnakīrti on Epistemically Significant Doubt

Vācaspati's response to the original argument that non-observation cannot prove that an inferential reason is excluded from (all) dissimilar cases was to insist that the opponent's position would result in epistemically significant doubt about all inferentially produced states of awareness.[78] He recognized that even though a dissimilar case 'x' was not observed there could, on the opponent's view, still be doubt about whether an inferential reason is excluded from that locus (or property-possessor). As Vācaspati sees it, this means that there will always be doubt about whether some as yet unobserved dissimilar case does or does not possess an inferential reason. Since that possible locus 'x' need not be an object of awareness, there could be doubt about some possible 'x' in every state of awareness. If this sort of "objectless-doubt [anartha-sandeha]" is supposed to be epistemically significant Vācaspati reasoned that not only would the pervasion sub-component of every proposed Instrument of inferential awareness be undermined by $H3a_2$, but every state of awareness would be undermined by this sort of doubt. As a result, the ghost of (paralyzing) doubt would be released and rational people could never act. He concluded from this that the only epistemically significant kind of doubt should be "object doubt [artha-sandeha];" that is, doubt that is about whether a specific property-possessor that is present in awareness (the "object") possesses a particular property. This sort of doubt, he claimed, has to be based on observation. Since the doubt raised by the opponent is "objectless doubt [anartha-sandeha];" that is, doubt about a property-possessor that is not present in awareness, he claims that it is not epistemically significant and so does not undermine the pervasion sub-component of the Instrument in the Naiyāyikas' argument for the existence of Īśvara.

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[78] See 1.4.1.1, passage [b].

1.4.1.3.1 'Object-Doubt' and 'Objectless-Doubt'

Ratnakīrti responds to this argument by first challenging the interpretation of the terms "object-doubt [artha-sandeha]" and "objectless-doubt [anartha-sandeha]." He writes,

[a] What was said --"The ghost of doubt would be released. Nowhere would she not exist. Thus, one could not act anywhere"[79]-- does not follow. Positive activity is definitely not prevented since for the wise 'object-doubt' is a cause for activity. Doubt which does not have an object [anartha-sandeha] can be raised in every case. It is said that [iti cet]: "There isn't positive activity 'because of observing death even when there is the use of nutritious food and drink.'[80]" This is difficult to understand.

[b] To explain: The terms "object-doubt [artha-sandeha]" and "objectless-doubt [anartha-sandeha]" are not genitive compounds. Rather, "object-doubt [artha-sandeha]" means "doubt which is directed towards an object [artha-unmukhaḥ sandehaḥ] and the word "objectless-doubt [anartha-sandeha]" means "doubt which is not directed towards an object [anartha-unmukhaḥ sandehaḥ]." These are compounds in which the middle word has been elided, like the compound "era-king [śāka-pārthiva]."[81]

Ratnakīrti reasons that the compound words "object-doubt [artha-sandeha]" and "objectless-doubt [anartha-sandeha]" do not describe states of awareness in which there

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[79]See 1.4.1.1 passage [b], RNA [42.13].

[80]See 1.4.1.1 passage [b], RNA [42.15].

[81]RNA [43.04-43.10]: [a] yac coktam, saṃśayapiśācī labdhaprasarā na kvacin nāstīti na kvacit pravarteteti | tad asaṅgatam | arthasaṃśayasyāpi prekṣāvatāṃ pravṛttyaṅgatvāt pravṛttir avirodhiny eva | anarthasandehaḥ sarvatra kartum śakyate | antataḥ snigdhānnapānopayoge 'pi maraṇadarśanād apravṛttir iti cet | durjñānam etat | [b] tathā hi, arthasandeho 'narthasandeho veti sāyaṃ ṣaṣṭhīsamāsaḥ | kintv arthonmukhaḥ sandeho 'rthasandehaḥ, anarthonmukhaḥ sandeho 'narthasandeha iti iti śākapārthivādivan madhyapadalopī samāsaḥ |

Parallel passages to RNA [43.04-43.10] can be found at RNA [42.13], RNA [42.15], and RNA [42.08-42.17] quoted earlier.

Note: The example "śaka-pārthiva [era-king]" is usually understood as "śāka-(priya)-pārthiva [era-dear-king]" where the elided middle word is "priya [dear]." The term can be translated as "a king who is dear to the era." See MB ad Pāṇini 2.1.69. The elided word in the compounds "object-doubt [artha-(unmukha)-sandeha]" and "objectless-doubt [anartha-(unmukha)-sandeha]" is "unmukha [directed towards]."

is doubt about a specific object 'x' that either is or is not itself present (or represented) in that state of awareness. This is because such an interpretation presupposes that the compounds are best interpreted to mean "doubt that has an object" and "doubt that does not have an object;" where "doubt" refers to a state of awareness and "object" refers to a specific object of that state of awareness. On Ratnakīrti's view, however, these compounds are best interpreted as members of a class of compounds in which the "middle word" is elided [madhyapada-lopī samāsaḥ, (passage [b])]. On his interpretation, the compound "object-doubt [artha-sandeha]" refers to a state of awareness in which there is doubt that is 'directed towards [unmukha]' an object 'x'; that is, doubt that is about some object (or property-possessor) 'x.' Ratnakīrti argues that this sort of "object-doubt [artha-sandeha]" is epistemically significant. The compound "objectless-doubt [anartha-sandeha]" refers to doubt that is not directed towards [unmukha] an object 'x;' that is, doubt that is not about some object (or property-possessor) 'x.' Ratnakīrti agrees with Vācaspati that "objectless-doubt [anartha-sandeha]" should not be considered epistemically significant since it could be raised with respect to every state of awareness. Given his re-interpretation, however, the examples that the Naiyāikas took to be epistemically insignificant examples of "objectless-doubt" are better understood as epistemically significant examples of "object-doubt." For example, according to Vācaspati, the opponent's worry that the inferential reason may not be excluded from an as yet unobserved dissimilar case is an example of "objectless-doubt [anartha-sandeha]." According to Ratnakīrti, however, it is an example of doubt that is directed towards an object [artha-unmukha-sandeha]; a possible dissimilar locus 'x.' For Ratnakīrti, it is not necessary that a specific property-possessor 'x' be present in awareness for there to be epistemically significant doubt about whether it possesses a

particular property. All that is necessary, is that there be some potential property-possessor 'x' about which there is such doubt.[82]

1.4.1.3.2 The Ghost of (paralyzing) Doubt

Vācaspati's criticism of the opponent's theory was that it would create paralyzing doubt for rational people and would result in their complete inactivity.[83] To support this claim he provided the following reasons: He argued (i) that the opponent's theory entails that there will be epistemically significant doubt about every state of awareness, (ii) that rational people cannot act if such objectless states of doubt are supposed to be epistemically significant, and finally (iii) that the opponent's position cannot account for widely accepted inferential practices in which epistemically significant "object-doubt" is present e.g., the inference of a long and healthy life from nutritious food and drink.[84]

With his interpretation of the terms "object-doubt" and "objectless-doubt" in place, Ratnakīrti responds to Vācaspati by defending the opponent's original insights. More specifically, he argues that not only is it possible to show that $H3a_2$ applies to the inferential reason "on account of being an effect" but that the unwanted consequences that Vācaspati attributes to the opponent's position do not follow. In a passage

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[82]This discussion is related to the issue of "empty subject" terms in logic. This has been discussed in Matilal (1970), McDermott (1970), and McDermott (1971).

[83]See 1.4.1.1.

[84]See 1.4.1.1 passage [b].

immediately following the one in which he interprets the terms "object-doubt" and "objectless-doubt," Ratnakīrti explains that,

[c] (t)his being the case, in the example of "nutritious food and drink etc.," there is indeed doubt that is directed towards an object [artha-sandeha]. This is the result of observing, innumerable times, that in one's own and in others' continuua objects which belong to that class are observed to be nourishing etc., and from observing objects such as death etc., only occasionally in some cases. Doubt which is not directed towards an object must be seen as opposed to this. Therefore, it is indeed difficult to deny that in such cases wise people also act because of doubt that is directed towards an object, like they do from warranted awareness.[85]

And in a somewhat different context he says,

[d] When there isn't a proving or disproving warranted mode of awareness, reasonable doubt is accepted even by those who act in accordance with the warranted modes of awareness. Moreover, there isn't the unwanted consequence of complete inactivity since activity is possible either because of a warranted mode of awareness or from "object-doubt." Also, it isn't possible (to raise) "objectless-doubt" in every case since in some cases what is observed is doubt which is directed towards an object.[86]

In passage [c], Ratnakīrti addresses Vācaspati's concern that the opponent's position cannot adequately explain some widely accepted inferential practices. It is, for example, well-known that a diet of nutritious food and drink (the inferential reason [hetu]) will lead to a long and healthy life (the property to be proved [sādhya]). It is also observed, however, that some people who maintain such diets occasionally become sick and die. According to the opponent, such a person would be a locus of deviation since she

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[85]RNA [43.10-43.12]: [c] evaṃ sati snigdhānnapanādāv arthasandeha eva, tajjātīyasya svaparasantāne dṛṣṭipuṣṭyādyarthasya koṭiśaḥ karaṇadarśanāt, maraṇāder anarthasya kvacit kadācid darśanāt | etad viparīto 'narthasandeho dṛṣṭavyaḥ | tasmāt prāmāṇād ivārthasaṃśayād api prekṣāvatāṃ tatra tatra pravṛttir durvāraiva |

[86]RNA [47.19-47.21]: [d] prāmānikair eva sādhakabādhakapramāṇābhāve nyāyaprāptasya saṃśayasya vihitatvāt | na ca sarvatrāpravṛttiprasaṅgaḥ, pramāṇād arthasaṃśayāc ca pravṛtter upapatteḥ | na cānarthasandehaḥ sarvatra kartuṃ śakyate, kvacid arthonmukhatāyā eva darśanāt |

is a locus in which the property to be proved is absent and the inferential reason is present. On the basis of having observed such a person, however, the opponent should have epistemically significant doubt about the exclusion of the inferential reason from (all) dissimilar cases. Moreover, based on this doubt, she should conclude that $H3a_2$ applies to the inferential reason. As a result, she must also conclude that the inference of a long and healthy life from a diet of nutritious food and drink is not warranted and so should not provide a basis for the actions of rational people. The problem, according to Vācaspati, is that rational people do not come to this conclusion. That this is the case is clear from seeing, for example, that rational people do maintain a diet of nutritious food and drink in order to live a long and healthy life. According to Vācaspati, these sorts of inferential practices cannot be explained by the opponent.

As Ratnakīrti explains in passage [c], however, from his perspective they can be easily explained. Although Ratnakīrti would agree with the opponent that the inference is not warranted, he disagrees with Vācaspati that epistemically significant doubt must result in inactivity. In fact, as this example reveals, according to Ratnakīrti rational people do act on the basis of unwarranted states of awareness. As a result, Vācaspati's worry that the opponent's position would result in complete inactivity can be dismissed. In passage [d] Ratnakīrti further explains this point and extends its significance to the other two "unwanted consequences" that Vācaspati attributes to the opponent's position. As Ratnakīrti explains, without a "warranted mode of awareness that proves or disproves [sādhaka-bādhaka-pramāṇa]" that a particular inferential reason is excluded from (all) dissimilar cases, for example, there will inevitably be doubt about whether that inferential reason is excluded from (all) dissimilar cases. Moreover, this doubt will be epistemically significant since it will be doubt that is directed towards a potential object.

As a result, the pervasion sub-component of the Instrument will undermined and the state of awareness that is produced by it will not be warranted. In such cases, however, the doubt is said to be "reasonable" since there is not a warranted mode of awareness that could resolve the matter in one way or the other. Moreover, it is an example of "object-doubt." In cases where there is reasonable doubt, then, Ratnakīrti argues that rational people still choose to act.

1.4.1.5 Summary

Ratnakīrti helpfully concludes his discussion of why $H3a_2$ defeats the inferential reason as follows. He says,

> Thus, the inferential reason defined as "being an effect" is inconclusive [anaikāntika] since there is doubt about its exclusion from (all) dissimilar cases [vipakṣa]. This is because (negative) concomitance is not established since there is the absence of a warranted mode of awareness that proves that the inferential reason is not present in dissimilar cases.[87]

1.4.2 The Defect called "Generally Inconclusive ($H3a_1$)," The Theory of Remoteness, and Deviation

1.4.2.1 A Restatement of Argument 1

In defending their argument from H3a, the Naiyāyikas also argued that since there were no known instances of deviation [vyabhicāra] the defect $H3a_1$ did not defeat the pervasion sub-component [vyāpti] of the Instrument defined by the inferential reason

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[87]RNA [43.27-43.29]: tad evaṃ viparyayabādhakapramāṇābhāvād avyāpter asiddheḥ sandigdhavipakṣavyāvṛttikatvād anaikāntikaḥ kāryatvalakṣaṇo hetuḥ |

[hetu] "on account of being an effect [kāryatvāt]."[88] One of the issues raised in their defense was the criteria through which instances of deviation could be identified.[89] As previously discussed, an instance of deviation is a locus, other than the subject locus [pakṣa], in which the inferential reason [hetu] is known to be present and the property to be proved [sādhya] is known to be absent.[90] When such a locus is identified the defect is known to apply. Determining that a particular locus is a locus of deviation [vyabhicāra] requires: [a] Determining that a particular locus is not a subject-locus; [b] Determining the nature of the property to be proved; [c] Determining that the property to be proved is not present in that locus; [d] Determining the nature of the inferential reason; and [e] Determining that the inferential reason is present in the locus being considered. Through the theory of remoteness [viprakṛṣṭa], the Naiyāyikas had argued that the opponent could not know [c], that the property to be proved was not present in the opponent's proposed locus of deviation, growing grass.[91] They reasoned, therefore, that the defect did not apply. Of the five issues mentioned above, [a], [b], and [c] are central to Ratnakīrti's argument in the *Section on Pervasion* [vyāpti]; [d] and [e] are discussed in the *Section on the Inferential Reason* [hetu]. Ratnakīrti begins his argument in the *Section on Pervasion* [vyāpti] with [b], a brief discussion of the property to be proved [sādhya].

1.4.2.2 Two Alternatives

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[88]See Chapter 1, Section 3.2.

[89]See Chapter 1, Section 3.2.1.

[90]Deviation [vyabhicāra] has been discussed in Chapter 1, Section 3.2.2 and in Chapter 2, Sections 1.2-1.3

[91]See Chapter 1, Section 3.2.1.

From the Naiyāyikas inferential argument, it is clear that what they are trying to prove is that an intelligence-possessing maker created the world.[92] What is not entirely clear, however, is whether this maker is supposed to be observable, unobservable, or both observable and unobservable.[93] If this maker is supposed to be "observable [dṛśya]" (Alternative 1), Ratnakīrti argues that a locus of deviation [vyabhicāra] can be identified and therefore that $H3a_1$ will defeat the Instrument. He specifically identifies a tree as being an example of such a locus.[94] If this maker is unobservable [adṛśya] or both observable and unobservable [dṛśya-adṛśya-sādhāraṇa] (Alternative 2), however, Ratnakīrti argues that there will be epistemically significant doubt about the exclusion of the inferential reason from (all) dissimilar cases [sandigdha-vipakṣa-vyāvṛtti] and therefore that $H3a_2$ will defeat the Instrument.[95] What is specifically at issue is whether, according to the Naiyāyikas, the property to be proved [sādhya] is always, occasionally, or never supposed to be observable.[96] Given that a dissimilar case [vipakṣa] must be a locus in which the property to be proved [sādhya] is known to be present and that observation [darśana] and non-observation [adarśana] (or non-apprehension [anupalabdhi]) are the Instruments most often appealed to when establishing the presence or absence of a property in a particular locus, the issue of whether the maker is always (i.e., inevitably and immediately) or only occasionally (i.e., neither inevitably

[92] See Chapter 1, Sections 2.0-2.2.

[93] RNA [43.31-44.01]

[94] See Section 1.4.2.3.

[95] See Section 1.4.2.4.

[96] Interestingly, the issue of Īśvara's being in principle unobservable (i.e., never observable) is not discussed in this context. The (mis-)interpretation of "unobservable" as "in principle unobservable" is discussed in Kellner (1999).

nor immediately) observable is very significant. In either case, however, Ratnakīrti argues that H3a can be shown to apply.

1.4.2.3 Ratnakīrti on Alternative 1, Observable

Ratnakīrti introduces Alternative 1 as follows,

> [Ratnakīrti] If it is the first alternative, the inferential reason is generally-inconclusive [sādhāraṇa-anaikāntika (H3a_1)] (...) This is because (the inferential reason) 'being an effect [kāryatva]' is observed in trees etc., which are produced even without the property to be proved [sādhya] being like that [tathā-bhūta].[97]
>
> [Naiyāyika] One may argue [nanu]: "Trees etc., are included in the subject of the inference [pakṣīkṛta]. How can there be deviation [vyabhicāra] with respect to them? For [hi] the collection of existing things [bhāva-rāśi] is of three sorts: Either there is doubt about a maker [sandigdha-kartṛka] like there is for trees etc., or a maker is well-known [prasiddha-kartṛka] like for pots etc., or there is not a maker [akartṛka] as with space [ākāśa] etc. After accepting by perception and non-apprehension that there is pervasion with respect to pots etc. --which have a well-known maker-- and having grouped together [upasaṃhṛtya] the inferential reason 'being an effect' with trees etc. --objects about which there is doubt [sandeha-pada]-- an intelligence-possessor is inferred. Again [punaḥ], that cannot be a deviating locus [vyabhicāra-viṣaya]. As it is said, "There definitely isn't deviation with what is to be proved [sādhya]"."[98]

In responding to Ratnakīrti's assertion that trees are a locus of deviation [vyabhicāra], the Naiyāyikas argue that this cannot be since they are a part of the subject of the inference [pakṣa] (issue [a]). They defend this view by classifying all objects into three

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[97]RNA [44.01-44.02]: yady ādyaḥ pakṣaḥ, tadā tathābhūtasādhyam antareṇāpy utpadyamāne viṭapādau kāryatvadarśanāt sādhāraṇānaikāntiko hetuḥ |

[98]RNA [44.03-44.08]: nanu vṛkṣādayaḥ pakṣīkṛtāḥ | kathaṃ tair vyabhicāraḥ | trividho hi bhāvarāśiḥ | sandigdhakartṛko yathā vṛkṣādiḥ | prasiddhakartṛko yathā ghaṭādiḥ | akartṛko yathā ākāśādiḥ | tatra prasiddhakartṛke ghaṭādau pratyakṣānupalambhābhyāṃ vyāptim ādāya sandehapade kṣmāruhādau kāryatvam upasaṃhṛtya buddhimān anumīyate | na punar asau vyabhicāraviṣayo bhavitum arhati |

See NVTT [563.11-563.13] ad NS 4.1.21.

distinct groups based upon whether the object is known to have an intelligence-possessing maker or not. The subject of the inference [pakṣa] includes, by definition, only those objects about which there is doubt regarding whether they have such a maker. Since it is very well-known for example that pots have an intelligent maker, they cannot be a part of the subject of the inference. However, even though Ratnakīrti does not have any doubt about whether trees have such a maker the Naiyāyikas argue that since they do trees must be included in the subject of the inference. As a result, the Naiyāikas conclude that trees cannot be a locus of deviation. In response, Ratnakīrti writes,

> This is incorrect since [hi] a deviating object [vyabhicāra-viṣaya] should definitely not be (included in) the subject of an inference [pakṣa]. This is because of the rule, "From stating that the inferential reason is in that about which there is doubt it is destroyed and the inferential reason is without a basis [anāśraya]." Moreover, there is a deviating object. This is because, in the case of growing grass etc., an intelligence-possessor-in-general with the additional property of an observable body is rejected through the non-apprehension of an observable [dṛśya-anupalambha]. Therefore, it is definitely proper to make the mountains etc., about which there is doubt regarding a maker, into the subject of the inference. Trees, however, have an insentient maker. This fourth collection of things is not accepted.[99]

Ratnakīrti argues that in simply asserting that they have doubt about whether trees have an observable, intelligence-possessing maker the Naiyāyikas have not shown that their doubt is either reasonable [nyāya-prāpta] or epistemically significant. He suggests that with the Naiyāyikas line of reasoning nearly any proposed locus of deviation could be

[99]RNA [44.08-44.13]: ayuktam etat| na hi vyabhicāraviṣaya eva pakṣe bhavitum arhati, sandigdhe heuvacanād vyasto hetor anāśrayaḥ iti nyāyāt* | vyabhicāraviṣayatā ca dṛśyaśarīropādher buddhiman mātrasya tṛṇādy utpattau dṛśyānupalambhena pratikṣiptatvāt | tataś ca kṣmādharādir eva sandigdhakartṛkaḥ paksīkartum ucitaḥ kṣmāruhādis tv cetanākartṛka iti caturtho bhāvarāśir neṣtavyaḥ |

*tasmāt sandigdhe arthe sādhaka-bādhaka-pramāṇa-viṣaye hetoḥ vacanāt vyastaḥ pramāṇa pratikṣiptaḥ hetoh anāśrayaḥ viśayaḥ (PV4.91).

dismissed by simply asserting that it is a part of the subject of the inference [pakṣa]. As Ratnakīrti points out, instead of the Nyāya assertion that the objects about which they have doubt cannot be instances of deviation since those objects are a part of the subject of the inference, he could similarly assert that a locus that he knows to be a locus of deviation cannot be included in the subject of an inference since it is a locus in which the inferential reason is present and the property to be proved is absent. Simply asserting that trees are a part of the subject of the inference is not, therefore, a proper response to the charge that they are a locus of deviation.

Ratnakīrti further argues that like in the case of growing grass it can also be shown that trees are a locus of deviation. For example, if the property to be proved [sādhya] is supposed to be observable [dṛśya] it is possible to know that it is not present in a particular locus through the "non-apprehension of an observable [dṛśya-anupalambha]."[100] Since both Trilocana and Vācaspati seem to consider non-apprehension [anupalabdhi] (or non-observation [adarśana]) to be an accredited Instrument of awareness, Ratnakīrti implies that they too should be able to determine whether growing grass and trees have an observable, intelligence-possessing maker. For example, given that nearly everyone has seen that grass and trees are produced from seeds, soil, sunlight, water etc., and that an observable, intelligence-possessing maker

[100] According to Buddhists like Ratnakīrti, the "non-apprehension of an observable [dṛśyānupalabdhi]" is an accredited Instrument for establishing the absence of observable objects. In such cases, the term refers to a form of sense perception which can directly establish the absence of an observable. In addition, the term can also be used to refer to an inferential reason [anupalabdhi-hetu]. In such cases, the "non-apprehension of an observable" is an Instrument that justifies the treatment of an object as absent [asadvyavahāra]. In contrast, the "non-apprehension of an unobservable" is able to establish the "treatment of an object as absent [asadvyavahāra]" but is not able to establish the absence of either an observable or an unobservable object. The secondary literature on non-apprehension [anupalabdhi] is extensive. See, for example, Katsura (1992), Kellner (1997, and the references contained therein), Kellner (1999), and Steinkellner (1992).

has never been observed, it should be clear that neither grass nor trees have such a maker. Since no one has ever seen the "causes" of the great mountains, however, there is epistemically significant doubt about whether they have an observable, intelligence-possessing maker. Their maker might have been observable, for example, but only a very long time ago at the moment of their origin. As a result, it cannot be determined through the non-apprehension of an observable [dṛśyānupalabdhi] whether or not they have such a maker. Ratnakīrti therefore explains that the mountains should be included in the subject of the inference [pakṣa]. His point is that there is a principled way of determining whether there is epistemically significant doubt about whether a proposed locus possesses a particular property. Moreover, once applied, it is clear that there isn't doubt about whether trees have an observable, intelligence-possessing maker and also that there is doubt about whether mountains have such a maker. As a result, trees cannot be included in the subject of the inference [pakṣa] and can therefore serve as examples of deviation [vyabhicāra]. From this, Ratnakīrti concludes that if the Naiyāyikas' claim that the property to be proved is an observable [dṛśya] it can be shown that trees are a locus of deviation [vyabhicāra] and therefore that $H3a_1$ defeats the pervasion sub-component [vyāpti] of the Instrument.

1.4.2.3 Ratnakīrti On Alternative 2, Unobservable

Ratnakīrti now considers the possibility that according to the Naiyāyikas the property to be proved is an intelligence-possessing maker who is not observable [adṛśya] (Alternative 2). Such a maker could be unobservable, in principle, or only occasionally unobservable as a result of being spatially, temporally, or essentially remote [deśa-kāla-svabhāva-viprakṛṣṭa]. In considering such a possibility Ratnakīrti writes,

[a] Because of astonishment that there is deviation and for the purpose of establishing the three collections of existing things, one may argue [athah] that it is the second alternative: Concomitance is understood with an intelligence-possessor-in-general who is indifferent to being observable or unobservable [dṛśyādṛśya] (and) cannot be rejected by perception (as being present) in the trees etc.

[b] In this case, since it is possible [sambhāvyamānatva] that there is an intelligence-possessor-in-general with respect to trees etc., we do not say that there is general-inconclusivity [sādhāraṇa-aniakāntikatā]. Nevertheless, because there is the absence of pervasion, we say that there is doubt about exclusion (of the inferential reason from dissimilar cases) [sandigdhavyāvṛttikatva]. This is because when pervasion is being grasped negative concomitance is not proved by the non-apprehension of an observable since what is to be proved, an intelligence-possessor who is indifferent to being observable or unobservable, is an unobservable.

[c] To explain: When prior to the activity of a potter the exclusion [vyatireka] of a pot is to be known, it is not possible to know that the exclusion [vyatireka] of the pot was brought about by the absence of the property to be proved [sādhyābhāvakṛta]. For example, when trees etc., are coming up [viṭapādijanmasamaye] it is possible that an intelligence-possessor-in-general [buddhiman-mãtra] exists since in virtue of his being unobservable it is impossible to deny. This is also the case with respect to pots etc., since when negative concomitance [vyatireka] is being ascertained the existence of an intelligence-possessor-in-general [buddhiman-mãtra] is possible in virtue of his being unobservable. Since it has not been proved that the absence of the inferential reason [sādhana-abhāva] is dependent upon the absence of the property to be proved [sādhyābhāva-prayukta], pervasion is absent. How is the inferential reason not one about which there is doubt about its exclusion (from dissimilar cases) [sandigdha-vyatireko hetuḥ]? [101]

Given that the property to be proved may be unobservable it is not possible, through non-observation, to know that that property is not present in a particular locus (passage [b]). This is because due to remoteness, for example, that property may not be observed

[101] RNA [44.16-44.24]: [a] atha vyabhicāracamatkārās trividhabhāvarāśivyavasthāpanārthaṃ ca viṭapādau pratyakṣāpratikṣiptena dṛśyādṛśyasādhāraṇena buddhimanmātreṇa vyāptir avagamyata iti dvitīyaḥ saṅkalpaḥ | [b] tadā viṭapādau buddhimanmātrasya saṃbhāvyamānatvāt na sādhāraṇānaikāntikatāṃ brūmaḥ | kiṃ tarhi, vyāptigrahaṇakāle dṛśyādṛśyasādhāraṇasya buddhimanmātrasya sādhyasya adṛśyatayā dṛśyānupalambhena vyatirekāsiddher vyāpter abhāvāt sandigdhavyāvṛttikatvam ācakṣmahe | [c] tathā hi | yadā kumbhakāravyāpārāt pūrvaṃ kumbhasya vyatirekaḥ pratyetavyas tadā na sādhyābhāvakṛto ghaṭavyatirekaḥ pratyetuṃ śakyaḥ | yathā hi viṭapādijanmasamaye buddhimanmātrasya adṛśyatvena niṣeddhum aśakyatvāt sattvasaṃbhāvanāyāṃ, sādhyābhāvaprayuktasya sādhanābhāvasyāsiddhatvena vyāpter abhāvāt kathaṃ na sandigdhavyatireko hetuḥ |

even though it is present in that locus. Ratnakīrti argues, therefore, that in such cases it cannot be shown that the pervasion relation is defeated by the defect called "generally inconclusive [sādhāraṇa-anaikāntika] (H3a_1, passage [b])." Instead, he argues that in such cases it is defeated by the defect called "doubt about the exclusion of the inferential reason from dissimilar cases [sandigdhavipakṣavyāvṛtti] (H3a_2, passage [b])." In considering this alternative , therefore, the discussion shifts back to H3a_2. According to Ratnakīrti, in order for the Naiyāyikas to know that the inferential reason, "being an effect," is not present in a dissimilar locus they must know that the absence of the inferential reason is due to the absence of what is to be proved (passage [c]). What is at issue is negative concomitance [vyatireka]. Since what is to be proved may be unobservable, however, there is no way to determine this through observation and non-observation (i.e., non-apprehension). Consider the well-known example of a potter as the maker of pots. What the Naiyāykas need to show according to Ratnakīrti is that their theory can account for pervasion in well-known inferences such as the inference of a potter from the presence of pots. In order to show this they must explain why the defect called "doubt about the exclusion of the inferential reason from dissimilar cases" does not apply. To do this, they must establish the negative form of pervasion; that is, they must show that the absence of a pot is due to the absence of a potter who in this case may be unobservable. Ratnakīrti argues, however, that according to their own theory the Naiyāyikas cannot establish this negative concomitance. To show this he makes use of the Naiyāyikas earlier point that one cannot know through observation and non-observation that trees do not have an intelligence-possessing maker since, due to remoteness, this maker could be unobservable.[102] Ratnakīrti's point in citing this example is to illustrate that even for the Naiyāyikas, the non-observation (or non-

[102]See Chapter 1, Section 3.2.1.

apprehension) of a non-observable cannot establish its absence in a particular locus. As a result, it is always possible that such a maker is present. Thus, the Naiyāyikas cannot show that such a maker is not present. As a result, if the property to be proved is an unobservable there will always be doubt about its exclusion from dissimilar cases. Moreover, this will be the case regardless of whether the property to be proved is a potter or an intelligent-possessing maker. As a result, Ratnakīrti concludes that there is epistemically significant doubt about the exclusion of the inferential reason from dissimilar cases and therefore that $H3a_2$ defeats the inferential reason. The problem, as Ratnakīrti sees it, is that if the property to be proved is not observable, negative concomitance cannot be established and so there will be epistemically significant doubt about the exclusion of the inferential reason from dissimilar cases.

1.4.2.4.1 Primary Causes, A Nyāya Counter-argument

Related to this is an earlier argument in which the Naiyāyikas were asked to explain how a pervasion relation that was established between specific (and observable) classes of effects and specific (and observable) classes of causes could be used to infer a specific, unobservable cause (that is, an unobserved maker) from effects-in-general.[103] The Naiyāyikas response was to provide an example. They argued that since the opponent would agree that there is pervasion between specific observed pieces of cloth (i.e., a specific and observable class of effects) and a primary cause, thread (i.e., a specific and observable class of causes), she should also agree that there is pervasion between all effects (i.e., effects-in-general) and having a primary cause (i.e., having a primary cause-in-general). The assumption underlying this argument is that the specific,

[103] See Chapter 1, Section 3.2.2.1.

observed pieces of cloth are known to be pervaded by the property 'having a primary cause' in virtue of having the property 'being an effect-in-general.' The Naiyāyikas then reason that since the opponent agrees with the conclusion of this argument she should also agree with the conclusion of a parallel argument in which the property 'having an instrumental cause' is substituted in both steps of the argument for the property 'having a primary cause.' The opponent, however, rejected the parallel argument. According to the Naiyāyikas, this rejection entails the rejection of the well-known argument. Since this is not acceptable to the opponent, the Naiyāyikas conclude that she must accept the parallel argument. This argument is important to Ratnakīrti's continuing discussion of $H3a_2$ since it provides another example of how the Naiyāyikas argue that negative concomitance [vyatireka] can be known even when one or both of the terms are not observable.

In responding to this argument Ratnakīrti rejects both the example and the analysis. He argues,

So [iti], who deceived you in this way? If in this case pervasion [vyāpti] is grasped by perception and non-apprehension, how is it proved that an effect-in-general [kārya-mātra] is caused by a primary cause [upādāna-pūrvaka]? You didn't mention another method for grasping pervasion. And it is impossible to rationally arrive at [abhyuhitam] the pervasion of an effect-in-general and primary cause, both of which are indifferent to being observable and unobservable by means of perception and non-apprehension which both need observable objects.[104]

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[104]RNA [44.25-44.30]: {yathoktam, na ca yathā kāryaṃ ca syān nirupādānaṃ ceti nāśaṅkanīyam, tathā kāryaṃ ca bhaved akartṛkaṃ ceti nāśaṅkaṇīyam iti, tatrāpi kāryaṃ ca syān nirupādānaṃ ca bhaved iti na vaktavyam iti} kenaivaṃ pratārito 'si | yadi hy atra pratyakṣānupalambhābhyāṃ vyāptir gṛhyate tadā katham upādānapūrvakaṃ kāryamātraṃ sidhyati | vyāptigrahaṇaprakārāntaraṃ ca tvayāpi nopanyastaṃ | dṛśyādṛśyasādhāraṇyor upādānakāryamātrayor dṛśyaviṣayābhyāṃ pratyakṣānupalambhābhyāṃ vyāpter abhyūhitum aśakyatvāt |

Ratnakīrti's response to the parallel argument strategy is based on his earlier point about the method that the Naiyāyikas use to establish pervasion. Although he would agree with the conclusion of the first argument he does not agree with the Naiyāyikas' theory of pervasion and so he rejects both arguments, but only the conclusion of the second one. In the above passage, Ratnakīrti, repeats his point that it is not possible to establish pervasion between unobservables by perception and non-perception. The reason why he rejects the Naiyāyikas parallel argument strategy is suggested by his earlier remark that to establish negative concomitance [vyatireka] it is necessary to know that "the absence of the inferential reason [sādhana-abhāva] is due to the absence of the property to be proved [sādhya-abhāva-prayukta]." Neither the Naiyāyikas' theory of inference-warranting relations nor their parallel argument strategy is able to show this 'dependence.' According to Ratnakīrti, then, the Nyāya theory cannot account for how a pervasion relation that is established for a specific set of objects based upon their observability can be extended to objects which are not observable. Without a plausible method for determining pervasion between an unobservable property to be proved, there will always be doubt about the exclusion of the inferential reason from dissimilar cases and so $H3a_2$ will be known to apply.

1.5 Summary, H3a in the Section on Pervasion

In his *Section on Pervasion*, Ratnakīrti considers the Nyāya theory of inference-warranting relations [vyāpti] in order to show why the inference-warranting relation in their argument for the existence of Īśvara is defeated by H3a. In describing the Nyāya theory, however, he also discusses the three Pervasion Conditions in terms of which the Naiyāyikas define the natural-relation [svābhāvika-sambandha] that they insist

underwrites the pervasion sub-component of all well-functioning Instruments of inferential awareness. In this section he also provides an account of how the Naiyāyikas propose to satisfy these conditions and thereby determine the epistemic necessity of the inference-warranting relations defined by them. Although Ratnakīrti argues that the Naiyāyikas have neither provided a precise definition of such relations nor proven that such relations exist, his most important criticism of the Nyāya theory is his argument that by observation [darśana] and non-observation [adarśana] alone the Naiyāyikas cannot show that T3 and U are ever satisfied. According to Ratnakīrti, an inherent weakness in the Nyāya theory is their view that a finite, unspecified number of empirical observations and non-observations can establish the absence of an inferential reason in (all) dissimilar cases [vipakṣa] (T3). As Ratnakīrti argues, the epistemic necessity conferred upon negative concomitance [vyatireka-vyāpti] by the Nyāya theory is such that there will always be the logical possibility that an inferential reason is present in a dissimilar case located in some spatially or temporally distant corner of the domain. As a result, Ratnakīrti concludes that the Naiyāikas cannot show that T3 is satisfied and that $H3a_2$ does not apply to an inferential reason. This is the case he suggests, not only for the inferential reason in the Naiyāyikas argument for the existence of Īśvara but for nearly every inferential reason that is supposed to be justified within the Nyāya epistemological framework. This general criticism of the Nyāya theory of inference-warranting relations and justification informs Ratnakīrti's response to each of the Nyāya arguments discussed in this section; that is, Argument 1 and Argument 2. In responding to each of these arguments, Ratnakīrti focuses his critical attention on weaknesses that he associates with the Naiyāyikas' empiricism.

In discussing Argument 1, for example, Ratnakīrti argued that if the Naiyāyikas suppose that Īśvara is observable [dṛśya] then it can be shown through the non-apprehension of an observable [dṛśyānupalabdhi] that trees and growing grass are instances of deviation [vyabhicāra] and that they defeat the pervasion sub-component of the Instrument in the Naiyāyikas' argument. This is because according to both Ratnakīrti and the Naiyāyikas the epistemic fact of not observing an observable object in a locus can establish the non-epistemic fact of its absence in that locus. If Īśvara is supposed to be an "unobservable [adṛśya]," however, Ratnakīrti argues that the Naiyāyikas cannot prove negative concomitance [vyatirek-vyāpti] through non-apprehension [anupalabdhi] or non-observation [adarśana] as required by their theory. This is because as Ratnakīrti has argued the epistemic fact of not observing an unobservable [adṛśyānupalabdhi] cannot establish the non-epistemic fact of the absence of that unobservable. More specifically, a finite, unspecified number of non-observations can never establish that the absence of an unobservable object, such as the property to be proved [sādhya], is due to the absence of the inferential reason [sādhana-abhāva-prayukta]. The observed instances of negative concomitance could be coincidental. Since negative concomitance cannot be established, Ratnakīrti argues that there will always be epistemically significant doubt about the exclusion of the inferential reason from all dissimilar cases [sandigdha-vipakṣa-vyāvṛtti] and therefore that $H3a_2$ will defeat the inferential reason.

In his discussion of Argument 2, Ratnakīrti considers the Naiyāyikas response to this sort of argument. The Naiyāyikas argue that the epistemic necessity conferred upon inference-warranting relations by their theory is sufficient for ruling out what they consider to be epistemically significant doubt about the presence of the inferential

reason in dissimilar cases. Ratnakīrti dismisses this on the grounds that it is based on an untenable theory of epistemic doubt. According to Ratnakīrti, the problem with the Nyāya theory of doubt is that it only considers empirical and not logical objects to be epistemically significant; the Nyāya view is impoverished by their empiricism. In responding to the Naiyāyikas Ratnakīrti reinterprets the Naiyāyikas' theory of doubt and shows that not only is his interpretation more reasonable but, that it will not even lead to paralyzing doubt as they suggest. Given his account of reasonable [nyāya-prāpta] and epistemically significant doubt, Ratnakīrti argues that $H3a_2$ can be shown to defeat the inferential reason.

2.0 The Section on the Inferential Reason

In the next section of his essay Ratnakīrti continues his discussion of $H3a_1$ and $H3a_2$ by focusing on issues that have to do with the scope of the inferential reason, "on account of being an effect [kāryatvāt]."[105] The discussion shifts, therefore, to the specific nature of the inferential reason (issue [d]) and the related issue of whether it is known to be present in a particular locus (issue [e]).[106] In Section 1.0, Ratnakīrti discussed H3a and deviation [vyabhicāra] primarily in terms of the property to be

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[105]See Chapter 1, Section 3.2.2.1.

Note: There are two somewhat different issues that have to do with what I am calling the "scope" of the inferential reason. The first issue, which will be discussed in this section, concerns the conditions under which, given a particular formulation of the inferential reason a pervasion relation can be "extended" from a "sample class," for which the co-presence and co-absence of the inferential reason and the property to be proved have been observed, to the "subject class" of the inference. The second issue, which will be discussed in Section 3.0, has to do with the special characteristics that can and cannot be proved from the inferential reason being a property of the subject of the inference. These two issues are related in that they both have to do with the precise formulation of the inferential reason (i.e., its scope) and with different aspects of the Instrument Condition, T1, which states that an inferential reason must be known to be a property of the subject of the inference [pakṣadharmatā].

[106]See Chapter 1, Section 3.2.2 and Chapter 2, Section 1.4.2.1.

proved [sādhya] (i.e., issue [b], issue [c]).[107] In this section, Ratnakīrti reconsiders this defect in terms of the inferential reason [hetu]. More generally, however, his concern is again with whether negative concomitance [vyatireka] can be determined for it. In addition, in Section 1.0, Ratnakīrti focused his attention almost exclusively on the pervasion [vyāpti] sub-component of the Instrument; that is, T2, T3, U and the defects associated with them. Here, his attention to the inferential reason [hetu] enables him to expand his analysis to include a discussion of both T1, the Instrument Condition in terms of which the second sub-component is defined and its associated defect, H1b. As discussed earlier, T1 states that an inferential reason must be known to be a property of the subject of the inference [pakṣadharmatvam].[108] It is in discussing the nature of the inferential reason and its proposed negative concomitance [vyatireka-vyāpti] that Ratnakīrti provides his response to what I have referred to earlier as "Argument 3."[109]

2.1 A Restatement of Argument 3

In defending their argument for the existence of Īśvara, the Naiyāyikas suggested that the inferential reason "on account of being an effect [kāryatvāt]" should be interpreted as "effects-in-general [kāryamātra]" so as to include any and all effects.[110] In defending this formulation of the inferential reason [hetu] the Naiyāyikas also responded to an opponent who argued that because of its scope it would be inconclusive (H3a). The

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[107]See Section 1.4.2.1.

[108]See Chapter 1, Section 2.3.1.2.

[109]See Chapter 1, Section 3.2.2 and Chapter 2, Section 1.4 where the argument is referred to as "Argument 3."

[110]See Chapter 1, Section 3.1.2 where RNA [33.32-34.05] is discussed.

opponent pointed out that this "unrestricted version" of the inferential reason is so general that it is known to be present in dissimilar cases [vipakṣa] such as growing grass ($H3a_1$).[111] Moreover, since it is not the case that all effects are observable [dṛśya], the opponent argued that there would always be doubt about whether the inferential reason was excluded from (all) dissimilar cases [sandigdha-vipakṣa-vyāvṛtti, ($H3a_2$)].[112] The opponent concluded, therefore, that the unrestricted version of the inferential reason was defective since both $H3a_1$ and $H3a_2$ were known to apply to it. The opponent suggested, however, that by limiting the scope of the inferential reason, its pervasion with an intelligence-possessing maker could be established.[113] More specifically, it was suggested that the scope of the inferential reason needed to be restricted to "specific effects [kārya-viśeṣa]" and further that what made effects "specific" was the restrictive property of 'being an effect from (the observation of) which there is the awareness of (its) having been made [kṛta-buddhi].'[114] This restrictive property was meant to distinguish between effects such as pots, for which an intelligence-possessing maker has been observed and those such as growing grass, for which such a maker has not. Given this more restricted version of the inferential reason the opponent suggested that pervasion with an intelligence-possessing maker could be established through observation and non-observation as required by the Nyāya theory.[115] At least, the opponent implied, T3 could be satisfied since such an inferential reason was not known

[111] See Chapter 1, Section 3.2.1 where RNA [36.26-36.27] is discussed.

[112] See Chapter 1, Section 3.2.2 where RNA [37.12-37.16] is discussed.

[113] See Chapter 1, Section 3.2.2.1 where RNA [37.17-37.18] and RNA [37.20-37.26] are discussed.

[114] See Chapter 1, Section 3.2.2.2 where RNA [37.27-37.29] is discussed.

[115] Although this is not directly stated by the opponent, it is clear from his discussion and Ratnakīrti's own interpretation of the argument that this is what the opponent has in mind.

to be present in a dissimilar case and given that it is an observable [dṛśya] there need not be epistemically significant doubt about its exclusion from (all) dissimilar cases. It is possible, therefore, that the pervasion sub-component of an Instrument defined by it would neither be defeated by $H3a_1$ nor undermined by $H3a_2$. As the opponent pointed out, however, the problem with the restricted version of the inferential reason was that it was not present in the subject of the Naiyāyikas inference [pakṣa]. In other words, it was defective because it was "unestablished in itself [svarūpāsiddha, (H1b)]."[116] The opponent's point was that the version of the inferential reason for which pervasion could be established could not prove what the Naiyāyikas intended because it was defeated by H1b and the version of the inferential reason that could prove what the Naiyāyikas intended was defective because of H3a.

2.2 H3a in the Section on the Inferential Reason

In this section of his essay, Ratnakīrti picks up the opponent's line of argument by arguing that there needs to be a limiting property 'P' that restricts the scope of the inferential reason, 'effects-in-general [kārya-mātra]' (i.e., all effects).[117] As mentioned earlier, the problem with the unrestricted version of the inferential reason is that since

[116]This is suggested at RNA [38.04-38.07]. For a definition of this defect see KTBh [106.01] which is quoted and translated in the notes to Chapter 1, Section 2.3.1.1.

[117]The structure of this section of Ratnakīrti's essay is somewhat complicated. In my discussion, therefore, I have chosen to reconstruct the Naiyāyikas argument and Ratnakīrti's response to it by referring to ideas that are scattered throughout the section and discussed somewhat differently in different places. What "complicates" the structure of the section is that there are two (very helpful) "summary" passages, one in which the Naiyāyikas summarize their main points (RNA [52.11-52.21]) and one in which Ratnakīrti reconstructs their argument and summarizes his own (RNA [52.22-53.20]). Consider the following "outline" of the section: RNA [50.21-5.13], 'Set up'; RNA [51.14-52.11], The Naiyāyikas Trick; RNA [52.11-52.21], Nyāya Summary; RNA [52.22-53.20], Ratnakīrti's Summary and Argument; RNA [53.20-54.01], Ratnakīrti's response (to miscellaneous parts of RNA [51.14-52.11] not discussed in his 'Summary'); and RNA [54.01-54.04], Conclusion.

there are numerous loci in which the inferential reason is known to be present and the property to be proved, an intelligence-possessing maker, is known to be absent, it is inconclusive [anaikāntika, ($H3a_1$)]. Here, Ratnakīrti cites the example of a pot in which the effects of drying and cracking are observed even without the activity of the potter.[118] His point is that since effects-in-general, such as the drying and cracking of a pot, are not observed to have an intelligence-possessing maker pervasion cannot be established. Such a pot, he points out, is clearly a locus of deviation [vyabhicāra] since it is a locus in which the inferential reason, 'being an effect-in-general,' is present and the property to be proved 'having an intelligence-possessing maker,' is absent. As a result of such examples, Ratnakīrti claims that the unrestricted version of the inferential reason deviates from the property to be proved. In addition, according to Ratnakīrti it cannot be shown that the absence of an effect-in-general (e.g., a pot) is due to the absence of an intelligence-possessing maker (e.g., the potter). This is because even though it can be shown, for example, that a pot is made by a potter, it cannot be shown that the absence of a pot is due to the absence of the potter. An observed instance of co-absence could be coincidental. Moreover, effects-in-general (i.e., all effects) are not always observable and given that negative concomitance has not been established, there will inevitably be epistemically significant doubt about the exclusion of the inferential reason from (all) dissimilar cases [sandigdha-vipakṣa-vyāvṛtti, ($H3a_2$)].[119] The challenge for the Naiyāyikas, according to Ratnakīrti, is to identify a property 'P' such that the sub-class of effects-in-general defined by it could be known through observation and non-observation to be pervaded by the property to be proved. Such a property would insure that the inferential reason is neither inconclusive ($H3a_1$) nor one about which there is

[118] RNA [50.23-50.27]. The example is referred to again at RNA [51.03-51.07]

[119] RNA [51.09-51.13]

epistemically significant doubt about its exclusion from dissimilar cases (H3a_2). In addition, it must also be shown that the inferential reason restricted by property 'P' is present in the subject of the inference; that is, that H1b does not apply.[120] If such a property could be found, it would restrict the inferential reason in such a way that T1, T2, and T3 could be satisfied. Through this line of reasoning, Ratnakīrti seeks to show not only that H3a applies to the inferential reason, effects-in-general, but also why given the Nyāya theory this must be the case.

As Ratnakīrti sees it, the Naiyāyikas respond to the challenge of identifying 'P' by making a distinction between two classes of effects; a class of specific effects [kārya-viśeṣa] for which an intelligence-possessing maker has been observed and a class of effects-in-general [kārya-mātra] (i.e., all effects).[121] The class of specific effects [kārya-viśeṣa] is supposed to include effects such as pots, cloth, and large buildings but not effects such as trees, mountains, growing grass, or drying and cracking.[122] Since there is doubt about whether effects such as trees, mountains, growing grass, and drying and cracking have an intelligence-possessing maker, they are said to be included in the subject of the inference [pakṣa].[123] In virtue of being effects, however, they too are included in the class of effects-in-general [kārya-mātra] (i.e., all effects). On the

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[120]See RNA [51.15-51.16] and RNA [52.11-52.14].

[121]RNA [51.14-51.16]

[122]RNA [51.18-51.21]

This passage considers whether the class of specified effects refers to (1) those individual effects for which concomitance has been observed or (2) those effects from the observation of which there is an awareness of having been made even though the particular effect being observed may not itself have been observed to be made. My discussion considers (2). At RNA [57.29-57.31] Vācaspati points out the obvious problem with (1).

[123]RNA [50.27-51.02], RNA [52.14-52.18]

Naiyāyikas' view, since the subject of the inference includes effects such as growing grass and drying and cracking, these effects cannot be cited as counter-examples to pervasion. As a result, the Naiyāyikas conclude that Ratnakīrti cannot show that the inferential-reason 'effects-in-general [kārya-mātra]' is inconclusive by showing that it is present in such cases. The Naiyāyikas then reason that since pervasion with an intelligence-possessing maker can be established for a specific sub-class of effects-in-general; that is, a "sample-class" of effects-in-general for which an intelligence-possessing maker has been observed, and since it is known that trees, mountains, growing grass, and drying and cracking are also a sub-class of effects-in-general, it is also known that they possess an intelligence-possessing maker.[124] The Naiyāyikas conclude, therefore, that the inferential reason "effects-in-general" does not need to be restricted since it is a well-functioning Instrument of awareness. Ratnakīrti refers to this line of reasoning as the "Naiyāyikas trick [viḍambana]" and argues that it does not work.

2.3 Ratnakīrti and the Naiyāyikas Trick

2.3.1 Exposing the Trick

Ratnakīrti begins his analysis of the Naiyāyikas trick [viḍambana] by arguing against their grouping of effects into just two classes. He says,

[a] (...) it is not accepted that there are two (classes of) effects, one which brings together all effects and another which brings together (effects) such as pots, cloth, and large buildings but excludes mountains etc. Rather, an effect belongs to multiple classes [anekajātīyakam]. Indeed, among these, even if cloth belongs to the same class [sajātīya] as large buildings in virtue of properties [dharma] such as 'being a thing [vastutva],' 'having a particular structure [saṃsthāna-viśeṣa-yogitva],' and 'being an effect [kāryatva],' still, ordinary perception [vyāvahārikaṃ pratyakṣaṃ] does not discover that those properties [dharma] are caused by an intelligence-possessor. This is

[124] RNA [51.31-52.02], [52.03-52.04]

because (properties) such as 'being an effect [kāryatva]' do not have negative concomitance with an intelligence-possessor. So, how could there be the inference of an intelligence-possessor [buddhimad-anumānam] from observing (properties) such as 'being an effect' in large buildings or mountains?[125]

Ratnakīrti then continues his analysis by further explaining the significance of his remark that "effects belong to multiple classes [anekajātīyakam]" to the inference of an intelligence-possessing maker. What he wants to do is show why it can be inferred that objects such as pots have an intelligence-possessing maker but why it cannot be inferred that effects such as mountains do. He explains that,

[b] (...) negative concomitance is proved for a collection [cakra] of effects that belong to the class of pots (since) its being pervaded by an intelligence-possessor is proved through perception. As a result, at a different place and time, there is indeed the inference of an intelligent-possessor from (an effect) that belongs to the class of pots [ghaṭajātīya]. And when (an effect) that belongs to the class of large buildings [prāsādajātīyaka] is also separately ascertained as being caused by an intelligence-possessor, then, an intelligence-possessor is also proved from (an effect) that belongs to that class. Thus, the inference of an intelligence-possessor is without fault [anavadya] since the collection of effects such as a cart, cloth, and bracelets, which belong to their respective classes [tattajjātīya] are separately [pṛthak pṛthag] ascertained as being caused by an intelligence-possessor (…).

[c] Thus, although (effects) such as a pot, cloth, and mountain belong to the same class in virtue of properties [dharma] such as 'being an effect [kāryatva]' and 'being a thing [vastutva],' it is (only) after admitting a difference between the respective [avāntaram] classes, pots, cloth, or mountains, that the perception which grasps pervasion [vyāpti-grāhakaṃ pratyakṣam] functions for an ordinary person [loka] (…).[126]

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[125]RNA [52.28- 52.33]: na hi kāryatvaṃ dvividham abhimatam | ekaṃ sarvakāryānuyogam aparaṃ parvatādivyāvṛttaṃ ghaṭapaṭaprāsādādyanuyāyīti | kin tu kāryam anekajātīyakam | tatra yadi nāma paṭasya prāsādādibhiḥ saha vastutvasaṃsthānaviśeṣayogitvakāryatvādibhir dharmaiḥ sajātīyatvam asti tathāpi na tān dharmān buddhimatpūrvakān adhigacchati vyāvahārikaṃ pratyakṣam, kāryatvādīnāṃ buddhimadvyatirekānuvidhānābhāvāt | tat kathaṃ prāsādaparvatādiṣu kāryatvādidarśanād buddhimadanumānas tu |

[126]RNA [52.33-53.09]: {kin tu} yasya ghaṭajātīyakāryacakrasya vyatirekasiddhis tasya buddhimadvyāptatvaṃ pratyakṣataḥ sidhyatīty ukataṃ | tena deśakālāntare ghaṭajātīyād eva buddhimad anumānaṃ | yadā tu prāsādajātīyakam api buddhimaddhetukam ekatra prthag avadhāryate tadā tajjātiyād api buddhimatsiddhiḥ | evaṃ tattajjātīyasarāvodañcanaśakaṭapaṭakeyūra prabhṛteḥ kāryacakrād buddhimatpūrvakatvena pṛthak pṛthag avadhāritād buddhimadanumānam anavadyam | {amum evārtham

In these passages, Ratnakīrti explains that there are numerous properties on the basis of which classes of effects can be defined (passage [a], passage [c]). This is important since, as he explains, pervasion with an intelligence-possessing maker can be established for observed members of a class of effects on the basis of some properties but not on the basis of others (passage [b], passage [c]). Moreover, as Ratnakīrti points out, a pervasion relation that is established for a class of specific effects on the basis of a property 'P' (e.g., the class of pots for which a maker is observed) can only be extended to effects beyond the original sample when those effects (e.g., the pots for which a maker is not observed) are known to be defined by 'P' (e.g., the property 'being an pot').[127] The pervasion relation can be extended to include <u>other</u> classes of effects (e.g., the class of carts, cloth, or bracelets) only if pervasion has been separately established for each one of them (passage [b]). Ratnakīrti explained earlier that this is because in order for there to be pervasion it must be known that the presence of the property to be proved is due to or dependent upon [prayukta] the presence of the inferential reason and that the absence of the inferential reason [sādhana-abhāva] is due to or dependent upon [prayukta] the absence of the property to be proved [sādhya-abhāva]. Ratnakīrti also argues, in passage [a], that 'P' cannot be a property such as 'being a thing [vastutva],' 'having a specific structure [saṃsthāna-viśeṣa-yogitva],' or even 'being an effect [kāryatva]' since pervasion has not been and cannot be determined

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abhisandhāyācāryapādair abhihitam, siddhaṃ yādṛg adhiṣṭhātṛbhāvābhāvānuvṛttimat | sanniveśādi tad yuktaṃ tasmād yad anumīyate ||} iti evaṃ ghaṭapaṭaparvatādīnāṃ kāryatvavastutvādibhir dharmaiḥ sajātīyatve 'pi avāntaraṃ ghaṭapaṭaparvatatvādijātibhedam ādāya lokasya vyāptigrāhakaṃ pratyakṣaṃ pravartata iti {darśayituṃ saṃvyavahārapragalbhapuruṣabuddhyapekṣayā yad darśanād akriyādarśino pi kṛtabuddhir bhavatīty uktam }|

[127] Dharmakīrti seems to make a similar point at PVSV [3.09-3.19]. Note: My use of the phrase "on the basis of 'P'" parallels Ratnakīrti's use of "dependent upon [prayukta]."

for a sample class of specific effects on the basis of such properties (passage [a], passage [c]). The Naiyāyikas response is a "trick," according to Ratnakīrti, since they improperly extend the scope of the inferential reason to include effects that are defined by properties for which pervasion has not been established (passage [a]). They violate what may be called "the extension principle."

The Naiyāyikas respond to this by pointing out that in every inferential argument the inference-warranting relation is extended beyond the sample class of objects (or property-possessors) for which it was originally established.[128] After all, they argue, there is always some dissimilarity between the sample class for which pervasion is established and the subject class to which the relation is extended. For example, in Ratnakīrti's example of inferring that pots have an intelligence-possessing maker, the sample class of effects could be defined by the property 'effects-in-general for which pervasion has been observed' and the subject class by the property 'effects-in-general for which pervasion has not been observed.' Thus, an inference-warranting relation that is established on the basis of a property 'P' is extended to a non-P possessor. From this, the Naiyāyikas conclude that, if correct, Ratnakīrti's argument would undermine all inferential reasoning. As described by him, the "extension principle" is too rigid.

2.3.2 Preserving Intuitions

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[128] RNA [52.18-52.21]

As both Ratnakīrti and the Naiyāyikas recognize, however, there are many cases in which an intelligence-possessing maker can be inferred from an effect-in-general.[129] The paradigmatic example is the inference of a potter from a pot. In addition, they also recognize that in almost every inferential argument an inference-warranting relation is extended beyond the sample class for which it was established to the subject of the inference. This feature of inferential reasoning is (partially) reflected, for example, in T1 which states that an inferential reason must be known to be present in the subject of the inference. There is, therefore, a very close relationship between T1 and what I am calling the "scope" of the inferential reason. According to the Naiyāyikas, for example, in addition to its being observed in a sample class of similar cases (T2) and not observed in a sample class of dissimilar cases (T3), the Instrument Condition T1 states that the "scope" of an inferential reason must extend beyond the sample classes to the subject of the inference. Another way of expressing this idea is to say that the inference-warranting relation must extend beyond the sample class for which it was established to the subject of the inference. What is specifically at issue in Ratnakīrti's argument is the conditions under which the scope of the inferential reason or the pervasion relation can be "extended" from the sample to the subject class. What Ratnakīrti is trying to show is that the conditions that the Naiyāyikas rely on are not consistent with our intuitions about the inference of intelligence-possessing makers. In response, the Naiyāyikas argue that Ratnakīrti's point about the necessity of a restricting property 'P' is not

[129]It is interesting to note that there has recently been a great deal of interest in such inferences. Philosophers of social science, for example, have become interested in how it can be known that an artifact has been made by a person. An early discussion of this is, of course, Paley's (1802) classic discussion of why intelligent design is inferred when we discover a watch while walking across the heath but not when we discover a stone. It should be clear that if the ground rules for such inferences could be understood, it would shed light on the argument for design and the Naiyāyikas' version of the cosmological argument. Part of what is at stake in Ratnakīrti's argument are these ground rules. See Sober (1997) and Sober (2000) for a discussion of such ground rules and their relevance to the design argument.

consistent with what we know about inferential reasoning more generally. What Ratnakīrti now tries to show, therefore, is how on the basis of property 'P' the Instrument Conditions for a restricted version of the inferential reason can be satisfied for well-known inferences but not for the Naiyāyikas' inference of Īśvara. In so doing, he seeks to show that his version of the extension principle is not too rigid. In addition, he also explains why the Naiyāyikas' criticism of his earlier argument is not consistent with what we know about inferential reasoning. Interestingly, he does so by accusing them of allowing their intuitions to become "subservient to philosophy [śāstra-paravaśa]." In order to illustrate this Ratnakīrti provides an example that brings his discussion back to the original property 'P' suggested by the opponent.[130] He writes,

[d] In order to show this, it is said that relative to the awareness of a worldly and wise person [saṃvyavahārapragalbhapuruṣa] there (can be) the awareness that 'it is a product [kṛta-buddhi]' from observing an 'x' even though he did not see it being made. [akrīyādarśino 'pi]. This is not the case, however, for a person whose awareness is subservient to philosophy [śāstraparavaśabuddhipuruṣa].

[e] To explain [tathā hi]: A worldly and wise person who is free from the influence of philosophy [śāstra-saṃskāra-rahita] has determined that (things that) belong to the class of temples [devakula-sajātī ya] were caused by a person [puruṣa-pūrvaka]. He then (leaves) the city and enters a forest. Upon seeing a mountain and a temple (in that forest) he has the awareness, 'it is a product [kṛta-buddhi],' (after seeing) the temple but not (after seeing) the mountain. (This is so) even though he did not see either of those two (things) being made. Although in virtue of being effects both (the temple and the mountain) belong to a single class [ekajātitva], he cannot account for (his awareness) that there is or is not the awareness 'it is a product' [kṛtabuddhi-bhāva-abhāva] for either of them without (first) establishing a difference between the classes "mountain-ness" and "temple-ness." But, once a difference in classes is established, pervasion (can only be) grasped for what belongs to the class of temples [devakulajātīya], but not for what belongs to the class of mountains [parvatajātīya]. It is also not the case that pervasion (can be) established for what belongs to the class of large buildings [prāsādajātīya]. Thus, for them (too) there (cannot be) the inference of an intelligence-possessor. But once pervasion has been grasped, separately, for large buildings, then there can be the inference of an intelligence possessor even for what belongs to that class [tajjātīya]. It is

[130] See, Chapter 1, Section 3.2.2.2.

not the case (however that) even in a dream pervasion can be grasped for what belongs to the class of mountains etc.[131]

Consider, Ratnakīrti says, an ordinary person who has determined that there is pervasion between a sample class of temples and the property 'having an intelligence-possessing maker.' Upon seeing another temple that person concludes that it too has an intelligence-possessing maker. This is the case even though unlike the sample class of temples this person did not observe it being made. The reason why the pervasion relation can be extended to include this object is because it is recognized as being a member of the "same class [sajātīya]" of objects for which pervasion was originally determined; that is, it is recognized as 'being a temple.' The reason why it cannot be extended to include mountains or even pots, for example, is because mountains and pots are not the same kind of object as the objects for which pervasion was originally determined. Pervasion can only be extended then to include objects that 'belong to the same class [sajātīya]' as the sample class for which pervasion was originally established. As Ratnakīrti explains, objects that 'belong to the same class [sajātīya]' must be known to share the property 'P' on the basis of which pervasion was determined for the sample class. This must be the case even though there may be other properties that they all

[131]RNA [53.09-53.19]: iti darśayitum saṃvyavahārapragalbhapuruṣabuddhyapekṣayā yad darśanād akriyādarśino 'pi kṛtabuddhir bhavatīty uktam | na tu śāstraparavaśabuddhipuruṣāpekṣayā |

tathā hi, śāstrasaṃskārarahitasya vyavahārapragalbhasya puruṣasya devakulajātīyakaṃ puruṣapūrvakatayāvadhāritavato nagarād vanaṃ praviṣṭasya parvatadevakulayor darśane tayor dvayor apy akriyādarśino 'pi devakule kṛtabuddhir bhavati na parvate | tad anayor devakulaparvatayoḥ kāryatvādinā ekajātitve kṛtabuddhibhāvābhavau na tayoḥ parvatadevakulatvalakṣaṇāvāntarajātibhedam anavasthāpya sthātuṃ prabhavataḥ | jatibhede ca siddhe devakulajātīye vyāpter grahaṇāt na parvatajātīyasya, na ca prāsādajātīyasya vyāptisiddhir iti na tato buddhimadanumānam | yadā tu prāsādasyāpi pṛthag vyāptigrhaḥ tadā tajjātīyād api buddhimadanumānam astu | na kṣitidharādijātīyasya svapne 'pi vyāptigrahaḥ |

share. In Ratnakīrti's example, 'P' is a property such as 'being a temple' or 'being a large building' but not a property such as 'being a mountain.'

As previously discussed, Ratnakīrti's implicit challenge to the Naiyāyikas was to discover a property 'P' that redefined the scope of the inferential reason, effects-in-general, in such a way that on the basis of 'P' pervasion could be established with an intelligence-possessing maker in accordance with our intuitions and in a manner that satisfies the Instrument Conditions T1, T2, and T3. The opponent's originally proposed property 'P' was supposed to be just such a property. This property was supposed to restrict and thereby redefine the inferential reason in such a way that not only could pervasion could be established for it, but, T1 could also be satisfied. Ratnakīrti now returns to this property 'P' in order to show that it can account for our ordinary intuitions, satisfy the conditions according to which the scope of an inferential reason can be extended, and explain why the Naiyāyikas trick is inference-defeating (passage [e]). His point is that while preserving our intuitions about "maker-inferences" and inferential reasoning more generally, property 'P' shows why the Naiyāyika's inference is defeated by H3a.

Consider, for example, the various effects for which an intelligence-possessing maker e.g., pots and temples has been observed. Ratnakīrti suggests that once all of these effects have been identified it will be noticed that they all share the property of 'being a member of a class of effects from the observation of which there is awareness, "it is a product".' These effects are all of the effects-in-general that are restricted by the property 'P.' It is not in virtue of their being 'effects-in-general' that their pervasion with an intelligence-possessing maker is known, but, in virtue of their being members

of this more restricted class of effects. What this reveals is that the proper form of the inferential reason in well-known inferences of an intelligent-possessing maker cannot be the unrestricted, 'effects-in-general.' As Ratnakīrti has previously explained, if this were the case the inferential reason would be defeated by H3a. Moreover, it is on the basis of being restricted by property 'P' that pervasion is determined for the observed sample class of effects. It is, therefore, on the basis of also being restricted by 'P' that the inferential reason is extended to unobserved members of that class. Therefore, it is the restricted form of the inferential reason that accounts for our intuitions regarding the inference of an intelligence-possessing maker from an effect. As the opponent originally pointed out, however, this restricted version of the inferential reason is not known to be present in the subject of the Naiyāyikas inference. After all, it is not the case that a world [jagat] was ever observed to have an intelligence-possessing maker. The inferential reason is, therefore, defeated by H1b and so is not a well-functioning Instrument for the existence of Īśvara. Ratnakīrti's extension principle therefore explains our ability to infer an intelligence-possessing maker for effects such as pots and temples, but not for mountains or the earth.

It is important to note that Ratnakīrti does not need to show that there isn't a property 'P' that could suitably restrict the inferential reason 'being an effect-in-general.' All he needs to show is that the Naiyāyikas violate the extension principle that accounts for our well-known inferences of an intelligence-possessing maker from an effect. This is important since without violating the extension principle the Naiyāyikas cannot show that H3a does not defeat the inference-warranting relation in their argument for the existence of Īśvara.

2.3 Summary, H3a in the Section on the Inferential Reason

In this section of his essay, Ratnakīrti has taken a very different approach to showing that H3a applies to the inferential reason in the Naiyāyikas' argument for the existence of Īśvara. Here, in discussing Argument 3, he focuses his attention on a "trick" that the Naiyāyikas use to show that the unrestricted version of their inferential reason is not defective because it is known to be present in a locus of deviation. In pointing to the extension principle at work in well-known inferences of intelligence-possessing makers, Ratnakīrti shows that the Naiyāyikas are able to defend their argument only by violating this principle. Since Ratnakīrti has defended this principle by showing that it explains our intuitions about "maker inferences," his argument shifts the burden of proof back to the Naiyāyikas who must now show that they do not violate the extension principle in showing that H3a does not apply to their inferential reason. It is Ratnakīrti's discussion of this argument that concludes his discussion of H3a. In the next section of his essay, Ratnakīrti turns to H2.

3.0 H2 in The Section on the Property to be Proved

The presence of the defect called "Opposed [viruddha (H2)]" blocks the pervasion sub-component of a well-functioning Instrument of inferential awareness [anumiti-karaṇa] by establishing that an inferential reason [hetu] is known not to occur together with the property to be proved [sādhya] in a single similar case [sapakṣa].[132] The defect is usually defined, therefore, in terms of an inferential reason that is known to be pervaded by what is "opposed to" the property to be proved [sādhya-viparyaya]. In order to show

[132]See Chapter 1, Section 2.3.1.2 and Section 3.1.

that this defect does not apply to a particular inferential reason, it is sufficient to show that it is present in at least one similar case [sapakṣa]. In their attempt to show that H2 does not apply to the inferential reason [hetu] "on account of being an effect [kāryatvāt]," the Naiyāyikas considered three issues, each of which had to do with the nature of the property to be proved [sādhya].[133] The first issue concerned its proper description and the related issue of whether once it had been properly described pervasion could be established between it and the inferential reason [hetu]. A second issue had to do with whether the example [dṛṣṭānta] cited in the inference i.e., a pot, is a similar case [sapakṣa]. The third issue had to do with how special, identifying properties [viśeṣa] of what is to be proved [sādhya] could be established when pervasion is established between, what I referred to earlier as, the "general form" of the property to be proved [sādhya] and the "general (or unrestricted) form" of the inferential reason [hetu].

In this section of his essay, Ratnakīrti assumes for the sake of argument that there is pervasion between 'effects-in-general' (the general form of the inferential reason) and 'being caused by an intelligent-maker-in-general' (the general form of the property to be proved) and instead focuses his critical attention on the third issue described above. He argues, for example, that the Naiyāyikas' general approach to establishing special characteristics [viśeṣa] of what is to be proved [sādhya] and their specific arguments for establishing that the 'intelligent-maker-in-general' has the special characteristics [viśeṣa] that distinguish him to be Īśvara are unsuccessful. The significance of this is that without a satisfactory account of how these special characteristics [viśeṣa] are established, Ratnakīrti argues that the pervasion sub-component of the Instrument will be defeated, in part, because of the presence of H2. What follows is a brief discussion of

[133]See Chapter 1, Section 3.1.1.

Ratnakīrti's argument against the Naiyāyikas approach to this issue and his specific arguments against their application of it to the inference used to prove the existence of Īśvara.

3.1 The Nyāya Approach, Step 1

If the inference-warranting relation between the inferential reason, 'effects-in-general,' and the property to be proved, 'intelligent-maker-in-general,' is assumed to have epistemic necessity, the problem for the Naiyāyikas becomes how to prove that this intelligent-maker who is now known to be the maker of the world has the special characteristics [viśeṣa] that distinguish him to be Īśvara.[134] These special characteristics [viśeṣa] include being unique, omnipresent, omniscient, and eternal.[135] In defending their inferential reason, the Naiyāyikas argued that in virtue of the property to be proved [sādhya] being a property of the subject of the inference it is known that the 'intelligent-maker-in-general' is a maker of the earth. Since this entails that he is unique and omniscient the Naiyāyikas argue that this maker is Īśvara. Ratnakīrti reherses their argument before responding to it. He says,

(The Naiyāyikas) argue [nanu]: "Although pervasion with a general-term [sāmānya] is well known, a special characteristic [viśeṣa] is proved through the force of being a property of the subject of the inference [pakṣadharmatā]. Just as fire is proved (to be present on the mountain etc.) through the exclusion of a non-connection with the mountain etc. [parvata-ayogavyavaccheda] (...).

About this it is said: "A special characteristic [viśeṣa] is indeed proved through the force of being a property of the subject [pakṣadharmatā-balataḥ] but not all (special

[134] In discussing this issue, Ratnakīrti turns his attention to what I referred to earlier as the "second step" of the Naiyāyikas' cosmological argument. See the notes to Chapter 1, Section 2.1.

[135] RNA [54.13-54.14]

characteristics are so proved). For (only) that characteristic is proved without which the inferential reason's location in the subject of the inference does not occur [upa+ √pad]. Just as for fire, the special characteristic is "being present on the mountain" and not the "beauty of a five-colored crest jewel. And it is not the case that without a single, omnipotent, or omniscient maker, the mountains and trees are not observed as being effects. This is because of observing this even in other cases [itareṣu] (...).[136]

Although Ratnakīrti agrees with the Naiyāyikas that special characteristics [viśeṣa] can be proved through the force of being a property of the subject of the inference [pakṣadharmatā-balataḥ], he argues that there is actually only one characteristic that can be proved in this way; the characteristic [viśeṣa] that accounts for the property to be proved [sādhya] being a property of the subject of the inference [pakṣa]. In the case of fire-in-general, the special characteristic [viśeṣa] that is proved is the property, 'being excluded from a non-connection with the mountain [parvata-ayogavyavaccheda]' which Ratnakīrti (somewhat imprecisely) paraphrases as 'being present on the mountain.' Other special characteristics of fire-in-general e.g., having a particular color or being caused by grass or leaves etc., cannot be proved in this way.[137] This position preserves well-known inferences and also points to a problem in the Naiyāyikas argument for the existence of Īśvara. According to Ratnakīrti, all that the Naiyāyikas are entitled to prove in virtue of the intelligent-maker-in-general being a property of the

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[136]RNA [54.17-54.27]: nanu sāmānyena vyāptau pratītāyām api pakṣadharmatābalād viśeṣasiddhiḥ | yathāgneḥ | parvatāyogavyavacchedādisiddhiḥ | {anyathā sarvānumānocchedaḥ | anumānadveṣī hy evaṃ jalpati, anumānabhaṅgapaṅke 'smin nimagnā vādidantinaḥ | viśeṣe 'nugamābhāvaḥ sāmānye siddhasādhyatā || } atrocyate | sidhyaty eva pakṣadharmatābalato viśeṣaḥ | na tu sarvaḥ | yena hi vinā pakṣasthaṃ sādhanaṃ nopapadyate sa viśeṣaḥ sidhyatu | yathā vahner eva parvatavartitvādiviśeṣo na pañcavarṇaśikhākalāpakamanīyaḥ | na ca giriṇāṃ taruṇāṃ kāryatvaṃ kartur ekatvavibhutvasarvajñatvādikam antareṇa nopapadyate, tad itareṣv api darśanāt | {tasmāt, pakṣāyogavyavacchedabhedamātre na dūṣaṇam | iṣṭasiddhyanvayābhāvād atirikte tu dūṣaṇam |}

For a discussion of related issues see NKan [149.18-150.15] and Nkan [153.29-ff]. For a parallel passage see MTBh [45.05-45.12].

[137]The example of fire that is fueled by grass and fire that is fueled by wood is discussed at MTBh [45.05-45.12].

subject of the inference is that he is 'excluded from a non-connection with the earth, mountains, or trees;' where the phrase "excluded from a non-connection with" can be paraphrased with the phrase "being present in." As a result, according to Ratnakīrti, what is inferred is an intelligent-maker-in-general who is "excluded from a non-connection with the earth, mountains, and trees." This does not mean that this maker has the special characteristics [viśeṣa] of uniqueness, omnipresence, and omniscience that distinguish him to be Īśvara. According to Ratnakīrti, then, the Niaȳayikas general approach to establishing special properties of what is to be proved cannot establish that the intelligent-maker has the qualities that identify him to be Īśvara.

3.2 The Nyāya Approach, Step 2

The Naiyāyikas now argue that if Ratnakīrti grants that there is pervasion [vyāpti] between the general form of the property to be proved [sādhya] 'an intelligent-maker-in-general' and the general form of the inferential reason [hetu] 'an effect-in-general' and also accepts that the special property [viśeṣa] "the exclusion of non-connection with the subject of the inference" can be proved, then, it is possible to use the following pair of inferences to prove that the intelligent-maker of the earth, mountains, and trees etc., is Īśvara. All that these inferences additionally require is that "intelligent-maker" refers to a maker who knows the primary causes, instruments, beneficiaries, and purposes of the effect that is created. The Naiyāyikas argue,

[Inference #1] The subject being discussed, bodies and the earth etc., has a maker who knowns the primary causes etc., on account of (its) being an effect. All effects have makers who know their primary causes etc. For example, a large building (has a maker who knows its primary cause). And the subject being discussed, bodies and the earth etc., is like that. Therefore it is like this (that is, it has a maker who knows the primary causes etc.)

[Inference #2] Now, given the proof of a maker-in-general who knows the primary causes etc., there is the proof of special characteristics (...). To explain: A maker who knows the primary causes etc., of bodies and the earth, etc., is neither non-eternal nor one who does not have an awareness of all objects. This is because there would (otherwise) be the unwanted consequence that a maker of 'x' does not know the primary cause etc., of 'x.' And there is no one of this sort (that is; non-eternal and non-omnisicient) who knows the primary cause etc., of (this) 'x' (that is; bodies and the earth etc.). For example, (makers like) us etc., (do not know the primary causes etc., of bodies and the earth). But this maker knowns the primary cause etc., of 'x' (that is; the bodies and the earth etc.). Therefore, this (maker) is like that (that is; neither non-eternal nor one who does not have an awareness of all objects).[138]

In Inference #1 it is assumed that in the original argument the general form of the inferential reason is a maker who knows the primary causes etc. This is, according to Inference #1, just what it means for there to be a maker. Given this assumption and pervasion between the general form of the property to be proved [sādhya] and the general form of the inferential reason [hetu], the Naiyāyikas reason that the intelligent maker of the earth is a maker who knows the primary causes of the earth. Given this, they argue in Inference #2 that this maker is known to be eternal and omniscient. This pair of inferences provides an example of how the Naiyāyikas believe they can argue from the special property that is directly proved through an inferential argument to those that are "entailed" by it.

Ratnakīrti chooses to respond to this pair of inferences by arguing that the Naiyāyikas have suppressed an important issue in their response; the issue of exactly how the

[138] RNA [55.04-55.14]: vivādādhyāsitās tanugirisāgarādayaḥ upādānādyabhijñakartṛkāḥ | kāryatvāt | yadyatkāryaṃ tattadupādānadyabhijñakartṛkam | yathā prāsādādi | tathā ca vivādādhyāsitās tanvādayaḥ | tasmāt tatheti | {evam ataḥ sādhanād upādānādyabhijñakartṛmātraṃ prasādhya tasya sarvajñasādhanāya vācaspatir eva punar idam āha,} bhavatu, tāvad upādānādyabhijñakartṛmātrasiddhiḥ | {pāriśeṣyāt tu vyatirekidvitīyanāmno 'numānād viśeṣasiddhiḥ |} tathā hi, tanubhuvanādyupādānadyabhijñaḥ kartā nā 'nityāsarvaviṣayabuddhimān | tatkartus tadupādānādyābhijñatvaprasaṅgāt | na hy evaṃvidhas tadupādānādyabhijño yathā 'smādādiḥ | tadupādānādyabhijñaś cāyaṃ | tasmāt tatheti |

property to be proved is to be interpreted. Ratnakīrti argues, for example, that there are three likely interpretations: Either there is a single intelligent maker who knows the primary causes of all of the numerous diads from which according to Nyāya ontology the world is created; or there is more than one maker who knows these primary causes; or there are numerous makers who, in virtue of being spatially, temporally, and essentially remote from each other only know the primary causes of their own respective objects.[139] Ratnakīrti very quickly dismisses these three alternatives. He argues, for example, that the Naiyāyikas have not proved that there is a single maker.[140] In the inference of fire-in-general from smoke-in-general, for example, what is proved is that there is fire-in-general on the mountain and not that there is only a single fire on the mountain. Similarly, in the proposed inference of Īśvara, all that can be proved is that there is a maker-in-general of bodies and the earth etc., and not that there is only one unique maker. As a result, Ratnakīrti argues that the Naiyāyikas need to provide a further argument to establish uniqueness. Ratnakīrti dismisses the second alternative by arguing that it is entirely possible that a number of different agents could work together to produce a single effect.[141] Without further argument there is no need to suppose that this is not the case. Ratnakīrti dismisses the third alternative by arguing that if the Naiyāyikas were to agree that there were many agents who created the earth etc., then there would not be any one agent who was omniscient.[142] Thus, the third alternative cannot be accepted either.

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[139] RNA [55.17-55.21]

[140] RNA [55.21-55.29]

[141] RNA [56.06-56.07]

[142] RNA [56.14-56.29]

What is significant about these very brief remarks is that they show that, according to Ratnakīrti, the opponent's original worries about whether the Naiyāyikas are able to show that H2 does not apply to the inferential reason in their argument for Īśvara are well-founded. While justifying their argument, the Naiyāyikas had tried to show that H2 did not apply to the inferential reason "on account of being an effect" by showing that it is known to be present in a similar case; that is, in a locus in which the *general form* of the property to be proved is also known to be present. The locus they cited was a pot. They then argued that in virtue of knowing that the general form of the property to be proved is present in the subject of the inference, its special characteristics could also be proved. They claimed to have shown, therefore, that neither is it the case that the inferential reason is not present in a similar case; that is that H2 applies to it, nor that the intelligent maker cannot be shown to be Īśvara. Following the opponent, however, Ratnakīrti has now argued that even though the Naiyāyikas may have shown that the general form of the property to be proved is present in a similar case, they have not shown how the special characteristics that identify this maker as Īśvara e.g., uniqueness or omniscience can be established in virtue of it being a property of the subject of the inference. As a result, while it may be known that the world has an intelligent-maker, it cannot be shown that this maker is Īśvara.

Interestingly, Ratnakīrti does not choose to directly relate these arguments to H2. Instead, he argues that if the Naiyāyikas agree that all they can show is that the world has an intelligent maker, then, their argument is rhetorically defective since it proves what is (already) accepted [siddha-sādhana] by those they are trying to convince.[143] If, on the other hand, the Naiyāyikas insist that what is to be proved is an intelligent-maker who is

[143] RNA [54.13-54.14], RNA [56.28-56.29]

characterized by special characteritistics such as omnisicence then the inferential reason is inclonclusive [anaikāntika] since pervasion with this maker has not been (and cannot be) established (issue 1).[144] It is also clear, however, that Ratnakīrti's arguments do relate to the previous discussion of H2. If, for example, the Naiyāyikas have not shown that the maker is Īśvara, their strategy for showing that H2 does not apply to their inferential reason does not succeed. Their strategy depended on first showing that H2 did not apply to the inferential reason when the similar case was defined in terms of the general form of the property to be proved (issue 2). This move was then supported by an argument that purported to show that the special characteristics could be proved in a separate step. It is through this two part strategy that the Naiyāyikas argued that H2 is shown to not apply to their inferential reason. Without the second part, however, the strategy will be ineffective since the Naiyāyikas will not be able to reject the opponent's point that for the Naiyāyikas a similar case must be defined in term of a more specific form of the property that is proved e.g., in terms of a unique intelligent maker-in-general or an omniscient intelligent maker-in-general. If it is not so defined, then, as Ratnakīrti has argued, the Naiyāyikas will not be able to show that the intelligent-maker-in-general has the special characteristics that identify him to be Īśvara. If it is so defined then the Naiyāyikas have not shown that the inferential reason is present in a similar case; that is, they have not shown that H2 does not apply to their inferential reason.

3.3 Summary, H2 in the Section on the Property to be Proved

Ratnakīrti's discussion of the three issues that were raised in the Naiyāyikas defense of the inferential reason from H2, points to a general problem with the Naiyāyikas theory

[144] RNA [54.13-54.14], RNA [56.28-56.29]. See Section 3.0 for a list of the three "issues."

of inferential reasoning and to two specific problems with the pervasion sub-component of the Instrument that the Naiyāyikas use to try and prove the existence of Īśvara. Both the general and the specific problems are interpreted by Ratnakīrti as having to do with the way in which the property to be proved is interpreted. The general problem according to Ratnakīrti is that the Naiyāyikas account of the special characterstics that can be proved in virtue of the property to be proved being located in the subject of the inference is not careful enough. In fact, the only characteristic that can be so proved is the characteristic of '(its) exclusion of non-connection with the subject of the inference.' The specific problems focus on the pervasion sub-component of the Instrument. The first problem is that since the Naiyāyikas insist that what is to be proved is not the general form of the property to be proved but a more specific form of it, they must show that there is pervasion between this more specific form and the inferential reason. Since this cannot be established in the Naiyāyikas argument for the existence of Īśvara, the pervasion sub-component will be defeated by H3. The second problem is that given this they cannot show that the inferential reason is present in a similar case. As a result they cannot have shown that H2 does not apply to their inferential reason. Each of these specific defects affects the pervasion sub-component of the Instrument and thus prevents it from being a well-functioning Instrument of inferential awareness.

4.0 Conclusion: Is Īśvara the Maker of the World?

Even within the relatively focused framework of Ratnakīrti's "Refutation of Arguments for Establishing Īśvara" it is clear that in order to determine whether Īśvara is the maker of the world a number of other philosophical problems will need to be resolved. In my view, (at least) three such problems have been introduced in this Chapter. These

problems have to do with the nature of epistemic necessity (and the related problem of determining standards for rationality), the nature of epistemic objects, and the epistemology of negative existentials. In concluding both this chapter and Part 1 of this dissertation, I want to briefly consider what is at stake, philosophically, in Ratnakīrti's argument with the Naiyāyikas. I will do so by explaining why the three problems just referred to need to be resolved before the Naiyāyikas' inference and the success of Ratnakīrti's critique can be fully evaluated. In so doing I also hope to justify, at least partly, my decision to not take a position on the final outcome of Ratnakīrti's debate with the Naiyāyikas in this work.

4.1 Epistemic Necessity

According to Ratnakīrti's Naiyāyikas, epistemic necessity supervenes on a non-epistemic fact, namely, the fact that the inferential reason and the property to be proved are related to one another, naturally (Vy*). As I have interpreted the Nyāya theory, this fact can be described in terms of an "ontic" (or "non-epistemic") interpretation of the three Pervasion Conditions, T2, T3, and U. According to such an interpretation, the relation between an inferential reason and a property to be proved is natural if and only if the inferential reason is present in a similar case (T2*) and it is excluded from (all) dissimilar cases (T3*) and it has no additional conditions (U*). As a result, the non-epistemic fact Vy*, on which epistemic necessity is supposed to supervene, can be described by the conjunction of T2*, T3*, and U*. This set of facts describes a state of affairs. The Nyāya theory of justification seeks to determine this state of affairs by showing that T2, T3, and U are satisfied. In what follows, I want to focus on the Naiyāyikas' attempt at satisfying T3 in order to show that what is at stake in

Ratnakīrti's argument is the kind of necessity that is supposed to be "necessary enough" to underwrite the pervasion sub-component of all well-functioning Instruments of inferential awareness. The other two arguments referred to above are, in my view, related to this more central concern. As explained earlier, T3 states that an inferential reason is known to be excluded from (all) dissimilar cases. It states, therefore, a positive epistemic fact; the fact that there is known to be negative concomitance [vyatireka-vyāpti] between the inferential reason and the property to be proved. In other words, T3 states that negative concomitance is known to be epistemically necessary. T3 can be interpreted, then, as stating that an inferential reason is known, with epistemic certainty, to be excluded from (all) dissimilar cases.[145] The phrases "epistemically necessary" and "epistemic certainty" modify the sense in which something is said to be "known (or established)." They thereby provide a set of concepts with which to distinguish between Ratnakīrti and the Naiyāyikas' position. T3 itself is most precisely described, however, in terms of $H3a_1$ and $H3a_2$, the two defects in terms of which it is defined. As a result, a precise characterization of its epistemic necessity depends on how it is shown (and established) that neither $H3a_1$ nor $H3a_2$ apply to the inferential reason being considered. In order to show that neither of these defects apply to an inferential reason, the Naiyāyikas argue that the following two negative epistemic facts need to be established: (a_1) The inferential reason is not known to be present in a dissimilar case; and (a_2) There is no known dissimilar case in which there is doubt about the exclusion of the inferential reason.[146] According to the Naiyāyikas, epistemic fact a_1 shows that $H3a_1$ does not apply to an inferential reason

[145]Let us suppose that there is "epistemic certainty" about some fact 'F' when 'F' is known to be epistemically necessary. Here fact 'F' is the negative concomitance between the inferential reason and the property to be proved.

[146]A "negative" epistemic fact is one in which the negation operator comes before, and therefore governs, the epistemic claim (e.g., "not known" and "no known").

and epistemic fact a_2 shows that $H3a_2$ does not apply. Attention to the argument schema that the Naiyāyikas use to show that these facts satisfy T3 makes possible, in my view, a characterization of the Nyāya theory of epistemic necessity. In what follows, I want to first focus on the Naiyāyikas' argument schema, and then on each of its premises. It is important to note that this schema is not explicitly discussed by either Ratnakīrti or the Naiyāyikas. My discussion of it is, therefore, a reconstruction, and is intended to provide a framework within which to reconsider the significance of some of the arguments and counter-arguments discussed in this Chapter.

4.1.1 *Argumentum ad Ignorantium*

In my view, the overall argument schema that the Naiyāyikas use to satisfy T3 (and U) is a version of the "argument from ignorance (*argumentum ad ignorantiam*)."[147] Such arguments generally begin with a premise such as, "It is not known that 'S' is true (or false)" and on the basis of it conclude that "S is known to be false (or true)." Although such arguments are often assumed to contain fallacies, it is widely recognized that this is not always the case.[148] Interestingly, the three defining characteristics of such arguments are present in what I want to call the Nyāya version of it. One characteristic feature of arguments from ignorance is that they have a "lack-of-knowledge" premise in which it is stated that some fact 'S' is not known to be true (or

[147] "Arguments from Ignorance" are also known as "lack-of-knowledge arguments," "negative evidence arguments," and arguments based on "default reasoning." For a careful discussion of such arguments see Walton (1996) in which he surveys previous literature on the subject, offers an interpretation of such arguments, and provides numerous examples of "good" and "bad" versions of it. My interpretation generally follows the one given by Walton. Both Walton (1996: 141-142) and Ganeri (2001: 122) have noted the relevance of this argument to Sanskrit philosophy. See Oetke (1996) for a discussion of the relevance of default reasoning to Sanskrit epistmemology.

[148] Walton (1996)

false). In the Naiyāyikas' argument, this fact is the presence of the inferential reason in a dissimilar case; that is, the presence of a locus of deviation. In their version of the argument, this premise is the statement, "It is not known that the inferential reason is present in a dissimilar case." For Ratnakīrti's Naiyāyikas, this is equivalent to the statement, "There is the non-apprehension (or non-observation) of the inferential reason in a dissimilar case." That this is a part of the Nyāya argument for T3 should be clear from Ratnakīrti's presentation of the Nyāya theory. A second characteristic of such arguments is that they make use of what is called a "search premise." A search premise states that "If S were true (or false) it would be known to be true (or false)." In the Naiyāyikas' version of the argument this premise is something like, "If an inferential reason were present in a dissimilar case it would be known to be present in a dissimilar case." This parallels, almost exactly, the supportive role that suppositional reasoning [tarka] is supposed to play in the Nyāya account of how negative epistemic facts, such as the exclusion of an inferential reason from dissimilar cases, are determined.[149] Although this use of suppositional reasoning is not explicitly discussed in Ratnakīrti's account of the Nyāya argument, it is clearly suggested by Vācaspati's remark that "even after searching with great effort" an inferential reason is not discovered in a dissimilar case.[150] Moreover, this use of suppositional reasoning is explicitly noted by Ratnakīrti in his "An Inquiry into Inference-Warranting Relations [vyāptinirṇaya]."[151] In addition, the search premise exactly captures the significance of the Naiyāyikas' appeal to a_1 and a_2. In fact, it seems to be the failure of just such a

[149]See, for example, the notes to Section 1.2.3 and the references contained therein.

[150]See passage [a] in 1.4.1.1 where RNA [42.08-42.17] is discussed, and RNA [107.14-107.15] where this same idea is repeated. Note: In focusing his attention on the "lack of knowledge premise" Ratnakīrti makes the Nyāya argument appear weaker than it is. As will become clear, it is the "search premise" that is crucial to the success of such arguments.

[151]RNA [VN: 107.26-108.02]

search that establishes these facts.[152] The third characteristic of such arguments is that their general pattern follows *modus tollens*. This pattern is also evident in the Naiyāyikas' argument. As a result, the Naiyāyikas' argument for T3 can be reconstructed as follows: "If an inferential reason were present in a dissimilar case, it would be known to be present in a dissimilar case (*search premise*), but, it is not known to be present in a dissimilar case (*lack-of-knowledge premise*), therefore, it is known (with epistemic certainty) that it is not present in a dissimilar case (by *modus tollens*)." As explained earlier, this conclusion is supposed to be equivalent to the statement that "Negative concomitance is known to be epistemically necessary."

4.1.2 Problem 1: Choosing Standards

In my view, this argument schema provides a framework for thinking about how Ratnakīrti and the Naiyāyikas interpret "epistemic certainty" and "epistemic necessity." For example, it should be clear that the Naiyāyikas' argument is not deductively valid. In order for it to be so, the "knowledge base" would have to be closed; that is, the domain of searchable objects would have to be finite. As both Ratnakīrti and the Naiyāyikas recognize, however, this is rarely the case in inferential arguments. And as Ratnakīrti has pointed out, this is certainly not the case in the Naiyāyikas' argument for the existence of Īśvara. For the Naiyāyikas, then, epistemic necessity is not logical necessity; the conclusion is not supposed to follow deductively from the premises. As the Naiyāyikas recognize, epistemic necessity is weaker. It is, for example, defeasible.[153] The Naiyāyikas argue, however, that

[152]See 1.2 and 1.4.1.1.

[153]See Chapter 1, Section 4.0.

epistemic necessity is still not too weak to underwrite the pervasion sub-components of well-functioning Instruments of inferential awareness. As a result, they are not particularly concerned that T3 does not follow deductively from their showing that neither $H3a_1$ nor $H3a_2$ applies to an inferential reason. After all, they do not agree that epistemic necessity and certainty need to be modeled on deduction as many of Ratnakīrti's arguments seem to suggest. In fact, they argue that logical necessity is too strong to correctly model epistemic necessity and certainty. What is at issue in their argument with Ratnakīrti is how much necessity is necessary enough to be genuinely, epistemically necessary.[154] Since the Naiyāyikas' argument schema in not supposed to show that T3 follows deductively from the premises of the argument, it is worth considering what it is supposed to do. In my view, the Nyāya argument is supposed to establish T3 with sufficient certainty that the burden of proof will shift from them having to show that T3 is satisfied to an opponent who must now show that it is not. According to the Naiyāyikas, in order to satisfy T3 all they need to do is meet their epistemic obligations to the extent that T3 may be presumed to be the case. Once T3 has been satisfied in this way, the burden of proof will shift back to the opponent, who must now show that the Naiyāyikas do not have the right to presume T3. As a result, it is helpful to characterize the Naiyāyikas' notion of epistemic necessity as "presumptive necessity" and Ratnakīrti's as "logical (or law-like) necessity." What this suggests is that Ratnakīrti and the Naiyāyikas have different standards for what it means to know, establish, show, and determine. It suggests that they have very different standards for justification and for determining whether a belief rational. In criticizing how the

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[154]There has recently been a great deal of interest in freeing the concept of necessity from its formal, logical roots. This has been due, in part, to a renewed interest in informal logic and the theory of argument. For early statements of this see Toulmin (1958) and Toulmin (1973). For more recent work on this issue see Groarke (1992), Govier (1999), and Johnson (2000).

Naiyāyikas satisfy T3, Ratnakīrti is criticizing the foundation of their theory of justification by questioning the epistemic norms that define their standard for rationality.[155] One of the issues that needs to be resolved before the outcome of Ratnakīrti's debate with the Naiyāyikas can be determined, therefore, is the nature of epistemic necessity and the standard of rationality that is determined by it. Interestingly, attention to the search premise points to the supposed source of this standard for the Naiyāyikas.

4.2 The "Search Premise" and Problem 2: Epistemological Objects

An important feature of the Naiyāyikas' argument schema is that their (epistemic) right to presume T3 is directly related to the strength of the search premise. That is, assuming the lack of knowledge premise, they have the right to presume T3 only to the extent that they have searched for and failed to find a dissimilar case in which the inferential reason is present. According to the Naiyāyikas, it is this "failure to find" that establishes a_1 and a_2, and the strength of the search premise itself. In a number of different contexts, however, Ratnakīrti argues that in order to properly defend the search premise, the Naiyāyikas must show that an inferential reason is excluded from all dissimilar cases. According to him, this is the only way to establish a_1 and a_2 and thereby show that neither $H3a_1$ nor $H3a_2$ apply to an inferential reason. As he sees it, a_1 is not the fact that **there is no known dissimilar case** in which the inferential reason is present, but, the fact that **it is known that there is no dissimilar case** in which the inferential reason is present. It is not a negative epistemic fact that shows that $H3a_1$ does not apply, but, a positive one. Ratnakīrti's worry is that the standard that

[155] For a discussion of epistemic norms and their relation to rationality see Pollock (1985: Chapter 5).

the Naiyāyikas have set for the search premise is so weak that nearly anything could be inferred from anything. This worry is based on his conviction that the Naiyāyikas have not successfully explained why they are entitled to presume that something is true of every member of a domain without having first inspected each and every member of that domain. Given that the Naiyāyikas have not inspected each and every effect, there is, according to Ratnakīrti, the ineliminable possibility that there is a locus of deviation in some distant corner of the domain. As a result, there will always be doubt about whether an inferential reason is excluded from (all) dissimilar cases (T3). As he sees it, a_2 cannot be the fact that a locus of doubt is not known, but, the fact that it is known that there is no locus of doubt. The search premise cannot be adequately defended according to Ratnakīrti since the Naiyāyikas cannot explain how they can be aware of all dissimilar cases. The Naiyāyikas respond to this by arguing that all that they need to show is that there are no known dissimilar cases and no known cases of doubt. In making this claim, the Naiyāyikas are trying to show, through their theory of doubt, why unobserved cases should not be considered a part of the knowledge base or domain. Their reasoning is that since such cases represent only possible, and not actual objects of awareness, they cannot be included in the search domain. To insist that they be included in the domain is, according to them, an unreasonable demand since it could never be satisfied. The Naiyāyikas' point is that Ratnakīrti's criticism of their argument places demands on the search premise that are just too strict. In responding to Ratnakīrti, what they are trying to show is that the knowledge base should be "strongly closed;" that is, that the findings to date should be allowed to represent all the relevant facts from which a conclusion may be drawn.[156] Many of their arguments are designed to show, therefore, that given the depth of their search and that of their opponents their

[156] Walton (1996: 264).

point of closure is reasonable. The force of Ratnakīrti's critique depends on the extent to which one can have "knowledge of all" from "knowledge of a few." In the language favored by both Ratnakīrti and the Naiyāyikas, the issue is whether one can have an awareness of an entire class of objects from observing only a few of them. Related to this is the issue of whether possible (or potential) objects of awareness are epistemically significant and need to be included in the searchable domain. These two issues are directly related to the strength of the search premise: If the entire class of objects that make up the domain could be searched, the conclusion could follow deductively. If not, then this standard of logical necessity could never be met. One philosophical issue that is raised by all of this has to do with the nature of epistemic objects; that is, with the issue of whether and how an entire class of objects, including potential objects, can be the object of awareness. If such an object could be an object of awareness then Ratnakīrti's demand that the search be exhaustive may not be unreasonable. As he argues, it may be the case that the Naiyāyikas' concept of epistemic necessity is too weak. If such an object could not be an object of awareness then as the Naiyāyikas argue, Ratnakīrti's standard may be too strict.

4.3 The "Lack of Knowledge Premise" and Problem 3: The Epistemology of Negative Existentials

Attention to the "lack of knowledge" premise points to a third issue on which the success of the Nyāya argument and Ratnakīrti's critique depends. The lack of knowledge premise states, "It is not known that the inferential reason is present in a dissimilar case." According to the Naiyāyikas, such a premise can be defended by showing that there is the non-apprehension of the inferential reason in dissimilar cases. As Ratnakīrti's

arguments make clear, what is at issue in the Naiyāyikas defense of this premise are the conditions under which non-apprehension (or non-observation) is an accredited Instrument for the warranted awareness of absence. Nearly all of Ratnakīrti's arguments with the Naiyāyikas about this premise have to do with these conditions, which include the nature of observables and unobservables and the precise way in which their absence can be known. Determining the outcome of this set of arguments requires taking a position on the epistemology of negative existentials; that is, taking a position on the conditions, if any, under which the absence of the warranted awareness of 'x' entails the warranted awareness of the absence of 'x'. According to Ratnakīrti, the Naiyāyikas' error lies in supposing that the non-apprehension of 'x' entails that one knows that not-'x' and not just that one does not know that 'x.'

Although I have not done so here, in my view it is possible to resolve the three issues described above and determine whether Īśvara is the maker of the world, as the Naiyāyikas suppose. Such a project would involve at least three further steps. First, it would require considering Ratnakīrti's epistemology and his own theory of justification. This is necessary for determining whether and how the demands that he has placed on the Naiyāyikas could be met by his own theory. One way to pursue this would be to look carefully at Ratnakīrti's positive inferential arguments such as those in support of the Buddhist theory of momentariness, his doctrine of multifaceted non-duality, and his position on the existence of other mental continua. Secondly, it would be necessary to consider Ratnakīrti's views on two more specific issues; the nature of epistemic objects and the epistemology of negative existentials. In addition to the texts referred to above, it would be necessary therefore to consider his "Refutation of Other Mental Continua" and his teacher's "The Mysteries of Non-apprehension [anupalabdhi-

rahasya]." These two steps would provide the philosophical details that are necessary for evaluating the argument in accordance with the ground rules set by Ratnakīrti's text. The final step in this process would be philosophical reflection on the nature of rationality and the role that philosophical arguments should play in reasoning about religious matters.

4.4 Semantics and Ontology, A Transition to Part 2

Part 1 of this dissertation has focused, almost exclusively, on epistemological aspects of Ratnakīrti 's critique of the Nyāya argument for the existence of Īśvara. In Part 2, I turn to aspects of Ratnakīrti's thought that are only indirectly related to the epistemological arguments developed in his "Refutation of Arguments for Establishing Īśvara." More specifically, his theory of exclusion, which will be discussed in Chapter 3, and his ontology, which will be discussed in Chapter 4. Ratnakīrti's theory of exclusion is indirectly relevant to the arguments discussed in this Chapter since it is here that he offers a positive account of how one can know about an entire class of objects by observing only a sample set of its members. In addition, the theory of exclusion also provides another set of philosophical reasons for why Ratnakīrti cannot accept the Naiyāyikas belief in the existence of Īśvara. Ratnakīrti's ontology is also indirectly relevant to the arguments discussed in this Chapter since it explains the grounds for Ratnakīrti's own view of necessity. In addition, it too provides another set of philosophical reasons for why Ratnakīrti cannot accept the Naiyāyikas conclusion that a God-like entity called "Īśvara" is the maker of the world. Part 2 begins with Ratnakīrti's version of the theory of exclusion.

PART 2. SEMANTICS AND ONTOLOGY

Chapter 3

Inferential Reasoning, The Theory of Exclusion, and Īśvara

0. Introduction

The Buddhist theory of exclusion [apoha] has long provided a context within which a broad range of philosophical issues have been discussed. Given its pre-history in the work of the Sanskrit grammarians the theory has been linked, most closely, with issues in semantics and the philosophy of language.[1] It was, however, first developed by the Buddhist philosopher Dignāga in response to more epistemological and ontological concerns.[2] What Dignāga noticed was that debates about meaning, reference, and semantic value could be related both to epistemological questions regarding how the awareness of an inferential reason [hetu] is supposed to produce awareness of an inferred object and to ontological questions regarding the existential status and proper description of that object.[3] As a result of Dignāga's work, subsequent Buddhist

[1] Bronkhorst (1999), Deshpande (1992), Ganeri (1995), Ganeri (1996), Ganeri (1999), Hattori (1968), Hattori (1977), Hattori (1980), Hayes (1988: Chapters 1, 3, and 4), Herzberger (1986), Katsura (1991), Ogawa (1999), Pind (1991), Pind (1999), Raja (1986), and Scharf (1996).

The terms "philosophy of language" and "semantics" have a wide variety of meanings. I intend the term "philosophy of language" to be very general. By "semantics" I generally mean "descriptive semantics" (see below).

[2] Although the term "exclusion [apoha]" is well-known before Dignāga, the "theory of exclusion" seems to have been first developed by him. For pre-Dignāga references to "exclusion [apoha]" see the references in note 1. The close connection between the theory of exclusion and Dignāga's epistemology (and ontology) is also well known. The specific nature of this connection, however, is not. For references see note 3. That Dignāga recognizes such a connection is clear from PS5.1: "na pramāṇāntaraṃ śābdānumānāt tathā hi saḥ | kṛtakatvādivat svārtham anyāpohena bhāṣate ||" Hattori (2000: 139 n. 3). For a translation of PS5 ad PS5.1-PS5.12 see Hattori (2000: 137-146). For an account of how the theory of exclusion developed in Dignāga's work see Frauwallner (1959), Katsura (1983), and Katsura (1991: 139).

[3] Bronkhorst (1999: 20), Frauwallner (1959: 103), Ganeri (2001), Hayes (1986), Hayes (1988: Chapters 4 and 5), Hattori (1968), Hattori (2000: 137), Matilal (1990: 38), Pind (1991), and Pind (1999: 324).

philosophers developed versions of the theory that reflected their views on a variety of philosophical issues.[4] In discussing the version of the theory developed by a particular Buddhist philosopher, therefore, it is important to consider what that philosopher took to be most central to his discussion. Attention to this issue is important since an awareness of the philosophical context in which a particular version of the theory was developed can help determine exactly what that version of the theory was supposed to explain.

In his "Proof of Exclusion [apohasiddhi]," Ratnakīrti develops a version of the theory that seeks to explain how and why our words are about what they are about.[5] Although his primary concern is with the semantic value of linguistic expressions, it is clear from his work that his theory is also about much more. On my reading, Ratnakīrti's account of exclusion [apoha] provides a general theory of conceptual content; that is, an account

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On my use of the term, "semantic value" is neutral to whatever it is that a semantic theory associates with the expressions of the language it interprets. It is, in other words, the "object" that a semantic theory assigns to an expression. A "descriptive semantic theory" is a theory that (1) assigns semantic values to expressions of a language and (2) explains how the semantic values of complex expressions in that language are a "function" of the semantic values of its components. One such explanation is that the semantic values of complex expressions are just the propositional content or thought expressed by that expression and are not, strictly speaking, a function of its parts. See Stalnaker (1999: 535) and Hale (1999: 684). Many Buddhist philosophers, however, seem to work with what is known as "compositional semantics;" that is, a semantic theory in which the semantic values of complex expressions are understood to be a function of their parts. In this chapter, my focus will be (1).

[4]For example, Dharmakīrti, Jñānaśrīmitra, Ratnakīrti, and Mokṣākaragupta all discuss the relationship between exclusion and inferential reasoning. See, for example, the numerous references to PV and PVSV in Dunne (1999), JNA [201.03-201.04] "apohaḥ śabdaliṅgābhyām prakāśyata iti sthitiḥ (...)," the references to RNA in this paper, and Kajiyama (1966). Katsura (1986: 172 n.8) points out that Dharmakīrti also used the theory of to discuss causation in HB [9*.13-10*.04] and Meindersma (1991) has pointed to Dharmakīrti's discussion of exclusion in PV2 [vv. 88-102] which is Dharmakīrti's "proof of another world [paralokasiddhi]" section. See also Ganeri (1999a) and Gillon (1999) for a discussion of "exclusion" and Dharmakīrti's account of the semantics of the particle '*eva*.'

[5]This text, RNA [58.01-66.23] is translated in its entirety in the Appendix B.

of the kind of object about which we speak and think and with respect to which we act.[6] According to Ratnakīrti, this object is best described as "a positive entity characterized by its exclusion of others [anyāpoha-viśiṣṭa-vidhi]" and is best understood as the content [viṣaya] of conceptual (or constructing) states of awareness [vikalpa-buddhi] such as those produced through inferential reasoning [anumāna] or verbal testimony [śabda].[7] This complex positive entity [viśiṣṭa-vidhi] is also said to be the "meaning of words [śabdānām artha]" and the object that is "denoted by the word exclusion [apohaśabdavācya]."[8]

In this chapter, I want to consider what Ratnakīrti's discussion of semantics and semantic value reveals about the content of inferential-verbal states of awareness.[9] In my view, it is in providing an account of what our words are about that Ratnakīrti also explains how and why are thoughts are about what they are about. This issue is also important to Ratnakīrti's debate with the Naiyāyikā's since according to them Īśvara is

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[6]The theory of exclusion [apoha] does not, however, directly provide an account of the content of non-conceptual states of awareness e.g., purely perceptual states of awareness. For Ratnakīrti, the non-conceptual content of such states of awareness is described as a "multi-faceted non-duality." See, for example, RNA [CAPV: 129-144]. Throughout this paper, the word "thought" will be used to denote conceptual thought. The assertion that "conceptual content" is "what our physical activity is directed towards" may seem unwarranted. According to Ratnakīrti, however, there is sufficient similarity (and in some cases identity) between the objects about which we speak and think and the objects upon which we physically act. This has to do with his understanding of verbal, mental, and bodily activity and the objects of such activity. For a discussion of this see Chapter 4.

[7]These states of awareness will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 4.

[8]Like the word "meaning," the Sanskrit word "artha" has a broad semantic range and can be translated as "meaning," "object," "thing," "function," or "purpose." In discussions which focus on the philosophy of language, the term is sometimes translated as "meaning-relatum." I will generally translate the term "artha" as "meaning" or "object." On this use of the term, the "meaning" of a linguistic expression is whatever a competent speaker of a language understands from hearing that expression on a particular occasion of its use. The meaning of an expression will also be described in terms of the content of the state of awareness that is produced in the mind of such a speaker upon hearing it.

[9]An "inferential-verbal state of awareness" is a mental event produced through inferential reasoning or language (e.g., testimony).

the proper object of an inferentially produced state of awareness and is, therefore, an entity about whom we can genuinely speak and think. If Ratnakīrti is able to provide an explanation of why an Īśvara-like entity cannot be the object of inferential-verbal states of awareness he will have also provided a reason for the failure of any inferential argument that seeks to prove his existence. Although Ratnakīrti does not himself make this argument it is one about which he was aware and to which he indirectly refers. In addition, attention to the theory of exclusion [apoha] helps to further explain Ratnakīrti's view on the status of epistemic objects and epistemic necessity. In this chapter I will offer an interpretation of Ratnakīrti's theory of exclusion and will explain its significance to his argument with the Naiyāyikas. For the most part, however, this chapter will provide a close reading of the central arguments in Ratnakīrti's "Proof of Exclusion [apohasiddhi]."

1.0 Preliminaries

Ratnakīrti begins his essay by explaining how and why his version of the theory of exclusion [apoha] is different from other possible interpretations. There are two series of such remarks that open his essay. The first takes place in the voice of an "opponent" who argues that there is no plausible interpretation of the exclusion theorists slogan that "exclusion [apoha] is the meaning [artha] of a word [śabda]."[10] The second series of remarks, which begins in Ratnakīrti's own voice, is used to explain how his version of exclusion is different from the theories of the so-called "Positivists [vidhi-vādin]" and "Negationists [pratiṣedha-vādin]." What is important about the first few sections of

[10]This "slogan" is the first sentence of Ratnakīrti's "Proof of Exclusion." RNA [58.01]: apohaḥ śabdārtho nirucyate| "Exclusion is said to be the meaning of a word."

Ratnakīrti's essay is that in briefly discussing how and why his interpretation of exclusion [apoha] is different from these others, he also introduces the issue that he will have to resolve in defending his version of the theory. It is in these introductory remarks that Ratnakīrti also begins to defend his account of meaning [artha] and semantic value, exclusion [apoha], and conceptual content [viṣaya]. These three concepts are inextricably related in Ratnakīrti's work since, for him, the content [viṣaya] of an inferentially or verbally produced state of awareness is an exclusion [apoha] which is itself the meaning [artha] and semantic value of a word [śabda]. Equally interesting about these introductory sections, however, are the issues that Ratnakīrti does not choose to discuss; issues such as the precise nature of a "word [śabda]" and the relationship between the meaning of a word and the meaning of more complex linguistic expressions such as sentences. Section 1 of this chapter considers what is and what is not discussed in these introductory remarks in order to set the stage for Ratnakīrti's more detailed presentation and defense of his view.

1.1 What Exclusion is Not

Ratnakīrti's "Proof of Exclusion [apohasiddhi]" begins with an opponent who considers three possible interpretations of the statement that "exclusion [apoha] is said to be the meaning [artha] of a word [śabda]."[11] In identifying "exclusion [apoha]" with "meaning

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[11] See previous note. The opponent's description of these views can be found at RNA [58.01-58.04].

nanu ko 'yam apoho nāma | kim idam anyasmād apohyate ' asmād vānyad apohyate ' asmin vā anyad apohyata iti vyutpattyā (1) vijātivyāvṛttaṃ bāhyam eva vivakṣitaṃ | (2) buddhyākāro vā | (3) yadi vā apohanam apoha ity anyavyāvṛttimātram iti trayaḥ pakṣāḥ |

See JNA [202.12-202.14].

[artha]" it is also assumed by the opponent that exclusion theorists interpret "exclusion [apoha]" as referring to either an excluded object or the 'process' of exclusion itself. On the opponent's view, therefore, the theory of exclusion is either a form of what I will call, "Pure Referentialism" or "Pure Non-referentialism." On my use of these terms, Pure Referentialism is the view that the semantic value of a linguistic expression can be completely specified in terms of some (positive) object 'x.' Following the opponent, my description of this view is neutral to the ontological status of this object; that is, whether it is an 'external' or an 'internal' object and whether it is a particular, a universal, or a complex object made up of particulars and universals. There can be, therefore, both realist and ideational versions of Pure Referentialism. A realist version for example would be the view that the semantic value of a linguistic expression is the external object for which it stands. The ideational version would be that it is the internal object or, more specifically, facet of awareness [buddhi-ākāra] for which it stands. Pure Non-referentialism, in contrast, is the view that the semantic value of a linguistic expression can be completely specified without reference to an object of any sort. On this view, semantic value is supposed to be completely specified by exclusion itself [vyāvṛtti-mātra]. Here, "exclusion" does not denote an object 'x,' but, a process, capacity, or (perhaps) intensional or dispositional property.[12]

On my reading, the "Introductory Discussion" at RNA [58.01-59.03] is presented in the form of objections and responses by an opponent to the thesis, stated at RNA [58.01], that "exclusion is the meaning of words." This "opponent" is not necessarily an actual historical opponent or group of opponents, although many of the passages can be traced to specific authors. In my view, Ratnakīrti uses previous (and well known) discussions and criticisms of exclusion to create an imagined opponent whose criticism provides the immediate philosophical (and rhetorical) context for his own discussion.

[12]The idea is that the semantic value of a general term 'F' is something like a quantifier-predicate expression such as (y) (-Fy --> y≠a) which is, of course, logically equivalent to Fa. See Ganeri (1999: 118 n. 15) and Siderits (1991).

As plausible interpretations of exclusion [apoha], however, both the realist and ideational versions of Pure Referentialism and Pure Non-referentialism are summarily dismissed by the opponent. Pure Referentialism cannot be the proper interpretation of the theory since, the opponent reasons, it does not make sense of the obviously negative term "exclusion [apoha]."[13] The opponent also argues that Pure Non-referentialism cannot be what is intended by exclusion theorists. On this view, the opponent supposes that exclusion itself [vyāvṛtti-mātram] is taken to be the meaning of a word. More specifically, meaning [artha] is supposed to be the property (or function) 'excluding [apohanam].' On this view, what a word such as "fire" really means is an exclusion or an excluding from what is other than it [anyāpoha]. The opponent rejects this view by arguing that the self-examination of our own mental states reveals that the process of exclusion is, in fact, not the object of a state of awareness. After all, the opponent remarks, it is obvious that when we hear the word "fire" our awareness is of a positive entity, fire, and that in such cases our awareness is never be described in terms of what is not non-fire. Since the proper description of the content of our awareness "There is fire here" is not "There is not non-fire here" it is not reasonable for the exclusion theorist to claim that exclusion itself is its content.[14] Since neither Pure Referentialism nor Pure Non-referentialism are plausible interpretations of the theory of exclusion [apoha], the opponent concludes by asking how exclusion [apoha] can be the meaning [artha] of a word [śabda].[15]

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[13]RNA [58.05]: na tāvad ādimau [i.e., 1 and 2] pakṣau | apohanāmnā vidhir eva vivakṣitatvāt |.

[14]RNA [58.06-58.07]: anitmo 'py [i.e., 3] asaṅgataḥ, pratītibādhitatvāt | tathā hi, parvatadeśe vahnir astīti śābdī pratītir vidhirūpam evollikhantī lakṣyate |

[15]RNA [59.03]: katham apohaḥ śabdārtho ghuṣyate |

Before responding to the opponent's introductory remarks, Ratnakīrti introduces an interpretation of exclusion that I will call "Sequentialism." Unlike Pure Referentialism and Pure Non-referentialism, Sequentialism asserts that there are two components of semantic value: One component is taken to be the direct or primary semantic value of a term and the other is taken to be its indirect or implied value. Ratnakīrti calls supporters of the view that a positive object [vidhi] is the direct semantic value of a term and exclusion [apoha] its implied value, "Positivists [vidhi-vādin]." Supporters of the view that exclusion [apoha] is the direct semantic value of a term and a positive object is its implied value are called, "Negationists [niṣedha-vādin]."[16] These two views are also supposed to be neutral to the ontological status of the objects.

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[16]RNA [59.07-59.09]: yat tu goḥ pratītau na tadātmā parātmeti sāmārthyād apohaḥ paścān niścīyata iti vidhivādinām matam anyāpohapratītau vā sāmarthyād anyāpodho 'avadhāryate iti pratiṣedhavādinām matam|

Mookherjee (1935) has famously argued that there are three distinct versions of the theory of exclusion: Negativism, Positivism, and Synthesism. He identifies Dignāga and Dharmakīrti as "Negativists," Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla as "Positivists," and Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti as "Synthetists."

In support of the possibility that Dignāga and Dharmakīrti are "Negativists," Kajiyama (1966: 125 n. 338) quotes the following remark by Śaṅkaramiśra: "kīrtidignāgādibhir gaur itīyam ity ādi vikalpe vidhisphuraṇam nāsty ev ety uktam | jñānaśrīyā tu vidhisphuraṇam adhyupagamya niṣedhasphuraṇam api tatra bhavantīti svīkṛtam | yad āha tatrāpohas tadguṇatvena gamyata iti." The last part of this remark is from JNA [206]. And although Hayes (1988) does not directly support or intend to support this view, there are a few places in his work where this interpretation is suggested. Against this identification Katusra (1986: 171 n. 6) quotes PVSV [62.24-63.16]: "ayam arthāntaravyāvṛttyā tasya vastunaḥ kaścid bhāgo gamyate | śabdo 'rthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭān eva bhāvān āha." The latter half of this verse is identified as PS5.36d. For a discussion of PS5.36d and Dharmakīrti's interpretation of it see Pind (1999). Also see Raja (1986: 190 n. 11) who quotes the following remark from the *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa*: "dignāgena viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvasamarthanam nīlotpalādiśabdā arthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭān arthān āhuḥ iti uktam."

Pind (1999) has, in my view, shown that Dignāga should not be characterized as a Negativist. In addition to the passages referred to above he quotes fragments from Dignaga's SāmP that are preserved in NCV [611.21-612] in Pind (1999: 318 n. 3-8, 319), fragments from his DvāṬ which are preserved in NCV [548.25] in Pind (1999: 321 n. 13), and PS5.38 in Pind (1999: 322). Interestingly, Pind also cites some passages which suggest that Dignāga is a sort of Sequentialist and more specifically a Negationist. He refers to PS5.34 quoted at TS 965 in Pind (1999: 324) and to PVA [265.23]. For a discussion of Dharmakīrti's position see Dunne (1999: Chapter 3).

In support of the identification of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla as "Positivists" see Katsura (1986: 174). In qualified support of this view see Siderits (1986: 196).

1.2 Ratnakīrti's "Complex Object"

According to Ratnakīrti, however, each of these views, Pure Referentialism, Pure Non-Referentialism, and Sequentialism misrepresents his own position. He explains, for example,

> [a] By the word 'exclusion [apoha]' we do not just mean a positive entity [vidhi] alone (Pure Referentialism) or the mere exclusion of others [anya-vyāvṛtti-mātra] (Pure Non-referentialism) but rather that the meaning [artha] of a word [śabda] is a positive entity [vidhi] characterized by its exclusion from others [anyāpoha-viśiṣṭa].[17]

and

> [b] (...) it is neither the case that after becoming aware of a positive entity [vidhi] one subsequently [paścāt] understands exclusion [apoha] by implication [arthāpattitaḥ] ("Positivist" interpretation of Sequentialism) nor that after becoming aware of exclusion [apoha] (one subsequently understands) that which is excluded from others [anyāpoḍha] (The "Negationist" interpretation).[18]

As he explains, this is because,

> [c] when a positive entity [vidhi] is becoming known [pratīyamāna] there is, at just that time [tatkāla], the awareness of exclusion [apoha-pratīti] as its characteristic [viśeṣaṇa].[19]

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[17]RNA [59.04-59.05]

nāsmābhir apohaśabdena vidhir eva kevalo 'bhipretaḥ | nāpy anyavyāvṛttimātraṃ | kin tv anyāpohaviśiṣṭo vidhiḥ śabdānām ārthaḥ|

[18]RNA [59.09-59.11]

prāthāmikasyāpi pratipattikramādarśanāt | na hi vidhiṃ pratipadya kaścid arthāpattitaḥ paścād apoham avagacchati | apohaṃ vā pratipadyānyāpoḍham |

[19]RNA [60.16-60.18]

The problem with both Pure Referentialism and Pure Non-Referentialism is that according to them the semantic value of a linguistic expression is supposed to be described in terms of a single component, either a positive entity of some sort or the exclusion of others (passage [a]). As Ratnakīrti explains, these theories do not accurately describe his position since, according to him, the semantic value of an expression is a complex object made up of both a positive component, the "positive entity [vidhi]" and a negative component, "exclusion [apoha]" (passage [a]). As Ratnakīrti explains in passage [b] and passage [c], Sequentialism too does not describe his view. One problem with Sequentialism, for example, is that when we think about how it is we understand what it is we understand from hearing a token utterance of a term it is clear that there is not a sequence in our awareness (passage [b]). According to Ratnakīrti there is then no reason to accept the idea that the content of our awareness should be described in terms of two sequentially understood components of meaning. Instead of Sequentialism, Ratnakīrti suggests that the object of our awareness is a single complex entity. On his view the "positive" and "negative" components of meaning [artha] that are identified by the Sequentialists jointly constitute a complex object that is itself the single semantic value of a term. As he states in passage [c], Sequentialism is an incorrect description of his view since according to him there is always the simultaneous awareness of a characterized object, which is the "positive" component of verbal content, and its "negative" characteristic, exclusion [apoha].

According to Ratnakīrti, then, the meaning of a word is a "positive entity characterized by its exclusion from others [anyāpohaviśiṣṭaviddhi] (passage [c])." It is this positive entity that is denoted by term "exclusion [apoha]" in the slogan that "exclusion [apoha] is

the meaning [artha] of a word [śabda]." The central task of Ratnakīrti's essay is to clarify and defend this claim by providing a description of this positive entity [vidhi] and its negative characteristic.

1.3 Excursus: Words, General Nominals, and Sentences

Although in introducing his essay Ratnakīrti pays a great deal of attention to interpreting the term "exclusion [apoha]," it is interesting that he does not explicitly discuss what he means by the term "word [śabda]" or the issue of how word-meaning (śabda-artha) is related to sentence-meaning (vākya-artha). Since these issues were considered in earlier discussions of exclusion [apoha], it is instructive to briefly consider them in the context of Ratnakīrti's analysis.[20]

Like the early exclusion theorist Dignāga, Ratnakīrti focuses his attention on so-called "general nominal terms (jāti-śabda)." General nominal terms (jāti-śabda) denote common noun phrases and correspond, roughly, to the class of non-complex descriptions in English. Common examples used by Ratnakīrti are "cow," "pot," "water," and "flower."[21] It is in specifying a semantic theory for these sorts of terms that Ratnakīrti and almost all of the early Sanskrit philosophers of language focused their effort. Such terms are, therefore, usually the paradigmatic example of a word [śabda] in classical discussions of semantics. According to Buddhist philosophers, moreover, it was not

[20]For a treatment of these "earlier discussions" see Ganeri (1999), Hayes (1988), Hattori (1968), Raja (1971), Scharf (1996), and Siderits (1991).

[21]It is interesting to note that this list includes both "mass terms" (e.g., water) and "sortal terms" (e.g., cow).

even necessary to provide an independent analysis of the semantics for other sorts of terms since, according to them, adjectives or 'quality-terms (guṇa-śabda)' such as "white," 'verbal-terms (kriyā-śabda)' such as "cook," 'substance-words (dravya-śabda)' such as "horned," and proper or 'arbitrary names (yādṛcchā-śabda)' such as "Ḍiṭṭa" could be understood on the model of general nominal terms (jāti-śabda).[22] Thus, by discussing the semantics of general nominal terms (jāti-śabda) Buddhist philosophers understood themselves to be offering a unified and complete semantic theory.

Although Ratnakīrti does not make this point directly and although his illustrative examples are usually general nominal terms (jāti-śabda) it is clear that he intends his analysis to be more general. This is implied in an interesting passage in his essay where he explains that,

> It is also possible [eva] to understand exclusion [apoha] in a (sentence such as) "This road leads to Śrughna [eṣa panthāḥ śrughnam upatiṣtate]." This is because it is easy to find exclusion [vyavaccheda] for each and every word: Relative to other incorrect [apakṛta] roads, it is only this one [eṣa eva]; Relative to an undesired place which rivals [pratyanīka] Śrughna, it is definitely to Śrughna [śrughnam eva]; Because of the absence of any breaks, it, unlike a mounain path, definitely leads [upatiṣtata eva]; and By excluding [avaccheda] it from (what is used by) caravans and messengers etc., it is surely a road [panthā eva].[23]

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[22]Ganeri (1999: 82-3), Hattori (1968: 85-6 n. 129), Hayes (1988: 203), and Matilal (1971: 35-7) all make this same point. On this view, even so-called 'singular terms' i.e., proper names and definite descriptions were taken to share the semantic properties of general nominal terms [jāti-śabda]. For Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla's discussion of this issue see TSP 1226-1228 ad TS 1226.

Dignāga mentions these five sorts of terms at PS1.3d. See Hayes (1988: 203), Hattori (1968: 25 n. 26-28), and Matilal (1971: 35). Incidentally, Matilal (1971: 36 n. 19), contra Hattori, suggests that Dignāga's classification has more do to with Praśastapāda's five-fold classification of predicables [viśeṣaṇa] than with Patanjali's classification of terms.

[23]RNA [60.11-60.14], my emphasis.

eṣa panthāḥ śrughnam upatiṣṭhata ity atrāpy apoho gamyata eva | apakṛtapthāntarāpekṣayā eṣa eva (|) śrughnapratyanīkāniṣṭasthānāpekṣayā śrughnam eva | araṇymārgavad vicchedābhād upatiṣṭhata eva | sārthadūtādivyavacchedena panthā eva iti pratipadam vyavacchedasya sulabhatvāt |

According to Ratnakīrti, exclusion [apoha] also applies to parts of speech such as pronouns, "this [eṣa]," nouns, "road [pantha]," verbs, "leads [upa+√sthā]," and proper names, "Śrughna," and therefore to words [śabda] other than general nominal terms (jāti-śabda). In this same passage, Ratnakīrti almost incidentally also introduces the issue of whether exclusion [apoha] applies to sentences. He asserts, for example, that exclusion [apoha] does apply to sentences since each and every word in a sentence could be understood through exclusion [apoha]. It is as if a compositional theory of semantics is assumed to explain how word-meanings (śabda-artha) are related to sentence-meaning (vākya-artha) and vice versa. Unfortunately, Ratnakīrti does not explicitly discuss these issues in greater detail.[24] What Ratnakīrti seems to mean by the term "word [śabda]," then, is both individual words [śabda] and linguistic expressions more generally. General nominal terms (jāti-śabda) are just the paradigm case of linguistic expression and an historically convenient focal point for his analysis of exclusion [apoha]. There is, however, another ambiguity concerning such terms that Ratnakīrti does not discuss.

General nominal terms (jāti-śabda) are usually analyzed, in Sanskrit, as being composed of a stem which derived from a nominal base and to which an inflection is added which indicates case, number, and gender. Since classical Sanskrit very rarely uses determiners, it is not always clear whether the inflected nominal is to be thought of

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Also see JNA [206.06-206.14] and MTBh-K (p. 57, n. 132] where Kajiyama traces the use of this example to Dharmottara, PVinT [Peking 216b8]. This passage has also been discussed in Raja (1986: 186).

[24]The issue of how word meaning is related to sentence meaning is not discussed in detail in Ratnakīti's essay. This is because this issue is subsumed under the general theory of exclusion which is supposed to provide an account of all linguistic expressions. The theory is able to do so, in part, because according to Ratnakīrti the implied compositional principle just is exclusion.

on the model of an indefinite (e.g., a/some cow(s)) or a definite description (e.g., the cow(s)). In addition, it is also open as to whether the inflected noun is to be used generically or non-generically.[25] Ratnakīrti, like many of his Buddhist, Mīmāṃsā, and Nyāya predecessors, does not clearly distinguish between these different uses of general nominal terms. In two of his examples, "Tie (a {the}) cow [gām badhāna]" and "(Some {All}) cows are grazing on (the {a}) bank of (the {a}) river [saritaḥ pāre gāvaś caranti]," the general term "cow" is used to refer to an unspecified individual or group of individuals.[26] The term is being used, therefore, indefinitely and non-generically. In another example, "This is a cow," the general term "cow" is used to refer to a specified class and so it is being used definitely and generically. Although distinguishing between various uses of general terms can be important it does not seem to be so for Ratnakīrti, whose analysis is intended to apply to all of the terms and all of the ways in which they can be used.[27]

1.4 Summary

The introductory sections of Ratnakīrti's "Proof of Exclusion [apohasiddhi]" presents three rival interpretations of exclusion [apoha] and explain how they are different from Ratnakīrti's own view. Throughout his essay Ratnakīrti returns to the issues raised by

[25]There are, then, four possible uses of general nominal terms: (1) Definite Generic e.g. "The cow has a dewlap etc." Here, the term "cow" is being used to denote the class or speicies; (2) Definite Non-Generic e.g. "The cow belongs to Kauṇḍinya" where the term "cow" is used to denote a specific individual; (3) Indefinite Generic "A cow must not be kicked" where the term "cow" denotes ; and (4) Indefinite Non-Generic e.g. "Bring a cow" where the term "cow" is used to denote an unspecified individual. See Ganeri (1999).

[26]RNA [59.19-59.20], RNA [63.10]

[27]Although this is never explicitly stated, it seems to be the case.

proponents of Pure Referentialism, Pure Non-Referentialism, and Sequentialism in order to further clarify and defend his view that a single complex entity is the best way to account for semantic value and conceptual content. It is Ratnakīrti's analysis of this complex entity that will be discussed in what follows.

2.0 Semantic Value and Conceptual Content

As explained in Section 1, according to Ratnakīrti the semantic value of a linguistic expression is a "positive entity that is characterized by its exclusion of others [anyāpoha-viśiṣṭa-vidhi]." This "positive entity" is a single complex object [viśiṣṭa-vidhi] that is conceptually (and not actually) constituted by two analytically separable components that are non-sequentially and simultaneously brought to awareness.[28] These "components" are the positive entity [vidhi] itself and its "negative" characteristic, the exclusion of others [anyāpoha]. Through his analysis of these two components Ratnakīrti addresses many of the issues that were mentioned in Section 1. He clarifies, for example, what he means by "exclusion [apoha]" and explains, in some detail, how, why, and in what sense it must be a component of semantic value. He also responds to questions about what sort of an object the complex positive entity [viśiṣṭa-vidhi] is supposed to be. For example, he considers the question of whether it is an "external object [bāhyārtha]" or an "internal facet of awareness [buddhyākara]" and whether it is best described as a particular [svalakṣaṇa], a universal [sāmānya], or some other sort of object e.g., an "imposed object [upādhi]." Following Ratnakīrti, my discussion will begin with his

[28] See next note: "tatkāla eva" and "tulyakālameva."

account of the 'negative' component of semantic value, the exclusion of others [anyāpoha].

2.1 The Exclusion of Others [anyāpoha]

2.1.1 Exclusion as a Characteristic

According to Ratnakīrti, the exclusion of others [anyāpoha] is a "component" of semantic value in the sense that it is an essential characteristic [viśeṣaṇa] or property [dharma] of it. He says, for example,

(j)ust as in the awareness 'blue lotus [nīlotpala]' from the word "Indīvara-flower [indīvara]" --which is attached to [niveśita] a blue lotus [nīlotpala]-- there is simultaneously [tatkāla] the manifestation [sphuraṇa] of blue-ness [nīlima], it is difficult to deny [anivārya] that in the awareness 'cow' from the word "cow" --which is attached to that which is excluded from non-cows [agāvāpoḍha]-- there is also simultaneously [tatkāla] the manifestation [sphuraṇa] of exclusion [apoha] on account of it being a <u>characteristic</u> [viśeṣaṇa].

More simply, he says,

(...) what is understood [avagati] from a word has the form of a positive entity [vidhi-rūpa] with exclusion [apoha] as its <u>property</u> [dharma]: Just like from the word "Puṇḍarīka-flower " (what is understood is) a lotus having the characteristic 'white' [śvetima-viśiṣṭa].[29]

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[29]RNA [59.13-59.16]

yathā nīlotpale niveśitād indīvaraśabdān nīlotpalapratītau tatkāla eva nīlimasphuraṇam anivāryaṃ tathā gośabdād apy agavāpoḍhe niveśitād gopratīpatau tulyakālam eva viśeṣaṇatvād apohasphuraṇam anivāryam|

RNA [60.14-60.18]

tasmād apohadharmaṇo vidhirūpasya śabdād avagatiḥ puṇḍarīkaśabdād iva śvetimaviśiṣṭasya padmasya |

Ratnakīrti asserts that exclusion [apoha] is a component of the semantic value of a term in the sense that it is a necessary characteristic [viśeṣaṇa] or property [dharma] of the proper objects of inferential-verbal states of awareness. His argument is that upon hearing a token utterance of a word such as "Indīvara" or "Puṇḍarīka," the content of a competent speaker's awareness will, in part, have to be analyzed in terms of the necessary characteristics "blue [nīla]" and "white [śveta]." This is the case even though the color component of the content may not be phenomenally present to the hearer and is not explicit in the names themselves.[30] His point is that although the proper names "Indīvara-flower [indīvara]" and "Puṇḍarīka-flower [puṇḍarīka]" do not explicitly name the color of the flower to which they refer, the verbal state of awareness produced in the mind of a competent speaker of the language from hearing a token utterance of these terms must be described in terms of a lotus flower which is either blue or white. The example reveals that there can be characteristics of the content of a state of awareness that are neither present in the word itself nor are felt to be present upon hearing a token utterance of a term. According to Ratnakīrti, exclusion [apoha] is just such a characteristic or property. Like the colors "blue [nīla]" and "white [śveta]" it is a component of the content of an inferential-verbal state of awareness even though it is not felt to be so. Exclusion [apoha] is, therefore, a component of semantic value in the sense that it is a characteristic [viśeṣaṇa] or property [dharma] of it.

2.1.2 Exclusion as a Negative Characteristic and Capacity

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[30]This issue has been discussed by Siderits (1991: Chapter 4) and Bhattacharya (1986: 294).

In order to further explain what sort of a characteristic [viśeṣaṇa] or property [dharma] the exclusion of others [anyāpoha] is, Ratnakīrti compares it with a capacity [śakti] that sense perception [pratyakṣa] has to perceive absence [abhāva]. What elicits this comparison is a question about how exclusion [apoha], which is considered by many to be a kind of absence [abhāva] or "negative" object, can be present in states of awareness in which there only seem to be "positive" objects. Ratnakīrti says,

> (j)ust as perception's [pratyakṣa] grasping of the non-implicative form [prasajya-rūpa] of absence just is (its) capacity [śakti] to produce a mental construction of absence [abhāva-vikalpa]. Similarly, even for constructing states of awareness involving a positive entity [vidhi-vikalpa] the grasping of (this) absence [abhāva i.e., *exclusion* [apoha] is said to be the capacity [śakti] to produce [dāna] activity [anuṣthāna] that is consistent with it [tad-anurūpa].[31]

An example may help explain what (I think) Ratnakīrti has in mind. Ratnakīrti might analyze the awareness that "There is nothing on the floor" as the awareness that "The floor is characterized by the absence of all other things."[32] In this paraphrase, "the floor" is a 'positive' component of what is perceived and "the absence of all other things" a 'negative' component. This "non-implicative" form of absence [prasajya-rūpa-

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[31]RNA [59.16-59.17].

yathā pratyakṣasya prasajyarūpābhāvāgrahaṇam* abhāvavikalpotpādanaśaktir eva tathā vidhivikalpānām api tadanurūpānuṣṭhānadānaśaktir evābhāvagrahaṇam abhidhīyate |

Note: In this passage the word "abhāva [absence]" is being used in two different senses. In its first two occurences, "prasajyarūpābhāva [non-implicative form of absence]" and "abhāvavikalpa [mental construction of absence]" the term is being used in its more familiar sense as "absence." In the compound "abhāvagrahaṇam [grasping absence]," however, it is also being used in the sense of exclusion [apoha]. This use of the term is not uncommon. See, for example, 2.1.2.

This same passage is cited in the same context in MTBh [Kajiyama (1966): 124]. *Note: Instead of "prasajya-rūpa-abhāva-agrahaṇam," Mokṣākaragupta reads "prasajya-rūpa-abhāva-grahaṇam." See Singh (1988: 88.23).

[32]For Dharmakīrti's discussion see HB [4*.30- 28*.03].

abhāva] is not itself an object of sense perception; only the floor is. The question, then, is how the "absence of all other things" can be a part of that state of awareness. What we learn from this passage is that according to Ratnakīrti its presence in awareness is, like the presence of exclusion [apoha], due to a capacity [śakti] that states of awareness have to construct objects such as the concept "absence of all other things" and to produce object-consistent activity such as not looking for a pot on that part of the floor. While in the earlier passages exclusion [apoha] was compared to a characteristic [viśeṣaṇa] of an object, here it is compared with a capacity [śakti] belonging to the state of awareness itself: The capacity of producing activity that is consistent with the content (or object) of a particular state of awareness. This begs, at least, the following two questions: "How does exclusion produce (or contribute to) object-consistent activity?" and "What, if anything, does this have to do with its being a characteristic [viśeṣaṇa] or property [dharma] of semantic value?" Attention to these two questions helps to further explain the kind of characteristic, property, and capacity that exclusion is supposed to be by focusing attention on the relationship between the exclusion of others [anyāpoha], semantic value, and conceptual content.

2.1.3 How Exclusion Contributes to Object-consistent Activity

2.1.3.1 Exclusion as Mental Construction

In my view, it is in thinking of the exclusion of others [anyāpoha] as a capacity of constructing [vikalpa] and inferential-verbal states of awareness that its role in Ratnakīrti's analysis of semantic value and conceptual content becomes apparent.[33] This is

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[33] The following account is reconstructed from remarks made by Ratnakīrti in a number of different places in his work. The passages to which I refer in the notes are, therefore, taken out of their original

because,for Ratnakīrti, exclusion [apoha] is linked very closely with a capacity that all such states of awareness have to construct objects that are not themselves directly present or manifest [pratibhāsa] in that state of awareness. This capacity is called "determination [adhyavasāya]."[34] Exclusion of others [anyāpoha] is more specifically the process or

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context. Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this essay to defend my reconstruction fully. I have, however, tried to indicate in the notes the textual basis for it.

[34]Briefly: Determination [adhyavasāya] is a capacity that constructing states of awareness have to determine that an object that is not directly manifest in a state of awareness as 'x' is present in that state of awareness as 'x'. Such an object is said to be the kind of object toward which we act. For a discussion of determination in Dharmakīrti see Katsura (1993) who also discusses the "pre-history" of this concept (but not necessarily the term) in *Abhidharmakośa* 6.4 and 7, in Katsura (1993: 69); the *Vādavidhi*, in Katsura (1993: 68 quotes Frauwallner (1957: 18, 35-36)]; and the *Nyāyamukha* in Katsura (1993: 68) and Katsura (1982: 90). Katsura (1993: 37-38) also refers to a number of "other names" for determination: "ekapratyavamarśajñāna," PV [1.73, 1.109, 1.119]; "abhedapratyavamarśana," PV [3.162]; "abhinnākāraparāmarśapratyaya," PVSV [50], "pratyakṣāsannavṛtti," PV [3.289-3.395], HB [2*-3*]. See too PVV ad PV 2.3 where Manorathanandin uses expressions such as: "darśanottarakālam vikalpajñānam", "pratyakṣapṛṣthajaś ca vikalpo (...) pramāṇavyāpārānukārī," and "avayavyādiviṣaya." See Dunne (1999: 140. 180-181), Katsura (1993), and Pandeya (1989: 3-4).

It is described famously in Pvin 2.8 as follows: "svapratibhāse anarthe arthādyavasāyena pravṛtter (...)." See JNA [227.23], PVV [25.10-12] and NBhū [140.25-26]: "svapratibhāse anarthe arthadhyavasāyena pravartanād (...)."

JNA [AP: 226.02] "adhyavasāyas tv agṛhīte 'pi pravartanayogyatānimittaḥ"

JNA [AP: 226.22] "adhyavasitam ity apratibhāse 'pi pravṛttiviṣayīkṛtam"
RNA [AS: 65.25-65.26] "tadadhyavasitam iti ko 'rthaḥ | apratibhāse 'pi pravṛttiviṣayīkṛtam iti yo'arthaḥ"

RNA [KS: 73.09-73.18] from Woo (1999: 72): na | adhyavasāyasvarūpāparijñānāt | agṛhīte 'pi vastuni mānasādipravṛttikārakatvaṃ vikalpasyādhyavasāyitvam | apratibhāse 'pi pravṛttiviṣayīkṛtam adhyavaseyatvam | etac cādhyavaseyatvaṃ svalakṣaṇasyaiva yujyate, nānyasya, arthakriyārthitvād arthipravṛtteḥ | evaṃ cādhyavasāye svalakṣaṇasyāsphuraṇam eva |na ca tasyāsphuraṇe 'pi sarvatrāviśeṣeṇa pravṛttyākṣepaprasaṅgaḥ, pratiniyatasāmagrīprasūtāt partiniyatasvākārāt partiniyataśaktiyogāt, pratiniyata evātadrūpaparāvṛtte apratīte 'pi pravṛttisāmarthyadarśanāt | yathā sarvasyāsattve 'pi bījād aṅkurasyaivotpattiḥ, dṛṣtasya niyatahetuphalabhāvasya parikṣeptum aśakyatvāt | paraṃ bāhyenārthena sati pratibandhe prāmāṇyam ' anyathā tv aprāmānyam iti viśeṣaḥ || (For a translation, see Chapter 4, Section 2.1.2.1)

For parallel passages to this see PVV [25.10-25.12], NBhū [140.25-140.26], JNA [226.01-226.07], RNA [CAPV: 138.03-138.09], and RNA [AS: 65.25-66.05].

RNA [VN: 109.13-109.23]: yadi pratyakṣaṃ svalakṣaṇaviṣayam ity ayogavyavacchedenocyate, tadā siddhasādhanam | anyayogavyavacchedas tv assidhaḥ, pratyakṣānumānādi sarvajñānānāṃ grāhyāvaseyabhedena viṣayadvaividhyānatikramāt | yad dhi yatra jñāne pratibhāsate, tad grāhyam | yatra tu yataḥ pravartate, tad adhyavaseyam | tatra pratyakṣasya svalakṣaṇaṃ grāhyam, adhyavaseyam tu sāmānyam, atadrūpaparāvṛttasvalakṣaṇamātrātmakam | anumānasya tu viparyayaḥ ||

mechanism through which determination [adhyavasāya] constructs these objects. The link between determination [adhyavasāya], exclusion of others [anyāpoha], and "object-consistent activity" is that determined [adhyavaseya] objects are constructed through exclusion to be the objects about which we speak and think and towards which we act. Determined [adhyavaseya] objects are, then, the conceptual content [viśaya] of all inferential-verbal states of awareness. Semantic value [vācya] is just one such determined object. Exclusion of others [anyāpoha] "produces" (or contributes to) object-consistent activity in the sense that it is the mechanism whereby the objects of conceptual states of awareness are constructed from the objects that are directly present in awareness; that is, from non-conceptual content. These constructed objects are often described as "universals [sāmānya]," in part, in order to distinguish them from the particulars [svalakṣaṇa] i.e., the non-conceptual content from which they are constructed.

A series of examples may illustrate what Ratnakīrti has in mind. According to Ratnakīrti, a universal [sāmānya] is most generally an object that is excluded from those that do not have its form [atadrūpaparāvṛtta].[35] More specifically, in late Buddhist epistemology, a "token [vyakti]" is sometimes described as a vertical universal [ūrdhva-sāmānya]; that is,

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tataś ca sāṃvyavahārikapramāṇāpekṣayā rūparasagandhasparśasamudāyātmakasya ghaṭasya rūpamātragrahaṇe 'pi pratyakṣataḥ samudāyasiddhivyavasthā | tathaikasyātadrūpaparāvṛttasya grahaṇe 'pi sādhyasādhanasāmānyayor atadrūpaparāvṛttavastumātrātmanor ayogavyavacchedena viṣayabhūtayor vyāptigraho yukta eva | ata eva vikalpānām avastv eva viṣayaḥ | vastu tu teṣāṃ parokṣam evety api durjñānam, sarvavikalpānām adhyavaseyāpekṣayā vastuviṣayatvāt, śāstre 'pi tathaiva pratipādanāt ||

For parallel passages see JNA [VC: 12.16; 14.04-14.06; 13.03-13.06; 13.13; 14.01; 14.02], PVin [2.08-2.10], and NVTT [136.17; 135.09-135.14].
RNA [CAPV: 137.09-137.10] "agṛhīte 'pi paratra pravṛttyākṣepo 'dhyavaseyāḥ"

From RNA [CAPV: 133.24-135.04] Ratnakīrti considers 12 different interpretations of determination [adhyavasāya].

[35]For example RNA [VN: 109.17]: adhyavaseyaṃ tu sāmānyam, atadrūpaparāvṛttasvalakṣaṇamātrātmakam|

as an object that is excluded from those that belong to the same class [sajātīya-vyāvṛtta], and a "type [sāmānya]" as a horizontal universal [tiryag-sāmānya]; that is, as an object that is excluded from those that belong to a different class [vijātīya-vyāvṛtta].[36] In addition to being defined in terms of an exclusion, each of these universals is also associated with a particular mode of determination [adhyavasāya]. A vertical universal [ūrdhva-sāmānya], for example, is understood to be constructed through the determination of singularity (or non-difference) [ekatva-adhyavasāya] and a horizontal universal [tiryag-sāmānya] through the determination of difference [bheda-avasāya].[37] It is important to note that particulars [svalakṣaṇa] are the only objects that can be directly present [pratibhāsa] in awareness. According to Ratnakīrti both types of universals [sāmānya] are constructed from these directly present particulars [svalakṣaṇa] through determination [adhyavasāya] and exclusion [apoha].[38]

[36]Kajiyama (1966: 58-59). This passage is based on JNA [VC: 166.16-166.18]. For a discussion of these two universals in Jaina texts, numerous references, and a discussion of JNA [VC: 166.16-166.18] and RNA [CAPV: 143.12-143.14] see Balcerowicz (1999).

[37]RNA [CAPV: 143.12-143.14]

(...) tasmāt, yathordhvam indriyapratyakṣataḥ kṣaṇabhede pratīte 'py avidyāvaśād ekatvādhyavasāyaḥ tathā tiryak svasaṃvedanapratyakṣeṇākākārābhede 'dhigate 'py avidyāvaśād eva bhedāvasāya || (For a translation, see Chapter 4, Section 2.1.2.1)

Note: What I have referred to as a token can be perceived by sensory perception [indriyapratyakṣa] while what I have referred to as a type is perceived by reflexive-perception [svasaṃvedanapratyakṣa].

Also quoted in Kajiyama (1966: 59 n. 137).

Note: In contrast to these "universals," a particular [svalakṣaṇa] can be thought of as an object that is excluded both from those that belong to the same class and those that belong to a different class [sajātīya-vijātīya-vyāvṛtta]. Ratnakīrti does not himself use this expression. It is, however, used by Mokṣākaragupta. See MTBh [21.18-21.13] and Kajiyama (1966: p. 56).

[38]See previous note.

Consider the following: According to Ratnakīrti, what is perceived and directly present in awareness is a particular [svalakṣaṇa] 'p'. Let us suppose that what individuates 'p' is its unique set of causes and potential effects: Nothing else has exactly the same set of causes and potential effects that it does.[39] For simplicity, suppose that this set of causes and potential effects, 'P', can be completely described as the union of the following three sub-sets of causes and potential effects: (Subset 1) A "uniqueness" class 'S' consisting of those causes and potential effects that are unique to just this 'p' [tad*] (e.g., the causes and effects that produce an awareness of its unique red color); (Subset 2) A "dissimilarity" (atulya) class 'non-S' consisting of those causes and potential effects that belong to non-p's [atadrūpa*] (e.g., the causes and potential effects that produce the awareness of non-red colors). Notice that 'non-p' is defined as a term negation of 'p'; and (Subset 3) A "similarity" class 'like-S' (tulya) consisting of those causes and potential effects that are shared only by p's [tadrūpa*] (e.g., it produces an awareness of the color red). Notice here that the similarity class, like-S, can be defined in terms of the dissimilarity class and the relation of "non-intersection:" Like-S is just the class of causes and potential effects that do not intersect with the dissimilarity class. Notice too that the uniqueness class 'S' is a subset of the similarity class like-S. All that is directly grasped [grāhya] by awareness, however, is 'p'. The exclusion from 'p' of the dissimilarity class, non-S, results in the construction of a new object that is defined in

[39]This is, of course, not the only way to account for the individuation of 'p'. One could, for example, individuate 'p' by referring to its properties more generally. For Dharmakīrti's "effect-centered" account of the individuation of particulars see Dunne (1999) and Katsura (1991). Dunne's (1999: Chapter 4) discussion of "property-svabhāva" and "nature-svabhāva" also provides references and resources for thinking about Dharmakīrti's view of this. See especially Dunne (1999: 181-183, 187 n. 37, 198, 228-231).

Although my account makes use of set-theoretic vocabulary, it is not intended to be completely consistent with it. For a useful discussion of set theoretic vocabulary see Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet (1990). For a discussion of what he (appropriately) calls a "trope-theoretic" account see Ganeri (2001: Chapter 4).

terms of the two remaining subsets of causes and effects; that is, the uniqueness class 'S', which consists of all of the causes and effects that are unique to 'p', and the similarity class 'like-S', which consists of all of the causes and effects that are only shared by p's. This new object is, therefore, one that has been excluded from all those that are non-S [atadrūpaparāvṛtta; where "tad" is S]. In other words, this new 'object' is the non-intersection between class 'P' and the dissimilarity class non-S. As mentioned above, this is nothing but the similarity class, like-S. What exclusion does, therefore, is construct a similarity class from a particular and its term negation. According to Ratnakīrti, it is this sort of a similarity class that is often taken to be a "real" rather than just a "constructed" universal [sāmānya].

For example, suppose that 'p' is a single moment in a continuum of pot-moments. In this case, the object constructed from 'p' by excluding non-S would be defined by the causes and potential effects that are unique to this particular moment; that is, those that belong to its uniqueness class, and those that it shares with other moments in the pot-continuum; that is, those that belong to its similarity class. Such an object would be, therefore, the complete continuum [santāna] of pot-moments of which the directly grasped object 'p' is but a single moment. In other words, the constructed object would be an individual pot. This "token" pot or vertical universal [ūrdhva-sāmānya] is also said to be constructed through a determination of singularity [ekatva-adhyavasāya] among the single moments in that pot-continuum. In this context, exclusion results in the construction of a difference [bheda] between moment-p and all of the momentary objects that are not a part of its continuum and a non-difference [abheda] between the directly grasped moment-p and all of the other moments in its continuum. Importantly, Ratnakīrti also says that by directly grasping one sensible characteristic of an object, it is

possible to construct the entire object, in a similar way, through the determination of singularity [ekatva-adhyavasāya]. He asserts, for example, that by directly perceiving only its unique color, it is possible to determine the pot of which the sensed color is a characteristic.[40]

Now suppose that 'p' is a single pot and not a single moment in a pot continuum. In this case, the object constructed from 'p' by excluding non-S; that is, by excluding non-pots, would be defined by the causes and effects that are unique to that particular pot and those that are shared with all other pots. Such an object would be, therefore, a similarity class; the collection of all pots or a pot-in-general. This "type" or horizontal universal [tiryag-sāmānya] is constructed through a determination of difference [bheda-avasāya] between pots and non-pots. More specifically, in this context exclusion constructs a difference [bheda] between the directly present pot and all non-pots and a non-difference [abheda] between it and all other pots.

Exclusion of others [anyāpoha] can be understood to contribute to object-consistent activity, therefore, in the sense that it is necessarily implicated in the construction of the objects of that activity; that is, the similarity classes that according to Ratnakīrti are the objects about which we speak and think and towards which we act.

2.1.3.2 Exclusion and Selection

[40]RNA [KSA: 73.20-73.24]

In addition to its role in the construction of objects, Ratnakīrti provides an additional set of reasons for why exclusion is a necessary component of semantic value. In the following passage, for example, Ratnakīrti asserts,

> If on the other hand the exclusion from others [parāpoha] is not present [kalita] when there is the awareness of meaning [artha] from a word, how can there be positive activity [pravṛtti] through the exclusion of others [anya-parihāra]? As a result, someone who is ordered to tie a cow could also tie horses.[41]

Without exclusion [apoha] it would not be possible to explain why a competent speaker of the language will tie a cow and not a horse upon hearing the phrase "Tie a cow." The claim is that it is necessary for exclusion [apoha] to be a component of inferential-verbal content since otherwise we would be unable to explain our general ability to successfully determine the objects of our intentional activity. Imagine that a competent speaker of the language is looking out over a pasture in which cows, horses, etc. are grazing and is told "Bring a cow." Suppose further that the state of awareness produced in the mind of this person upon hearing the word "cow" could be described without the negative component, exclusion [apoha]. Given this supposition, this person's state of awareness could be plausibly described as a state of awareness in which there is a positive component "cow." The problem with this view is that it does not distinguish between states of awareness in which a cow is the only positive component and states of awareness in which, for example, a cow, horse, and field are positive components. While it is clear that the person in question has a state of awareness in which "cow" is a

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[41] RNA [59.18-59.20]

anyathā yadi śabdād arthapratipattikāle kalito na parāpohaḥ katham anyaparihāreṇa pravṛttiḥ| tato gām badhaneti codito 'svādīn api badhnīyāt |

This is a very common example. See, for example, JNA [206.14-206.15]. This example is also used and discussed by Mokṣākaragupta. See Kajiyama (1966: 125).

component, it has not been explained why that state of awareness has to be one in which "cow" is the only component or how a person who is aware of a cow, horse, and field could distinguish between the appropriate positive object and the other positive components of her awareness. As a result of this lack of specificity Ratnakīrti claims that one cannot explain why such a person might not act towards another positive component of her awareness by bringing a horse instead of a cow. The only way to explain this according to Ratnakīrti is to admit exclusion [apoha] as a negative component of inferential-verbal content. The command "Bring a cow" has a deeper structure in which the semantic value of the word "cow" does not just have a positive component 'cow' but also has a negative component 'and not anything other than a cow' i.e., not a horse or field. Thus, exclusion [apoha] is needed in this context since it explains our ability to select an appropriate object for our actions.[42]

2.1.4 How Exclusion is (still) a Characteristic or Property

Why Ratnakīrti insists that exclusion [apoha], which has thus far been primarily described as a capacity of a state of awareness, should also be described as a property [dharma] or characteristic [viśeṣaṇa] of semantic value becomes apparent from his description of the relationships between a property [dharma] and a possessor of a property [dharmin] and between a characteristic [viśeṣaṇa] and what is characterized by it

[42] "Selection" is only one mode of exclusion. On my typology there are three such modes: Construction, Selection, and Abstraction. "Construction" accounts for the role that exclusion plays in constructing individuals [piṇḍa, vyakti, vastu, svalakṣaṇa], groups or classes of individuals, and universals [jāti, sāmānya]. "Abstraction" accounts for the role that exclusion plays in abstracting out various features, such as properties, from constructed objects and also for the "abstraction" of individuals from classes or tokens from types. It is important to note that these three modes of exclusion can all be described in terms of the construction of a relevant set of differences and non-differences.

[viśeṣya]. According to Ratnakīrti, "(...) it is well established that the ordinary use [vyavahāra] (of the terms) 'property [dharma]' and 'possessor of a property [dharmin]' is based upon a constructed difference [kālpānika-bheda]"[43] and that "the relationship between a characteristic and what is characterized by it [viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva] is acknowledged after assuming an imagined difference [parikalpita-bheda]."[44] Ratnakīrti's point is that although it may be useful to speak of semantic value as having two different components, it is more precisely a single object that is only conceptually separable into a positive entity [vidhi] and exclusion [apoha]. Whether one locates the property 'exclusion of others [anyāpoha]' in states of awareness in which semantic value is present or in semantic value itself becomes, therefore, a matter of conceptual convenience. After all, semantic value is nothing but an object or facet [ākāra] that is constructed out of awareness itself. In addition, due to the non-difference between properties [dharma] and property-possessors [dharmin] the term "exclusion [apoha]" can denote either the property [dharma], the exclusion of others [anyāpoha] or its possessor [dharmin], the excluded object. Given what has been said earlier Ratnakīrti's point about these relationships also applies to the other conceptual objects that are constructed through exclusion.

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[43]RNA [62.18]

kālpānikabhedāśrayas tu dharmadharmivyavahāra iti prasādhitaṃ śāstre |

See JNA [212.26-213.01].

[44]RNA [65.10-65.12]

{svarūpavān ghaṭa ityādivat gotvajātimān piṇḍa iti} parikalpitaṃ bhedam upādāya viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvasyeṣṭatvād {agovyāvṛttānubhavabhāvitvād gaur ayam iti vyavahārasya} |

See JNA [225.01-225.09].

This point is also emphasized in another passage in which Ratnakīrti responds to the objection that it is incoherent to suppose that semantic value can be described as a complex entity consisiting of both a positive and negative component.

And if it is agreed [abhimata] that when the word 'cow' is used it is also proper to name the remainder by the word 'non-cow,' then there is neither a contradiction [virodha] between that which is excluded from others [anyāpoḍha] and the exclusion from others [anyāpoha] nor is the relation between what is characterized and (its) characteristic [viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇa-bhāva] destroyed. This is because there is not mutual exclusion [paraspara-vyavaccheda-abhāva] (and) there is the real presence of (those two) having the same substratum [sāmānādhikaraṇya], like the floor and the absence of a pot: For there is a contradiction [virodha] through self-absence [sva-abhāva] (but) not with (its) absence from another [para-abhāva]. This is well known even to a child [ābāla-prasiddha].[45]

The objection implicit in this passage is that conceptual content should not be described even in terms of a positive entity characterized by its exclusion from others. This is because on the opponent's view the idea that a single object can be constituted by both a positive and negative component is incoherent. Ratnakīrti's response is that on his view there isn't really a difference between the two components at all. They are non-different from one another just like the positive awareness of an empty floor is non-different from, and in this sense equivalent to and compatible with, the negative awareness of the absence of a pot.[46] Since the two components are conceptually compatible with one another there cannot be an internal contradiction in supposing that semantic value and conceptual content can be described in terms of these two non-different components.[47]

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[45]RNA [60.08-60.11]

abhimate ca gośabdapravṛttāv agośabdena śeṣasyāpy abhidhānam ucitam | na cānyāpoḍhānyāpohayor virodho viśeṣyaviśeṣaṇabhāvakṣatir vā parasparavyavacchedābhāvat | sāmānādhikaraṇyasadbhāvāt | bhūtalaghaṭābhāvavat | svābhāvena hi virodho na parābhāvenety ābālaprasiddham |

[46]See 2.1.1.2.

[47]Siderits (1991: Chapter 4) also discusses this issue.

2.1.4 Summary: Exclusion of Others

The content of inferential-verbal states of awareness is a conceptually complex entity constituted by two analytically separable components which are actually non-different from each other. In providing a description of the semantic value of a term, however, it is necessary to make a conceptual distinction between a positive and negative component since without a conceptually distinct and negative component such as exclusion [apoha] it would not be possible, on Ratnakīrti's view, to explain how were are able to pick out, differentiate, and therefore act towards the relevant object in what can be complex states of awareness. Exclusion [apoha] is the capacity or characteristic feature of conceptual content that constructs, selects, and determines the appropriate and only the appropriate intentional object(s). Moreover, since it is non-different from the positive component the term "exclusion" denotes both the capacity to exclude i.e., the exclusion of others [anyāpoha] and the excluded object i.e., that which is excluded from others [anyāpoḍha]. Ratnakīrti's view cannot be classified, therefore, as either Pure Referentialism, Pure Non-referentialism, or Sequentialism.

2.1.5 Excursus: Describing Exclusion

Before turning to Ratnakīrti's account of the 'positive' component of semantic value, it may be helpful to briefly survey the variety of different expressions he uses to refer to exclusion. Attention to these expressions is important since they provide a somewhat

different perspective from which to consider what Ratnakīrti means by the "exclusion of others [anyāpoha]."

Ratnakīrti uses at least ten different expressions to describe "exclusion of others [anyāpoha]."[48] Each of these expressions is itself a complex expression consisting of a term which denotes the process of excluding and one which denotes of what there is exclusion. In the word "exclusion of others [anya-apoha]," for example, the word "exclusion [apoha]" denotes the process or capacity of excluding while the word "others [anya]" denotes of or from what there is exclusion. Ratnakīrti uses five different terms to denote the process of excluding: "exclusion [apoha],"[49] "taking away [parihāra],"[50] "separating out [vyāvṛtti],"[51] "covering up [(para)-āvṛtta],"[52] and "absence [abhāva]."[53] These terms are used synonomously and, with the exception of "absence [abhāva]," are consistently translated by the word "exclusion." What these expressions suggest is that exclusion [apoha] is the capacity of differentiating or selecting between elements in what could be multi-entitied states of awareness.[54] The elements from which

[48]anyāpoha [59.05], para-apoha [59.19], anya-parihāra [59.19], atajjatīya-parāvṛtta [59.24], atad-vyāvṛtti [59.25], anya-vyāvṛtta [59.29], vijatīya-vyāvṛtta [59.26], atadrūpa-parāvṛtta [60.20], viṣayāntara-parihāreṇa [65.26], anya-abhāva [66.05].

[49]RNA [59.05]

[50]RNA [59.19]

[51]RNA [59.29]

[52]RNA [59.24]

[53]RNA [66.05]

[54]It is not the case that every state of awareness needs to be understood as being "multi-entitied" in the manner described above. A state of awareness could be described, for example, as containing only one entity e.g., a single cow. In such a case, one of the other two modes of exclusion (e.g., construction) would be appealed to in order to explain why exclusion must be a component of conceptual content.

there is exclusion are also described by Ratnakīrti in a number of different ways. He says, for example, that these entities are: "other than [anya]," [55] "different from [para],"[56] "non-that [atad],"[57] those that "belong to a class which is non-that [atajjātīya],"[58] those that "belong to a different class [vijatīya],"[59] "other objects [viṣayāntara],"[60] or those that "have the form of non-that [atadrūpa]."[61] What these expressions help clarify is the sense in which the elements from which there is exclusion are different or other; they are different [anya] or other [para] in the sense that they have a different form [atadrūpa] or belong to a different class [atajjatīya or vijatīya].[62] It is important to note that both terms in the complex expressions that Ratnakīrti uses to refer to exclusion of others [anyāpoha] convey an idea of difference. In an important sense, exclusion of others [anyāpoha] just is the construction of a relevant difference through exclusion.

2.3 Positive Entity

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[55]RNA [59.05]

[56]RNA [59.19]

[57]RNA [59.25]

[58]RNA [59.24]

[59]RNA [59.26]

[60]RNA [65.26]

[61]RNA [66.08]

[62]Although it is not evident from the expressions themselves, the "differences" in form and class are mentally constructed in accordance with a particular set of expectations. Through the construction of these differences, form and class are constructed.

While Ratnakīrti's descriptions of exclusion [apoha] as a property [dharma], characteristic [viśeṣaṇa], and capacity [śakti] focus on an "active" feature of semantic value, its capacity to construct itself, his descriptions of exclusion [apoha] as a positive entity [vidhi] focus on the more "passive" object that is actively constructed in states of awareness through the exclusion of others [anyāpoha]. As explained earlier, these objects may be thought of as "constructed universals" or "similarity classes" and, as I read Ratnakīrti, the objects of conceptual states of awareness. It is Ratnakīrti's own description of these objects that is considered in what follows.

2.3.1 Internal and External

Ratnakīrti's attention to how semantic value is constructed suggests that he might classify his theory as an ideational theory of meaning; that is, as a theory according to which meanings are just "in the head."[63] Interestingly, Ratnakīrti argues that the complex (and constructed) positive entity [vidhi] that he takes semantic value to be should be described as both an internal (āntara) and an external [bāhya] object [artha].[64] He explains, for example, that,

By the word 'positive entity' [vidhi] what is meant [abhimata] given determination [yathā-adhyavasāya] is an external object [bāhyo artha] and given manifestation [yathā-

[63]This phrase is from Putnam's famous remark, "Cut the pie any way you like it, meanings just ain't in the head." See Putnam (1975: 144) for his statement of semantic externalism and Burge (1979) for an extension of Putnam's thesis. Stalnaker (1999: Chapter 9) has a nice discussion of what is and what is not, "in the head."

[64]Ratnakīrti does not use the word "āntara [internal]" to refer to this object. He uses the word "buddyākāra [facet of awareness] which, in this context, clearly refers to an internal object. The word "āntara [internal]" is, however, used in a similar context by Jñānaśrīmitra. By the term "internal" I simply mean "mind-dependent."

pratibhāsa], a facet of awareness [buddhi-ākāra]. (Each) is excluded from those that do not have its form [atadrūpa-parāvṛtta].[65]

What this passage reveals is that the complex positive entity [vidhi] that Ratnakīrti identifies with semantic value is supposed to be both an internal facet of awareness [buddhi-ākāra] i.e., an object that we take to be manifest [pratibhāsa] or present in our awareness such as a mental representation, concept, or idea of, for example, a cow and an external object i.e., an object that we, as a result of determination [adhyavasāya] take to be present in the external world e.g., a cow.[66] In addition to the two modes of determination discussed earlier, the determination of singularity [ekatva-adhyavasāya] and the determination of difference [bhedāvasāya], Ratnakīrti's analysis is also dependent upon a "third mode" of determination, the "determination of externality." It is through this mode of determination that internal facets of awareness [buddhi-ākāra] appear as if they are objects in the external world. These determined-to-be-external objects are the sorts of "external objects" to which Ratnakīrti refers in this passage.[67] The question of whether an object of awareness is internal (antara) or external [bāhya] depends, therefore, upon whether we take it to be manifest [pratibhāsa] in our awareness or externally determined [adhyavaseya] by it. It is, then, how an object is made present to awareness that determines whether it is properly described as an internal (antara) or an

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[65]RNA [60.20-60.21]

vidhiśabdena ca yathādhyavasāyam atadrūpaparāvṛtto bāhyo 'rtho 'bhimataḥ yathāpratibhāsam buddyākāraś ca | {tatra bāhyo 'rtho 'dhyavasāyad eva śabdavācyo vyavasthāpyate | na svalakṣaṇaparisphūrtyā | pratyakṣavad deśakālāvasthāniyatapravyaktasvalakṣaṇāsphūraṇāt} |

See JNA [208.11-202.12].

[66]"Manifestation [pratibhāsa]" and "determination [adhyavasāya]" will both be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4.

[67]RNA [60.06], See passage [c].

external [bāhya] one. In a passage near the end of his essay, Ratnakīrti explains the significance of this to the meaning of words and semantic value. He writes,

So, in this way, a positive entity [vidhi] is definitely the meaning of a word [śabdārtha]. And, it supposed to be an external object [bāhya-arthaḥ] and a facet of awareness [buddhi-ākāra]. Among these, it is not the case that either ultimately [tattvataḥ] or conventionally [saṃvṛtyā] there are positive or negative assertions [vidhi-niṣedha] about a facet of awareness [buddhi-ākāra] since it is known by reflexive awareness [svasaṃvedana] and is without determination [anadhyavasāya]. It is also not the case that ultimately [tattvataḥ] there are positive or negative assertions [vidhi-niṣedha] about an external object [bāhya-artha] since it is not manifest in a verbal state of awareness. Thus, all entities [sarvadharma] are ultimately [tattvataḥ] inexpressible [anabhilāpyatva] since there is either the absence of manifestation [pratibhāsa] or determination [adhyavasāya]. Therefore, conventionally [samvṛta] it is of an external object [bāhyārtha] alone that there are positive and negative assertions [vidhi-niṣedha]. If this were not so there would be the unwanted consequence of the destruction of all ordinary activity [samvyavahāra].[68]

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[68]RNA [65.15-65.24]

tad evam vidhir eva śabdārthaḥ | sa ca bāhyo 'rtho buddhyākāraś ca vivakṣitaḥ | tatra na buddyākārasya tattvataḥ saṃvṛtyā vā vidhiniṣedhau svasaṃvedanapratyakṣagamyatvāt anadhyavasāyāc ca | nāpi tattvato bāhyasyāpi vidhiniṣedhau tasya śābde pratyaye 'pratibhāsanāt | ata eva sarvadharmāṇāṃ tattvato anabhilāpyatvam pratibhāsādhyavasāyābhāvāt | tasmād bāhyasya eva sāṃvṛtau vidhiniṣedhau | anyathā samvyavahārahāniprasaṅgāt |

See JNA [230.19-230.27]. For an interesting discussion of "sāṃvrta" at PV 2.3 and "saṃvṛtiḥ" at PV [1.68-1.69] see Katsura (1993: 67). For PVSV ad PV [1.68-1.69] see Dunne (1999: 394).

Initially, this passage may appear to contradict the one just discussed since here, Ratnakīrti appears to deny that we can ever make positive or negative existential statements about internal-facets of awareness [buddhi-ākara]. Ratnakīrti suggests that in so far as they are directly present [pratibhāsa] in awareness, facets of awareness [buddhi-ākara] are internal-particulars and are, therefore, perceptible through reflexive awareness [svasaṃvedana]. Not all internal facets of awareness [buddhi-ākara] are, however, directly present in states of awareness. This is because, as described earlier, facets of awareness [ākāra] can also be indirectly present as a result of being constructed and determined [adhyavasāya]. What Ratnakīrti is arguing in this passage is that non-determined internal facets of awareness cannot be the objects about which we speak. They cannot be such objects, ultimately [tattvataḥ], since they are the momentary objects of reflexive awareness [svasaṃvedana]. They cannot be such objects conventionally [saṃvṛttyā] since they are not determined and, it is only through determination [adhyavasāya] that semantic value and conceptual content is constructed and so made available to us. In this passage, Ratnakīrti also explains why external objects [bāhyārtha] are not ultimately [tattvataḥ] the objects about which we speak. He argues that in so far as they are taken to be "external," such objects cannot be directly present [pratibhāsa] in awareness and so cannot themselves be the objects about which we most directly speak and think. Ratnakīrti concludes, therefore, that no non-determined internal or external objects can be the objects of inferential-verbal states of awareness. According to him, "all (such) entities are (ultimately) inexpressible."[69] Conventionally [saṃvṛttyā], however, Ratnakīrti claims that determined external objects

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[69]Interestingly, this conclusion seems to be much more important to Jñānaśrīmitra's discussion of apoha. See Katsura (1986: 176) for a discussion of JNA [231.21-231.22] where PVSV [92.23-93.01] is quoted.

can be considered the objects about which we speak and think. Without such a view Ratnakīrti argues that it would be impossible to account for our ability to successfully speak, think about, or interact with objects in the "external" world. And although it is not made explicit in this passage Ratnakīrti also believes that, conventionally [saṃvṛtyā], determined internal objects can be objects of inferential-verbal states of awareness. Without such a view it would not be possible to account for our ability to successfully speak and think about "internal" objects such as mental representations, concepts, or ideas. According to Ratnakīrti, then, his version of the theory of exclusion is neither a purely realist nor ideational theory of meaning and conceptual content.

2.3.2 Neither Particulars nor Universals

Ratnakīrti continues his analysis of the positive component of semantic value and conceptual content by arguing that on neither description (i.e., neither as an "internal" nor "external" object) and from neither persepctive (i.e., neither conventionally nor ultimately) should this object be described as a sensible-particular [svalakṣaṇa] or a real universal [sāmānya].[70] What is specifically at issue in this discussion is the sort of object that this positive external or internal entity [vidhi] cannot be.

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[70]To this list Ratnakīrti also adds "imposed objects [upādhi]." His discussion of these objects will not be considered here. It is also important to note that Ratnakīrti often uses the terms "sensible-particular [svalaṣaṇa]" and "universal [sāmānya]" to refer to semantic value and conceptual content. When he does so, however, he has his own interpretation of these terms in mind. In arguing against the view that sensible-particulars [svalakṣaṇa] or universals [sāmānya] are the proper objects of inferential-verbal states of awareness he is assuming his opponents' understanding of these terms.

Note: On my use of the term, "sensible-particular [svalakṣaṇa]" refers to an object that can be perceived by sense perception and reflexive awareness. A "real universal" refers to a universal that is neither constructed nor mind dependent.

2.3.2.1 Particulars

Ratnakīrti argues, for example, that neither the determined external nor internal objects about which we speak and think are sensible-particulars [svalakṣaṇa]. In other words, according to Ratnakīrti, sensible-particulars [svalakṣaṇa] are not manifest in inferential-verbal states of awareness. Ratnakīrti begins his argument by explaining why the external objects about which we speak cannot be sensible-particulars [svalakṣaṇa]. He argues,

> (...) it is specifically established that an external object is denoted by a word only as a result of determination and not through the manifestation of a particular. This is because a spatially, temporally, and structurally specified manifest-particular [pravyakta-svalakṣaṇa] is not present like (it is) in perception.[71]

It is only when considered through determination [adhyavasāya] that the objects about which we speak and think can be described as external objects. Ratnakīrti asserts that these determined objects cannot be sensible-particulars [svalakṣaṇa] since they do not appear in states of awareness in the same way as sensible-particulars [svalakṣaṇa] appear. The implication is that the asymmetry in the appearance of the objects is due to the fact that they are different sorts of objects. In perceptual states of awareness, the manifest object, a sensible-particular [svalakṣaṇa], is vivid or clear [spaṣṭa] while in inferential-verbal states of awareness the objects are less vivid or unclear [aspaṣṭa].[72] This clarity in perceptual states of awareness is said to result from the unique spatial,

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[71] RNA [60.21-60.23]

tatra bāhyo 'rtho 'dhyavasāyad eva śabdavācyo vyavasthāpyate | na svalakṣaṇaparisphūrtyā | pratyakṣavad deśakālāvasthāniyatapravaktasvalakṣaṇāsphuraṇāt |

This passage is also used by Mokṣākaragupta. See MTBh [Kajiyama (1966): 125].

[72] See RNA [61.03], quoted earlier.

temporal, and structural specificity [deśa-kāla-avasthā-niyata] of the objects of perception.

An opponent argues, however, that Ratnakīrti's account of this asymmetry need not be the case since perceptual and inferential-verbal states of awareness could just present the same object differently. The proper explanation of the asymmetry noted by Ratnakīrti is, according to the opponent, due to a "difference in the manifestations of one and the same object [artha]."[73] Ratnakīrti responds to this possibility by asserting that,

(...) the difference between things [vastu-bheda] isn't (anything) other than [apara] a difference in self-nature [svarūpa-bheda] and a difference in self-nature [svarūpa-bheda] isn't (anything) other than a difference in manifestation [pratibhāsa-bheda].[74]

The opponent's argument is based on the idea that the difference between "clear [spaṣṭa]" and "unclear [aspaṣṭa]" manifestations is due to the ways in which sensation and inferential-verbal states of awareness present the same thing and not because there is a difference in the thing presented. Ratnakīrti's response is based on his conviction that the difference in manifestations, correctly noted by the opponent, must be associated with and understood in terms of a difference in the things themselves. In the passage quoted above, Ratnakīrti presents a very strong formulation of this view by asserting that the difference between manifestations implies that there is, necessarily, a difference between things. The opponent immediately objects to Ratnakīrti's formulation by providing what he takes to be a counter-example. He points out that,

[73]RAN [60.26]: {indriyaśabdasvabhāvopāyabhedād } ekasyaiva arthasya pratibhāsabhedaḥ |

See JNA [29.04].

[74]RNA [61.01]

na {hi} svarūpabhedād aparo vastubedhaḥ | na ca pratibhāsabhedād aparaḥ svarūpabhedaḥ |

Although there is a difference in manifestation [pratibhāsa-bheda] --(i.e.,) clear and unclear-- for someone close to and someone far away from a single tree, there isn't a difference in the tree [śākhi-bheda].[75]

Ratnakīrti responds by qualifying his earlier remarks,

We do not say that a difference in manifestation [pratibhāsa-bheda] is invariably related with a difference in things [bhinna-vastu-niyata] but rather, that it is invariably related with the absence of there being a single object [ekaviśayatva-abhāva-niyata]. Therefore, when a difference in manifestations is accompanied by a difference in telic-function etc. [arthakrīyā-bhedādi-saciva] there is a difference in things, like a pot. Otherwise, there being a single object is denied (...).[76]

Ratnakīrti's claim is that a difference in manifestations [pratibhāsa-bheda] is necessarily related to the absence of a single object [viṣaya]. In the proposed counter-example, therefore, the different manifestations 'clear [spaṣṭa]' and 'unclear [aspaṣṭa]' necessarily imply that the two persons do not have the same object [viṣaya] of awareness. What Ratnakīrti's qualifying remarks explain is that it is only when different manifestations have different telic-functions [arthakrīyā] that they are invariably associated with different things [vastu].[77] And since the manifestations 'clear [spaṣṭa]' and 'unclear [aspaṣṭa]' do not have different telic-functions [arthakrīyā] it is proper to conclude that the two people are seeing the same thing [vastu] and yet are not aware of the same object [viṣaya]. A difference in manifestations necessarily implies the absence of a single object

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[75]RNA [61.03-61.04]

dūrāsannadeśavartinoḥ puruṣayor ekatra śākhini spaṣṭāspaṣṭapratibhāsabhede 'pi na śākhibheda {iti cet} |

[76]RNA [61.04-61.05]

na brūmaḥ pratibhāsabhedo bhinnavastuniyataḥ kintv ekaviṣayatvābhāvaniyata iti | tato yatrārthakrīyābhedādisacivaḥ pratibhāsabhedas tatra vastubhedaḥ ghaṭavat | anyatra punar niyamena ekaviṣayatāṃ parhāratīty {ekapratibhāso bhrāntah}|

[77]The translation of "arthakrīyā" as "telic-function" is taken from Dunne (1999).

of awareness [ekaviṣayatva-abhāva] but does not necessarily imply the presence of more than one thing [vastu]. What Ratnakīrti is trying to show is that sensible-particulars [svalakṣaṇa] cannot be the determined objects about which we speak and think. His argument is that the obvious differences in manifestations [pratibhāsa] necessarily imply that the objects of awareness [viṣaya] are different. Moreover, since a difference in manifestations only implies that the objects of awareness are different and does not preclude the possibility that these different objects are associated with the same thing [vastu], his view is also consistent with the opponent's example.

A second set of arguments that Ratnakīrti uses to show that a sensible-particular [svalakṣaṇa] cannot be the positive entity about which we speak and think is based upon what I am calling the "argument from indifference."[78] Ratnakīrti states the argument as follows,

Moreover, if a thing [vastu] having the nature of a (sensible)-particular [svalakṣaṇa-ātman] is what is denoted [vācya] then because of an awareness of its entire nature [sarvātmanā pratipatteḥ] positive and negative statements are inappropriate [vidhi-niṣedha-ayoga].[79] For if it really exists, "it exists" is meaningless [vyārtham] (and) "it does not exist" is incorrect [asamartham]. But there is the use of words such as "it exists". Therefore, a verbal-manifestation [śābda-pratibhāsa], being indifferent to the existence or non-existence of an external obejct [bāhyārtha-bhāva-abhāva-sādhāraṇya], cannot have it as its object [viṣaya].[80]

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[78] As Kajiyama (1984) notes, versions of this argument can be found in numerous Buddhist and Nyāya works. See, for example, PV4 [4.225-226], PVin2 [14-27], AP-D, NVTT [681.11] ad NS 2.2.66, JNA [211.01-213.09], and MTBh [54.03-54.14]. The JNA version is discussed in Katsura (1986) and both the JNA and PV4 versions are discussed in Siderits (1999: Chatper 4).

[79] JNA [219.03-04]

[80] RNA [61.10-61.14]

kiṁ ca svalakṣaṇātmani vastuni vācye sarvātmanā pratipatteḥ vidhineṣedhayor ayogaḥ | tasya hi sadbhāve 'stīti vyārtham nāstīty asamartham | asadbhāve tu nastīti vyartham astītiy asamartham | asti cāstyādipadaprayogaḥ | tasmāt śābdapratibhāsasya bāhyārthabhāvābhāvasādhāraṇyam na tadviṣayatāṃ kṣamate |

Suppose the sensible-particular [svalakṣaṇa] being denoted [vācya] is an external tree-token. On this view, the object [viṣaya] of the state of awareness that is produced in the mind of a competent speaker of English upon hearing the word "tree" is a tree. Ratnakīrti's argument is that this realist version of semantic particularism cannot account for an indisputable fact about the proper object of inferential-verbal states of awareness, namely, that the objects about which we most directly speak and think are indifferent [sādhāraṇya] to both positive and negative existential statements. We may say, for example, both that "The tree exists" and that "The tree does not exist." The "tree" about which we are speaking is, therefore, indifferent to claims about its existence. Ratnakīrti's point is that if the semantic value of the term "tree" were an external tree-token such as a presently existing tree it would be redundant and therefore meaningless to say "The tree exists" since this would just be equivalent to asserting that "The presently-existing-tree exists." It would also be incorrect and therefore meaningless to assert that "The tree does not exist" since this would be equivalent to "The presently-existing-tree does not exist." Unlike the view being considered, Ratnakīrti's view is able to accomodate this fact since for him it is only a determined and not a sensible particular that is the object of inferential-verbal states of awareness.[81] Ratnakīrti's argument is also applicable to ideational versions of semantic particularism since in so far as a facet of awareness [buddhi-ākāra] is an internal particular it too is an object of

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cāstyādipadaprayogaḥ | tasmāt śābdapratibhāsasya bāhyārthabhāvābhāvasādhāraṇyam na tadviṣayatāṃ kṣamate |

See JNA [211.01-211.06].

[81] Ratnakīrti's discussion is much more involved that what I have considered. For example, he offers posible stategies that his opponents could use to show that their views could acount for indifference. See RNA [61.10-63.09].

sensation i.e., reflexive-awareness [svasaṃvedana]. And in so far as it is an object of sensation there is "an awareness of its entire nature [sarvātmanā pratipatteḥ]."[82] As a result, such an object could not be indifferent [sādhāraṇya] to statements in which, for example, properties are predicated of it. If, for example, the internal particular has property 'P' the positive statement "It has 'P'" would be redundant and the negative statement "It does not have 'P'" would be incorrect.[83] If it does not have property 'P' the positive statement "It has 'P'" would be incorrect and the negative statement "It does not have 'P'" would be redundant. As our use of language reveals, however, the objects of inferential-verbal states of awareness are indifferent to such statements. We can ask, for example, whether the tree about which I thinking or speaking is green, tall, or exists. Ratnakīrti concludes from this that such objects cannot be manifest internal-particulars. Ratnakīrti's view avoids this problem since according to it only determined internal particulars can be the objects of inferential-verbal states of awareness.[84]

2.3.2.1.1 Summary

As a result, neither internal nor external sensible-particulars [svalakṣaṇa] can ultimately [tattvatah] be the objects of inferential-verbal states of awareness. This is because such objects are not determined and therefore are not directly available to us. These objects cannot conventionally [samvṛttyā] be taken to be the objects of inferential verbal states of

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[82]See RNA [61.10-61.14], quoted earlier.

[83]The JNA version of this explicitly extends this to properties. Ratnakīrti would clearly agree, but, chooses not to discuss the issue in this way. This argument is discussed in some detail in Siderits (1991: Chapter 4), where he discusses both the argument in PV4 and JNA.

[84]For Mokṣākaragupta's treatement of this issue see MTBh [Kajiyama (1966): 126].

awareness since unlike the proper objects of such states of awareness they are not indifferent [sādhāraṇya] to positive and negative statements about them.

2.3.2.2 Universals

Ratnakīrti also argues that real universals [sāmānya] are not manifest in inferential-verbal states of awareness [śābda-pratyaya-pratibhāsa] and so they cannot be the proper objects of such states of awareness.[85] Through one set of arguments, for example, he tries to show that neither perception nor inference can establish that real universals are the proper objects of any constructing state of awareness. Through a second set of arguments he provides an alternative account of conceptual content by describing the sort of complex object [viśiṣṭa-vidhi] that he claims is the proper object of such states of awareness. What Ratnakīrti wants to show through this second set of arguments is (1) that this complex object has all of the explanatory power attributed to real universals and (2) that unlike a real universal, which cannot be proved by either warranted mode of awareness [pramāṇa], this complex object can be established through inferential reasoning [anumāna]. Section 2.3.3 considers (1) and section 3.0 will consider (2).

2.3.3 Positive Entity

Ratnakīrti's account of this complex positive entity [viśiṣṭa-vidhi] can be reconstructed from the following four passages:

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[85]For Mokṣākaragupta's treatement of this issue see MTBh [54.15-57.06].

[a] From a word such as "cow" in the (sentence) "Cows are grazing on the far bank of a river," dewlap, horns, and tail are grouped together through the facets of phonemes (that make up the word) and, as a result of not considering (their) differences from what belong to the same class [sajātīyabheda], they are manifest as if united together [saṃpiṇḍita-prāyaḥ]. And that is definitely not a (real) universal. {...} And even though it is utterly distinct [atyanta-vilakṣaṇa] in every individual [akhila-vyakti] that very collection of dewlap and horns etc., is associated with [ekī + √kṛ] a particular [svalakṣaṇa] and it is said to be a (real) universal [sāmānya]. Since an external object like that is not found [aprāpti], it is definitely erroneous {...}.[86]

[b] Everything that is verbally expressive [vācaka] has for its object [gocara] a thing-in-general [vastu-mātra] that is determined [adhyavasita] and excluded from those that do not have its form [atadrūpaparāvṛtta] {...}.[87]

[c] {...} (It is) a facet of a constructing state of awareness that is preceded by the observation of an individual thing [piṇḍa] and is (then) externally determined as if common [sādhāraṇa] to every individual {...}.[88]

[d] {...} from the co-operating cause of remembering the prior observation of an individual thing [piṇḍa], the total causal complex [sāmagrī] produces an awareness through which particular characteristics are surpassed, bringing about an objectless [nirviṣaya] awareness of a universal.[89]

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[86]RNA [63.10-63.16]

saritaḥ pāre gāvaś carantīti gavādiśabdāt sāsnāśṛṅgalāṅgūlādayo 'kṣarākāraparikaritāḥ sajātīyabhedāparāmarśanāt sampiṇḍitaprāyāḥ pratibhāsante | na ca tad eva sāmānyam| {varṇākṛty akṣarākāraśūnyaṃ gotvaṃ hi kathyate | }* tad eva ca sāsnāśṛṅgādimātram akhilavyaktāv atyantavilakṣaṇam api svalakṣaṇena ekīkriyamāṇaṃ sāmānyam iti ucyate tādṛśasya bāhyasya aprāpter bhrāntir evāsau keśapratibhāsavat |

See JNA [220.02-220.08], JNA [220.14-220.15], and *PV [III.147].

[87]RNA [66.08-66.09]

{atra prayogaḥ |} yad vācakaṃ tat sarvam adhyavasitātadrūpaparāvṛttavastumātragocaraṃ |{ yatheha kūpe jalam iti vacanam}* | vācakaṃ cedaṃ gavādiśabdarūpam iti svabhāvahetuḥ |

*Note: For other references to this example see Krasser (1991: 57).

[88]RNA [60.06]

{tasmāt} ekapiṇḍadarśanapūrvako yaḥ sarvavyaktisādhāraṇa iva bahiradhyasto vikalpabuddhyākaraḥ {tatrāyaṃ gaur iti saṃketakaraṇe na itaretarāśrayadoṣah}|

[89]RNA [63.20-63.21]

{yataḥ} pūrvapiṇḍadarśanasmaraṇasahakāriṇātiricyamānaviśeṣapratyayajanikā sāmagrī nirviṣayaṃ sāmānyavikalpam utpādayati |

When taken together, these passages suggest the following: What a competent speaker of English, for example, understands from hearing a token utterance of a term such as "cow" is a "thing-in-general [vastu-mātra] that is determined [adhyavasita] and excluded from those that do not have its form [atadrūpaparāvṛtta]" (passage [b]). This object may also be described as a non-specific collection of components that is constructed through exclusion. It is this "thing-in-general [vastu-mātra]" or "non-specific collection" that was described in section 2 as a "constructed universal" and that is identified here as semantic value.[90] In these passages, Ratnakīrti describes how this object is constructed. He suggests, for example, that upon hearing a token utterance of the term "cow" a competent speaker of English first recalls the objects that were previously and invariably associated with earlier uses of the term (passage [c] and passage [d]). The recollection of a previously observed individual [pūrvapiṇḍadarśana-smaraṇa] is said to be a co-operating cause [sahakāri] in the total causal complex [sāmagrī] that brings about the construction of the object. In so far as a remembered individual is an object or "facet of awareness [buddhi-ākāra]" it is a mental particular [svalakṣaṇa] that has its own unique causal history i.e., no other particular has exactly the same set of causes and potential

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See JNA [221.11-221.14].

[90]Although the term "semantic value [vācya]" is not explicitly used in these passages. It is clear from context that this is what he is referring to. Elsewhere Ratnakīrti describes this collection as "an object that is characterized by its exclusion from others and excluded from those which belong to a different class [anyābhāva-viśiṣṭo vijātīyavyāvṛtto 'rthaḥ]," as "a thing-in-general that is determined and excluded from those which belong to a different class [adhyavasita-vijātīyavyāvṛtta-vastumātra]," and as "a determined external object [adhyavasita-bāhya-viśayatvam]." See RNA [66.05-66.06], RNA [66.13], and RNA [66.20].

A general term such as "cow" expresses the fact that in a particular context a specific conglomeration of components brings about a single set of effects as a result of those components causally supporting each other in virtue of their 'proximity.'

effects. It can function, therefore, as a basis for exclusion. In so far as it is constituted by components, however, it too is a collection. This recalled object may be more specifically described as a specific collection of the components that jointly constitute the object in question. For a recalled cow, for example, the components are a specific set of dewlap, horns, and tail etc. By ignoring the differences between a specific collection of these components and other such collections, a non-specific collection or thing-in-general [vastu-mātra] is constructed (passage [a]).[91] Elsewhere, Ratnakīrti describes this process as the exclusion of a specific collection from those that belong to a different class.[92] It is clear, therefore, that the construction in question, the ignoring of differences, is a variety of exclusion. It is this non-specific collection that is (mistakenly) taken, by some, to be a real universal and that is unconsciously and erroneously associated [ekī+√kṛ] with the particulars in which it is (mistakenly) thought to be instantiated. According to Ratnakīrti, this object is a positive entity [vidhi] that is neither a real particular [svalakṣaṇa] nor a real universal [sāmānya]. It is a thing-in-general [vastu-mātra] that is constructed through its essential characteristic, exclusion [apoha] and is determined to be an object about which we speak and think and towards which we act. According to Ratnakīrti, it is this complex positive entity that best describes what is understood from hearing a token utterance of a term.

2.3.3.1 Specificity and Generality

[91] RNA [63.11]: "sajātīyabhedāparāmarśana" from passage [a].

[92] RNA [66.05-66.06; 66.13]

Following his description of this positive entity, Ratnakīrti defends his view from those who insist that real universals (and not just constructed ones) are necessary for explaining certain obvious and otherwise inexplicable features of verbally produced states of awareness. He shows, for example, that some of his opponents' criticism of his position are equally applicable to their own;[93] that given their own view real universals are unecessary;[94] that real universals cannot be proven by either perception or inference;[95] and that the complex positive entity [vidhi] that he takes semantic value to be has all of the explanatory power mistakenly thought to be unique to real universals. It is this final set of arguments that will be considered in what follows. There are, more specifically, two features of verbally produced states of awareness that Ratnakīrti wants to show can be explained without real universals. These are our awareness of specificity in the use of words and our awareness of generality [sāmānya-pratyaya].[96] Through these phrases Ratnakīrti is referring to aspects of language use that his opponents charge are inexplicable without an appeal to real universals. Ratnakīrti responds to this charge, in part, by showing how the "specificity" of a word; that is, how a word such as "{a/the}cow" can be applied to a cow but not to a horse, and its "generality" [sāmānya-pratyaya]; that is, how the word "cow" can apply to all cows and not just to a particular cow, can be explained in terms of the process through which non-specific collections

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[93]RNA [63.03-63.06]

[94]RNA [64.07-64.09], RNA [64.26-64.29]

[95]RNA [63.26-63.28], RNA [65.01-65.14]

[96]RNA [63.30-64.03]. The arguments in this section of Ratnakīrti's text are very compressed. It is, therefore, very helpful to read the parallel passages at JNA [221.11-223.27]. Ratnakīrti's discussion is not, however, the same as the discussion in JNA and so the JNA discussion must be used with some care.

i.e. Ratnakīrti's "universals," are constructed.[97] As mentioned earlier, according to Ratnakīrti, a thing-in-general [vastu-mātra] or non-specific collection is what is constructed from a specific-collection, through exclusion. The construction of this "universal" is, therefore, dependent upon a specific individual since a recalled individual provides the basis for the selective exclusion that generates it.[98] According to Ratnakīrti, this account provides the conceptual resources necessary for explaining the two features of semantic value that are mentioned by the opponent.

Suppose, for example, that someone is told "Bring a brown cow" i.e., any brown cow. Suppose further that upon hearing this utterance of the term "brown cow," the object that is recalled is a specific cow that has a unique brown color and set of dewlap, horns, and tail. Based on this specific collection of color, dewlap, horns, and tail it is possible according to Ratnakīrti to construct a non-specific collection; that is, a similarity class of these components, through the exclusion of other collections of color, dewlap, horns, and tail (i.e. its dissimilarity class). Such a non-specific collection is what is understood from hearing this utterance of the term "brown cow." The reason why this utterance of the term cannot be used to correctly refer to horses is that its semantic value is, in part,

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[97]Strictly speaking there is not a single opponent. I have grouped together objections that are raised by a variety of opponents for the sake of brevity and clarity. For concerns about "generality" see RNA [63.20-63.22], for "specificity" see RNA [63.26-63.28], for both see RNA [64.07-64.08]. To these objections could be added concerns about the awareness of "continuity" or "consistency" [anuvṛtti-pratyaya]. See, for example, RNA [64.15-ff].

[98]See RNA [65.26-66.03].

yady api viśvam agṛhītaṃ tathāpi <u>vikalpasya niyatasāmagrīprastūtatvena niyatākāratayā niyataśaktitvāt niyataiva</u> jalādau pravṛttiḥ | dhūmasya parokṣāgnijñānajananavat | niyataviṣayā hi bhāvāḥ pramāṇaparinisṭhitasvabhāvā na śaktisāṅkaryaparyanuyogabhajaḥ | tasmāt tadadhyavasāyitvam ākāraviśeṣayogāt tatpravṛttijanakatvam |

See RNA [KS 74.07-74.12] and CAPV [137.09-137.10].

based upon a specific causal process, a specific individual, and an intensionally determined or "selective" process of exclusion: It is not possible, for example, given the selective exclusion described above to construct a horse-facet of awareness from either the observation of a brown cow or a recalled brown cow. Similarly, neither the observation of a horse nor a recalled horse could, through the selective exclusion described above, correctly lead to the awareness "brown-cow." Thus, the "specificity" in the correct use of the word "cow" in this context can be explained. What also needs to be explained, however, is how an exclusion that is based upon a recalled individual can apply to more than the individual on which it is based. Suppose we are told, for example, to bring a cow i.e., any cow and not just a brown cow.[99] Suppose further that the recalled object is a specific brown cow. As mentioned above, from its specific collection of color, dewlap, horns, and tail it is possible to construct a non-specific collection of its characteristics. This would lead to the awareness "brown cow" and would apply to all brown cows. It is also possible, however, to selectively focus on just its specific collection of dewlap, horns, and tail. In this case, the color component need not be considered since it is not relevant to the specific needs determined by the context in which the term "cow" is uttered. Given this exclusion, what will be constructed is a non-specific collection of dewlap, horns, and tail; that is, an object that "applies" to all cows regardless of their color. Ratnakīrti argues, therefore, that his account of what is understood from hearing a token utterance of a term can also account for "generality."

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[99]This example is not discussed explicitly in RNA. It is, however, discussed in a parallel section section of text at JNA [221.26-222.02]: {athāpi syād} yadi bāhuleyapiṇḍābhāvāt turage na gobudhiḥ śābaleye 'pi ma bhūt svalakṣaṇasya kvacid ananvayāt | "(...) if in the case of a horse there isn't the awareness "cow" because of an exclusion from a particular brown cow, then there shouldn't be (such an awareness) even in the case of a spotted cow since particulars are never distributed."

3.0 Ratnakīrti's Inferential Argument

In explaining why exclusion [apoha] is a necessary component of conceptual content and why neither sensible particulars [svalakṣaṇa] nor universals [sāmānya] are the positive objects of inferential-verbal states of awareness, Ratnakīrti has not always made explicit how his own view is supported by either of the two Instruments of warranted awareness [prāmāṇa] that are accepted by him.[100] In concluding his essay, however, Ratnakīrti offers an inferential argument [anumāna] in support of his view. His decision to conclude his essay in this way is important since it brings together the various sub-arguments used throughout his essay and does so in a more "formal" context. What Ratnakīrti's argument seeks to prove, of course, is that the semantic value of a word is a positive entity characterized by its exclusion from others [anyāpoha-viśiṣṭa-viddhi]. He says,

> Here is the argument: Everything that is verbally expressive [vācaka] has for its object [gocara] a thing-in-general [vastu-mātra] that is determined [adhyavasita] and excluded from those that do not have its form [atadrūpaparāvṛtta]: Just as in the statement "There is water here in this well." Moreover, what is linguistically expressive [vācaka] has the form of a word such as "cow" [gavādiśabdarūpa]. Thus, the inferential reason is the self-nature (of what is to be proved) [svabhāva-hetu].[101]

In this statement of the argument the inferential reason [hetu] is the property, "being verbally expressive [vācakatva]." As Ratnakīrti also explains, this property is supposed

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[100] According to Ratnakīrti, there are two accredited Instruments for warranted awareness, perception [pratyakṣa] and inferential reasoning [anumāna]. A discussion of why there are only two such Instruments can be found at RNA [PAP: 96.01-105.19]. Much of this material is cited in MTBh [5.03-11.15]. For a translation of this see Kajiyama (1966: 30-40).

[101] RNA [66.08-66.09]: atra prayogaḥ | yad vācakaṃ tat sarvam adhyavasitātadrūpaparāvṛttavastumātragocaraṃ | yatheha kūpe jalam iti vacanam | vācakaṃ cedaṃ gavādiśabdarūpam iti svabhāvahetuḥ |

to be the self-nature [svabhāva] of what is to be proved [sādhya] and so, is supposed to be related to the property to be proved [sādhya] through the identity-mode [tādātmya] of pervasion. The subject of the inference [pakṣa] is "that which has the form of a word such as 'cow.'" The "that" being referred to is the state of awarenes that is produced in the mind of a competent speaker of a language upon hearing a token utterance of a term in that language. What is being argued for [sādhya] is that such states of awareness have as their objects or semantic values a "thing-in-general that is determined and excluded from those that do not have its form [adhyavasita-atadrūpaparāvṛtta-vastumātra]." Elsewhere, Ratnakīrti has described this complex positive entity [vidhi] as "an object that is characterized by its exclusion from others and excluded from those that belong to a different class [anyābhāva-viśiṣṭo vijātīyavyāvṛtto 'rthaḥ];"[102] "a thing-in-general which is determined and excluded from those which belong to a different class [adhyavasista-vijātīyavyāvṛtta-vastumātra];"[103] and "a determined external object [adhyavasita-bāhya-viśayatvam]."[104] As discussed in section 1 and section 2, this object is neither a particular [svalakṣaṇa] nor a universal [sāmānya]. It is a non-specific collection or thing-in-general [vastu-mātra] that is constructed through its essential component exclusion [apoha] and is determined to be an object towards which we act. In section 2, I also referred to these objects as "similarity classes" and "constructed universals."

The two steps in Ratnakīrti's argument are the statement of pervasion [vyāpti]; "Whatever is verbally expressive [vācaka] has for its object a thing-in-general that is determined and excluded from those that do not have its form [adhyavasita-

[102]RNA [66.05-66.06]

[103]RNA [66.13]

[104]RNA [66.20]

atadrūpaparāvṛtta-vastumātra-gocaram]" and the statement that the inferential reason [hetu] is a property [dharma] of the subject of the inference [pakṣadharmatā]; "Words such as "cow" are verbally expressive [vācaka] (i.e., meaningful)."[105] In order to defend this argument, Ratnakīrti must establish each of these statements. He does so by showing that the inferential reason is neither unestablished [asiddha], opposed [viruddha], nor inconclusive [anaikānitka]. Since the second of these two statements is taken to be obvious, however, Ratnakīrti focuses his atttention on proving the statement of pervasion [vyāpti]. It is interesting to note that in terms of the Acceptibility Conditions discussed in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, Ratnakīrti describes his inferential argument only in terms of the Instrument Conditions; that is, T1, T2, and T3. It should come as no surprise, then, that in defending his argument he only considers those defects that were earlier said to defeat the two sub-components of the functioning of an Instrument i.e., 'being a property of the subject of the inference [pakṣadharmatvam]' and 'pervasion [vyāpti].'

3.1 Unestablished, Opposed, Inconclusive

3.1.1 Being a Property of the Subject of the Inference

In defending his inferential argument, Ratnakīrti first argues that the inferential reason is not unestablished [asiddha].[106] He says, for example,

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[105]Unlike the Naiyāyikas who express inferential arguments in five steps. Buddhist philosophers like Ratnakīrti maintain that only two such steps are necessary. For an account of why they do so see MTBh [27.12-28.01] and Mookherjee (1975: 356-365).

[106]In this context Ratankīrti is referring to what I earlier called a "sub-type" of the defect "unestablished" (H1) [asiddha]. Both Ratnakīrti and the Naiyāyikas call this sub-type, "unestablished in itself [svarūpāsiddha]." See the notes to Chapter 1, Section 2.3.1 for the Naiyāyikas discussion of this defect. For a Buddhist discussion of this defect see NB 3.6.1, RNA [KSA: 67.15-67.20], and MTBh [61.03-62.03], where it is explained that there are two ways in which an inferential reason may be

(...) everyone who engages in everyday activities [sarva-vyavahāri] accepts that although the expressed-expressor relation [vācya-vācaka-bhāva] is not ultimate [pāramārthika] it is definitely created through determination [adhyavasāya]. If this were not so there would be the unwanted consequence of undermining every everyday activity [sarva-vyavahāra-uccheda].[107]

Earlier in his essay Ratnakīrti had argued that what is reflected in our use of indispensible pairs of concepts such as "property [dharma]" and "possesor of a property [dharmi]" and "verbally expressive [vācaka]" and "verbally expressed [vācya]" is a constructed difference [kālpānika-bheda].[108] The inferential reason [hetu] "being verbally expressive [vācakatva]" is established, therefore, through a form of conceptual construction.[109] Although the property 'being verbally expressive [vācakatva]' does not exist ultimately [tattvataḥ] or naturally, in virtue of it being conceptually indispensable for explaining our ordinary practices it has a kind of conceptual existence which is sufficient for establishing its existence for the purposes of an inferential argument. As a result, Ratnakīrti concludes that it is not Unestablished (in itself) [(svarūpa)-asiddha]. Given its existence it can be known to be present in the subject of the inference.

"unestablished." There may be (epistemically significant) doubt about its existence or there may be (epistemically significant) doubt about the existence of the subject of the inference. On the basis of either form of doubt, it cannot be known that the inferential reason is present in the subject of the inference and so, the inferential reason is defective. In this context, however, Ratnakīrti is referring to doubt about the existence of the inferential reason itself. For a very similar discussion of this defect in Ratnakīrti's work see RNA [KSA: 67.15-67.20].

[107]RNA [66.10-66.12]{nāyam asiddhaḥ | pūrvoktena nyāyena}*
pāramārthikavācyavācakabhāvasyābhāve 'py adhyavasāyakṛtasyaiva sarvavyavahāribhir avaśvaṃ svīkartavyatvāt | anyathā sarvavyavahārocchedaprasaṅgāt |
*This is referring to the "rule (nyāya)" at RNA [66.06-66.07]

[108]See 2.1.4 where this is discussed in detail.

[109]According to my typology this form of construction is "abstraction."

3.1.2 Pervasion

Ratnakīrti next asserts that the inferential reason [hetu] is not opposed [viruddha] since "it is present in a similar case [sapakṣa]." [110] According to Ratnakīrti, this is obvious since the inferential reason, "being verbally expressive [vācakatva]," is well-known to be present in similar states of awareness other than those produced upon hearing the word "cow." His point is that in order to show that the defect called "opposed [viruddha]" does not apply to the inferential reason all that he has to show is that other verbally produced states of awareness are meaningful. As a result, Ratnakīrti argues that it is obvious that the inferential reason is not opposed [viruddha]. Earlier, this was described as satisfying Pervasion Condition T2.

In arguing that the inferential reason [hetu] is not inconclusive [anaikāntika] i.e., that it is not present in dissimilar cases [vipakṣa], Ratnakīrti satisfies Pervasion Condition T3 and proves pervasion [vyāpti]. He argues,

(The inferential reason) "being linguistically expressive" is excluded from (all) dissimilar cases since there is the exclusion of its pervader [vyāpaka], which is defined by the (property) 'being an object [viṣayatva],' from (states of awareness in which) another denoted object [vācyāntara] is absent. Thus, pervasion [vyāpti] is proved. [111]

Through this very compressed argument, Ratnakīrti proves negative concomitance [vyatireka-vyāpti] and thereby shows that the inferential reason is not inconclusive [anaikāntika]. He is able to do so since if negative concomitance is proved the inferential

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[110] For a similar discussion see RNA [KSA: 67.20-70.08].

[111] RNA [66.19-66.21]: {tad evaṃ} vācyāntarasya abhāvāt viṣayavattvalakṣaṇasya vyāpakasya nivṛttau vipakṣato nivarttamānaṃ vācakatvam adhyavasitabāhyaviṣayatvena vyāpyata iti vyāptisiddhiḥ |

reason will be known to be excluded from (all) dissmilar cases [vipakṣa]. There are three components to Ratnakīrti's argument: (i) the inferential reason [hetu] 'being verbally expressive [vācakatva];' (ii) dissimilar cases [vipakṣa] i.e., loci (which in this case are states of awareness) in which the inferential reason [hetu] is present but the property to be proved [sādhya] is not. An example of a dissimilar case would be an inferential-verbal state of awareness that has an object other than [vācyāntara] the sort of object described by Ratnakīrti and (iii) a "pervader [vyāpaka]" i.e., a property which is known to pervade the inferential reason [hetu]. Here, the pervading property is the property, "being an object [viṣayatva]." This property is known to pervade the inferential reason [hetu] since, according to Ratnakīrti, it is not possible for there to be states of awareness that are linguistically expressive and objectless.[112] Ratnakīrti's argument against the inferential reason being inconclusive [anaikāntika] can be understood in terms of these components. For example, Ratnakīrti first states that the pervading property 'being an object [viṣayatva]' is excluded from all dissimilar cases; that is, from all inferential-verbal states of awareness in which either a sensible particular [svalakṣaṇa] or a real universal [sāmānya] is supposed to be the content of awareness.[113] We know this to be the case since as Ratnakīrti has shown earlier in his essay inferential-verbal states of awareness cannot have either sensible particulars or real universals as their objects. Given that these two objects are assumed to exhaust the possibilities it is then known that the property, 'being an object [viṣayatva],' is

[112]Ratnakīrti does not defend this view here. For a very brief discussion of arguments in favor of such a position see MTBh [69.11-69.18]. Also see Kajiyama (1965).

[113]I have simplified this discussion by assuming, as I have done earlier, that these are the only possibilities other than Ratnakīrti's complex positive entity. As mentioned earlier, Ratnakīrti himself discusses other possibilities such as "imposed objects [upādhi]." Ratnakīrti's discussion (and dismissal) of these other possibilities can be found in his very brief discussion of the defect, inconclusive [anaikāntika], at RNA [66.12-66.18].

excluded from states of awareness in which "objects" other than [vācyāntara] the complex positive entity described by Ratnakīrti are supposed to be present. Given that the property 'being an object' is also known to pervade the inferential reason 'being verbally expressive,' it is also known that the inferential reason is excluded from all dissimilar cases [vipakṣa]. As a result, negative concomitance [vyatireka-vyāpti] is proved and the inferential reason is known not to be inconclusive [anaikāntika].[114] Interestingly, Ratnakīrti's essay concludes, somewhat abruptly, with this argument.

4.0 Conclusions: Exclusion, Conceptual Content, and Īśvara

4.1 Summarizing Exclusion: Jñānaśrīmitra's Three Questions

Interestingly, the best summary of Ratnakīrti's conclusions can be found in a passage that concludes his teacher Jñānaśrīmitra's "Treatise on Exclusion [apohaprakaraṇa]." At the end of this essay Jñānaśrīmitra says the following,

(...) About question (1) "How is exclusion [apoha] denoted by a word [śabda-vācya]?," the answer, as just discussed is, "as its characteristic [tadguṇatva]." If it is question (2) "Why is neither an internal facet of awareness [buddhyākāra], a particular [svalakṣaṇa], nor an imposed property [upādhi] denoted?," (the answer is,) "because they are dismissed in the following sequence; there is the absence of determination, manifestation, or both." And if it is question is (3) "What is denoted by a word?," then, after taking into account manifestation [pratibhāsa], the determination of an object [artha-adhyavasāya], and (what is) ultimate [tattvataḥ], the following answers are given;

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[114] Although he does not explicitly mention it here, Ratnakīrti is using a "standard" Buddhist technique to prove negative concomitance. This technique is described in terms of an accredited Instrument of awareness that is able to refute the presence of the inferential reason in loci in which the property to be proved is absent [sādhyaviparyaya-bādhaka-pramāṇa]. This technique is discussed in great detail by Ratnakīrti at RNA [KSV: 83.01-95.07]. Also see TSP ad TS [385-427], Kajiyama [1983: 126-127], Steinkellner [1982], Mimaki [1976: 59-66], and Tani [1991]. Note: According to Ratnakīrti it is not necessary to prove positive concomitance [anvaya-vyāpti] since negative concomitance entails positive concomitance and positive concomitance entails negative concomitance. This is of course not the view of the Naiyāyikas, according to whom both forms of concomitance must be established in inferences like the inferential argument for the existence of Īśvara. For a very clear statement of Ratnakīrti's view of this see RNA [KSA: 70.17-70.26]. This is further evidence of his logicism.

"a facet of awareness which is excluded from others (and is) present in a constructing state of awareness [vikalpastho 'nyāpoḍhākāraḥ], a particular which is excluded from others [anyāpoḍhasvalakṣaṇaṃ], and nothing [na kiñcid]." Therefore, the argument that establishes that words and inferential reasons [śabdaliṇgayor] have exclusion [apoha] as their object explains that all entities are inexpressible [sarvadharmāvācyatva].[115]

4.1.1 Question 1: How is Exclusion Denoted by a Word?

According to both Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti, exclusion [apoha] is the object of inferential-verbal states of awareness [śabda-vācya] since it is an essential characteristic [guṇa] of the objects that are constructed by those states of awareness. As Ratnakīrti has explained, exclusion [apoha] is the capacity [śakti] inherent in all constructing states of awareness [vikalpa] through which semantic value and conceptual content are constructed. And since the objects of awareness [viśaya] are nothing but facets of awareness [ākāra] (and so nothing but awareness itself), it is helpful to think of exclusion [apoha] as an essential component, characteristic, or property of every object [viśaya] or facet [ākāra] of a constructing state of awareness. It is in this sense that Ratnakīrti argues that exclusion is an analytically separable component or characteristic of the complex objects that are constructed by specifically inferential-verbal states of awareness. Exclusion is denoted by a word since it is, necessarily, a component of the object to which that word refers.

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[115]JNA [232.05-232.10]

tadevaṃ katham apohaḥ śabdavācya iti praśne tadguṇatvena yathoktārthenety uttaram | atha buddhyākāraḥ svalakṣaṇam upādhayo vā kasmān na vācyā iti praśnaḥ tadadhyavasāyasya pratibhāsasya ubhayasya cābhāvād iti krameṇa visarjanāni | yadā tu śabdaiḥ kiṃ vācyam ity anuyogaḥ tadā pratibhāsād arthādhyavasāyāt yad va tattvata iti vikalpasya vikalpasthaḥ anyāpohḍhakaṛaḥ anyāpoḍhasvalakṣaṇaṃ na kincid iti prativacanāni krameṇaivety uktaṃ bhavati | tasmāt śabdaliṅgayor apohaviṣayatāsthitiprasādhanaṃ sarvadharmāvacyatvapratipādanaparam iti {prathamaślokārthopasaṃhāraḥ}*|

*JNA [203.01-203.04]: śabdais tāvan mukhyam ākhyāyate 'rthas tatrāpohas tadguṇatvena gamyaḥ | arthaś caiko 'adhyāsato bhāsate 'nyaḥ sthāpyo vācyas tattvato naiva kaścit ||

4.1.2 Question 2: Why is neither a Manifest nor External Particular Denoted?

Directly present (i.e., non-determined) facets of awareness cannot be the proper objects of inferential-verbal states of awareness since without being determined such objects cannot be the objects towards which we mentally, verbally, or physically act. Without being determined such facets of awareness would be present in awareness as momentary mental particulars and would, in this sense, not really be "objects" at all. Just as exclusion [apoha] is necessary for constructing semantic value, determination [adhyavasāya] is necessary for us to experience that value as an object about which we can think (e.g., a concept) or towards which we can act (e.g., a physical object). An external i.e., non-determined, individual cannot be the proper object of such states of awareness since in so far as it is an external object it cannot be directly present in a state of awareness. This is the case regardless of whether this object is supposed to be a real universal or a real particular. Ultimately, therefore, neither internal nor external objects can be the objects of inferential-verbal states of awareness. All such determination-independent objects are ultimately inexpressible since in so far as they are determination-independent they are unavailable to conceptual thought.

4.1.3 Question 3: What is Denoted?

The objects about which we speak and think are either determined facets of awareness, such as the concept "tree" or determined individuals, such as a tree. Such objects are both constructed through exclusion and determined. Since they are constructed through exclusion they are present in constructing states of awareness and since they are determined they are experienced as being the kinds of objects towards which we act.

Ultimately, however, these objects are inexpressible since both exclusion and determination are components of the unconscious error that accompanies all conceptual thought. It is only conventionally, therefore, that we can speak about such objects at all.

4.2 Exclusion, Inferential Reasoning, and Īśvara

Although Ratnakīrti's "Proof of Exclusion [apoha]" begins with a question about semantic value, it clearly touches on a wide range of issues in the philosophy of language, the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of religion. Although it is not discussed in his "Proof of Exclusion," related to Ratnakīrti's remarks about what is ultimately [tattvataḥ] and conventionally [saṃvṛtyā] the case is his version of the "misplacement theory" of error, according to which error [bhrānti] is the result of taking something to be an 'x' when what is given is 'non-x' [atasmiṃs tadgraha].[116] Since determination [adhyavasāya] constructs an object 'x' (a similarity class or "universal") when a 'non-x' (a particular) is given, Ratnakīrti asserts that it is error [bhrānti] itself.[117] As a result, he notes that all determined objects and conceptual content (including semantic value) are erroneous.[118] Ratnakīrti goes on to explain that

[116]For an account of "error" in Dharmakīrti see Dunne (1999: 86 n. 8; 209 n. 59; 347-350), Katsura (1984), and Katsura (1993: 71-72).

[117]RNA [CAPV: 137.03-137.04] "śāstre ca atasmiṃs tadgrahāt svapratibhāse 'narthe 'rthādhyavasāyād dṛśyavikalpyayor ekīkaraṇād bhrāntir uktā."

For a parallel passage see PVin 2.1c. Also see Tillemans (1999: 209-210) where he refers to this as "unconscious error" and cites (with a translation) PVin 2.2 and NBT ad NB 1.12.

[118]Importantly, the particular [svalakṣaṇa] i.e., the non-conceptual content that is the basis for the construction of these objects, is not erroneous. What is erroneous are the constructions that are based on it. For cases where non-conceptual content could be considered erroneous see Dunne (1999: 107-108; 209 n. 59) where he discusses PV 1.58 and PV 3.288.

determination [adhyavasāya] and error [bhrānti] directly account for our everyday experiences [saṃsāra] and that their elimination is a necessary if not sufficient condition for liberation [mokṣa].[119] In concluding his remarks on exclusion with the idea that "all entities are inexpressible" he gestures, therefore, to the broader (and religious) significance of his theory. From Ratnakīrti's work, it should be clear that Sanskrit intellectuals did not always obey the sub-disciplinary guidelines that shape so much philosophical reflection today. This is important to note since it can often point us to aspects of a Sanskrit philosophers work that might not initially seem relevant to the topic being considered. For example, the theory of exclusion [apoha] is important, in a variety of ways, for understanding Ratnakīrti's critique of the Naiyāyikas' argument for the existence of Īśvara. In what follows, I want to discuss just three of these "ways."

4.2.1 Classes of Objects

As discussed in Chapter 2, Ratnakīrti focuses his criticism of the Naiyāyikas' argument on Pervasion Condition T3. More specifically, he argues that the Naiyāyikas cannot satisfy T3 since they cannot show that the inferential reason "on account of being an effect" is excluded from all dissimilar cases. According to Ratnakīrti there are two specific problems with the Naiyāyikas' approach. The first is that the Naiyāyikas cannot explain how on the basis of observation and non-observation alone they can be aware of all dissimilar cases. The second is that they cannot rule out the logical possibility of there being deviation since they are unwilling to consider potential objects

[119] RNA [CAPV: 137.12] "ayam (adhyavasāyaḥ) eva saṃsāras tatkṣayo mokṣa iti." For related remarks by Dharmakīrti see Dunne (1999: 351, Chapter 5).

of awareness, such as those that are spatially or temporally remote, as epistemically significant. According to Ratnakīrti, this results in epistemically significant doubt about T3. The Naiyāyikas' response to this criticism is that it places unreasonable demands on inferential reasoning. For example, they argue that since Ratnakīrti's demands can never be met accepting them would render inferential reasoning impossible. In providing an account of how "universals" (i.e., similarity classes) are constructed from "particulars" (i.e., individual members of a class), however, Ratnakīrti provides an account of just how it is possible to be aware of all dissimilar cases by observing only a few of them. In addition, he also explains how what the Naiyāyikas' consider to be only potential objects of awareness can actually be objects of awareness and therefore epistemically significant. It is because constructed similarity classes, such as the class of all dissimilar cases, can be the objects of awareness that Ratnakīrti argues that the demand that he places on the Naiyāyikas is not unreasonable. His arguments against T3 are clearly supported by his theory of exclusion and their success depends, at least in part, on the success of his version of this theory.

4.2.2 Epistemic Objects and Epistemic Relations

Ratnakīrti also explains that every object that is present in a constructing state of awareness is an exclusion. This means that the epistemic objects with which we think when reasoning inferentially are also exclusions. This group of objects includes the class of all dissimilar cases [vipkaṣa], the subject of an inference [pakṣa], its inferential reason [hetu], and the property to be proved [sādhya]. This further suggests that epistemic relations such as presence [e.g., (sapaḳe) sattvam], absence [e.g., (vipakṣād) vyāvṛtti], and pervasion [vyāpti] can also be interpreted in the vocabulary

provided by the theory of exclusion; perhaps, in terms of the intersection and non-intersection of similarity classes. What this shows is that Ratnakīrti is most probably a conventionalist about epistemic necessity; that is, that for him epistemic necessity is grounded, at least in part, in our decisions and conventions and is not simply supervenenient on non-epistemic facts as supposed by the Naiyāyikas.[120] According to conventionalists like Ratnakīrti, necessity outstrips empirical observation and thus cannot be determined by it. In this context, it becomes clear that Ratnakīrti's logicism about epistemic necessity is also supported by his theory of exclusion.

4.3.2 Exclusion and Īśvara

Ratankīrti's theory of exclusion also provides a new set of philosophical resources for arguing against the Naiyāyikas' conception of Īśvara. Even if there were an Īśvara-like being, for example, given the theory of exclusion it would be impossible to speak or think about him. All we could think and speak about would be the similarity class or constructed object that is supposed to be proved in the Naiyāyikas' inferential argument. Although this object would be Īśvara, it would not be the mind-independent being who is the maker of the world and about whom the Naiyāyikas believe they can speak and think. Such an argument does not show that there is not an Īśvara but only that if there were he would be "inexpressible." Chapter 4 takes up the issue of Īśvara's existence by trying to show how Ratnakīrti could argue that there is not an Īśvara-like being at all.

[120] For an excellent defense of conventionalism see Sidelle (1989).

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NECESSITY, NAMING, AND THE EXISTENCE OF ĪŚVARA

VOLUME TWO

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Chapter 4
Ratnakīrti's World

0. Introduction

In concluding his "Refutation of Arguments for Establishing Īśvara [īśvarasādhanadūṣaṇa]" Ratnakīrti remarks that what he has shown is that the Naiyāyikas have not and perhaps cannot prove the existence of Īśvara inferentially. He recognizes, however, that he has not yet shown that Īśvara does not exist and that in order to do so he will have to offer positive arguments which establish His non-existence. Interestingly, he suggests that his inference to prove the Buddhist theory of momentariness [kṣaṇikatva] could provide just such an argument since, as he notes, "momentariness is (utterly) incompatible with His defining characteristics."[1] Ratnakīrti clearly recognizes that aspects of his thought that are not discussed in his "Refutation" are relevant to the problem of Īśvara. In drawing our attention to the theory of momentariness, Ratnakīrti explains that his views on ontology are particularly significant. More specifically, it is his view on what, what there is, is like that he thinks is the most relevant.[2] In this chapter, I want to consider a related ontological issue,

[1] RNA [ISD: 57.11-57.13]: tad evaṃ tāvad īśvarasya sadvyavahāro niṣedhaḥ | asadvyavahārārthan tu tallakṣaṇavilakṣanakṣaṇabhaṅgasādhakaṃ sattādisādhanam eva draṣṭavyam iti ||

Ratnakīrti's inferential arguments for the theory of momentariness can be found at RNA [KSA: 67-82] which is translated in Woo (1999), and RNA [KSV: 83-96] which is translated in McDermott (1969). The secondary literature on the Buddhist theory of momentariness is extensive. See, for example, Rospatt (1995), Gupta (1990), Halbfass (1997), Laine (1998), Mimaki (1976), Mookherjee (1975), Steinkellner (1968), Tani (1990a), Tani (1990b), Tani (1991), Tani (1996a), Tani (1996b), Tani (1996c), and Tani (1997).

[2] MTBh [64.09-65.12] takes a similar approach to arguing against the Naiyāyikas' belief in the substance "soul [ātman]" of which Īśvara is said to be a special type.

Ratnakīrti's account of what there is.[3] More specifically, by focusing on Ratnakīrti's remarks on the status of mind-independent external objects I want to illustrate why there is no room in his ontology for an Īśvara-like entity. While Chapter 3 provided resources for thinking about why, if there were an entity like Īśvara he would not be accessible in the way envisioned and required by the Naiyāyikas, this Chapter provides one way in which Ratnakīrti could argue that there is, in fact, no such entity at all.

Interestingly, Ratnakīrti's remarks on the status of external objects are scattered throughout his work. In order to understand his position therefore it is necessary to rationally reconstruct it by providing an interpretation of his various remarks and the diverse contexts in which they appear. The primary purpose of this Chapter is to provide such a reconstruction. Since this Chapter does not focus on a single text or set of arguments and does not present Ratnakīrti's position as he himself has presented it, it is the most speculative of the four substantive chapters in this work. What is important about such a reconstruction, however, is that it helps to connect Ratnakīrti's remarks on epistemology (discussed in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2) and semantics (discussed in Chapter 3) with his overall philosophical project which in my view is to show how mind, language, and world together create mind, language, and world. In this Chapter many of the issues that were discussed in the previous three chapters will be considered again, but this time from an ontological point of view. Like Chapter 3, this Chapter contributes to the dissertation as a whole by describing the philosophical background from which Ratnakīrti presents his arguments against the existence of Īśvara.

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[3] As I am using the term, "ontology" refers to the inquiry into what there is and into what, what there is, is like. To some extent, then, my use of the term overlaps with some of the ways in which the term "metaphysics" is used.

While the specific details of his position on the status of external objects are never discussed directly, Ratnakīrti's general approach to the issue is relatively clear. In his essay "The Doctrine of Multifaceted Non-duality [citrādvaitaprakāśavāda],"[4] for example, Ratnakīrti describes and defends an account of reality in which external, mind-independent objects do not exist. This account is developed in interesting ways from conceptual resources that were originally developed by his predecessors. What makes Ratnakīrti's account distinct is the specific interpretation he gives to each of these concepts and the variety of ways in which he uses them in the construction of his world view. Throughout his work Ratnakīrti also argues in support of his account of reality by showing that it is internally and conceptually consistent, that neither it nor any of the conceptual tools needed for its construction presuppose the existence of external mind-independent objects, and that it is better able to explain the world and our experiences of it than is any other account. It is through this 'indirect' approach that we can, in my view, best understand Ratnakīrti's "argument" against the existence of external, mind-independent objects. In this Chapter I will follow Ratnakīrti's general approach to the problem. In Section 1, therefore, I will begin with a very general description of Ratnakīrti's account of what there is and in so doing will introduce some of the conceptual vocabulary on which my reconstruction will rely. Section 2 will provide a more detailed discussion of the various components of Ratnakīrti's account and will explain how they are used to describe the world and our experiences of it. The Chapter will conclude with a brief discussion of the significance of this reconstruction to my discussion of Ratnakīrti's arguments against the existence of Īśvara.

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[4]RNA [CAPV: 129-144]

1.0 Ratnakīrti's World, A General Overview

According to Ratnakīrti, reality and our experiences of it can be completely described in terms of four different kinds of objects.[5] These four objects are differentiated from one another by the state of awareness [buddhi, jñāna] in which they appear and the mode through which they appear in them. According to Ratnakīrti, there are two such states of awareness; perceptual and inferential-verbal.[6] Each has a direct and indirect object. The direct object of a state of awareness is the object that appears in that state of awareness through a process called "manifestation [pratibhāsa]." This object is most often referred to as the object that is directly "grasped [grāhya]" by that state of awareness. The indirect object appears through determination [adhyavasāya]. This object is most often referred to as the object that is "determined [adhyavaseya]" by that state of awareness.[7]

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[5]Since what is at issue is the precise definition of "object," I will not explain what I mean by this term at this point.

[6]Strictly speaking, verbal states of awareness are a subset of inferential states of awareness. For convenience, however, I have chosen to use the label 'inferential-verbal.'

[7]Ratnakīrti describes this typology of objects in a number of different places in his work. Consider, for example:

RNA [VN: 109.14-109.18]: {yadi pratyakṣaṃ svalakṣaṇaviṣayam ity ayogavyavacchedenocyate tadā siddhasādhanam | anyayogavyavacchedas tv asiddhaḥ,} <u>pratyakṣānumānādisarvajñānānām grāhyāvaseyabhedena viṣayadvaividhyānatikramāt</u> | yad dhi yatra jñāne pratibhāsate tad grāhyam | yatra tu tat pravartate tad adhyavaseyam | tatra pratyakṣasya svalakṣaṇaṃ grāhyam | adhyavaseyaṃ tu sāmānyam, atadrūpaparāvṛttasvalakṣaṇamātrātmakam | anumānasya viparyayaḥ |

RNA [CAPV: 131.04-131.05]: {atrocyate} | iha <u>dvividho vijñānānām viṣayaḥ grāhyo 'adhyavaseyaś ca</u> | pratibhāsamāno grāhyaḥ | agṛhīte 'pi pravṛttiviṣayo 'dhyavaseyaḥ | "The objects of awareness are of two sorts, grasped and determined. Those that are grasped are manifest. Although (they are) not grasped, those that are determined are the objects of positive activity."

RNA [KSA: 73.20-73.21]: dvividho hi pratyakṣasya viṣayaḥ, grāhyo 'dhyavaseyaśca | "This is because the object of perception is twofold, grasped and determined."

For other examples and parallel passages to the three quoted above see NBT [12.16], NBhū [140.22-140.25], JNA [166.11-166.21], and MTBh [21.13-22.01].

Note: The textual support for my reconstruction will be provided in footnotes to the text. The Sanskrit text cited there will either be translated in Appendix B, or if the passage cited is not from a text

An object can also be understood as being nothing more than a facet [ākāra] or "formation" of a state of awareness. For Ratnakīrti, reality and our experiences of it can be completely described in terms of these four kinds of mental objects [viṣaya] or facets of awareness [ākāra]; the direct objects of perceptual states of awareness (Object #1 [O1]), the indirect objects of perceptual states of awareness (Object #2 [O2]), the direct objects of inferential-verbal states of awareness (Object #3 [O3]), and the indirect objects of inferential-verbal states of awareness (Object #4 [O4]). While these four kinds of objects are the only kinds of objects that are necessary for describing reality and explaining our experiences of it, Ratnakīrti argues that under the most rigorous philosophical description only objects like O1 really exist. In the final analysis, then, neither mind independent external objects nor mind dependent 'internal' objects like O2, O3, and O4 really exist. Trying to understand exactly what Ratnakīrti means by this claim and how he is able to account for reality and our experiences of it in terms of it is the central task of this Chapter. What follows therefore is a more complete reconstruction of Ratnakīrti's account of reality, a detailed discussion of the four objects and ten concepts used in its construction, and an account of why under the most rigorous philosophical description only objects like O1 really exist.[8]

2.0 Ratnakīrti's World, A Detailed Description

translated in the Appendix, it will be translated in the footnote itself. Selected portions of some of the passages are cited and translated more than once.

[8] The "10 concepts" are manifestation [pratibhāsa], determination [adhyavasāya], grasped [grāhya], determined [adhyavaseya], exists [sat], does not exist [asat], particular [svalakṣaṇa], universal [sāmānya], activity [pravṛtti], and facet [ākāra].

Figure 2 provides a pictorial representation of my reconstruction of "Ratnakīrti's world." In this section, I hope to provide a detailed explanation of this Figure by discussing how Ratnakīrti understands the various objects represented in it and interprets the concepts used to describe them.[9]

2.1 The Objects of Perceptual States of Awareness

2.1.1 Object O1: Facets of Non-constructing States of Awareness

Object O1 is the direct object of a perceptual state of awareness. More specifically, it is the only possible object of a non-constructing state of awareness [nirvikalpa-jñāna] i.e., a state of awareness that is not inherently associated with some form of mind-dependent activity or mental construction. In Ratnakīrti's view, since inferential-verbal states of awareness are necessarily associated with various forms of mental construction, the only non-constructing state of awareness is a non-constructing perceptual state of awareness. As the direct object of such a state of awareness, O1 is said to be manifest [pratibhāsa] in that state of awareness and grasped [grāhya] by it. Much of this is implied in the general overview described above.

In his 'Doctrine of Multifaceted Non-duality [citrādvaitaprakāśavāda]', Ratnakīrti defends the following inferential argument [anumāna] and indirectly tells us more about these facets [ākāra] of non-constructing states of awareness. He argues, for example, that whatever appears directly or is manifest [prakāśate] in this state of awareness is non-dual [advaita] and single [eka].[10] He explains further that this single, non-dual

[9]A copy of Figure 2 can be found in Appendix A.

[10]In different contexts, Ratnakīrti uses different terms to mean "appears (or is present) in" a state of awareness. Most often, however, he uses the term "manifests [pratibhāsa]" to mean "*directly appears*

object is also a complex and dynamic collection of diverse facets [vicitra-ākāra-kadambakam] such as the color 'white', the note 'ga', the taste 'sweet', the smell 'fragrant', the touch 'soft', and the feelings 'happiness and its opposite.' He then infers on the basis of this statement that this object is a multifaceted non-duality.[11] Ratnakīrti's description of these facets [ākāra] suggests that O1 objects are the most basic or ontologically primitive objects of perception.[12] They are in other words the most direct objects of perception [pratyakṣa]. In addition, since under the most rigorous philosophical description only these kinds of objects really exist, Ratnakīrti's description also implies that all of the other objects in his ontology can be explained in terms of them.[13] Unfortunately, Ratnakīrti does not say more about these objects. This is, in part, because in his 'Doctrine of Multi-faceted Non-duality [citrādvaitaprakāśavāda],' Ratnakīrti is primarily concerned with showing that it is conceptually consistent to maintain that awareness is both multifaceted [citra] and non-dual [advaita].[14] He does

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in a state of awareness." There are, however, important exceptions to this general rule. This is one of them.

[11]The inference is stated at RNA [CAPV: 129.19-129.21]: yat prakāśate tad ekam | yathā citrākāracakram adhyavartī nīlākāraḥ | prakāśate cedaṃ gauragāndhāramadhurasurabhisukumārasātetarādivicitrākārakadambakam iti {svabhāvahetuḥ |} Whatever manifests (in awareness) is single, just as the facet 'blue' that exists in the midst of a collection of diverse facets (this sentence states the inference-warranting relation [vyāpti]). And this collection of diverse facets, namely, white, the note 'ga', sweet, fragrant, soft, happiness and its opposite etc., is manifest (this states that the inferential reason is a property of the subject of the inference [pakṣadharmatā]).

[12]Feelings such as 'happiness and its opposite' are most probably the objects of reflexive-awareness [svasaṃvedana]. See, for example, MTBh [15.17-16.03]: sarvacittacaittānām ātmasaṃvedanaṃ svasaṃvedanam | cittaṃ vastumātragrāhakaṃ jñānam | citte bhāvāḥ caittāḥ | vastuno viśeṣarūpagrāhakā sukhaduḥkhāpekṣālakṣaṇāḥ | teṣāṃ sarvacittacaittānām ātmanā saṃvedyate yena rūpeṇa tatsvarūpam ātmasvarūpasākṣātkāritvāt svasaṃvedanaṃ pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntaṃ cocyate ||

[13]The existential status of these objects will be discussed in Section 3.0.

[14]RNA [CAPV: 129.16-129.17]: tasmāc <u>citrateyam advaitavirodhinīti vyāmohād</u> ekatva eva vipratipattir iti tatra prasādhanaṃ sādhanam ucyate | Therefore, due to the mistaken view that this i.e., 'being multifaceted' is incompatible with 'being non-dual' there is indeed a dispute about non-duality. Thus, in order to correct this, this inferential argument was stated.

not, therefore, choose to provide a more detailed discussion of O1 objects or the complex awareness of which they are facets [ākāra]. From his remarks, however, it seems as though this complex state of awareness is dynamic and metaphorically at least, in motion. This is suggested by his use of wheel imagery [cakra] and is implied by his views on how these diverse facets are related to everyday sensory objects.[15] His references to O1 objects also suggest that although they form a single complex they are individuated in so far as they can be identified as facets [ākāra] of it.[16]

2.1.2 Object O2: Facets of Constructing States of Perceptual Awareness

Object O2 is a facet of a constructing state of awareness i.e., a state of awareness necessarily associated with some form of mind-dependent activity or mental construction. More specifically, O2 is the indirect object of a perceptual state of awareness. And like all indirect objects, O2 appears in that state of awareness as a result of determination [adhyavasāya]. It is, therefore, the determined [adhyavaseya] object of that state of awareness.

2.1.2.1 Determination and Two of its Modes

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[15]There is no direct textual support for the first part of this claim, although Ratnakīrti occasionally uses wheel imagery [cakra] to refer to the complex of facets. See RNA [CAPV: 141.08] and RNA [CAPV: 129.19] which was quoted earlier.

[16]This is clear from his list of these facets at RNA [CAPV: 129.19-129.21], quoted earlier.

As discussed in Chapter 3, determination [adhyavasāya] is a capacity inherent in all constructing states of awareness.[17] It is therefore impossible for there to be a constructing state of awareness [vikalpa] without determination [adhyavasāya]. According to Ratnakīrti there are three ways in which objects are determined and through these "modes" of determination [adhyavasāya] three different sorts of objects are constructed from the objects that are directly grasped [grāhya].[18] Since what is being considered here are the objects of perceptual states of awareness, determined [adhyavaseya] objects are those objects that can be constructed through the three modes of determination [adhyavasāya] from objects like O1.

The first mode of determination [adhyavasāya] is the construction of an individual or token. Ratnakīrti refers to this as the capacity to determine singularity [ekatva-adhyavasāya].[19] He explains what this means through the following examples. Given

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[17]See Chapter 3, Section 2.1.3.1 and the numerous references cited there. For a general account of determination consider the following two passages:

RNA [AS: 65.25-65.26]: tadadhyavasitam iti ko 'rthaḥ | apratibhāse 'pi pravṛttiviṣayīkṛtam iti yo'arthaḥ| "What is the meaning of "it is determined by it." It means, although it is not manifest it is made into an object of positive activity."

RNA [KS: 73.09-73.18]. The text quoted is from Woo (1999: 72): na | adhyavasāyasvarūpāparijñānāt | agṛhīte 'pi vastuni mānasādipravṛttikārakatvaṃ vikalpasyādhyavasāyitvam | apratibhāse 'pi pravṛttiviṣayīkṛtam adhyavaseyatvam |{ etac cādhyavaseyatvaṃ svalakṣaṇasyaiva yujyate, nānyasya, arthakriyārthitvād arthipravṛtteḥ } | "No, because (he) doesn't fully understand the nature of determination. Belonging to conceptual construction, determination is its (capacity) to effect positive activity, such as mental-(activity), towards a thing even though it is not grasped. 'Being determined' means 'being made into an object of positive activity even though it is not manifest'."

For parallel passages see PVV [25.10-25.12], NBhū [140.25-140.26], JNA [226.01-226.07], RNA [CAPV: 138.03-138.09], and RNA [AS: 65.25-66.05].

[18]The "three modes" of determination and the objects that can be constructed through them are also discussed in Chapter 3.

[19]RNA [CAPV: 143.12-143.14]: {yathordhvam indriyapratyakṣataḥ } kṣaṇabhede pratīte 'py avidyāvaśād ekatvādhyavasāyaḥ | Although different moments are manifest, because of ignorance [avidyā] there is a determination of singularity.

that all existing things are momentary, the determination of singularity [ekatva-adhyavasāya] is like the construction of a single continuum [santāna] from the direct awareness of one discrete moment [kṣaṇa-grahaṇa].[20] It is, in other words, like the construction of an abiding individual from its discrete moments. This determination of singularity [ekatva-adhyavasāya] is also said to be like the construction of an individual from its various components.[21] For Ratnakīrti, an individual or token is nothing more than a collection [samudāya] of sensible components. And from the direct awareness of only one of its components, Ratnakīrti argues that an individual collection can be constructed. He explains, for example, that by directly sensing only its color it is possible to determine the pot of which the sensed color is a component. It is, moreover, this determined pot or pot continuum that is said to be the actual object of sense perception.[22] Regardless of whether it is understood as a continuum [santāna] or a collection [samudaya], as these two examples suggest, the determination of singularity [ekatva-adhyavasāya] is the determination or construction of an individual token from the

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[20]RNA [KSA: 73.24]: kṣaṇagrahaṇe santānaniścayavat | "(...) it is like coming to know a continuum from grasping a moment."

[21]RNA [KSA: 73.24-73.25]: rūpamātragrahaṇe rūparasagandhasparśātmakaghaṭaniścayavac ca | "(...) it is like coming to know a pot which is made up of color, taste, smell, and touch from grasping only its color."

RNA [VN: 109.18-109.19]: {tataś ca sāṃvyavahārikapramāṇapekṣayā} rūparasagandhasparśasamudāyātmakasya ghaṭasya rūpabhedamātragrahaṇe 'pi pratyakṣataḥ samudāyasiddhivyavasthā |

[22]This is clear from RNA [CAPV: 143.13] and VN [109.18-109.19] where the term "perception [pratyakṣa]" is used and RNA [KSA: 73.24-73.25] where the term "sense perception [indriyapratyakṣa]" is used to refer to the states of awareness in which these constructed tokens are objects. In addition, RNA [KSA: 73.20-73.23], the passage which precedes the examples cited above, explains that the tokens that are described in the examples are supposed to be the objects of perception.

directly grasped [grāhya] objects of perceptual states of awareness.[23] In Figure 2, O2.1 is such an object.

The second mode of determination [adhyavasāya] is the construction of a set, type, or collection of tokens. In Figure 2, O2.2 is such an object. Ratnakīrti refers to this as the determination of difference [bheda-avasāya].[24] He explains that although there isn't, strictly speaking, a difference [bheda] between the various facets of awareness or collections of facets of awareness since, in so far as they are facets of awareness they are all facets of a single complex state of awareness, differences [bheda] between them can be constructed through the determination of difference [bheda-avasāya]. It is clear from a number of different contexts that the set of individual pots and types, such as smoke and fire, are examples of O2.2 objects. It is also clear that these are supposed to be the indirect objects of perception.[25] Ratnakīrti's interpretation of the distinction between particulars [svalakṣaṇa] and universals [sāmānya] helps to further explain O2.1 and O2.2 and provides some of the conceptual resources necessary for understanding, in greater detail, how the two modes of determination [adhyavasāya] bring about the construction of such objects.

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[23] In principle, the determination of singularity [ekatva-adhyavasāya] can also describe the construction of types such as the collection of all pots. In this case, the part or component that is being directly grasped may be an individual pot.

[24] For Ratnakīrti's use of the term see RNA [CAPV: 137.30], RNA [CAPV: 143.14], RNA [AS: 60.06], and RNA [AS: 60.21].

[25] RNA [KSA: 73.21-73.23]: sakalātadrūpaparāvṛttavastumātram sākṣād asphuraṇāt pratyakṣasya grāhyo viṣayo mā bhut | {tadekadeśagrahaṇe tu tanmātrayor vyāptiniścāyakavikalpajananād} adhyavaseyo viṣayo bhavaty eva |" The entire collection of things which is excluded from those that do not have its form cannot be the direct object of sense perception since (it) is not directly manifest (in perceptual states of awareness). It is, however, definitely the indirect object (...)."

2.1.2.2 Universals and Particulars

Ratnakīrti most often refers to O2 objects as being determined objects [adhyavaseya]. He also describes them, however, as being universals [sāmānya]. In general, a universal [sāmānya] is defined as an object which is excluded from those that do not have its form [atadrūpaparāvṛtta].[26] This general description is made more precise by specifying the meaning of the phrase "those that do not have its form [atadrūpa]." More specifically, a universal [sāmānya] is either an object which is excluded from *those that belong to the same class* [sajātīya-vyāvṛtta] or an object which is excluded from *those that belong to a different class* [vijātīya-vyāvṛtta]. These two sorts of exclusion are inherent to determination [adhyavasāya] and result in the construction of two different sorts of universals.[27]

The first sort of universal is called a vertical universal [ūrdhva-sāmānya]; it is an object that is excluded from those that belong to the same class [sajātīya-vyāvṛtta].[28] Tokens, such as an individual pot or pot continuum, are examples. Objects O2.1 is understood, therefore, to be a vertical universal [ūrdhva-sāmānya]. The second sort of universal is called a horizontal universal [tīryag-sāmānya]; it is an object which is excluded from those that belong to a different class [vijātīya-vyāvṛtta].[29] A type, such as the class or

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[26]As discussed in Chapter 3, according to Ratnakīrti, a "type" is a similarity class or "that which is excluded from those that do not have its form." See RNA [VN: 109. 17]: adhyavaseyam tu sāmānyam, atadrūpaparāvrttasvalaksanamātrātmakam | For more references see Chapter 3, Section 3.1.3.1 where RNA [VN: 109.13-109.23] is discussed. Also see Chapter 4, Section 2.1.5.

[27]See Chapter 3, Section 2.1.3.

[28]RNA [CAPV: 143.12], quoted above. For more references see Chapter 3, Section 2.1.3.1.

[29]RNA [AS: 66.05-66.06] and RNA [AS: 66.13]. For more references see Chapter 3, Section 2.1.3.1.

set of pots, is an example of this sort of universal. In Figure 2, O2.2 is a horizontal universals [tīryag-sāmānya]. As the indirect objects of perceptual states of awareness it is important to keep in mind that both O2.1 and O2.2 are perceptible or sensible. In perceptual states of awareness, then, universals [sāmānya] are the determined [adhyavaseya] and therefore indirect objects of that state of awareness. As a result, they are constructed through the different modes of determination [adhyavasāya] from the direct objects of that state of awareness i.e., O1. More specifically, a vertical universal [ūrdhva-sāmānya] like O2.1 is constructed from these objects by the determination of singularity [ekatva-adhyavasāya] while a horizontal universal [tīryag-sāmānya] like O2.2 is constructed by the determination of difference [bheda-avasāya].[30]

In this context, objects like O1 are referred to by a number of different terms. They are said to be parts [deśa], pieces [bheda], special properties [viśeṣa], and also particulars [svalakṣaṇa].[31] According to Ratnakīrti, particulars [svalakṣaṇa] are conceptually differentiated from universals [sāmānya]. This means that they are neither objects which are excluded from those that belong to the same class [sajātīya-vyāvṛtta] nor objects which are excluded from those that belong to a different class [vijātīya-vyāvṛtta]. Although Ratnakīrti never describes them in this way, a particular [svalakṣaṇa] is an object which is excluded from those that belong to the same class and those that belong to a different class [sajātīya-vijātīya-vyāvṛtta].[32] Ratnakīrti understands such particular objects to be the basic objects from which determined [adhyavaseya] objects are

[30]See RNA [KSA: 73.20-73.24], quoted above.

[31]RNA [KSA: 73.22; 73.24], RNA [VN: 109.19], RNA [KSA: 74.07], RNA [VN: 109.16-109.17], and RNA [KSA: 73.25-73.29] respectively. What I mean by "objects like O1" are objects from which universals are constructed.

[32]This description of a particular is given at MTBh [21.12].

constructed. In the context of perceptual states of awareness, it is objects like O1 that are said to be the particulars [svalakṣaṇa]. From Ratnakīrti's examples it is clear that the individual moments of a continuum [kṣaṇa] and the individual components of a collection [deśa, bheda, viśeṣa] are examples of particulars. It is interesting that for Ratnakīrti universals [sāmānya] and particulars [svalakṣaṇa] are defined only in terms of each other: Universals are what are constructed from particulars and particulars are what universals are constructed from.[33]

2.1.2.3 Object O2.1 and Object O2.2

The concepts described thus far make it possible to reconstruct Ratnakīrti's view of how objects O2.1 and O2.2 are constructed from O1 by the determination of singularity [ekatva-adhyavasāya] and the determination of difference [bheda-avasāya].[34] There are a variety of contexts in which Ratnakīrti describes this process. One of the more detailed descriptions is in his "Proof of the Continual Destruction of Moments [kṣaṇabhangasiddhi]."[35] Here, Ratnakīrti explains that all of the special properties

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[33] Given this, set-theoretic vocabulary may be more appropriate e.g., members of a class (or element) and class (or set).

[34] For a different, but, supporting interpretation see Chapter 3, Section 2.2.1

[35] There are two features of this process that are particularly important to note. The first is its specificity and the second is that classes of objects are constructed from a member of the class.

RNA [KSA 74.07-74.15]: atha teṣāṃ sarveṣām eva viśeṣāṇāṃ sadṛśatvāt sadṛśasāmagrīprasūtatvāt sadṛśakāryakāritvād iti pratyāsattyā ekaviśeṣagrāhakaṃ pratyakṣam atadrūpaparāvṛttamātre niścayaṃ janayad atadrūpaparāvṛttaviśeṣamātrasya vyavasthāpakam | yathaikasāmagrīpratibaddharūpamātragrāhakaṃ pratyakṣaṃ ghaṭe niścayam janayad ghaṭagrāhakaṃ vyavasthāpyate | anyathā ghaṭo 'pi ghaṭasantāno 'pi pratyakṣato na sidhyet, sarvātmanāgrahaṇābhāvāt || "Now through this similarity, namely, that all those particulars [viśeṣa] are similar because they are produced from a similar totality of causes and are makers of a similar effect, perception determines a collection that is excluded from those that do not have its form by grasping a single particular. This is just as perception grasps a pot by determining a pot from grasping only (its) color-particular which is necessarily related to the one totality of causes,. If this were not so, neither the (class), pot, nor a pot

[viśeṣa] or components (O1 objects) that are made or formed into a determined object [adhvavaseya] (objects O2.1 and O2.2) are similar [sadṛśa] in that they are produced by the same causal complex [sadṛśasāmagrīprastūta] and have the same causes and effects [sadṛśakāryakāritva]. This means that although all of the colors, sounds, tastes, smells, tactile sensations, and feelings that are the facets [ākāra] of the one dynamic state of awareness are inseparable, there is a process whereby a specific group of these facets [ākāra] come to be related to [pratibaddha] one another. This grouping of a specific set of facets [ākāra] is caused by a single causal complex and in so far as this set of facets comes to be a single group it has the same causes and effects. This group is individuated, therefore, by its cause and effects. While Ratnakīrti does not say very much about this, it seems as though what brings about this grouping is an unending series of latent (karmic) impressions [anādivāsanā]. His remarks suggest that is the ripening of karmic seeds that begins the process of individuating, constructing, and determining objects.[36] The specific details, however, are never mentioned.

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continuum could be established through perception. This is because they are not grasped by perception in their entirety [sarvātmanā]."

RNA [KSA: 73.12-73.17] evaṃ cādhyavasāye svalakṣaṇasyāsphuraṇam eva | na ca tasyāsphuraṇe 'pi sarvatrāviśeṣeṇa pravṛttyākṣepaprasaṅgaḥ, pratiniyatasāmagrīprasūtāt partiniyatasvākārāt partiniyataśaktiyogāt, pratiniyata evātadrūpaparāvṛtte 'pratīte 'pi pravṛttisāmarthyadarśanāt | yathā {sarvasyāsattve 'pi bījād aṅkurasyaivotpattiḥ, dṛṣtasya niyatahetuphalabhāvasya parikṣeptum aśakyatvāt | paraṃ bāhyenārthena sati pratibandhe prāmāṇyam | anyathā tv aprāmānyam iti viśeṣaḥ} || "And so, given determination, there definitely is not the manifestation of a particular. But although it isn't manifest there is not the unwanted consequence of effecting positive activity indiscriminately towards any object. This is because it is obseved that there is positive activity towards a specific 'x' which is excluded from those that do not have its form etc., even though it is not perceived. This is because constructing states of awareness are endowed with a specific capacity due to their specific fact of awareness which is produced from a specific causal complex."

For parallel passages to this see PVV [25.10-25.12], NBhū [140.25-140.26], JNA [226.01-226.07], RNA [CAPV: 138.03-138.09], and RNA [AS: 65.25-66.05].

[36]At RNA [CAPV: 138.14-138.16], for example, Ratnakīrti explains: na vayam āropeṇa pravṛttim brūmaḥ | kiṃ tarhi, svavāsanāparipākavaśād upajayamānaiva sā buddhi apaśyanty api bāhyaṃ bāhye pravṛttim ātanoti, iti viplutaiva saṃsārātmikā ca || "We do not assert that there is positive activity in virtue of imposition. But rather, it is that awareness which is produced in virtue of a ripening of latent

Given that a number of facets are grouped or linked together in this way Ratnakīrti explains that although only one facet is the direct object [grāhya] of perception, by grasping it, it is possible to be "in touch with" the set of facets to which it is grouped or linked. By excluding this facet from what does not have its form [atadrūpaparāvṛtta] therefore there is also the exclusion of the set of facets with which it is linked from those that do not have its form [atadrūpaparāvṛtta]. Thus, if a set of facets is excluded from the set of facets belonging to the same class [sajātīyavyāvṛtta], a vertical universal [ūrdhva-sāmānya] or individual token (O2.1) is formed through the determination of unity [ekatva-adhyavasāya]. If, however, the set is excluded from those that belong to a different class [vijatīya-vyāvṛtta], a horizontal universal [tiryag-sāmānya] or type (O2.2) is formed through the determination of difference [bheda-avasāya]. So, by grasping a particular [svalakṣaṇa] facet one is in touch which all of the other particulars [svalakṣaṇa] with which it is linked. Through the determination of singularity [ekatva-adhyavasāya], therefore, a collection of all of those particular facets is constructed and so a vertical universal or token (O2.1) is determined [adhyavaseya]. Through the determination of difference [bheda-adhyavasāya], a collection of these collections is constructed and so a horizontal universal or type (O2.2) is determined. Consider, for example, an O2.1 object such as a blue pot. According to Ratnakīrti this individual pot is simply a specific collection [samudāya] of directly sensible [grāhya] particulars [deśa, bheda, viśeṣa, svalakṣaṇa]. For simplicity, suppose it is a collection of the color 'blue,' the shape 'round,' and the smell 'earthy.' By grasping the particular color 'blue,' perception is in

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karmic impressions that leads to positive activity towards an external object even though it does not see an external object. This is, of course, the error that is the nature of everyday existence."

Also see RNA [AS: 66.04] where the second part of this passage is quoted and MTBh [68.07-68.08] where the phrase, "pratibhāsaḥ khalv eṣo 'nādivitathavāsanātaḥ pravartamāno (...)" is used.

touch with all of the other facets with which this particular color 'blue' is linked i.e., the particular shape 'round' and the particular smell 'earthy.' By excluding this particular color 'blue' from all other blue-color-particulars what remains is this particular color 'blue' and all of the other particulars with which it is linked. In other words, what remains is an individual blue pot i.e., a vertical universal like object O2.1. By excluding this particular color 'blue' from all non-blue-color-particulars what remains is all of the blue-color-particulars linked with the shape 'round' and the smell 'earthy'. In other words, what remains is the set of blue pots i.e., a horizontal universal like object O2.2.

2.1.3 O2e and The Third Mode of Determination

The third mode of determination [adhyavasāya] is the capacity to externally place or project an already determined object. In Figure 2, O2e is considered to be such an externally projected [bahir-adhyasta] object.[37] O2e objects are those that we purport to see, hear, taste, smell, touch, and have feelings about. Like objects O2.1 and O2.2, object O2e is also a determined object [adhyavaseya] which is constructed from O1 objects. Unlike O2.1 and O2.2, however, O2e is 'doubly determined.' It is the result of the determined object O2.1 itself becoming the object of determination. More specifically, it is through the third mode of determination that O2.1 is externally projected [bahir-adhyasta] and an external O2e object is constructed. According to Ratnakīrti, then, O2e is an externally projected [bahir-adhyasta] facet of a constructing state of awareness [vikalpa-buddhi-ākāra] and so must be considered a mind-dependent external object. As an external object, O2e is understood to be the object of sense perception.

[37]See Chapter 3, Section 2.3.1.

2.1.4 Bodily Activity, Mental Activity, and Verbal Activity

In addition to describing determined [adhyavaseya] objects such as O2.1, O2.2, and O2e in terms of how they are constructed from objects like O1 or as universals [sāmānya], Ratnakīrti also describes them as being the objects of activity [pravṛtti-viśaya]. In fact, much like the terms 'directly appearing' or 'manifesting [pratibhāsamāna]' describe the direct objects [grāhya] of a state of awareness, the phrase 'being an object of activity [pravṛtti-viśaya]' is used, almost definitionally, to describe determined [adhyavaseya] objects.[38] A determined [adhyavaseya] object should also be understood, then, as an object which has been made into an object of activity [pravṛtti-viśayīkṛta].[39]

Ratnakīrti explains that there are three sorts of activity [vṛtti]; bodily [kāyikī], verbal [vācikī], and mental [mānasī]. The objects of these various forms of activity are the objects towards which we in some way physically act, those which are involved in our referential use of language, and those about which we are mentally aware. In 'The Doctrine of Multifaceted Non-duality [citrādvaitaprakāśavāda]' Ratnakīrti briefly illustrates the relationships between determination [adhyavasāya], these three activities, and their objects.[40] He explains, for example, that the determination [adhyavasāya] that there is fire in a particular place can lead to all three forms of activity. A toddler, for instance, instinctively withdraws her hand after touching the flames of a gas stove. The

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[38]See the references given in Chapter 3, Section 2.1.3.1.

[39]See the references given in Chapter 3, Section 2.1.3.1.

[40]RNA [CAPV: 139.17-139.19]: iha agnir atrety adhyavasāyo yathā kāyikīm vṛttiṃ prasūte tathāgnir mayā pratīyate iti vācikīm api prasūte, etad ākārānuvyavasāyarūpāṃ mānasīm api prasavati | evaṃ ca sati yathā vikalpenāyam artho gṛhīta iti niścayaḥ | "Just as the determination 'There is fire here' produces bodily activity, it also produces verbal (activity) 'I am aware of fire.' It also produces mental (activity) which takes the form of what follows determination."

fire that she touches and from which she withdraws her hand is a determined [adhyavaseya] object like O2e and the object of her bodily [kāyikī] activity. The determination [adhyavasāya] that there is fire in a particular place can also produce, in an older child, linguistic [vācikī] activity such as the sentence, "I know there is fire in a particular place." In this sentence the word 'fire' is the determined [adhyavaseya] object of the speaker's verbal [vācikī] activity. It is important to keep in mind that since perceptual states of awareness never involve language, no object or facet [ākāra] of a perceptual state of awareness can ever be the object of verbal [vācikī] activity. The object of verbal activity must therefore be a determined object of an inferential-verbal state of awareness. These kinds of objects will be discussed in Section 3.0. According to Ratnakīrti, the determination that there is fire in a particular place can also produce mental [mānasī] activity in the form of one's reflexive awareness of it. In this case, the object of mental [mānasī] activity would be the facet 'fire'.

Other than this brief illustration, Ratnakīrti does not discuss the three forms of activity [vṛtti] in detail. He also does not provide a detailed analysis of the objects of these forms of activity. What is clear from his remarks, however, is that determined [adhyavaseya] objects are objects of various types of activity [pravṛtti] and can be classified as such. As I have described them, objects such as O2.1 and O2.2 are universals [sāmānya] and facets of perceptual states of awareness. More specifically, in so far as they are facets of a state of awareness Ratnakīrti understands them to be objects of reflexive awareness [svasaṃvedana]. This suggests that O2.1 and O2.2 are best understood as objects of mental activity [mānasī]. O2e on the other hand, is best understood as an object of bodily activity [kayikī].

2.1.5 O2.1, O2.2, O2e, and Inferential Reasoning

Ratnakīrti's description of the various objects or facets [ākāra] of perceptual states of awareness is intended to contribute to an account of reality and our experiences of it in which the existence of mind-independent external objects need not be assumed. Included in any such account must also be an account of our (putatively) reality-involving practices.[41] In order for Ratnakīrti's account to be successful it must be able to explain reality-involving practices that depend upon perception, for example, exclusively in terms of O1, O2.1, O2.2, and O2e. One such practice is the process of establishing an inference-warranting relation [vyāpti]. By considering this practice in the context of making an inference for one's own sake [svārthānumāna], it is possible to see how Ratnakīrti's account could be used to explain other reality- involving practices.[42]

Consider, for instance, the standard example of inferring that there is fire on a particular mountain by perceiving smoke on that mountain. The thought process that results in one's inference of fire can be understood to take place in two stages.[43] The first step

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[41] A "reality-involving practice" is any activity which is supposed to require the existence of external, mind-independent objects i.e., reality. For example, seeing a beautiful sunset, eating an ice-cream cone, inferring that there is fire on that mountain, etc.

[42] Since we are considering perceptual states of awareness it is necessary to consider an inference for one's own sake and not an inference for another which, it is said, is linguistic in nature.

[43] MTBh [24.02-24.04] describes an inference for one's own sake [svārthānumāna] as follows: svasmai yat tat svārtham anumānaṃ jñānātmakam | parvatādau dharmiṇi dhūmādikaṃ dṛṣṭvā yasya pratipattuḥ vahnijñānam utpadyate, sa eva tena jñānena parokṣam arthaṃ pratipadyate na anya iti svārtham anumānam|| "An inference which is for oneself is one that is for one's own sake. It has the nature of awareness. After seeing smoke on a property possessor such as a mountain, an awareness of fire is produced in a certain inquirer. An object that is beyond the range of the senses is known through that awareness by him alone, not by another. This is an inference for one's own sake."

The two steps of an inferential argument are described at MTBh [27.12-27.13]: vyāptipakṣadharmatāsaṃjñakaṃ dvyavayavam eva sādhanavākyaṃ saugatānām | "For Buddhists, the statement of an inferential argument has only two parts, the inference-warranting relation and (the statement that) the (inferential reason is) a property of the subject of the inference."

involves visually perceiving that there is smoke on a particular mountain and the second requires remembering that wherever there is smoke there is fire. This process is said to immediately result in the awareness that there is fire on that mountain. It can be described in terms of the following four objects: The perceived object, the token, 'smoke-on-that-mountain-at-a particular-time' (O2.1); the two invariably concomitant objects, the types, 'fire(-in-general)' and 'smoke(-in-general)' (O2.2); and the inferred object, the universal [sāmānya] 'fire-in-general-on-that mountain-at-a-particular-time'.

The perceived object, 'smoke-on-that-mountain-at-a-particular-time,' is clearly an object of a perceptual state of awareness. More specifically, it is an object of visual sense perception. As Figure 2 indicates, this object is an O2.1 object which has been externally projected. It is, therefore, a mind-dependent external object like O2e. Unlike the O2.1 and O2e objects described earlier, however, this object is also spatially and temporally located. Its construction is therefore more complicated. According to Ratnakīrti, objects are individuated through a specific set of spatial, temporal, and facet-specifying co-ordinates [deśa-kāla-ākāra-niyata].[44] So this O2e object could be described as the object smoke that was constructed from the perception of one component of a particular grouping of sensory components and determined to be perceived at a particular place 'p' and a particular time 't.' It is not completely clear exactly how Ratnakīrti accounts for the spatial and temporal components of an object.

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[44]Ratnakīrti usually prefers the equivalent phrase "deśa-kāla-svabhāva-niyama." For examples of how he uses this term see RNA [ISD: 41.12], RNA [48.07], and RNA [KSA: 69.03]. See too MTBh [21.08-21.09] where the more familiar term 'deśa-kāla-svabhāva-niyata' is used to describe the coordinates of the particular [svalakṣaṇa], pot. For more on the specificity of such facets see, for example, RNA [KSA: 73.12-73.18] and RNA [KSA: 74.07-74.15], quoted earlier.

They are, however, not a part of the one dynamic and complex collection of facets.[45] It seems, therefore, that the temporal and spatial components of an object are the result of determination [adhyavasāya]. What is important, at present, is that for the perceived token, 'smoke-on-that-mountain-at-a-particular-time,' a set of three individuating characteristics can be specified.

It might be argued that the perception of smoke on a particular mountain is an example of a reality-involving practice that cannot be accounted for without an external, mind-independent object such as the smoke on that particular mountain. It might be further argued that sense perception presents a special problem for Ratnakīrti's account since it seems clear that the spatial and temporal coordinates of an object can only be specified if external, mind-independent objects are in fact the objects of sense perception. According to Ratnakīrti, however, the reality-involving practice of sense perception can be explained in terms of the reflexive awareness [svasaṃvedana-pratyakṣa] of a determined [adhyavaseya] object which has been externally projected [bahir-adhyasta] so that it appears at a particular place and time as a mind-independent object in the external world. It is because the object 'smoke-on-that-mountain-at-a-particular time' appears as an object in the external world that it is considered to be an object of visual sense perception. This does not mean, however, that it is a mind-independent object. Since on Ratnakīrti's view external objects like O2e are mind-dependent, he is able to account for reality-involving practices like sense perception in terms of mind-dependent rather than

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[45] For a hint of how he might account for this see, RNA [CAPV: 142.29-143.02] where he quotes the following verses from JNA: bhramābhramākalpanakalpanāni, śātāsitādīny akhilākṣajāni | jñānāny abhinnāni sopalabdeḥ, pūrvāparatvaṃ tu vedyam eva || "All perception whether erroreous or not, (whether it is) with or without mental construction, and (whether it is) white or black is awareness which is non-different on account of being grasped together. (And in each of these cases) priority and posteriority cannot be known."

mind-independent external objects. Thus, the first step in the thought process of inferring something for one's self [svārthānumāna] i.e., the perception of smoke, can be explained through Ratnakīrti's account.

The second step in this type of inferential reasoning is the act of remembering that wherever there is smoke there is fire. In order to remember this, however, it is necessary to have established sometime in the past that smoke and fire are invariably concomitant. As Ratnakīrti explains, this amounts to establishing that the type 'smoke' is invariably concomitant with the type 'fire.'[46] According to Ratnakīrti, this can be established through a total of three perceptions of the co-absence [vyatireka] and co-presence [anvaya] of smoke and fire tokens.[47] Concomitance could be established by observing once, that where there is smoke there is fire and by observing twice, that where there is the absence of fire there is the absence of smoke. It could also be established by observing once, that where there is the absence of fire there is the absence of smoke and by observing twice, that where there is smoke there is fire.[48] In both of these cases, the objects observed to be co-present [anvaya] or co-absent [vyatireka] are individuals or tokens of smoke and fire. They are, in other words, externally projected

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[46]There are a number of places where Ratnakīrti makes it clear that pervasion is established between "types" or "similarity classes." See, for example, RNA [KSA: 73.11-73.23], RNA [KSA: 74.07-74.13], and [VN: 109:13-109.36], all of which are quoted below.

[47]For a detailed discussion of how causal relationships are established see Gillon (1997), Inami (1999), Kajiyama (1966), Lasic (1999), and Woo (1999: 180-181). See too MTBh [28.02-28.15] where this issue is discussed. Since this discussion is incidental to the point that I am making here, I will not consider it in any detail.

[48]See RNA [SSD: 125.17-125.20]: tathā hi, upādānopādeyabhāvasthitacittasantitam apy āśrity īyaṃ vyavasthā sustheti katham ātmānaṃ pratyujjīvayatu | tatra kāryakāraṇabhāvapratītis tāvad anākulā | tathāpi, prag bhāvivastuniścayajñānasyopādeyabhūtena tadarpitasaṃskārgarbheṇa paścād bhāvivastujñānenāsmin satīdaṃ bhavatīti niścayo janyate | tathā prāg bhāvivastvapekṣayā kevalabhūtalaniścāyakajñānopādeyabhūtena tadarpitasaṃskāragarbheṇa paścād bhāvivastvapekṣayā kevalabhūtalaniścāyakajñānenāsminn asatīdaṃ na bhavatīti vyatirekaniścayo janyate || This is similar to how the process is described at MTBh [28.02-28.15].

O2.1 objects like O2e. In his 'Inquiry into Inference-Warranting Relations [vyāpti-nirṇaya],' Ratnakīrti explains how the perception of tokens can lead to an awareness involving types.[49] He argues that just as an individual collection [samudaya] or token

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[49]Consider the following passages:

RNA [KSA: 73.18-73.23]: nānākālasyaikasya vastuno vastuto 'saṃbhave 'pi sarvadeśakālavartinor atadrūpaparāvrttayor eva sādhyasādhanayoh pratyaksena vyāptigrahaṇāt | dvividho hi pratyakṣasya viṣayaḥ, grāhyo 'dhyavaseyaś ca | sakalātadrūpaparāvṛttavastumātraṃ sākṣād asphuraṇāt pratyakṣasya grāhyo viṣayo mā bhut | tadekadeśagrahane tu tanmātrayor vyāptiniścāyakavikalpajananād adhyavaseyo visayo bhavaty eva | ksanagrahane santānaniścayavat, rūpamātragrahane rūparasagandhasparśātmakaghataniścayavac ca | anyathā sarvānumānocchedaprasaṅgāt || "Even though it is in actuality impossible for a single thing to (belong to) different times, perception (still) grasps pervasion between an inferential reason and a property to be proved, (both of) which are present in all places and at all times and which are excluded from those that do not have their form. The reason for this is that the object of perception is twofold, direct and determined. The entire collection of things which is excluded from those that do not have its form cannot be the direct object of sense perception since (it) is not directly manifest (in perceptual states of awareness). It is, however, definitely the indirect object since in grasping one part of it a constructing state of awareness is produced which determines the pervasion between those two (things)-in-general. This is like coming to know a continuum from grasping a moment and like coming to know a pot which is made up of color, taste, smell, and touch from grasping only its color. If this were not the case, there would be the unwanted consequence of the destruction of all inferential reasoning."

For parallel passages see JNA [166.11-166.21], NBhū [140.22- 140.25], and RNA [VN: 109.13-109.19].

RNA [KS: 74.07-74.13] atha teṣāṃ sarveṣām eva viśeṣāṇāṃ sadṛśatvāt sadṛśasāagrīprasūtatvāt sadṛśakāryakāritvād iti pratyāsattyā ekaviśeṣagrāhakaṃ pratyakṣam atadrūpaparāvṛttamātre niścayaṃ janayad atadrūpaparāvṛttaviśeṣamātrasya vyavasthāpakam | yathaikasāmagrīpratibaddharūpamātragrāhakaṃ pratyakṣaṃ ghaṭe niścayam janayad ghaṭagrāhakaṃ vyavasthāpyate | anyathā ghaṭo 'pi ghaṭasantāno 'pi pratyakṣato na sidhyet, sarvātmanāgrahaṇābhāvāt | tadekadeśagrahaṇaṃ tv adatrūpaparāvṛtte 'pi aviśiṣṭam | yady evam anenaiva kramena sarvasya viśesasya viśesanaviśesyabhāvavad vyātpipratipattir apy astu || "Now through this similarity, namely, that all those particulars [viśeṣa] are similar because they are produced from a similar totality of causes and are makers of a similar effect, perception determines a collection that is excluded from those that do not have its form by grasping a single particular. This is just as perception grasps a pot by determining it after grasping only (its) color-particular which is necessarily related to the one totality of causes,. If this were not so, neither the (class), pot, nor a pot continuum could be established through perception. This is because they are not grasped by perception in their entirety [sarvātmanā]. Now, grasping of one part of that is not different from what is excluded from those that do not have its form. Given this there is an awareness of pervasion through this method for all particulars, just as in the qualifier-qualificand relation."

For parallel passages see PVSV [158.20], JNA [52.03-52.09], and PVSVT [562.10] where the term "pratyāsattyā" is glossed with the term "sādṛśyena."

RNA [VN: 109.13-109.26]: yadi pratyakṣaṃ svalakṣaṇaviṣayam ity ayogavyavacchedenocyate, tadā siddhasādhanam | anyayogavyavacchedas tv asiddhaḥ, pratyakṣānumānādi sarvajñānānāṃ grāhyāvaseyabhedena viṣayadvaividhyānatikramāt | yad dhi yatra jñāne pratibhāsate, tad grāhyam | yatra

can become the object of a perceptual state of awareness by directly perceiving only one of its components, a type can become an object of a perceptual state of awareness as a result of only perceiving one of its tokens. This is possible on Ratnakīrti's view since types and tokens are constructed through two different modes of determination from the same directly perceived object i.e., O1. For Ratnakīrti then, three instances of perceiving the co-presence [anvaya] and co-absence [vyatireka] of tokens can lead to the perception of concomitance between two types. Ratnakīrti argues, therefore, that inference-warranting relations such as concomitance can be established through the perception of types like object O2.2. Unlike tokens, however, these objects do not have spatial or temporal coordinates. They can be individuated from other types, however, through the perceived component from which they were constructed through the determination of difference [bheda-adhyavasāya] or from the perceived token through which the type comes to be perceptible. For these objects only one of the three individuating co-ordinates, the facet specifying coordinate, can be described.

What is remembered in the second step of an inference for one's self [svārtha-anumāna] is what was originally perceived, namely, that the type 'smoke' and the type 'fire' are invariably concomitant. Unfortunately, Ratnakīrti does not discuss either memory or the objects of memory in detail. It is clear, however, that what are remembered are not

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tu yataḥ pravartate, tad adhyavaseyam | tatra pratyakṣasya svalakṣaṇaṃ grāhyam, adhyavaseyam tu sāmānyam, atadrūpaparāvrttasvalaksanamātrātmakam | anumānasya tu viparyayaḥ ||

tataś ca sāṃvyavahārikapramāṇāpekṣayā rūparasagandhasparśasamudāyātmakasya ghaṭasya rūpamātragrahaṇe 'pi pratyakṣataḥ samudāyasiddhivyavasthā | tathaikasyātadrūpaparāvrttasya grahane 'pi sādhyasādhanasāmānyayor atadrūpaparāvrttavastumātrātmanor ayogavyavacchedena visayabhūtayor vyāptigraho yukta eva | ata eva vikalpānām avastv eva viṣayaḥ | vastu tu teṣāṃ parokṣam eve ty api durjñānam, sarvavikalpānām adhyavaseyāpekṣayā vastuviṣayatvāt, śāstre 'pi tathaiva pratipādanāt | na ca manasā tajjātīyānām vyāptigrahaḥ śakyaḥ, manaso bahirasvātantryāt | anyathā andhabadhiradyabhāvaprasaṅgāt | na ca vahnivyabhicāre dhūma upādhirahitaṃ saṃbandham atikrāmed iti||

mind-independent external objects and that memories themselves are facets of awareness [ākāra]. As a result, all of the objects involved in the perception of smoke and the establishment of the concomitance [vyāpti] between fire and smoke can be explained as mind-dependent objects. By showing how both stages in the thought process leading up to the inference of fire can be completely explained in terms of these objects, Ratnakīrti protects his account from the charge that it is unable to explain sense perception and the establishment of concomitance [vyāpti].

It is important to note that the fire that is inferred in an inference for one's own sake [svārthānumāna] is not an object of a perceptual state of awareness. Although the type 'fire' is perceived while establishing invariable concomitance [vyāpti], the universal [sāmānya] 'fire-on-that-mountain-at-a-particular time' is not. What is inferred is not a specific body of fire like O2.1 nor is it a type like O2.2 which is neither spatially nor temporally specified. What is inferred is a universal [sāmānya] fire which is more general than a perceived body of fire and yet more specific than the perceived type 'fire.' It is in other words not that fire which is actually there on that mountain at a particular time 't,' but rather, whatever fire could be there on that mountain at a particular time 't.' This means that although inferential reasoning is a reality-involving practice which is dependent upon perception, the object of one's awareness that there is fire on that mountain is not an object of a perceptual state of awareness and must be understood, therefore, as an object of an inferential-verbal state of awareness. Although Ratnakīrti never makes this explicit, in this sort of inference the inferred object 'fire-on-that-mountain-at-a-particular-time' is the direct object of an inferential-verbal state of awareness.

2.2 Facets of Inferential-Verbal States of Awareness

Inferential-verbal states of awareness are understood to be distinct from perceptual states of awareness. This is, in part, because perceptual states of awareness are defined as being free from all forms of inferential reasoning and language. Strictly speaking, then, perceptual and inferential-verbal states of awareness do not share any of the same internal objects or facets [ākāra]. Their respective objects are, however, relatable to each other and can be described by and understood through the same set of concepts. Like perceptual states of awareness, inferential-verbal states of awareness are also said to have a directly grasped [grāhya] and an indirectly determined [adhyavaseya] object. Unlike perceptual states, however, in inferential-verbal states of awareness it is a universal [sāmānya] that directly appears or is manifesting [pratibhāsamāna] in that state of awareness and a particular [svalakṣaṇa] that is being determined [adhyavasāya] by it.[50] Concepts such as grasped [grāhya], determined [adhyavaseya], particular [svalakṣaṇa], and universal [sāmānya] are, therefore, concepts that must be understood relative to a particular state of awareness. Ratnakīrti's analysis of inferential-verbal states of awareness is central to his account of reality and our experiences of it since it is through his analysis of these states of awareness and its objects that he accounts for inferential reasoning and language use. These two reality-involving practices are linked in Ratnakīrti's view of the world since, as discussed in Chapter 3, it is an exclusion [apoha] or similarity class that is the object of both.

2.2.1 Object O3: The Direct Object of Inferential-Verbal States of Awareness

[50]For references to this see Section 1.0.

O3 is the directly grasped [grāhya] object of an inferential-verbal state of awareness. As a universal [sāmānya] and a facet of a constructing state of awareness [vikalpa-buddhi-ākāra] it must, however, also be a constructed or determined object [adhyavaseya]. As a result, it is somehow both directly grasped [grāhya] and determined [adhyavaseya]. This apparent contradiction can be resolved by thinking of O3 as an object which directly appears in inferential-verbal states of awareness after being determined by perceptual states of awareness. Although there isn't any direct textual support for this claim, some O3 objects are probably best understood as 'composites' of O2 objects which have been "externally" projected by a constructing form of perceptual awareness so that they directly appear in an inferential-verbal state of awareness. Consider, for example, the inferred object 'fire-on-that-mountain-at-a-particular-time.' This O3 object can be understood as a complex object composed of two perceptible O2 objects; the O2.1 object 'that-mountain-at-a-particular-time' and the O2.2 object 'fire(-in-general).' While both of its components are determined objects [adhyavaseya] of a perceptual state of awareness the complex object is not. It is a new and indivisible object which directly appears in its state of awareness as a result of inferring something for one's self [svārthānumāna].[51] As a result, it is an object which was not and could not have been previously perceived. What is perceived is the token, 'that mountain-at-a-particular-time' and the type, 'fire.' The indivisible complex object 'fire-on-that-mountain-at-a-particular-time' is not. The new object is, however, more general than the token O2.1 object and more specific than the type O2.2. This is also reflected in its three individuating characteristics: A particular place, the token 'mountain,' a particular time 't,' and a specific facet of awareness, the type 'fire.' Unfortunately, Ratnakīrti does not

[51] See Woo (1999: 182).

discuss O3 objects in detail and as a result there isn't any direct textual support for this particular interpretation of them. It is also not completely clear whether all O3 objects are indivisible complex objects or whether they could also be O2.1 or O2.2 sorts of objects. Whatever the range of possibilities, however, it must be the case that they cannot themselves be perceptible.

Ratnakīrti's most detailed discussions of inferential-verbal states of awareness take place in the context of his analysis of the reality-involving practices of inferential reasoning and language use. Even in these contexts, however, most of his attention is devoted to a consideration of the indirect objects of these states of awareness. Since the indirect objects of a state of awareness are related to the direct objects of the same state of awareness a description of them may help to further explain how Ratnakīrti understands O3 objects.

2.2.2 O4 & O4e: The Indirect Objects of Inferential-Verbal States of Awareness

Object O4 is an indirect object of an inferential-verbal state of awareness. As an indirect object it is a determined [adhyavaseya] object and so an object of activity [pravṛtti-viṣaya]. As a particular [svalakṣaṇa] it is an object which is related to a universal [sāmānya] i.e., O3, through determination [adhyavasāya].[52] Although Ratnakīrti does not specifically describe the determination [adhyavasāya] or construction of this object it is clear that O4 is a facet of awareness [ākāra] which is, in some way, constructed from O3. An example of such an object is a language-involving object such as a word, sentence or, perhaps, a concept. Object O4e is simply the external projection of object

[52]For references see Section 1.0.

O4. As such, it is a mind-dependent external object. An example of such an object is the external referent of a word.

As a particular [svalakṣana], O4 is an object which is excluded from those that belong to the same class [sajātīya-vyāvṛtta] and those that belong to a different class [vijātīya-vyāvṛtta].[53] What distinguishes the use of the term 'particular [svalakṣaṇa]' when it is applied to O1 and when it is applied to O4 is not its general definition. Rather, it is the nature of the object to which it is related through determination. In the context of perceptual states of awareness, particulars [svalakṣaṇa] are constructed by the first two modes of determination into universals [sāmānya]. In inferential verbal states, however, universals [sāmānya] are constructed into particulars [svalakṣaṇa]. As Figure 2 indicates, the terms 'universal [sāmānya]' and 'particular [svalakṣaṇa]' are defined in terms of each other and are not linked to any of the other concepts used to describe facets of awareness [ākāra]. It is not clear from Ratnakīrti's account whether O4 can be constructed from O3 by any of the three previously discussed modes of determination. It is also not clear whether there is a fourth mode of determination that could account for it. In describing O4 as a particular [svalakṣaṇa], therefore, all Ratnakīrti seems to have in mind is that it is an object which is related to a universal [sāmānya] through some form of determination [adhyavasāya].

As a determined [adhyavaseya] object, O4 is also an object of activity [pravṛtti-viṣaya]. More specifically, it is most often taken to be an object of a verbal [vācikī] or concept-involving form of activity. In so far as it is a facet of awareness [ākāra], however, it is like all facets of awareness [ākāra] also an object of reflexive awareness [svasaṃvedana].

[53] See Section 2.1.2.2.

Ratnakīrti's most detailed discussion of O4, however, is in contexts where it is the object of linguistic and conceptual activity. In concluding his "Proof of Exclusion [apohasiddhi]," for example, Ratnakīrti offers an inferential argument concerning these indirect objects of inferential-verbal states of awareness.[54] What is at stake in the argument is what sort of object a word such as "cow" refers to. Indirectly, we also come to know what sort of object Ratnakīrti considers such words to be. Ratnakīrti begins his argument by asserting that every inferential-verbal state of awareness which has the capacity for denotation [vācaka] has for its object [gocara] a collection of things [vastu-mātra] which is determined [adhyavasita] and excluded from those that do not have its form [atadrūpaparāvṛtta].[55] From context, it is clear that by the phrase "excluded from those that do not have its form [atadrūpaparāvṛtta]," Ratnakīrti means "excluded from those that belong to a different class [vijatīya-vyāvṛtta]" or, in other words, a horizontal universal [tiryag-sāmānya]. From other parts of his essay it is clear that by the word "determined [adhyavasita]" he means "made into an object of activity [pravṛtti-viṣaya]."[56] In this step of the argument, therefore, Ratnakīrti asserts the concomitance [vyāpti] between whatever functions as a denoter [vācaka] e.g. O4, and horizontal universals [tiryag-sāmānya] which have been made into the objects of activity [pravṛtti-viṣaya] i.e., O4e. As an example, he cites the linguistic expression [vacana], "There is

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[54]This argument was discussed in Chapter 3, Section 3.0. For references in support of what follows see Chapter 3 and my translation of "The Proof of Exclusion [apohasiddhi]."

RNA [AS: 66.08-66.13]: atra prayogaḥ | yad vacakaṃ tat sarvam adhyavasitātadrūpaparāvrttavastumātragocaram | yatheha kūpe jalam iti vacanam | vācakam idam gavādiśabdarūpam iti svabhāvahetuḥ | nāyam asiddhaḥ | pūrvoktena nyāyena pāramārthikavācyavācakabhāvasyābhāve 'dhyavasāyakṛtasyaiva sarvavyavahāribhir avaśyaṃ svīkarttavyatvāt | anyathā sarvavyavahārocchedaprasaṅgāt | nāpi viruddhaḥ sapakṣe bhāvāt | na cānaikāntikaḥ | tathā hi śabdānām adhyavasitavijātivyāvrttavastumātravisayatvam anicchadbhiḥ paraiḥ paramārthato |

[55]RNA [AS: 66.08]

[56]RNA [AS: 66.13], RNA [AS: 66.25]

water here in this well."[57] This implies that in so far as it is a similar case it is an example of denoting expression. According to Ratnakīrti, this expression should also be understood as a facet [ākāra] of an inferential-verbal state of awareness. Rather than being an object which is in some way expressed by a state of awareness, however, a linguistic expression is an object which is 'identical to' or 'contained in' it. Like all facets [ākāra] of awareness it is, in one sense, awareness itself. The linguistic expression "There is water here in this well" and the word "water" are, therefore, examples of such objects. This highlights the fact that O4 objects are simply facets of awareness [ākāra].

After asserting the inference-warranting relation [vyāpti] and providing an example, Ratnakīrti argues that since in this particular inference the denoting expression [vācaka] takes the form of a word such as 'cow' [gavādi-śabda-rūpam], one must conclude that the word 'cow' has for its object [gocara] a collection of things [vastu-mātra] which is determined [adhyavasita] and excluded from those that do not have its form [atadrūpaparāvṛtta]. As explained above, this inferred object can also be described as an object of activity [pravṛtti-viṣaya] which has been excluded from that which belong to a different class [vijatīya-vyāvṛtta]. This way of describing object O4, however, seems to contradict its description as a particular [svalakṣaṇa]. This seems to be the case since the phrase "excluded from those which belong to a different class [vijatīya-vyāvṛtta]" also describes horizontal universals [tiryag-sāmānya].[58] The apparent contradiction can be resolved by noticing that Ratnakīrti does not himself refer to this object as a universal [sāmānya]. Instead he refers to it by the phrases "excluded from what does not have its

[57]RNA [AS: 66.09]

[58]See Section 2.1.2.3.

form [atadrūpa-parāvṛtta]" and "excluded from those which belong to a different class [vijatīya-vyāvṛtta]." This suggests that these exclusion operations are more general than the sorts of universals often described in terms of them. It also highlights Ratnakīrti's somewhat peculiar understanding of the terms universal [sāmānya] and particular [svalakṣaṇa].[59]

Ratnakīrti also describes object O4 using a somewhat different set of concepts. He says, for example, that the indirect object of an inferential-verbal state of awareness can be described as both an exclusion [apoha] and a positive entity [viddhi]. He explains that this is so because this object is an indivisible complex object or facet of awareness [ākāra] made up of a characterized [viśeṣya] and characterizing [viśeṣaṇa] component.[60] More specifically, its characterized [viśeṣya] component is said to be a positive entity [viddhi] and its characterizing [viśeṣaṇa] component is said to be its exclusion from others [anyāpoha]. For Ratnakīrti, therefore, an O4 object is a positive entity characterized by its exclusion from others [anyāpohaviśiṣtaviddhi]. Ratnakīrti describes the awareness of this object as the simultaneous [tulyakālam] awareness of the positive entity [viddhi] and its exclusion from others [anyāpoha].[61] He also explains that in so far as it appears in a state of inferential-verbal awareness, this complex object is properly described as a facet of awareness [buddhi-ākāra] like O4. In so far as it is externally projected, however, it is described as an external object [bāhya-artha].[62] This positive entity [viddhi] describes both object O4 and its external projection object O4e. What this

[59]For more details see Chapter 3.

[60]RNA [AS: 65.01-65.14]

[61]RNA [AS: 60.16-60.18]

[62]RNA [AS: 60.20-60.21]

means is that in so far as O4 is taken to be a facet of awareness [ākāra] it refers to itself i.e., an O4 object. In so far as O4 is taken to be an object in the external world, however, it refers to its external projection O4e.[63] Ratnakīrti's description of O4 and O4e as a positive entities characterized by their exclusion from others [anyāpohaviśiṣṭaviddhi] is consistent with their earlier description as a collection of things [vastu-mātra] which is determined [adhyavasita] and excluded from those that do not have its form [atadrūpaparāvṛtta]. The positive entity [viddhi] i.e., the characterized component of the complex object, corresponds to the collection of things [vastu-mātra] while its exclusion from others [anyāpoha] i.e., the characterizing component, corresponds to its being determined and excluded from those that do not have its form [adhyavasita-atadrūpaparāvṛtta].

Other than these two descriptions of O4 and O4e Ratnakīrti does not directly tell us more about these objects. He does not, for example, explain how they are related to O3. Interestingly, however, he does explain how they are individuated. There seem to be three factors that account for the individuation of these facets of awareness. The first is the general fact that according to Ratnakīrti a particular state of awareness is produced by the ripening of a specific series of latent karmic impressions [svavāsanāvipāka].[64] The object that appears in that state of awareness is, therefore, also dependent upon this series. Ratnakīrti also discussed this in the context of describing the individuation of O2 objects. The second factor is that a constructing state of awareness is produced by a specific causal complex [niyata-sāmagrī-prasūta] and has a specific causal capacity

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[63]RNA [AS: 66.09]

[64]See section 2.1.2.3 where RNA [AS: 66.04], RNA [CAPV: 138.14-138.17], and MTBh [68.07-68.08] are quoted.

[niyata-śakti]. As a result, it contains a specific facet [niyata-ākāra] of awareness.[65] This means that an object of this state of awareness can be differentiated from other such objects in terms of the specific causal complex which produced it, its causal capacity, and its unique facet. This is also the case for O2 objects. The third factor, however, is unique to O3 and O4 objects and has to do with the components out of which O3 and therefore O4 objects are partially constructed. Though Ratnakīrti only discusses this factor in the context of O4 objects, if O4 objects are constructed from O3 objects as indicated in Figure 2, his remarks should be equally applicable to the O3 object from which a specific O4 object is constructed. The complex object O3 is constructed, in part, from O2.1 and O2.2 objects. As a result, the O4 object constructed from this O3 object should also be partially individuated through its relationship with these O2 objects. In a somewhat different context, Ratnakīrti accounts for this by explaining that the construction of O4 objects involves the memory of specific O2 objects.[66] The memory

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[65]RNA [AS: 65.28-66.05]: yady api viśvam agṛhītaṃ tathāpi vikalpasya niyatasāmagrīprasūtatvena niyatākaratayā, niyataśaktitvāt niyataiva jalādau pravṛtti | dhūmasya parokṣāgnijñānajananavat | niyataviṣayā hi bhāvāḥ pramāṇapariniṣṭhitasvabhāvā na śaktisāṃkaryaparyanuyogabhājaḥ | tasmāt tad adhyavasāyitvam ākāraviśeṣayogāt tat pravṛttijanakatvam | na ca sādṛśyād āropeṇa pravṛttim brūmaḥ, yenākāre bāhyasya bāhye vā ākārasyāropadvāreṇa dūṣaṇāvakāśaḥ | kiṃ tarhi, svavāsanāvipākavaśād upajāyamānaiva buddhir apaśyanty api bāhyam bāhye pravṛttim ātanotīti viplutaiva | tad evam anyābhāvaviśiṣṭo vijātīvyāvṛtto 'rtho vidhiḥ | sa eva cāpohaśabdavācyaḥ śabdānām arthaḥ pravṛttinivṛttiviṣayaś ceti sthitam |

RNA [KSA: 73.12-73.17] evaṃ cādhyavasāye svalakṣaṇasyāsphuraṇam eva | na ca tasyāsphuraṇe 'pt sarvatrāviśeṣeṇa pravṛttyākṣepaprasaṅgaḥ, pratiniyatasāmagrīprasūtāt partiniyatasvākārāt partiniyataśaktiyogāt, pratiniyata evātadrūpaparāvṛtte 'pratīte 'pi pravṛttisāmarthyadarśanāt | yathā sarvasyāsattve 'pi bījād aṅkurasyaivotpattiḥ, dṛṣṭasya niyatahetuphalabhāvasya parikṣeptum aśakyatvāt | {paraṃ bāhyenārthena sati pratibandhe prāmāṇyam | anyathā tv aprāmānyam iti viśeṣaḥ} || "And so, given determination there definitely is not the manifestation of a particular. But although it isn't manifest there is not the unwanted consequence of effecting positive activity indiscriminately towards any object. This is because it is obseved that there is positive activity towards a specific 'x' which is excluded from those that do not have its form etc., even though it is not perceived. This is because constructing states of awareness are endowed with a specific capacity due to their specific fact of awareness which is produced from a specific causal complex."

For parallel passages to these see PVV [25.10-25.12], NBhū [140.25-140.26], JNA [226.01-226.07], and RNA [CAPV: 138.03-138.09].

[66]RNA [AS: 63.20-63.22]

of specific O2 objects seems to be involved, therefore, in the construction and individuation of both O4 and O3 objects. This relationship between O2, O3, and O4 objects is important for what follows.

2.2.3 O3, O4, O4e, Linguistic Practices and Inferential Reasoning

Ratnakīrti's description of the objects of inferential-verbal states of awareness is central to his account of reality and our experiences of it since it is in terms of these objects that he explains a variety of reality-involving practices such as our use of language to successfully talk about objects in the "external" world and our use of inferential reasoning to teach us about objects we have not perceived. If Ratnakīrti's account is to be successful it must be able to explain these common reality-involving practices. What follows, therefore, is an attempt at reconstructing Ratnakīrti's account of linguistic reference and inferential reasoning in terms of objects O3, O4, and O4e.

2.2.3.1 Reference

Linguistic practices involving reference are examples of reality-involving practices which are commonly thought to involve extra-linguistic and mind-independent objects. One of the more basic examples of such a practice is the identification of an object as being an 'x.' Consider, for example, someone who upon seeing an animal walking up the road thinks to herself "This is a cow" or says to herself "cow." In identifying this animal as a cow an ordinary speaker will normally understand herself to be having thoughts about an extra-mental object. She will, moreover, normally assume that in this context the word or

concept "cow" refers to the mind-independent object that she sees in front of her. Her experience that language can be about mind-independent objects in the external world and that through language it is possible to refer to and talk about such objects is what Ratnakīrti's account must be able to explain. In general, Ratnakīrti understands the relationship between linguistic expressions [śabda] and their referents [artha] to be fixed through an initial act of ostension which is subsequently supported by and reinforced through linguistic practices and conventional agreement [samketa].[67] In referring to the object she sees as a cow, therefore, the person in the example is understood to be implicitly relying on this pre-established conventional relationship. While there are many disagreements about the specific nature of this relationship, in order for the linguistic practice of identification to be explained through Ratnakīrti's account what needs to be explained is not so much how this relationship is conventionally established but rather the general nature of the relationship and the kinds of objects that the relationship is said to be between.

According to Ratnakīrti, a word such as "cow" is an object or facet [ākāra] of an inferential-verbal state of awareness.[68] More specifically, it is an indivisible, complex, and determined [adhyavaseya] object of that state of awareness.[69] According to Figure 2, O4 is an example of such an object. As a facet [ākāra] of awareness, O4 is like all facets of awareness an object of reflexive awareness [svasaṃvedanam]. It is, for example, through reflexive awareness [svasaṃvedana] that we are able to be aware of, refer to, and therefore talk about words or concepts such as "cow." The word "cow" is,

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[67]For a helpful discussion of this see MTBh [6.01-8.04] translated in Kajiyama (1966: 32-35).

[68]RNA [AS: 60.21]

[69]RNA [AS: 60.16-60.18]

therefore, a mind-dependent internal object. The external referent of a word is also understood to be an indivisible, complex, and determined [adhyavaseya] object of that state of awareness. It too is a positive entity characterized by its exclusion from others. It differs from O4 only in that it is its external projection.[70] According to Ratnakīrti, then, the external referent of the word "cow" is the mind-dependent external projection of object O4.[71] According to Figure 2, O4e is an example of this sort of object. Ratnakīrti describes the relationship between these two objects as follows. He says that the word "cow" refers to a facet [ākāra] of a constructing state of awareness [vikalpa-buddhi-ākāra] which was preceded by the observation of an individual [eka-piṇḍa-darśana] and now has been externally projected as if it were common [sādhāraṇa] to all individuals [sarva-vyakti].[72] In terms of Figure 2, an O4 object such as the word "cow" refers to a facet [ākāra] of an inferential-verbal state of awareness whose appearance in that state of awareness was preceded by the observation of an externally projected O2.1 object and which has now been externally projected as if it were an O4e object common to all individuals of the O2.1 type. Unfortunately, Ratnakīrti does not describe the relationship between the O2.1 object which is perceived and the O4 or O4e object involved in linguistic practices in greater detail. What is clear, however, is that the memory of having observed O2e is necessary for and somehow involved in the construction of O4 and O4e.[73] These two objects are partially constituted, therefore, by the memory of an O2e object. The relationship between a word such as O4 and its

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[70]RNA [AS: 60.21-60.22]

[71]RNA [AS: 60.06-60.07]

[72]RNA [AS: 60.06-60.07]

[73]RNA [AS: 63.21]

referent O4e, however, is more clearly described in terms of O4e being an external projection of O4.

One consequence of this account is that, strictly speaking, one cannot see the object to which she refers. What one sees or observes, for example, is an O2.1 object which has been externally projected i.e., O2e. This is clear from Ratnakīrti's account since it is only as an O2e object that can be the object of visual sense perception. What the word "cow" refers to, however, is the externally projected O4 object, O4e. As an object of an inferential-verbal state of awareness neither O4 nor its external projection O4e can be perceived through visual sense perception. Moreover, since O4 and O4e are defined as being positive entities which are characterized by their exclusion from others [anyāpoha-viśiṣta-viddhi] they are particular, universal objects and not tokens like O2.1 and its projection O2e. According to Ratnakīrti's analysis then, what one sees is the mind-dependent object O2e and what one refers to is the mind-dependent object O4e. Ratnakīrti is able to explain however the experience of thinking that one is talking about what one sees. He is able to do so because the observed object O2e is, through its memory, involved in the construction of O4e. A specific O4 and O4e object are, therefore, necessarily related to a specific O2 object. In fact, in one sense, what one sees i.e., O2e is a part of what one thinks i.e., O4 and a part of what one is talking about i.e., O4e.

2.2.3.2 Inferential Reasoning

This understanding of the relationships between the various objects of constructing forms of awareness also makes it possible for Ratnakīrti to explain the success of

inferential reasoning. Consider, for example, the O3 object 'fire' which was inferred in the inference for one's self discussed earlier. In that context, this object was considered to be an object of mental activity. Suppose, however, that the person who infers the presence of this fire on a particular mountain says to herself "I know there is fire on that mountain." In this context, the word "fire" refers to its internal referent; an O4 object which is constructed from the specific O3 object she inferred and which has in the process of its construction been associated with language. As an O4 object, the word "fire" is an object of verbal or conceptual activity. Suppose further that the person who infers the presence of fire on the mountain decides to seek out the fire which she infers to be there. In this context, the word "fire" refers to its external referent i.e., an O4e object. As the object towards which she physically acts, O4e, is an object of her bodily activity. One consequence of this view is that the fire she seeks, the O4e object, and the fire she eventually reaches, the O2e object, are not the same. Strictly speaking, then, she does not infer the existence of what she eventually perceives. On Ratnakīrti's account, however, the inferential process is tightly regulated and this accounts for the reliability or success of inferential reasoning. More specifically, its reliability is due to the nature of the relationship between the O2e object i.e., the smoke she is currently perceiving, the O2 objects she perceived while establishing the concomitance between fire and smoke, the O3 object she infers, and the O4e object towards which she acts. The challenge for Ratnakīrti's account is to explain why the perception of a specific O2e object e.g., the smoke she currently sees on the mountain, leads to the inference of a specific sort of O3 object and O4e object e.g., fire on that mountain. According to Ratnakīrti, the O3 object she infers and the O4e object towards which she acts are partly constituted by the memory of the specific O2.1 and O2.2 objects that she, at one time, perceived. Moreover, these remembered objects are related to the specific O2e object, smoke, she is

currently perceiving on the mountain. These relationships are due to the fact that the set of causal factors that results in her perceiving smoke on the mountain is a subset of the causal factors that results in her remembering concomitance and inferring that there is fire on the mountain. This causal complex is in turn a subset of the causal factors that result in her associating the O3 object she infers with the word "fire" and so is itself a subset of the causal factors that result in the construction of O4 and O4e. The O2e object that she perceives on the mountain is causally related therefore to the O4e object towards which she eventually acts. This causal relationship between these facets of awareness underlies and regulates the inferential process so that under normal conditions the perception of smoke will lead to the inference of fire and not, for example, to the inference of water.

3.0 Non-existence, Existence, and Ultimate Existence

Ratnakīrti's description and analysis of O1-O4 provides a set of conceptual resources for thinking about reality and our experiences of it. While ontological issues concerning the existential status of these objects have been important to their description these issues have not yet been discussed directly. Such questions are, however, central to Ratnakīrti's account of the world. He argues, for example, that under the most rigorous philosophical description of reality only O1 objects ultimately exist. This is, in part, because O2, O3, and O4 objects are constructed from O1 and, therefore, are not ontological primitives. However, as Figure 2 indicates, Ratnakīrti also describes O2, O3, and O4 objects as existent [sat] and O2e and O4e objects as non-existent [asat]. It is important, therefore, to consider what Ratnakīrti means by this and why he chooses to describe these objects as he does.

3.1 O4e and O2e

Ratnakīrti explains some of the conceptual resources he uses to think about ontology and existence in the context of discussing how we are to think about the referent of a word.[74] As mentioned earlier, the referent of a word [śabda-artha] or linguistic expression is a positive entity which is characterized by its exclusion from others [anyāpoha-viśiṣṭa-viddhi]. In so far as this positive entity [viddhi] is present in a verbal state of awareness it is said to be an internal facet of awareness [buddhi-ākāra] i.e., O4. In so far as it is determined by this state of awareness it is said to be an external object [bahya-ārtha] i.e., O4e. In his "Proof of Exclusion [apohasiddhi]" Ratnakīrti explains why O4e objects can only conventionally be [samvṛtti] considered to be what language is about. This discussion is important since it introduces a distinction between what is really the case [tattvataḥ] and what is only the case, conventionally [samvṛtti].[75]

Ratnakīrti argues that positive [viddhi] and negative [niṣedha] statements cannot really be [tattvataḥ] about facets of awareness [buddhi-ākāra] since facets of awareness are internal objects that appear in states of awareness as the objects of reflexive awareness [sva-saṃvedana].[76] As facets of awareness [buddhi-ākāra], O4 objects are perceptible and so, strictly speaking, we are aware of them through reflexive awareness

[74]RNA [AS: 65.15-65.24]: tad evam vidhir eva śabdārthaḥ | sa ca bāhyo 'rtho buddhyākāras´ ca vivakṣitaḥ | tatra <u>na buddyākārasya tattvatah samvrtyā vā vidhinisedhau svasamvedanapratyaksagamyatvāt anadhyavasāyāc ca | nāpi tattvato bāhyasyāpi vidhinisedhau tasya sābde pratyaye 'pratibhāsanāt</u> | ata eva sarvadharmāṇāṃ tattvato anabhilāpyatvam pratibhāsādhyavasāyābhāvāt | tasmād bāhyasya eva sāṃvṛtau vidhiniṣedhau | anyathā samvyavahārahāniprasaṅgāt |

[75]This issue has also been discussed in Chapter 3, Section 2.3.1.

[76]RNA [AS: 65.16]

[svasaṃvedana] and not through language. Ratnakīrti also argues that these facets of awareness [buddhi-ākāra] cannot even conventionally be [samvṛtti] what language is about since in so far as they are facets of awareness [buddhi-ākāra] they are not externally projected and so are not what we normally consider our words to be referring to.[77] Ratnakīrti continues his discussion by arguing that since external objects [bāhya-artha] do not appear [pratibhāsa] in verbal states of awareness they too cannot really be [tattvataḥ] what language is about.[78] After all, in order for an object to be an object of a particular state of awareness it must at least appear in it. From the perspective of what is really the case [tattvataḥ], then, neither internal facets [buddhi-ākāra] of awareness nor external objects [bāhya-artha] are the referents of words. What is important about Ratnakīrti's remarks are the conceptual connections he begins to establish between two pairs of concepts; what is really the case [tattvataḥ] and what appears or does not appear in a particular state of awareness, and what is conventionally the case [samvṛtti] and what has or has not been made into an object of activity appropriate to that state of awareness. External objects [bahya-artha], for example, cannot really be [tattvataḥ] the objects about which we speak since they do not even appear in verbal states of awareness. Internal facets of awareness [buddhi-ākāra] cannot really be [tattvataḥ] the objects about which we speak since although they appear in verbal states of awareness they appear as the objects of reflexive awareness [svasaṃvedana]. In order for an object to really be [tattvataḥ] the referent of a word it would have to be an object which not only appears in a verbal state of awareness but is also determined by it to be an object of our ordinary verbal activity. Since there is no such object, there is no object about which we can really speak. As Ratnakīrti puts it, all objects are ultimately [tattvataḥ] inexpressible

[77]RNA [AS: 65.17]

[78]RNA [AS: 65.17-65.18]

[sarvadharmāṇām anabhilāpyatvam]. As a result, Ratnakīrti concludes that it is only conventionally the case [samvṛtti] that external objects like O4e are the referents of words.[79] Another way of putting this is to say that relative to verbal states of awareness O4e objects do not really [tattvataḥ] exist.

Although Ratnakīrti does not choose to do so, this kind of analysis can also be extended to perceptual states of awareness and objects O2 and O2e. Internal objects like O2 appear in perceptual states of awareness but cannot really [tattvataḥ] be the objects of sense perception since in so far as they are facets of awareness they are the objects of reflexive awareness [svasaṃvedana]. These objects cannot conventionally [samvṛtti] be the objects of sense perception either since as internal objects they are not the objects that we normally take ourselves to be perceiving. From neither perspective then are internal O2 objects the objects of sense perception. External objects like O2e cannot really [tattvataḥ] be the objects of sense perception either since in so far as they are externally projected they do not even appear in perceptual states of awareness. It is possible to conclude, therefore, that it is only conventionally [samvṛtti] the case that O2e objects are the objects of sense perception. As before, another way of putting this is to say that relative to perceptual states of awareness O2e does not really [tattvataḥ] exist.

3.2 O2, O3, and O4

Implicit in the above discussion is the idea that relative to a state of awareness what exists must appear in that state of awareness. This notion provides the rationale for claiming that relative to their respective states of awareness O2e and O4e do not exist. In so far

[79]RNA [AS:65.18-65.19]

as these objects are the external projections of objects that do appear in awareness i.e., O2 and O4, however, they do exist, but only conventionally. In a different context, Ratnakīrti makes this relationship between existence and appearance or manifestation explicit.[80] He explains, for example, that appearing [pratibhāsa] in a state of awareness is a mark of existence [sattā] since existence [sattā] is pervaded by appearance [prakāśa-vyāpta] and non-existence [asattā] by non-appearance [aprakāśa].[81] Ratnakīrti further explains the relationship between these two concepts through a short discussion in which he engages a critic who supports the theory that mind-independent objects exist.[82]

Ratnakīrti's critic argues that while the appearance of an object in a state of awareness may prove that the object exists, it is not the case that if an object does not appear in a state of awareness it does not exist. According to the opponent the existence of an object should be defined in terms of its capacity to perform a function [arthakriyāśakti]. As a result, according to him a perceived O2e object such as a pot exists even though it does

[80]The context in which Ratnakīrti discusses this is related to an issue that was raised at the end of Chapter 2 where I briefly considered Ratnakīrti's view that the class of all dissimilar cases could be the object of awareness. Here, Ratnakīrti explains that according to him this class of objects is a determined object that is present in a constructing state of awareness. He also explains, however, that this object does appear in non-constructing states of awareness but only in so far as it is a facet of awareness. For this discussion see RNA [CAPV: 131.13-135.04].

[81]RNA [CAPV: 132.19-132.20]: prakāśavyāptatvāt sattāyāḥ | aprakāśasya asattayā grastatvāt || "It is because it is known that existence is pervaded by appearance and non-appearance by non-existence."

[82]RNA [CAPV: 132.21-132.25]: nanu prakāśo nāma vastunaḥ sattāsādhakaṃ pramāṇam | na ca pramāṇanivṛttāv arthābhāvaḥ | arthakriyāśaktis tu sattvam | tac cāprakāśasyāpi na virudhyata iti cet |satyam etat | bahirarthavāde 'prakāśasyāpi sāmarthyābhyupagamāt | keśoṇḍukādipratibhāse 'dhyavasitasyārthasyārthakriyaśaktiviyogād evābhāvasiddheḥ |sarvathā bahirabhāve tu jñānasya prakāśāvyabhicārāt tāvataiva sattve kim arthakriyayā | "One may argue: Appearance is indeed an accredited Instrument for proving the existence of things. But given the absence of an accredited Instrument there is not the absence of the thing. Moreover, existence is 'the capacity for functionality.' And that is not impossible even for a non-manifest (thing). This is correct since given the view that there are external objects it is accepted that even non-manifest (things) have (functional) capability. But if there is always the absence of an external (object) what is the role of (the inferential reason,) 'the capapcity for functionality?' This is because awareness does not deviate from appearance and it is indeed by means of this that existence (is proved).

not itself appear in a perceptual state of awareness. In so far as this object is used to carry water, for example, it performs a function and so, the critic claims, it exists. Ratnakīrti responds to this by saying that for someone who believes in the existence of external mind-independent objects this is correct. He points out that it is correct since according to that theory there are objects that have the capacity to perform a function and do not appear in states of awareness and also objects that do not have the capacity to perform a function and do appear in states of awareness. An example of this sort of object is the referent of a non-referring expression such as "a net of hair [keśoṇḍuka]." Ratnakīrti argues, however, that since on his view there are not any mind-independent external objects there is no point in defining existence in terms of a mind-independent object's capacity to perform a function [arthakiryā]. For Ratnakīrti, appearance [prakāśa] alone is sufficient for proving existence [sattā]. One important consequence of this view is that a nonexistent [asat] object cannot, by definition, appear in a state of awareness. Ratnakīrti explains that although objects like a net of hair [keśoṇḍuka] can be shown not to have the nature of an external object, in so far as they are facets of awareness they have the nature of awareness, appear in states of awareness, and therefore exist. As a result, as Figure 2 indicates, O2, O3, and O4 exist and O2e and O4e do not.

3.3 O1

From Ratnakīrti's point of view objects O2-O4 are constructed from O1 through the various modes of determination. They are, however, not just nominal items which can be reduced to more basic ontological primitives or merely objects which are conceptually necessary for explaining reality and our experiences of it. This is because these objects

really do appear in their respective states of awareness and so although their existence is contingent upon determination according to Ratnakīrti's analysis they really [tattvataḥ] exist. There is, however, a distinction between the ontological status of these objects and O1 which is the only object not dependent upon determination for its appearance in a state of awareness. As discussed in Chapter 3, Ratnakīrti argues that error [bhrānti] is the result of taking something to be an 'x' when a 'non-x' [atasmintadgraha] is given.[83] Since determination constructs an object 'x' when a 'non-x' is given e.g., it constructs an O2.1 object from the non-O2.1 object O1, Ratnakīrti asserts that determination [adhyavasāya] is nothing other than error [bhrānti] itself. This means that even though it may not be possible to prove that specific O2-O4 objects are false or they will be contradicted by another object of awareness in the future, as a result of being determined they are still the product of error [bhrānti]. The distinction between O1 and O2-O4 is based, therefore, on O2-O4 being erroneous in this way. As a result, O1 is said to be the only object that ultimately exists.

4.0 Conclusion

In this Chapter I have tried to reconstruct Ratnakīrti's account of what there is in order to show that there is no room in his ontology for a mind-independent entity like Īśvara. Although it is speculative in many of its details, this reconstruction brings Ratnakīrti's general ontological position into view; Ratnakīrti is a reductionist.[84] According to

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[83]RNA [CAPV: 137.03-137.04]: {śāstre ca} atasmins tadgrahāt svapratibhāse 'narthe ' rthādhyavasāyād dṛśyavikalpyayor ekīkaraṇād bhrāntir uktā || "Since when a non-'x' is manifest determination grasps an 'x' in place of a 'non-x' and makes what is seen and what is determined into a single thing, it is said to be error." Also see Chapter 3, Section 4.2.

[84]For a quick characterization of reductionism see Horgan (1995: 438) in Kim and Sosa eds., (1998). "Ontologically reductionist positions typically assert that there are systematic identities between entities, kinds, properties and facts posited respectively in the 'higher-level' discourse and in the 'lower-level,'

Ratnakīrti's reductionism, what is denied about the ontological status of everyday objects is their status as ontological primitives. Ratnakīrti's position is that such objects can be reduced to a more primitive or basic set of components. This means that statements about such objects need not be false, since they too can be translated (without a significant loss of content) into statements about those objects that are more ontologically primitive. According to Ratnakīrti, for example, the (putative) existence of all mind-independent objects can be reduced to the existence of the determined objects of which they are just external projections. Statements involving such (putative) mind-independent objects are still meaningful, however, and may be true or false. What Ratnakīrti argues is simply that such statements must be divested of a certain kind of ontological commitment. This is reflected in his view that such objects are non-existent [asat] and can only be said to exist, conventionally. The status of determined objects is, however, slightly more complicated. In so far as determined objects are facets of awareness they are present in awareness and are, therefore, said to exist [sat]. They do not, however, exist as they appear since their appearance is due to the error that accompanies all forms of mental construction. As a result, they too do not have the status of ontological primitives. According to Ratnakīrti, these objects are themselves constructed from an even more primitive and single, complex set of facets. Ratankīrti's ontology is ultimately reducible to this single complex object which he says is nothing but awareness itself.

4.1 An Ontology for Epistemology

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reducing, discourse." More a more nuanced account of reductionism in the context of other positions see Price (1992).

Ratnakīrti's remarks on what there is provides, in my view, yet another perspective from which to consider his critique of the Naiyāyikas' argument for the existence of Īśvara. Just as his theory of exclusion provided resources for understanding Ratnakīrti's account of epistemic objects and relations, his ontology helps us to understand how these objects are related to one another. His account of O1-O4 provides a kind of "ontological structure" on which to map his theory of content and his epistemology. For example, while the theory of exclusion tells us that universals are constructed from particulars, Ratnakīrti's ontology helps us to see that many of those particulars are themselves the result of construction. Similarly, while his theory of exclusion suggests that he is a conventionalist about epistemic necessity, his ontology helps us to see that in the final analysis nothing about what our thoughts are about is due to the external world in which we are supposed to live. Most interestingly perhaps, his remarks on the status of external objects show us that even though an intelligence-possessing maker like Īśvara is not the maker of the world, there is still an intelligence-possessing (or mental) maker of the world: That maker is not the Naiyāyikas' Īśvara, but, mental construction, exclusion, and determination .

Conclusion
On Why It Still Is Important to Think about Īśvara

0. Introduction

Philosophical arguments for and against the existence of God-like beings such as Īśvara have been important to the study of philosophy in both its Euro-American and South Asian contexts. This is, in part, because there is often much more at stake in such arguments than just the existence of an entity of one kind or the other. Often what is at stake is both the world view within which an Īśvara-like being is supposed to play a central role and the sense of self and way of life that is recommended by it. While such concerns must have played a role in Ratnakīrti's argument with the Naiyāyikas, Ratnakīrti's texts are interestingly silent about it. For the most part, this is also the case with those of his Nyāya interlocutors. In concluding this dissertation, therefore, I want to just note what these texts do suggest is at stake in arguments about the nature and existence of Īśvara. I will do so by describing why it is still important for those of us who are interested in philosophy and the study of South Asian religions to think about Īśvara.

1.0 Philosophy

Although Ratnakīrti's arguments against the existence of Īśvara focus on a single inferential argument, they touch on a broad range of issues in the philosophy of religion, epistemology, the philosophy of language, the philosophy of mind, and

ontology. This is, of course, also the case with arguments for and against the existence of God.[1] And like arguments about the existence of God, the significance of arguments about the existence of Īśvara extends well beyond the theological contexts in which they may have originally developed. They are therefore much more important than is generally assumed. For example, such arguments often provide a context in which the full philosophical machinery available to a particular philosopher is (or can be) focused on a single issue. They provide, therefore, an excellent framework within which to study the work of a philosopher as a whole. As a result, they also provide an opportunity for considering a philosopher's views on a wide variety of different issues. For this reason alone such arguments should be of continuing interest to historians of philosophy. Interestingly, in Ratnakīrti's case, many of these arguments are also directly related to more contemporary concerns in both philosophy and the philosophy of religion. Consider, for example, just three sets of philosophical issues that emerge from Ranakīrti's work; two of which are rather specific and one which is more general. The first set of issues has to do with the problem of necessary *a posteriori* truths.

Ratnakīrti's account of inference-warranting relations shows that according to both Ratnakīrti and the Naiyāyikas epistemic necessity is determined, in part, through a set of empirical observations, and not through *a priori* reflection alone. Both seem to agree that empirical inquiry is a suitable method for investigating modality. Moreover, they also seem to agree that inference-warranting relations state truths that are both

[1]See, for example, Adams (1987), Alston (1991), Craig and Smith (1993), Dembski (1998), McClennen (1994: 1-31) in Jordan ed., (1994), Plantinga (1967), Plantinga (1980), Plantinga (1993), Plantinga (1999), Rowe (1975), and Swinburne (1991).

necessary and knowable *a posteriori*. Although they may agree that inference-warranting relations are examples of necessary *a posteriori* truths, they fundamentally disagree on both the grounds of their necessity; that is, what makes them necessary, and their nature; that is, in what their necessity consists. The Naiyāyikas, for example, are realists about modality. In arguing that epistemic necessity supervenes on non-epistemic facts they are arguing that inference-warranting relations are necessary because the state of affairs that they describe are necessary and furthermore that this state of affairs is simply a matter of the way the world really is. According to the Naiyāyikas, modality finds its home in a mind-independent world and specifically in its natural relations. In arguing that necessity is defined by these natural relations, the Naiyāyikas maintain that necessity consists in the natural regularities that are described by states of affairs. Specifically *epistemic* necessity consists in our warranted awareness of these regularities. Although our awareness of these regularities is such that there is always the logical possibility of error, this error is not always epistemically significant. In contrast, Ratnakīrti is a conventionalist about modality. According to him, modality cannot find its home in a mind-independent world. Rather, it finds its home in us and our ways of thinking, speaking, and living. In contrast to the Naiyāyikas, he argues that epistemic necessity does not consist in our awareness of natural regularities, but in our awareness of law-like relations such as those defined by the production and identity modes of pervasion. Unlike our awareness of natural relations, our warranted awareness of these relations is such that there is not even supposed to be the logical possibility of error. Given these different accounts of the grounds and nature of necessity, Ratnakīrti and the Naiyāyikas' basic agreement that inference-warranting relations are both necessary and knowable *a*

posteriori, and the attention that is focused on these relations, it should be clear that at least a part of what is at stake in debates about the nature and existence of Īśvara is the nature of modality and the problem of necessary *a posteriori* truths.[2]

Related to these issues about modality are also issues that have to do with mental content. The Naiyāyikas are externalists about content; according to them, our thoughts are about what they are about in virtue of the way in which we are situated in the world. Their confidence that our defeasible awareness is strong enough to support epistemic necessity is, in part, grounded in the conviction that even though our awareness may be defeasible the state of affairs that our awareness is of, is not. For them, it is because content is to a significant degree "non-conceptual all the way up" that there are virtually no "gaps" between epistemic certainty and epistemic necessity (both of which are located in us) and non-epistemic necessity (which is located in the world).[3] Satisfying a set of acceptibility conditions epistemically entails both that an argument is justified (an epistemic fact) and that an Instrument is well-functioning (a non-epistemic fact). Ratnakīrti, however, is anything but an externalist about content. He is perhaps best characterized as a constructivist, and a special kind of one at that. For him, it is "conceptual all the way down."[4] As a result, there could be significant "gaps" between epistemic and (so called) non-epistemic necessity. A fundamental problem with the Nyāya view according to him is that these

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[2]For some of the more important and yet accessible discussions of necessary *a posteriori* truths see Kripke (1980), Putnam (1981), Salmon (1981), and Sidelle (1986).

[3]The phrase "non-conceptual all the way up" is from Stalnaker (1999) and is used by him to characterize his own position.

[4]The phrase "conceptual all the way down" characterizes the view of McDowell (1996).

gaps cannot be bridged by their empiricist theory of justification. This conviction is grounded in his theory of content. With respect to inference-warranting relations, for example, his view is that such relations must be grounded in law-like generalizations. These non-defeasible relations are not only strong enough to support genuine epistemic necessity, but they are also the only way to bridge the gap between what we know and what there is (even if what there is, is ultimately what we know). It is Ratnakīrti's constructivism that grounds his logicism. For both Ratnakīrti and the Naiyāyikas, a theory of content; that is, a theory about how and why are thoughts are about what they are about, is central to their epistemology and therefore to their arguments about the nature and existence of Īśvara. Although it is not discussed explicitly, it is clear that what is also at stake in their arguments about the nature and existence of Īśvara are issues having to do specifically with the metaphysics of modality and the relationships between mind and world.[5]

In addition to the specific issues just described, Ratnakīrti's work also suggests that beyond the existence of Īśvara what is at stake in his arguments is a theory of rationality and more specifically a theory of religious reasoning in which the power and reach of inferential arguments is a central concern. Both Ratnakīrti and the Naiyāyikas agree that theories of inferential reasoning provide powerful frameworks for arriving at and sustaining rational beliefs. They also agree that inferential reasoning is a kind of intellectual practice that results in the production of an

[5]Many of these issues have to do with what is sometimes called the metaphysics of epistemology. Recently, there has been a renewed interest (primarily by students of Sellars) in pursuing such questions. See, for example, Chalmers (1996), Evans (1982), McDowell (1996), Putnam (1999), Sellars (1997), and Williams (1996).

inferential argument and a series of arguments and counter-arguments through which it is justified. This is clear from the dialogical nature of the texts themselves. Attention to the framework created by such reasoning is important since it is much broader than that of traditional logic which tends to see arguments just in terms of their formal structures. Yet, it is much narrower than approaches in which arguments are simply viewed as instances of rhetoric and therefore a proper part of communication theory. In arguing about inferential arguments as they do, Ratnakīrti and the Naiyāyikas are arguing about the standards for rational acceptability. This suggests that there is a very close relationship between Sanskrit theories of inferential reasoning and the "informal logic movement," particularly the branch known as empirical logic. For too long now the study of Sanskrit theories of inferential reasoning have been constrained by the demands of formal approaches to logic. As Ratnakīrti and the Naiyāyikas both recognize, there are many ways of arriving at and sustaining rational beliefs other than deduction, and as they both make clear, their informal argument schemas are supposed to meet normative standards. It is in the context of seeking a wider and perhaps more adequate framework for religious reasoning that philosophers of religion should be interested in arguments about the nature and existence of Īśvara.[6]

2.0 Religion

[6]In my view the study of Sanskrit theories of inferential reasoning needs to be recontextualized in more informal logical contexts and frameworks. It will be especially fruitful, in my view, to view them as theories of argumentation in which rationality is the most central concept and concern. Habermas (1981: 22) has long recognized both the genetic link between theories of argument and rationality, and the relative lack of attention given to such issues in Euro-American philosophy: "The concept of rationality that I have introduced (...) has to be elucidated in terms of a theory of argumentation. Notwithstanding a venerable tradition going back to Aristotle, however, this theory is still in its beginnings." For a discussion of theories of argument and informal logic see Finocchiaro (1980), Govier (1993), Johnson (2000), Toulmin (1958), and Walton (1996).

The arguments that I have considered in this dissertation represent just one moment in a very long history of polemical debates between Buddhists, Naiyāyikas, Mīmāṃsakas, Vedantins, and Jains on the nature and existence of Īśvara.[7] Even this

[7]Īśvara first appears, explicitly, as a part of the Nyāya system in Vātsyāyana's commentary on the *Nyāyasūtra*; that is, sometime in the latter half of the fifth century. Īśvara arrives in the Vaiśeṣika system about a century later through Praśastapāda's [550-650] commentary on the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*. For the next 800 years each and every (major) writer in the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika tradition discussed the nature and existence of Īśvara. Their comments, which were usually longer and more detailed than those of their predecessors, were in almost every case motivated by specific (and often identifiable) Buddhist and Mīmāṃsā criticisms. In addition to these commentaries there were independent Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Buddhist treatises which included lengthy discussions on the nature and existence of Īśvara. And as is common in this period of South Asian intellectual history, the Jains carefully followed each of these debates and included very close, critical, and often insightful readings of them in their works. Although this is not the place to provide a complete account of this history, consider this brief (and selective) outline of nearly one thousand years of an even longer textual history of Nyāya and Buddhist polemics regarding the existence of Īśvara.

As mentioned above, systematic Nyāya discussions of Īśvara appear in the 5th century with Vātsyāyana's commentary on the *Nyāya-sūtra* (NS), the *Nyāyabhāṣya* (NB). His work was followed by a now lost commentary on the Nyāyasūtra by a Naiyāyika named Aviddhakaraṇa (550-610). Two surviving fragments of this work preserve his inferential arguments for the existence of Īśvara and are known to us through a later Buddhist text, the *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* (TSP) of Kamalaśīla (740-795). At about the same time as Aviddhakaraṇa, Uddyotakara (550-610) wrote the second of the four main commentaries on the Nyāya-sūtra's, the *Nyāyavārttika* (NV). Uddyotakara appends an almost independent essay on the nature and existence of Īśvara to his comments on the three "theism sūtras" of the Nyāyasūtra (NS 4.1.19-4.1.21). This section of text also makes use of his response to the Buddhist Dignāga's (480-540) criticisms of the epistemological framework used by the Naiyāyikas to prove Īśvara's existence. Uddyotakara's views were criticized by the Buddhist Dharmakīrki (600-660), who devotes about 20 verses to discussing this topic in his *Pramāṇavārttika* (PV1.8-1.28); Śubhagupta (720-780), who composed a free standing work called the *Īśvarabhaṅgakārikās*; and more famously Śāntarakṣita (725-783) and his commentator Kamalaśīla (740-795) who devote an entire chapter in their works, the *Tattvasaṃgraha* (TS) and the *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* (TSP), to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika arguments for the existence of Īśvara. Their work is encyclopedic and also quotes extensively from the works of the Naiyāyikas themselves, and their previous Buddhist and Mīmāṃsā critics. Nyāya responses to this criticism are found in the work of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (840-900), in his independent work, the *Nyāyamañjari* (NM), and his play, the *Āgamaḍambara*(ī). Bhāsarvajña (860-920), in his *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* (NBhū) and Vācaspatimiśra (900-980), whose *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā* (NVTT), the third great commentary in the Nyāya tradition and Nyāyakaṇikā (NKan), a long commentary on the *Viddhiviveka* (VV) of the Mīmāṃsaka Maṇḍanamiśra, contain extensive and detailed summaries of and responses to the previously mentioned Buddhist and Mīmāṃsa critics of Īśvara. In roughly this time period a little known (but very interesting) Buddhist author named Śankarananda (800-900) also composed five independent (though related) texts on the existence of Īśvara. His work, which was known and used by the Śaiva Abhinavagupta (950-1020) in his *Pratyabhijñāvṛttivimarśinī*, has unfortunately not yet been printed. The Buddhist response to the work of Jayantabhaṭṭa, Bhāsarvajña, Vācaspatimiśra, and the two lesser known Naiyāyikas who followed them, Vittoka (950-1000) and Narasiṃha (950-1000), is found in the work of Jñānasrīmitra (980-1040) and Ratnakīrti (1000-1060) who each devote roughly one-quarter

small part of this long and complicated history suggests, however, why it is still important for those of us who are interested in the study of South Asian religions to think about Īśvara today.

Inter-religious debates about the nature and existence of Īśvara clearly show that technical philosophical discussions can be important for understanding broader themes in South Asian religious history. Seemingly irrelevant discussions about the proper form of inferential arguments or the nature of inference-warranting relations are easily seen to be necessary for understanding religious epistemology in South Asia. In

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of their work to presenting and refuting Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika arguments for the existence of Īśvara. The work of Jñānasrīmitra and Ratnakīrti was also used by Mokṣākaragupta (1075-1150) in his well known manual of Buddhist philosophy, the *Tarkabhāṣā* (MTBh). It was also Jñānasrīmitra's views that motivated, it seems, the Nyāya philosopher and theologian Udayana (1000-1050) to discuss Īśvara in his works, most famously, in his *Attmatattvaviveka* (ATV) , *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkāpariśuddhi* (NVTTP), and *Nyāyakusumāñjali* (NKu); a text which (along with its nearly 900 year commentarial history) is devoted exclusively to arguments for and against the existence of Īśvara. Although we do not know of any Buddhist authors who directly responded to Udayana, the Buddhist approach to criticizing the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position is clearly evident in the work of Udayana's greatest critic, the Vedāntin, Śrīharṣa (c. 1150). Following Udayana in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition of thinking about Īśvara were the Naiyāyikas, Varadarāja (1100-1150) [*Nyāyakusumāñjalibodhanī*]; Śaśādhara (1275-1325) [*Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa*]; and finally Gaṅgeśa (1300) and the commentarial tradition based on his discussion of Īśvara in the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*.

The texts and authors that I have just mentioned are still only a part of an even more extensive and complicated textual history of polemical debates between Naiyāyika's and Buddhists regarding the existence of Īśvara. What they reveal, however, is that these two intellectual traditions did not develop in parallel, but, were continually intersecting one another, so much so that when one looks closely at any of the texts mentioned it becomes clear just how much each tradition influenced the course of the other. To the intersecting paths of these two traditions must also be added the interventions of Jain, Mīmāṃsā, Vaiśeṣika, and to a lesser extent Vedanta philosophers and theologians. The debates about Īśvara are like a "hall of mirrors"; when one looks carefully at any text in which Īśvara is discussed one immediately sees in it innumerable reflections of earlier texts and comes to see that it too is reflected in those that follow. Given this textual history it is, in my judgement, impossible to conclude anything other than that it was important for Hindu, Buddhist, and Jain intellectuals to think about Īśvara. One question that immediately comes to mind, of course, is why it has not been equally important for those of us who study them.

Note: For references to the dates and texts referred to above see Potter (1977), Potter (1993), and Steinkellner and Much (1995).

many cases, such discussions are also the best way to appreciate the role that philosophical arguments did and did not play in the religious projects of Buddhists, Jains, Naiyāyikas, Mīmāṃsakas, and Vedāntins. It is, moreover, only by carefully reading and struggling with the details of such arguments that we can even begin to think along with, let alone understand, the concerns of individuals whom the various traditions themselves considered to be so important. Attention to these details helps us to see where our concerns and interests overlap with theirs and, more importantly, forces us to see where they do not. Polemical texts about the existence of Īśvara are, in my opinion, especially valuable.[8] They are contexts in which a variety of theories, doctrines, and beliefs are focused on a religious theme; they serve as concrete examples of the ways in which the philosophy of religion was interpreted and practiced in pre-modern and pre-colonial South Asia; and they suggest to me, at least, that in pre-modern South Asia philosophical activity could be a form of religious practice, and therefore ought to be of much greater interest to students of religion.[9]

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[8]By "polemical texts" I mean those classical Sanskrit texts in which a particular philosophical theory or religious doctrine is defended, in part, by surveying and refuting rival views. See Griffiths (1994): "(Polemics) points, rather, to the kind of engagement that does and should occur when those who take what they believe seriously encounter others equally serious about, and committed to, their beliefs."

[9]This controversial claim will not be defended here. I am mentioning it because I think that philosophical activity has too quickly and uncritically been dismissed as being a kind of religious practice, and therefore a proper object (and subject) of study for those interested in 'religious' matters. What debates about Īśvara suggest, however, is that inferential reasoning was indeed a kind of practice in South Asia. Whether this practice is best characterized as an intellectual, cultural, and/or religious one is something that I have not yet made a judgement about. For a discussion of related issues in Euro-American thought see Hadot (1985).

Also consider the following: "īśvaramanañ ca mokṣahetuḥ (religious reasoning about īśvara brings about liberation). This remark is made by Udyana's commentator Vardhamāna in his *Nyāyakusumāñjaliprakāśa* [NKP (1950: 12)]. The word "manana" refers to the analysis in Udayana's text. The sentiment expressed in this very short remark is, in my opinion, an important feature of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika interest in Īśvara and there are many passages in Udayana's work which confirm this. Consider, for example, the first three verses of Udayana's *Nyāyakusumāñjali* (NKu): satpakṣaprasaras satāṃ parimalaprodbodhabaddhotsavo |vimlāno na vimardane 'mṛtarasaprasyandamādhvīkabhūḥ | īśvarasyaiṣa niveśitaḥ padayuge bhṛṅgāyamāṇaṃ bhramacceto me ramayatvavighnam anagho nyāyaprasūnāñjaliḥ || svargāpavargayor mārgam āmananti manīṣinaḥ | yad upāstim asāv atra paramātmā

The textual history of inter-religious polemics about Īśvara also reminds us that the intellectual world of classical South Asia was an interconnected one in which Hindu, Buddhist, and Jain authors were not only aware of one another but often made extensive use of each others' work. The interconnections were, therefore, both broad and deep. There are, for example, hundreds of polemical texts and thousands of pages of commentaries in which even the issue of inference-warranting relations is discussed. The intellectual activity that occupied Ratnakīrti and his interlocutors was, therefore, hardly exceptional. This fact should force us to re-think the ways in which we study South Asian religions today; as separate, if not easily separable, units of discourse and practice. That pre-modern intellectuals chose to engage each other in the ways revealed in these texts also suggests that there are distinctively South Asian models of religious pluralism and shows, more specifically, how the "engaged pluralism" revealed by these texts differs radically from many contemporary points of view.

Finally, this material reminds us that while such texts and the technical discussions contained therein may be of only historical interest to many students of South Asian religions, they were clearly not of just historical interest to their Hindu, Buddhist, and Jain readers. There is a normative element to this work that cannot be denied and

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nirucyate || nyāyacarceyam īśvarasya mananavyapadeśabhāk | upāsanaiva krīyate śravaṇānantarāgatā | "This scattering of perfect blossoms which does not whither when crushed is a place from which honey flows forth like the essence of nectar. It is a permanent celebration of the awakening of its fragrance for the wise. This perfect handful of flower blossoms (i.e., the Nyāyakusumāñjali) is offered in the form of arguments, without hindrance, at the feet of the Lord. May it delight my mind which, like a bumble bee, is searching. The wise explain that the path to heaven and final liberation is this worship of the Paramātmā who is indicated here. It is a rational inquiry [nyāyacarcā] about Īśvara that is (itself) a meditation. It is indeed the form of worship that follows the listening (to śruti)."

must not be overlooked. In recognition of this normative element we must, in my view, take steps to assess the arguments that are made in these texts. Unless we do so it is unlikely that we will be able to even understand the arguments and what they are really about. This suggests, then, that to some extent it is always necessary to engage constructively with this material. Such texts remind us of just how close the relationship is between producing work that is historically and philologically responsible and that which is philosophically and theologically informed. What these texts teach us is that there is a need not only for work about what South Asian religions have been, but also for what they can be.

APPENDICES

Appendix A
Figures

Figure 1: Acceptability Conditions

A1: Performance Conditions

(P1) H1a, Unestablished in the subject [*āśraya-asiddha*]

A2: Instrument Conditions, Triple Conditions

P1, T1: H1b, Unestablished in itself [*svarūpa-asiddha*]

Pervasion Conditions

P2, **T2**, V, (A2.1): **H2**, Opposed [*viruddha*] (a direct defeater); H3b, Uncommon [*asādhāraṇa-anaikāntika*]; H3c, Not universal [*anupasaṃhārin*]

P3, **T3**, V: H2, (A2.2): Opposed [*viruddha*] (an indirect defeater); **H3a$_1$**, Generally-inconclusive [*sādhāraṇa-anaikāntika*] (a direct defeater); **H3a$_2$**, Generally-inconclusive [*sādhāraṇa-anaikāntika*] (an underminer called "doubt about the exclusion (of the inferential reason) from dissimilar cases [*sandigdha-vipakṣa-vyāvṛtti*]"); H3c, Not universal [*anupasaṃhārin*]


U: H1c, Unestablished in being pervaded [*vyāpyatva-asiddha*]

A3: Argument Conditions

P4: H4, Equal in scope [*prakaraṇa-sama*]
P5: H5, Too late [*kālātyāpadiṣṭa*]

Key
[A] Acceptibility Conditions, [H] Defects of an inferential reason (hetvābhāsa), [P] Five characteristics of an inferential reason (pañcarūpāni), [T] Triple Conditions (trairūpya), [U] Additional Condition (upādhi), [V] Deviation (vyabhicāra).

Figure 2: Ratnakīrti's World



Appendix B
Translations

B1. A Refutation of Arguments for Establishing Īśvara [Īśvarasādhanadūṣaṇam]

Om. Praise to Tārā.

[32.01-32.06] Introductory Verses

Having taken something from the ocean of (my) teacher's words through which he, in virtue of being a locus of well-spoken jewels, conquered the ocean (of samsāra) this was written, in remembrance.

Among those who follow the middle path and are the best of men this course is an ocean of ambrosia, among those who are enemies it is a poisonous flame, and for those who know a little it is nothing.

[32.07-40.16] The Opponent's Position

{32.07-32.18} Now, the Naiyāyikā's etc., admit a special person [puruṣa-viśeṣa] who is characterized by qualities such as omniscience (and) who knows how to apportion [vibhāga-pravīṇa] self-natures [svarūpa], primary causes [upādāna], instruments [upakaraṇa], recipients [sampradāna], and purposes [prayojana] to the mountains etc., which are the objects being discussed [vivāda-pada]. As they say:

He who is single [eka], omnipresent [vibhu], omniscient [sarvavid], a basis for intelligence [buddhisamāśraya], and eternal [śāsvata] is called "Īśvara." He is accepted as a warranted mode of awareness [pramāṇa], he is the maker [vidhātā] of the world, and should be sought by those who desire heaven [svarga] and final liberation [apavarga].[1]

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[1] See JNA [133.16-133.17].

When they are asked "How is he proved?," they present this argument [sādhana]:

The object being discussed [vivādādhyāsita] is caused by an intelligence-possessor [buddhimaddhetuka].

On account of (its) being an effect [kāryatva].

Whatever is an effect [kārya] is caused by an intelligence-possessor [buddhimaddhetuka], just as a pot.

And, this is an effect [kārya].

Therefore, it is caused by an intelligence-possessor [buddhimaddhetuka].[2]

[32.19-39.01] The Five Defects of an Inferential Reason

{32.19-39.01} An inferential reason [hetu] makes known an object which is beyond the range of the senses [parokṣārtha]. It cannot be included among the known fallacies [hetvābhāsa] of an inferential reason and there are five fallacies of inferential reasons. As it was said: "Having Deviation [savyabhicāra], Opposed [viruddha], A Rival for the Subject [prakaraṇasama], An Equivalent for the Property to be Proved [sādhyasama], (and) Mis-timed [atītakāla]."[3]

[32.22-33.20] Unestablished [asiddha]

Note: References to the numerous parallel passages in JNA have only been cited occasionally.

[2] JNA [133.03-133.05]

[3] NS 1.2.4

{32.22-32.24} Now then, among these, this inferential reason [hetu] does not (have) 'An Equivalent to the Property to be Proved [sādhyasama].' This is because 'An Equivalent to the Property to be Proved [sādhyasama]' is said to be 'Unestablished [asiddha].' And, being partially [saṃkṣepa] sub-divided, it is differentially established as being of two sorts: Either it is 'Unestablished [asiddha]' because it is 'Unestablished in the Subject of the Inference [āśraya-asiddha]' as (in the example) "A sky-lotus is fragrant on account of being a lotus" or it is 'Unestablished [asiddha]' because even when the subject of an inference [āśraya] exists, its relation (to it) is not proved by a warranted mode of awareness [pramāṇa], as (in the example) "Sound is impermanent on account of having parts [sāvayavatva]." {32.24-33.03} The proposed inferential reason [hetu], however [ca], is not disproved by either of these two methods since when (the subject of an inference), a property-possessor [dharmī] such as a tree, is known [sam+adhi+√gam] through a warranted mode of awareness [pramāṇa], the inferential reason [sādhana], 'being an effect [kāryatva],' is clearly known [prati+√ī] through (that) warranted mode of awareness [pramāṇa]. And if (the subject of the inference) is a property-possessor [dharmī] which was produced a long time ago such as a mountain, its 'being an effect' is made known through the inferential reason [hetu], 'having parts [sāvayavatva]'; that is, just as (in the argument):

The object being discussed [vivādapada] is an effect [kārya].
On account of (its) having parts [sāvayavatva].
Whatever has parts is an effect, just like cloth.
And, this is like that.
Therefore, it is an effect.

{33.10-33.11} One may argue [nanu...iti cet]: "Through the inferential reason [hetu] 'having parts [sāvayavatva],' only substances [dravya] are proven to be effects, not the qualities [guṇa] and actions [karma] etc., that are inherent [samaveta] in them. This is because they do not have parts [avayavasambandhābhāvāt]." {33.11-33.17} Correct. They should be known [adhi+√gam] as effects through another inferential reason [hetu]; (the inferential reason), 'being the quality [guṇa] of an effect [kārya].' To explain:

The objects being discussed i.e., qualities [guṇa] etc. that inhere in other than eternal things, are products [janmabhāj].

On account of (their) being qualities [guṇa] etc., of effects [kārya].

Every quality [guṇa] etc., of an effect [kārya] is like that, just like the color etc., of a pot etc.

And, these are like that.

Therefore, they are products [janmabhāj].

{33.18-33.20} Moreover, (the inferential reason) 'being an effect' should not be understood as inhering in its own form [svarūpasamavāya] or as a special universal [viśeṣa-sāmānya] since, as such, it would be unestablished in a part [bhāga-asiddha] (of the subject of the inference) since it would not pervade the absence-due-to-destruction [pradhvaṃsa-abhāva] (which is also an effect). Rather, (an effect should be understood as) 'merely that whose self-nature is dependent upon a cause [kāraṇa-adhīna-svarūpa-mātra].' And when there is destruction due to absence etc., it is known [adhi+√gam] through perception, like in the case of sound etc. {39.20} So then, this inferential reason [hetu] is not unestablished [asiddha].

[33.21-36.20] Opposed [viruddha]

{33.21-33.24} Neither is it opposed [viruddha]. To explain: It is well known [khalu] that one which exists in only [eva] dissimilar cases [vipakṣa] proves what is opposed to what is to be proved [sādhya-viruddha] through its pervasion by the opposite of what is to be proved [sādhya-viparyaya-vyāpti]. It is named "opposed [viruddha]" just as (the inferential reason in the example), "Sound is permanent on account of being an effect." But this (inferential reason) is not like that since it is observed to really exist in similar cases [sapakṣa], such as a pots, which have well-known makers [prasiddhakartṛka].

{33.24-33.26} One may argue [nanu...iti cet]: "If what is to be proved [sādhya] is (its) 'being caused by an intelligence-possessor [buddhimat-pūrvakatva],' there is (the problem of) 'proving what is accepted [siddha-sādhana].'[4] This is because even the opponents [para] agree that a collection of effects [kārya-jāta] is produced as the result of action [karma]. And since either the action [karma] itself is sentient [cetanā-ātmakatva] or it has a sentient cause [cetanā-hetukatva], the world [jagat] has a cause like that. {33.26-33.27} If, however, what is to be proved is (its) 'having an omniscient cause [sarvajña-pūrvakatva],' (then), in that case, pervasion [vyāpti] is not apprehended [upa+√labh] even in a dream.[5] Since potters etc., are not omniscient, the example [dṛṣṭānta] does not have what is to be proved [sādhya-hīna]. {33.27-33.28} Moreover, the inferential reason [hetu] is opposed [viruddha] since, in the case of pots etc., the pervasion of 'being an effect' with 'having a non-omniscient cause' is apprehended. {33.28-33.31} It is (also) not correct [sāmpratam] that the scope of the inferential reason [sādhana-viṣaya] is 'a sentient-cause-in-general [upalabdhimat-pūrvaka-mātra]' and that the special characteristic [viśeṣa], 'being an omniscient cause,' is proved as a result of it even

[4]RNA [33.28-34.16; 34.24-34.28] corresponds to NKaṇ [702.03-706.06]

[5]See RNA [50.23].

though it is not within its scope [viṣaya]. To explain: If the special characteristic [viśeṣa] is not within the scope [viṣaya] of the inferential reason [hetu], how is it proved by it? If it is proved, how is it not within its scope? {33.31} And if it is within its scope [viṣaya], how could one not admit [√spṛs] the problem of the lack of positive concomitance [ananvaya-doṣa]."

{33.32-34.05} (About this) it is said: An inference definitely takes special characteristics [viśeṣa] as its object [viṣaya]. This is because, although pervasion [vyāpti] is just between universals [sāmānya-mātra], since an inferential reason is a property of the subject of an inference [pakṣadharmatā] there is, with respect to the subject of an inference [sādhya-dharmī], the inference of a universal [sāmānya] which includes special characteristics [antarbhāvita-viśeṣa]. If this were not the case [itarathā], there would be the unwanted consequence of the failure [uccheda] of all inferences. {34.01-34.06} To explain: This is because it was proved just prior to this that even the inference of fire does not just take a universal as its object [sāmānyamātra-viśaya]. Neither is its object [gocara] a mountain which is qualified by it [tadviśiṣta-giri]. This is because, since it is not (directly) related to it, it is impossible for the universal 'fire-ness' to be a special characteristic [viṣeśaṇa] of it (i.e., the mountain). If this were not the case [itarathā], just as spotted cows etc., are cows because of the inherence of the universal 'cow-ness,' even a mountain could be taken to be fire because of the inherence of the universal 'fire-ness.' One may argue [iti...cet]: "There is the relation of 'inherence in what is joined' [samyukta-samavāya] between the universal 'fire-ness' and the mountain." But without knowing [prati√pad] the particular fire [vahni-viśeṣa] that is joined to the mountain, it is impossible to know that. And so there is not even the inference of a particular fire [vahni-

viśeṣa]. {34.06} And in this way there is the unwanted consequence of the problem of a lack of positive concomitance [ananvaya-doṣa].

{34.06-34.10} Just this reasoning [nyāya] is observed even in the inference of a sense faculty [indriya] where [yathā] a special instrument [karaṇa-viṣeśa] defined as a sense faculty [indriya] is proved. To explain: In that case too, an action [kriyā] that has a sense faculty as its instrument [indriya-karaṇika] is not perceived. As is well known [khalu], since a small saw isn't a sense faculty, the action [kriyā] of cutting etc., is not an inferential reason [sādhana] for proving a sense faculty. It is also not possible that the action [kriyā] whose defining characteristic is 'discerning [paricchitti] color etc.,' is an inferential reason for proving a small saw etc. {34.10-34.16} Therefore, just as when the universal 'being an action [kriyā-tva]' is pervaded by 'being dependent upon an instrument-in-general'[6] a special instrument [karaṇa-viśeṣa], defined as a sense faculty [indriya], is proved in virtue of (its) being a property of the subject of the inference [pakṣadharmatā], similarly, in this case too. Given that (the inferential reason) 'being an effect' is pervaded by 'a maker-in-general who knows the primary causes, instruments, beneficiaries, and purposes,' an implied [ākṣipta] special characteristic [viṣeśa], 'a knower-in-general of primary causes etc.,' is proved in virtue of (its) being a property of the subject of the inference [pakṣadharmatā]. {34.13-34.16} Otherwise, even the general-term [sāmānya] that is accepted as the pervader [vyāpaka] would not be proved since it is impossible that it does not have special characteristics [nir-viṣeśa] or special characteristics that are incomprehensible [asambhava-viṣeśa]. Since it is impossible for one who is not omniscient (and) who lacks awareness of the distinction between the unseen [adṛṣṭa] (karmic effects of our previous lives) to be the regulator [adhiṣṭātṛ], a

[6]See RNA [33.18- 33.20].

special (one) [viśeṣa] whose nature it is to be omniscient is strongly implied [balāt āpatati].

{34.17-34.24} One may argue [nanu ...iti cet]: "Just as (it is impossible to deny the pervasion of being an effect) with a maker-in-general who knows the primary causes [upādāna-abhijña-kartṛmātra], it is also impossible to deny (its) pervasion with 'being non-omniscient or embodied etc.' This is because the non-observation of deviation [vyabhicāra] is common [samāna] (to both)." This is not the case, because with respect to the production of an effect, being omniscient or non-omniscient, embodied or non-embodied, is not relevant [anupayogi]. This is because, since there would be the unwanted consequence of the non-production of pots etc., by non-omniscient potters etc., 'being omniscient [sārvajña]' does not result in [upa+√sthā] the correct maker. Neither does 'being non-omniscient' since there is the unwanted consequence that even bracelets could definitely be produced by a potter. In the same way neither is 'being embodied' relevant to the production of an effect since there is the unwanted consequence that even bracelets could definitely be produced by a potter. Neither is 'not being embodied' since there is the unwanted consequence that pots etc., could not be produced by a potter. Therefore, 'being caused by a person who knows the primary causes etc.,' alone pervades 'being an effect'. Moreover, just that is what is expressed by the word 'being caused by an intelligence-possessing person [buddhimat-puruṣa-pūrvaka].'

{34.24-34.26} Therefore, although the object of the pervasion [vyāpti-viṣaya] is 'being caused by an intelligence-possessor-in-general [buddhimat-pūrvakatva-mātra]' still, through (its) being a property of the subject of the inference [pakṣadharmatā], a special

characteristic of it [tadviṣeśa], omniscience, is ascertained [prati+√labh]. Thus, an inference has a special characteristic as its object [viśeṣa-viṣayam anumānam].[7]

{34.26-34.28} Moreover, there is not the unwanted consequence of the (previously) stated problem. This is because the questions defined as "excess [utkarṣa]" and "non-excess [apakarṣa]" which are common to all inferences on account of differences between the supposed properties [dharma-vikalpa] of what is to be proved [sādhya] and the example [dṛṣṭānta], are reasons for rejecting the legitimacy [prāmāṇya] of inferences-in-general.

{34.29-34.31} What the Kaṇikā said about this --"Given that potters etc., know the instruments etc. of a few (and) do not know the instruments etc., of everything [samastaupakaraṇajña], then, through this very example, Īśvara too (would) know only the instruments etc., of a few. If there is awareness of just those [tanmātra-jñāna], a knower of everything [sarvajña] is not proved. This is because, in such cases, he is a knower of a few [katipayajña]. {34.31-35.02} It is said (in Maṇḍanamiśra's Vidhiviveka): "And it is not the case that Īśvara knows just that [tanmātra-jña], like a child etc."[8] This is because although children and drunks etc., not having intentions [nirabhiprāya], do not know the purposes of their own actions [kārya], positive activity [pravṛtti] is observed in each an every case. Moreover, neither potters etc., nor children etc., are the example [nidarśana]. Thus, in this case, the inferential reason is invariable [niyama-hetu]."-- is refuted.[9]

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[7]See NKaṇ [702.03-706.06]. RNA [34.16-34.25] is not part of the NKaṇ passage.

[8]VV [700.02-700.03]

[9]Nkaṇ [700.08-700.15]

{35.03-35.14} This is because if Īśvara knows the super-sensory instruments etc., of a few [katipayātīndriyopakaraṇādijñāna], (then), because the cause is the same in every case, it is difficult to deny that he has knowledge of all of the instruments [aśeṣopakaraṇādijña]. And with respect to his knowledge, there is no cause other than existence [sattā] since it is impossible that merit [dharma] and demerit [adharma] etc., cause [hetu] ordinary perception [laukika-pratyāsatti] in that case. Moreover, given a non-difference in the causes there is a non-difference in the effect.[10] Otherwise there would not even be knowledge of the super-sensory instruments of a few. For just like a potter etc., does not have complete knowledge about what has similar, observational causal complexes [tulya-darśana-sāmagrī] so too does Īśvara, about super-sensory instruments etc. This is because there is a non-distinction in their capacity [sāmārthya]. It is not correct [na yukta] to deny that there is the awareness of the super-sensory instruments of a few through the example of a child or a drunk. This is because there would be the unwanted consequence of asserting the negation [niṣedhabhidhāna] of an intelligence-possessor-in-general through the example of a seed etc. Therefore, just as there is not the assertion of deviation [vyabhicāra-abhidhāna] through seeds etc., since there is also the possibility of knowing the primary caues etc., so too with the child or drunk etc. This is because what is to be proved [sādhya] and the inferential reason [sādhana] --'an inteligence-possessing maker who knows the primary causes etc.,' and 'being an effect'-- are well known with respect to that.

{35.12-35.15} Similarly, Īśvara's desire and effort [cikīrṣā-prayatna] are, like (his) knowledge, permanent. What was said about this -- "If the two are permanent how is Īśvara's knowledge relevant to his desire and effort [cikīrṣā-prayatna-upayogi]. This is

[10]PVSV ad PV1

because, since the two are permanent, there is no expectation that its purpose is their production, etc."[11]-- is also without substance [asāram].

{35.15-35.19} This is because it is impossible for there to be a maker who does not know [ajñātakartṛ]. This is because in those cases where desire and effort are impermanent, knowledge causes those two to come forth [upa+√sthā] (and) displays the instruments etc. But where those two are permanent, it also displays the instruments etc., and serves a purpose [saphalam]. Therefore, even when desire and effort are permanent, although it is not relevant to the direct production of an effect, Īśvara's knowledge serves a purpose [saphalam].

{35.19-35.21} And it is for just this reason that this too --"This special characteristic [viśeṣa] is not to be considered [vicāra-asaha]. How is it concluded [upa+sam+√hṛi] to be in the subject of the inference [sādhya-dharmi] even in virtue of being a property of the subject of the inference [pakṣadharmatā]?"[12]-- is mere prattle [pralāpa]. This is because since Īśvara's knowledge has not been refuted it is difficult to deny the special characteristic [viśeṣa] of being omniscient.

{35.22-35.24} What was said --"For the wise, positive activity of [pravṛtti] is pervaded by 'having a purpose [prayojanavat]'. And we do not see that the wise Īśvara has a purpose in creating the world. This is because there is the absence of that which is to be gained for one who has gained everything that is to be gained."[13]-- is also faulty [sāvadya].

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[11]NKaṇ [714.13-714.15]

[12]Nkaṇ [717.01-717.02]

[13]Nkaṇ [722.05-722.08]

{35.24-35.30} This is because his intention [abhiprāya] is difficult to know [durbodha]; because the absence of purpose [prayojana] is not proved; because there is the non-apprehension of the pervader [vyāpaka-anupalabdhi]; (and) because there is doubt [sandigdha]. Since [hi] the turnings of the mind [cetovṛtti] are complicated for people in general, how much more so [prāg eva] for the maker of the world! Since it is possible, even for one who has gained everything that is to be gained, to act, out of compassion [karuṇa], for the sake of others. It is, moreover, not the case that his positive activity of creating hell etc., strikes down his being compassionate [karuṇatā]. On the contrary [pratyuta], it is like a father's act of slapping the cheek of his son: It reveals the most excellent compassion because it removes a great deal of terrible suffering by giving a little pain. The inferential awareness of a purpose is reached through reason [nyāya-prāpta] since it is proved that for him too, like for the wise, there is invariable and steady positive activity [niyata-sthira-pravṛtti].

{35.31-36.02} What was said is, "For if there were one creator for all of the effects, then, he would be omniscient because it is impossible for an ignorant one to be so. But, if each and every effect is produced by its own unique maker then [iti] whoever causes an effect 'x' to be produced only knows its causes and is not omniscient."[14]

{36.03-36.10} About this it is said: "Because of a non-distinction [aviśeṣa] in the inferential reason 'an effect,' there is one maker. This is like (the non-difference) in the unity of existence [satta-ekatva] because there is a non-distinction [aviśeṣa] in the awareness 'exists [sad].' Because the multiplicity [nānātva] of a thing which was inferred from some inferential reason is to be inferred from a different inferential reason,

[14]See RNA [55.17-57.10].

a different warranted mode of awareness should be stated for demonstrating multiplicity [nānātva], just as those who establish [vi+ava+√sthā] the multiplicity of souls [ātma-nānātva] state that it is established through the mulitplicity of pleasures. But [ca] here, there is not another warranted mode of awareness for demonstrating more than one [aneka] maker. And another warranted mode of awareness is not needed for singularity since, if there is not a single maker, those numerous (and) independent makers whose minds are incompatiblethere could not simultaneously produce effects due to (them) contradicting one another and not communicating their selfish intentions [svānukūlābhiprāya] to each other. Or there would be the unwanted consequence that what was produced would be destroyed etc. On the other hand, if a single creator is established, there is no impediment to proving omniscience.

{36.10-36.11} And it is not the case that Īśvara is ignorant since there is not a cause for (his) knowledge of the merit [dharma] and demerit [adharma] that inheres in all individual souls [sakala-kṣetra-jña]. This is because knowledge [jñāna], desire [cikīrṣā], and purpose [prayojana] inhere in him (and) are eternal [nitya]. {36.11-36.12} And, there is not a contradiction between knowledge [buddhi] and being eternal [nitya].

{36.12-36.14} And it is not correct [na yuktam] that since in each and every case there is the apprehension that knowledge [buddhi] is impermanent, Īśvara's knowledge is like that. This is because there is the unwanted consequence that since in each and every case there is also the apprehension that color is impermanent, color, although it inheres in atoms of water etc., is impermanent.

{36.14-36.16} It is also definitely correct for him to be the regulator [adhiṣṭātṛ] of the merit [dharma] and demerit [adharma] that inheres in other persons since the relation [sambandha] of inherence in what is in contact with what is already in contact [saṃyukta-saṃyogi-samavāya] really exists. The atoms are already in contact [saṃyukta] with Īśvara and with them, the individual souls [kṣetra-jña]. Merit [dharma] and demerit [adharma] inhere in them.

{36.17-36.20} So having thus proceeded [upa+√sthā] in accordance with the essence [yathāsāram] of Vacaspati's refutation of Īśvara in his Kaṇikā, we have refuted it. And the rest is generally garbage. It is full of well-known unaccepted doctrines and was not written down [likhitam] out of fear of an exceedingly long text. So, in this way, the inferential reason is not opposed due to a special characteristic [viśeṣa-viruddha] since the intended special characteristic, defined as 'omniscience,' is proved. Nor is there the proof of what is accepted [siddha-sādhanam] through 'action [karma]'.[15] This is established [iti sthitam].

[36.21-38.13] Inconclusive [anaikāntika]

{36.21-36.23} And it is not Inconclusive [anaikāntika]. This is because [hi], being so, it would either be 'uncommon [asādhāraṇa],' as (in the example): "The earth is permanent on account of being fragrant [gandhavattva];" or 'without restriction [anupasaṃhārya],' as (in the example): "Everything is permanent [nitya] on account of being knowable [prameyatva];" or 'common' [sādhāraṇa],' as (in the example): "Sound is permanent [nitya] on account being intangible [asparśavattva]."

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[15]See RNA [33.24-33.26].

{36.24-36.25} Now then, among these it is neither of the first two alternatives since they are refuted by observing the existence [sadbhāva] of (the inferential reason in) a similar case [sapakṣa]. Neither is it the final one since there is the apprehension [upalabdhi] of its exclusion [vyāvṛtti] from dissimilar cases [vipakṣa] such as ether [vyomādi], with respect to which there is the exclusion of a known creator [adhigata-kartṛ-nivṛtti].

{36.26-36.27} One may argue [nanu...iti cet]: "People who see grass etc., growing without the activity [vyāpāra] of a person definitely do not admit [prati+√pad] the inference-warranting relation [vyāpti], 'Effects-in-general (i.e., all effects) [kārya-mātra] are caused by a person [puruṣa-pūrvaka]'."

{36.27-36.31} If this is so [evam], then even well-known inferences are to be offered a handful of water (and thereby given their last rites) [datta-jala-añjali]. This is because, in such cases, it is also possible to say that "when pervasion is being determined [vyāpti-pratīti-kāla], people who see [vi+√lok] smoke without the activity [vyāpāra] of fire -- (since) it is in a far away place filled with lions etc., or see a pot without the activity [vyāpāra] of a person --(since) it was made earlier, will definitely not admit [prati+√pad] the inference-warranting relation [vyāpti] "Smoke-in-general (i.e., all smoke) [dhūma-mātra] is caused by fire" or "Pots-in-general (i.e., all pots) [ghaṭa-mātra] are caused by a person."

{37.01} One may argue [iti...cet]: "Since in these cases fire is spatially remote [deśa-viprakṛṣṭa] and the person, temporally remote [kāla-viprakṛṣṭa], it is not ruled out [prati+√kṣip]."

{37.01-37.04} If this is so [yadyevam], (then) since the person is essentially remote [svabhāva-viprakṛṣṭa], it is not ruled out [prati+√kṣip] even in the case of grass etc. Thus, without your bias [abhiniveśa] everything is the same. Now then, it is not known that grass etc., is caused by the activity [vyāpāra] of a person. And that is not known because the person is either unobservable [adṛśya] or non-existent [asattva]. What is the use of this thinking [vicārita]?

{37.04-37.05} One may argue [iti...cet]: "Not seeing, in every case [sarvathā], that a specific effect [kimcit-kārya] is caused by an extraordinary person [apūrva-puruṣa], a thoughtful person [cetavān] understands the non-pervasion of effects-in-general (i.e., all effects) [kārya-mātra] with a person."

{37.05-37.11} If this is so [yady evam], then neither is it known that smoke is caused by fire-in-general [vahni-māta] nor that a pot is caused by a person-in-general [puruṣa-mātra]. And that is not known since the fire is either spatially remote [deśa-viprakṛṣṭa] or non-existent [asattva] and the person is either temporally remote [kāla-viprakṛṣṭa] or non-existent [asattva]. What is the use of this thinking [vicārita]? Not seeing, in every case [sarvathā], that smoke-in-general [dhūma-mātra] is caused by the activity of fire [vahni-vyāpāra-pūrvaka] and that pots-in-general [ghaṭa-mātra] are caused by a person [puruṣa-pūrvaka], some thoughtful person will understand the non-pervasion [avyāpti] of smoke with fire-in-general [vahni-mātra] and of a pot with a person-in-general [puruṣa-mātra]. Saying this (should) also not make one's mouth get bent out of shape [na vaktram vakrīkaroti]. So, what is the use of this sophistry [jātyuttara] which raises objections [apa+√lap (caus)] against well known inferences?

{37.12-37.14} This may be so. Non-deviation [avyabhicāra] is not ascertained [niścaya] through mere observation and non-observation [darśana-adarśana-mātra] in similar [sapakṣa] and dissimilar [asapakṣa] cases since, there is not the rule [niyama] of non-deviation [avyabhicāra] for (inferential reasons that are) either not of the same nature (as what is to be proved [sādhya]) [atadātmā] or are not produced from it [tadutpatti]. So, since there is doubt about its exclusion from dissimilar cases [sandigdha-vipakṣa-vyāvṛtti] this (inferential reason) 'being an effect [kāryatva]' is a non-inferential reason [asādhana].[16]

{37.15-37.16} About this it is said: There is no doubt [sandeha] about the exclusion [vyāvṛtti] of the inferential reason [hetu] from dissimilar cases [vipakṣa] since an effect-cause relationship, which is proved through apprehension [upalambha] and non-apprehension [anupalambha], is proved for an effect [kārya] and an intelligence-possessor [buddhimat], like it is for smoke and fire.

{37.17-37.18} One may argue [iti...cet]: "Only a specific effect [kārya-viśeṣa] is proved to be caused by him, not effects-in-general [kārya-sāmānya]; just as, it is not ascertained [niścaya] that being a thing [vastutva] etc., which is present in smoke etc., [dhūmādi-varti] is produced from fire."

{37.18-37.26} This is not the case since there is the absence of a distinct inferential reason [viśeṣahetvabhāva]. This is because, since there isn't a distinction [aviśeṣa] in the apprehension and non-apprehension [uplambha-anupalambha] which is admitted to

[16]JNA [235.06-235.08] attributes this passage to Vittoka.

prove [sādhana] the production-mode (of pervasion) [tadutpatti], an effect-in-general [kārya-sāmānya] is, like a specific effect [kārya-viśeṣa], proved to be dependent upon [āyatta] an intelligent basis [prabodha-āśraya]. This is because [hi], just as an effect such as cloth is observed to have a primary cause [upādāna] (and) another effect, whose primary cause is unobserved, is also established [upa+√sthā (caus)] as having a primary cause on account of being an effect, similarly, that very effect, cloth etc., is observed to have a maker [dṛṣṭa-kartṛ]. Therefore [iti], that whose maker is not observed is also established [vi+ava+√sthā (caus)] as having a maker on account of being an effect. This is because the positive and negative concommitance [anvaya-vyatireka] of a maker [kartṛ] with an effect [kārya] is like that of the primary cause. And because, in every case, the ordinary use of [vyavahāra] effects and causes is dependent upon just that [tan-mātra-nibandhana]. Therefore, just as it is not possible to doubt that "there could be an effect without a primary cause" since a primary-cause-in-general [upādāna-mātra] produces an effect-in-general [kārya-mātra], similarly, it must not be doubted that "that there could be an effect without a maker" since there isn't a distinction [aviśeṣa] in proving that a maker-in-general [kartṛ-mātra] produces an effect-in-general [kārya-mātra].

{37.27-37.30} One may argue [nanu...iti cet]: "You may say anything, still, there isn't the inference of an intelligence-possessor [buddhimat] from an effect-in-general [kārya-mātra]. On the contrary, it is only from a specific effect [karya-viśeṣa] from the observation of which there could be the awareness of being made [kṛta-buddhi] even for one who did not observe production [akriyādarśī].[17] It is, moreover, not correct [na yukta] to prove what is to be proved [sādhya] from the mere similarity of words [śabdamātra-sāmya] since it does not require following reality. This is because of the

[17]See JNA [235.20]; RNA [51.18-51.22].

unwanted consequence of inferring that speech etc., has horns merely in virtue of its being expressed by the word "cow/speech [go]".[18]

{37.30-38.01} This self-serving answer [svasthottaram] does not deserve an answer since pervasion is only proved for an effect-in-general [kārya-sāmānya]. Moreover, what is this awareness of being made [kṛta-buddhi]? Is it the determination [avasāya] that the activity of an other is needed [apekṣita-para-vyāpāra]? Or is it the ascertainment [niścaya] of coming from a person [pauruṣeyatva] i.e., "made by a person [puruṣakṛta]"?[19]

{38.01-38.02} If it is the first alternative, how is it not the case with the earth etc? This is because, as with pots etc., there is not a distinction [aviśeṣa] in (the inferential reason) 'being an effect,' which is defined as 'that which is produced from the activity of a cause [kāraṇavyāpārātmalābhalakṣaṇa].'

{38.02-38.04} If it is agreed [abhimata] that the awareness of 'being made' [kṛta-buddhi] is the ascertainment [niścaya] of 'coming from a person' [pauruṣeyatva] i.e., "made by a person [purusena kṛta]," then, it must be stated for whom there is not such an awareness of being made [kṛta-buddhi]. Is it for someone who knows the invariable relation [avinābhāva-vedī] of the inferential reason [hetu] 'being an effect' (with what is to be proved) or what is opposed to this? [tadviparīta]?

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[18]See PV 1.17.

[19]See RNA [53.20].

{38.04-38.07} It is not the first alternative since it is not correct that someone who knows the invariable relation [avinābhāvavedī] does not know [pratipatti] what is to be proved [sādhya]. If it is for (someone who knows) what is opposed to this, there is not an awareness of what is to be proved [sādya-buddhi]. So [iti] the earth, trees, and mountains etc., do not cause the awareness of being made [kṛta-buddhi-hetukatva]. Thus, the inference of an intelligence-possessor is ruled out [prati+√kṣip].

{38.08-38.13} One may argue [nanu]: If this is so [evam sati] (then) all inferences are destroyed since when an invariable relation [avinābhāva] is not grasped, no inferential reason is an indicator (of what is to be proved). Therefore, it is not the case that the special characteristic [viśeṣa] is 'causing the awareness of a being made [kṛta-buddhi-hetutva].' Alternatively, let there be a certain special characteristic whose nature [rūpa] is not indicated [anirūpita].[20] Still, what is the use of this since, like it is for smoke-in-general [dhūma-mātra], the pervasion [vyāpti] of an effect-in-general is known. Moreover, (the inferential reason) shaping of clay [mṛdvikāra] does not have equal weight [samakakṣatā] to the inferential reason [hetu], being an effect [kāryatva]. This is because its deviation [vyabhicāra] with an observable potter --which is itself what is to be proved [svasādhya]-- is observed in hundreds of cases. But, it is correct for there to be the pervasion of 'being an effect [kāryatva]' with 'an intelligence possessor-in-general which is common to observables and unobservables [dṛśyādṛśyasādhāraṇa].' Thus, the inferential reason [hetu] is not inconclusive [anaikāntika].

[38.14-38.18] A Rival for the Subject [prakaraṇasama]

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[20]See JNA [237.11] and RNA [52.08] where this is attributed to Vittoka. JNA [237.10-237.18] is reproduced at RNA [52.08-52.115].

Neither is (there the defect) 'A Rival for the Subject [prakaraṇasama].' This is because it (i.e., inferential reason) has the property 'not having a rival [apratipakṣatva].' For there is not another property (i.e., inferential reason) that proves what rivals the subject [pratipakṣopasthāpaka]. For example: "Sound is permanent because, since it is a thing [vastu], there is the non-apprehension of impermanent properties [anitya-dharma]" and "Sound is impermanent because, since is a thing [vastu], there is the non-apprehension of permanent properties [nitya-dharma]." In this case, there is another property (i.e., inferential reason) [dharmāntaram] that brings about a rival for the subject [pratipakṣa-kṛta]. It should not be said, moreover, that this (inferential reason) is a defeater [bādhaka] (of the subject). This is because since it is not the case that the world is created by Īśvara either on account of its being a thing [vastutva] or (its) existence [sattva] etc., there is the absence of an opposition [virodha] between 'being created by Īśvara' and 'being a thing [vastutva]' etc. So, neither is (there the defect) 'A Rival for the Subject [prakaraṇasama].'

[38.19-38.31] Put Forth Too Late [kālātyayāpadiṣṭa]

And it is not (an inferential reason) that is "Put Forth Too Late [kālātyayāpadiṣṭa]." This is because this applies to [tathā-bhāva] (an inferential reason) whose object [viśaya] is defeated [bādhita] by perception, inference, or scripture and (the object) of this (inferential reason) is not opposed [virodha] by them. Among these, (an example of) Opposed by Perception [pratyakṣa-viruddha] is, "A compound of fire is not hot on account of being an effect;" Opposed by an Inference [anumāna-viruddha], "Atoms have parts on account of being of limited size;" and Opposed by Scripture [āgama-viruddha], "The skull of a man is pure on account of being the limb of a living thing."

Now then, among these, this (inferential reason) is not 'Opposed by Perception' since what is opposed to what is to be proved [sādhya-viparyaya (i.e., iśvarākartṛkatva)] is not an object of perception. Nor is it 'Opposed by an Inference' since its object [viśaya] is not opposed by an inference that grasps the subject [dharmī] (as not being created by Īśvara). And it is not 'Opposed by Scripture' since what is opposed to what is to be proved is not discerned in scripture.

{38.24-38.28} One may argue [iti...cet]: "What is opposed to [viparita] (what is to be proved) is discerned through Buddhist scriptures." This is not so since by apprehending that things [artha] are momentary, they are not valid [prāmāṇya-abhāva]. Even Vedic scriptures should not be doubted as being a defeator since with phrases such as "A thousand headed man"[21] a creator is definitely explained there and since they are invalid [aprāmāṇya] given the absence of any past person who has amazing properties like that person. Thus this inferential reason [hetu] is not one whose time has passed [anatikrāntakāla]

(38.29-38.31} So, in this way, because the confusion due to the defects of an inferential reason has been removed, the intended intelligence-possessing maker who knows the primary causes etc., is proved by this inferential reason [sādhana]. And for us it is established [iti sthitam] that that great person is definitely Iśvara.

[39.01-40.14] Other Inferential Arguments for Establishing Iśvara.

{39.01-39.14} This is the inferential argument that Śaṅkara suggests for establishing Him.

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[21] Rg Veda X 90

The world [jagat], other than what is made by us (and) that does not have the property 'without a beginning' [anutpattirūpārupa]; that is, it is not a locus of speech, joy, and atomic extension [abhilāṣaprītiparamāṇumūrtyādhāra-], (it does not include) what is inferred from 'proximity' and 'remoteness' [paratvāparatvānumeya-], the final particularity that is inherent in universals [sāmānyasamavāyātyantaviśeṣa-], the extension, singularity, separateness, heaviness, and oiliness inherent in one (of the substances) [ekārthasamavetaparimāṇaikatvapṛthaktvagurutvasneha-], the color, taste, and touch that does not belong to earth [apārthivarūparasasparśa-], the fluidity that belongs to water [āpyadravatva-], that which is in contact with what is of medium extension [amūrtasaṃyogatad-], and mutual absences [itaretarābhāva-] is something whose production depends upon a locus of intelligence.

On account of (its) having an insentient primary cause.

And, whatever is like this is like that as, for example, a pot.

And this (world) is like this.

Therefore, this is also like that.

Here is the interpretation [artha] of it: The subject of the inference [dharmī] is "the world [jagat]." What is to be proved [sādhya] is that "its production is dependent upon a locus of intelligence." The words from "speech [abhilāpa]" upto the words "does not have the property 'without a beginning' [anutpattirūpārupa]" are adjectives of the subject of the inference and exclude the class of eternal things such as ether [ākāśa]. The word "us [asmad]" up to the words "other than what is made [vinirmita-itarad]" is (also) an adjective of the subject of the inference and (it) excludes pots etc., whose makers are well-known. The loci of speech, pleasure, and atomic extension are space, soul, and atom. Time and space are inferred on the basis of (spatial and temporal) remoteness and proximity. And (the list of words) beginning with "universal [sāmānya]" is to be understood in accordance with their well-known (meaning).

{39.15-39.26} In the same way, Narasiṃha asserts:

The class of knowables [prameyajāta] whose nature is restricted by what is not made [ajanmāvacchinnātmā] and that do not have a cause that is not being disputed by a pair of discussants and experience existence [bhāva], requires an intelligence possessor [vijñānādhāra] for its production .

On account of (its) being produced.

Whatever is connected with the stated inferential reason is a locus for the stated property to be proved, as is a house.

And this (class of knowables) is like that.

Therefore, this too is like that.

Here is the interpretation of it: The subject of the inference [dharmi] is "the class of knowables [prameyajāta]." What is to be proved [sādhya] is that it "requires an intelligence possessor [vijñānādhāra] for its production." "Having a nature that is restricted by what is not made [ajanmāvacchinnātmā]" is an adjective of the subject of the inference. In virtue of this, the class of eternal things, namely, ether [ākāśa] etc., is excluded. Also, by (the phrase) "those that do not have a cause that is not being disputed by a pair of discussants," pots etc., whose makers are well-known, are excluded. The phrase "experience existence [bhāva-anubhāvī]" means it takes the form of thing [vastu]. In virtue of this, absence due to destruction [pradhvaṃsa] etc., is excluded. The statement of pervasion [vyāpti] is "Whatever is connected with the stated inferential reason etc." It means that that which takes the form of the subject of the inference is connected with the stated inferential reason.

{39.28-40.08} On the other hand, Trilocana states an inferential argument having negative concomitance:

All effects have an intelligent cause.

On account of being characterized by production.

Whatever is seen to be eternal does not have an intelligent cause (and) it is seen that space [ākāśa] etc., is not produced in that way.

And that which has been made into the subject of the inference is characterized by production and is not made by (makers) like us.

Therefore it has an intelligent cause.

{40.02-40.08} Again, when establishing (the existence of) Iśvara from diads etc., Trilocana says:

Two-ness, which is the subject being discussed, requires for its own production an intelligence which has each individual as its object.

On account of its being two in number.

Whatever is two is like this, just as two substances.

And the two-ness that belongs to diads is like this.

Therefore, it is like that.

{40.09-40.14} And Vācaspati causes (Him) to be known in this way:

The subject being discussed, the trees, mountains, and oceans etc., has a maker who knows (their) primary causes etc.

On accout of (its) being an effect

Whatever is an effect has a maker who knows the primary causes etc., as does a large building etc.

And the subject being discussed, trees etc., is like this.

Therefore, it is like that.

{40.15-40.16} Presented in just this way, inferential reasons such as, on account of having the property, 'being produced;' on account of having connected parts; and on account of having causal efficacy are (also) known through the stated five-part method.

[40.17-57.17] Ratnakīrti's Response

{40.17-40.18} Now, respectable people should not disregard this effort which is (made) by the dimwitted in order to blind [andhīkaraṇa] the world. Thus [iti], something will be said.

[40.18-50.20] Pervasion [Vyāpti]

{40.17-40.21} As everyone knows [khalu], in this case, the universal concomitance [sarvopasaṃhāravatī vyāpti] between the property to be proved [sādhya] i.e., an intelligence-possessor [buddhi-mat], and the inferential reason [sādhana] i.e., an effect-in-general [kārya-mātra], must be grasped with certainty [avaśyaṃ] since otherwise the relation between what is to be inferred [gamya] and the inferential reason [gamaka] would not be suitable [ayoga]. But [ca], how is it grasped? {40.20} Is it grasped through a warranted mode of awareness which disproves (the presence of the inferential reason) in places where (the property to be proved) is absent [viparyaya-badhaka-pramāṇa], like (the concomitance between) a cause-in-general and an effect-in-general. {40.21} Or is it supposed to be known [boddhavya] through a special perception and non-apprehension which are directed towards grasping a special positive and negative concomitance [viśiṣṭānvayavyatireka-grahaṇa-pravaṇa-viśiṣṭapratyakṣānupalabha], like (the concomitance between) fire and smoke. {40.22} Or is it known [pratyetavya] through

repeated observations (of the inferential reason) in similar cases and non-observations in dissimilar cases [sapakṣāsapakṣayor bhūyodarśana], as per your position [svavyavasthayā]. {40.23} Or is it known [jñātavya] through a single observation (of the inferential reason) in a similar case and non-observation in a dissimilar case [sapakṣāsapakṣayor sakṛddarśanādarśanābhyām]. These are the four alternatives.

[40.24-43.29] Alternative 1

{40.24-40.25} Now then, it is not the first alternative. This is because there isn't a warranted mode of awareness that disproves [bādhaka-pramāṇa] the (presence of the) inferential reason, 'being an effect-in-general [kāryatva-sāmānya],' in places in which the property to be proved is absent [sādhya-viparyaya]; that is, in which an intelligent possessor [buddhi-mat] is absent.

{40.25-41.11} One may argue [nanu]: "The absence of a warranted mode of awareness that disproves [bādhaka-pramāṇa] (the presence of the inferential reason) is not proved [asiddha].To explain [tathā hi]: Just as the (inferential reason), 'being an effect,' is acknowledged to be pervaded by an intelligence-possessor [buddhi-mat], it is, similarly, also perceived [upalabdham] to be pervaded by (the properties), 'being spatially, temporally, and essentially specific [deśa-kāla-svabhāva-niyatatvam],' 'proximity of occasional causes [kādācitkāraṇa-sannidhi-mattā],' and 'being the effect of a total causal complex [samagrī-kāryatvam].' Moreover, it is established that spatial specificity etc. [deśādi-niyama], the proximity of occasional causes [kādācitkāraṇa-sannidhi], and the total causal complex [sāmgrī] are caused by an intelligence-possessor [buddimat-pūrvikā]. {40.29-40.31} But [punaḥ] if insentient things [acetanāni] that are not

regulated by a sentient thing [cetanānadhiṣṭita] could produce an effect, they would produce things (that would be) located somewhere or the other [yatra kvacanāvasthita]. Thus, an effect whose production is spatially, temporally, and essentially specific would not be perceived [upalabhyate]." {40.31-40.32} One may argue [iti cet]: "In virtue of being produced by a collection of causes, it is not the case that each effect is produced by (individual) causes. So, what accounts for [kutaḥ] just this collection of causes?" {40.32-41.02} One may aruge [iti cet]: "It is because of a special unseen force [adṛṣṭa-viśeṣa] whose effects are occasional [kādācitka-paripāka]." One may argue [nanu]: "How does this insentient thing cause the causes to be collected in the proper way [yathāvat]. As everyone knows [khalu], without the potter's effort, sticks etc., which are located somewhere (or the other), do not come together even by a special unseen force [adṛṣṭa-viśeṣa-vaśāt] nor do those which are collected together have control over the effect." {41.02-41.03} Thus [iti], the pervasion of spatial, temporal, and essential specificity, the proximity of occasional causes, and the total causal complex, with an intelligence-possessor, is proved. {41.03-41.11} Given the absence of an intelligence-possessor, (the inferential reason,) 'being an effect,' which is excluded when its three pervaders are excluded, is pervaded by (the property,) 'being caused by an intelligence-possessor.' This group of three non-apprehensions of a pervader [vyāpaka-anupalambha-trayam] was mentioned, therefore, for proving the connection [pratibandha] (between the inferential reason and the property to be proved). And so, it need not be supposed [na sambhāvya] that, "Without an intelligence-possessor, an effect would just be uncaused [aheutkam]." This is because there would be the unwanted consequence of the absence of spatial, temporal, and essential specificity [deśa-kāla-svabhāva-niyama-prasaṅga]. Nor should it be supposed [na śaṅkanīya] that, "It is because of something other than an intelligence-possessor." This is because (there would be) the unwanted consequence of

not being produced even once. And it should not to be supposed [na sambhāvya] that, "It is by this and also by something else." This is because (there would be) the unwanted consequence that without a specific cause [aniyatahetu] there would be a non-cause [ahetutva]. In the same way, without an intelligence-possessor the instrument would be insentient (and) there would be the unwanted consequence that the production (of an effect would be) continuous. This group of four extremely unwanted consequences [atiprasaṅgacatuṣṭayam] disproves (the presence of the inferential reason) in places in which (what is to be proved) is absent [viparyaya-bādhaka] and so proves pervasion [vyāpti-prasādhaka]. Thus, just like 'being an effect' is 'caused by a cause [hetupūrvakatva],' it cannot be denied [avārya] that it is also 'caused by an intelligence-possessor [buddhimatpūrvakatva]'.

{41.12-41.17} About this it is said: This fantasy [mano-rājya] could definitely be proved if spatial, temporal, and essential specificity [deśa-kāla-svabhāva-niyama], the proximity of occasional causes [kādācitkakāraṇasannidhi], and the total causal complex were proved to be pervaded by (the property) 'being caused by an intelligence-possessor.' However [kevalam], this too [eva] is difficult to accept [durāpam]. Even without an intelligence-possessor, the effects, spatial, temporal, and essential specificity, the proximity of occasional causes, and the total causal complex could be produced by a special cause. (This special cause is) defined as the total causal complex which, although insentient, has the capacity for spatial and temporal specificity [pratiniyatadeśakālaśakti] due to the proximity produced by its own causes. Thus, it is proved that there is doubt about the non-apprehension of the pervaders.

{41.18} One may argue: "Without an intelligence-possessor, what accounts for [kutaḥ] just this collection of causes?"[22] {41.18-41.20} This is also due to just [eva] that special, insentient, total causal complex which, in the manner stated, is not regulated by a sentient thing [cetana-anadhiṣṭhitayathokta-acetanasāmagrīviśeṣa]. (And) this is also due to what is like that. Thus, when spatial specificity etc., is considered, an intelligence-possessor is not necessarily [avaśyam] required. This is because of a beginningless sequence of insentient, total causal complexes [anādy-acetanasāmagrī-paramparā]. {41.20-41.22} One may argue [iti cet]: "For a pot etc., spatial, temporal, and essential specificity, the proximity of occasion causes, and the total causal complex are observed to be caused by an intelligence-possessor. Thus, for other (effects) too there is, in that way, spatial, temporal, and essential specificity etc." {41.22-41.24} If this were the case, (then since) effects such as pots are also repeatedly perceived [upalabdham] to be caused by an intelligence-possessor, all effects would be like that. So, what is the point of (your) determination to discuss the non-apprehension of pervaders [vyāpakānupalambhopanyāsadurvyasana]?

{41.24-41.26} One may argue [iti cet]: "Although pots etc., are repeatedly observed to be caused by an intelligence-possessor, this is not ascertained to be the case for all effects-in-general. This is also the same for spatial specificity etc. So, how will this doubt be removed?" {41.27} One may argue [iti cet]: "Then [tadā], let it be that in every case perception itself grasps pervasion." {41.27-41.29} In this case, (however,) it would not be sufficient for grasping pervasion since (what is needed) is a warranted mode of awareness which disproves (the presence of the inferential reason) in places in which what to be proved is absent [viparyaya-bādhaka-pramāṇa]. Moreover, that perception

[22] RNA [41.31-41.32]

is incapable in such a case will be explained when the second alternative is considered.[23]

{41.29-41.32} If it is supposed that the effect-cause relationship is proved in that way, or that smoke is produced without a cause, or that it is only produced by something else, or that it is also produced by something else, there would follow the unwanted consequences of the absence of spatial specificity etc., the absence of being produced even once, and not having a cause.[24] But, as proposed, the effect-cause relationship between an intelligence-possessor and an effect-in-general has not even been proved at this time nor can it be proved.

{41.32-42.04} Moreover, it is not the case that if the maker is insentient the unwanted consequence of continuous production would follow.[25] This is because [hi] it is not the case that just (one) insentient (thing) has causal capability [sāmarthya-yogi] since its causal capability is connected [pratibandha] to its own causal series. Thus, if it is supposed that there is a series of insentient causes, an intelligence-possessor is not necessarily implied. Thus, this (charge) is just the frustrated cry of someone whose own view is being destroyed. Thus, in this case, there isn't even a trace of good reasoning.

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[23]RNA [43.30-ff]

[24]There is an obvious problem with the text. Instead of what is printed, I am reading "deśādiniyamābhāva-sakṛdutpāda-ahetutva-prsaṅgāḥ" which is a modification of the reading given in RNA 41 n. 1.

[25]RNA [41.09]

{42.05-42.08} So, in this way, the group of three non-apprehensions of the pervader [vyāpaka-anupalambha-trayam],[26] which was mentioned for the purpose of proving concomitance, is unestablished. This is (both) because of doubt and because the group of four extremely unwanted consequences [atiprasaṅga-catuṣṭayam][27] cannot prove the pervasion of an effect-in-general with an intelligence-possessor. Therefore, since there is doubt about its exclusion from dissimilar cases, the inferential reason, 'being an effect', is inconclusive.

{42.08-42.23} About this,Vācaspati says, "There definitely is not the problem with the inferential reason called 'doubt about its exclusion from dissimilar cases.'[28] How is it refuted? To explain: Only an inferential reason which was observed in a dissimilar case does not prove what was intended, like (the inferential reason) 'being knowable' etc. But how could one that was not observed in a dissimilar case, even though it was searched for with great effort, not establish the property to be proved? "For those who do not see the regulator [niyāmaka] there will always [avaśyam] be doubt."[29] Thus, the ghost of doubt, to whom an opportunity is given by overstepping the bounds of common sense, would be released. Nowhere would she not exist. Thus, one could not act anywhere since, in every case, (an awareness) which does not have an object [an-arthaḥ] would be, in some way, a locus of doubt, because doubt which does not have an object would be a reason for the wise to stop acting, and finally because death is observed even on a diet of healthy food and drink. Therefore, for someone who protects the

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[26]RNA [41.05]

[27]RNA [41.09-41.10]

[28]See RNA [37.12-37.26].

[29]NVTT [135.17] ad NS 1.1.5

practices of those who follow warranted modes of awareness, there should be doubt only in accordance with observation and not (in accordance with) what was not previously observed.[30] For doubt definitely depends upon a specific memory and does not exist when there isn't memory. And memory cannot exist for an object which was not experienced."[31]

{42.19-42.23} This was said by the author of the Mīmāṃsā-vārttika in the *Adhyuṣṭasahasrikā*, "There is no doubt without a warranted mode of awareness."[32] In the *Bṛhaṭṭikā* it is as follows: "For someone who is naturally skeptical and who, because of confusion, would assume an unknown defeater [bādhaka], every everyday activity would be undermined ."

{42.24-42.29} Now [tad], this is nothing but idle banter [pralāpa-mātra] since the negative concomitance [vyatireka] of an inferential reason which was searched for in dissimilar cases, even with great effort, is not proved by non-observation alone [adarśanamātra].[33] To explain: What is meant by "the inferential reason is not apprehended in dissimilar cases"? (Does it mean) that there isn't a warranted mode of awareness which apprehends it [tadupalambhaka-pramāṇa-nivṛtti]? A warranted mode of awareness [pramāṇa] is the effect of the object in that mode of awareness [prameya]. This is because of the rule [nyāya], "There is no object [viśaya] without a cause [akāraṇam]." And [ca], it is not the case that the exclusion of a cause is apprehended when there is the

[30]See RNA [VN: 107.11-107.13].

[31]See NVTT [135.17-135.22] ad NS 1.1.5.

[32]RNA [42.12-42.20] corresponds to RNA [VN: 107.11-107.13]

[33] See RNA [37.12].

exclusion of (its) effect. This is because there is the apprehension of fire even when smoke is absent [nirdhūma]. But, if the existence of the objects of warranted modes of awareness [prameya-sattā] was pervaded by the existence of warranted modes of awareness, then this would be correct. However [kevalam], this pervasion (relation) is not possible since there would be the unwanted consequence that everything would be observed by everyone. So, negative concomitance is not proved by non-observation alone [adarśanamātra]. As it was said,

(If you say it is the) the non-observation by everyone then is doubtful. (But if you say) it is non-observation of oneself (then) there is deviation [vyabhicāra]. For example, although a blade of grass in a small hole on the Vindhyā mountains is not seen, it exists.

This is because with respect to proximate times [arvācīnaṃ prati] all dissimilar cases are not observed.

{43.04-43.05} It was said that, "The ghost of doubt would be released. Nowhere would she not exist. Thus, one could not act anywhere."[34] {43.05-43.12} This does not follow. For intelligent people, it is definitely the case that positive activity is not prevented. This is because (for them) doubt about an object [artha-sandeha] (still) results in activity. Objectless-doubt [anartha-sandeha] can be raised in every case.[35] One may argue [iti cet]: "There will not be positive activity because death is observed even on a diet of nutritious food and drink."[36] This is difficult to understand. To explain: The terms "object-doubt [artha-sandeha]" and "objectless-doubt [anartha-sandeha]" are not genitive compounds [ṣaṣṭhīsamāsa]. Rather, "object-doubt [artha-sandeha]" means "doubt

[34]RNA [42.13]

[35]See RNA [42.15], RNA [VN: 111.11].

[36]See RNA [VN: 111.12].

which is directed towards an object [arthonmukhaḥ sandehaḥ]" and the term "objectless-doubt [anartha-sandeha]" means "doubt which is not directed towards an object [anarthonmukhaḥ sandehaḥ]." These are compounds in which the middle word has been elided [madhyapadalopī], like the compound "era-(dear)-king [śāka-pārthiva-adi]."[37] This being the case, "nutritious food and drink etc.," is definitely (an example of) doubt which is directed towards an object [artha-sandeha]. This is due to observing innumerable times, in one's own and in others' continua, that objects that belong to this class are nourishing etc., (and) observing death etc., a 'non-object', only occasionally (and) in some cases. Doubt which is not directed towards an object must be seen as opposed to this. It is, therefore, very difficult to deny that intelligent people act in each and every case when there is doubt that is directed towards an object, just like (they act) when there is a warranted modes of awareness.

{43.13-43.14} The talk that --"There should be doubt in accordance with observation but not in accordance with what was not previously observed since it is definitely the case that doubt depends upon a specific memory"[38]-- is also irrelevant. {43.14-43.19} This is because, since it is definitely the case that there isn't a warranted mode of awareness that can prove or disprove (it) [sādhaka-bādhaka-pramāṇa], doubt will always arise from another thing by the implicative form of negation. Moreover, this doubt is also dependent upon a specific memory. To explain: That something belongs to one class [tajjātīya] or belongs to another class [atajjātīya] is asserted in virtue of (it) either possessing or not possessing a defining characteristic. Otherwise, offering a definition would be useless. Given this, observing deviation [vyabhicāra] with (the inferential

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[37] See MB ad Pāṇini 2.1.69.

[38] RNA [42.16-42.17], RNA [VN: 111.14]

reason) 'being an object of a warranted mode of awareness [prameyatva]' would establish doubt. This is because (the inferential reasons,) 'being an object of a warranted mode of awareness [prameyatva],' 'being smoke [dhūmatva],' and 'being an effect [kāryatva]' belong, on your view, to the same class, in virtue of the common characteristic 'not being connected (to the property to be proved) by either identity [tādātmya] or production [tadutpatti].' Thus, this doubt is definitely in accordance with observation.

{43.20-43.27} Kumārila's reference to "in virtue of being a witness" does not go beyond the proverb [pravāda], "A cat is a witness to a container of yogurt." What should be said about this? The defect of an inferential reason called "doubt about (its) exclusion from dissimilar cases [sandigdha-vipakṣa-vyāvṛttikatvam]" is very difficult to avoid since just the non-observation [adarśanamātra] of an inferential reason in dissimilar cases does not prove negative concomitance. It is for just this reason that the point of defeat [nigrahasthāna] called 'raising a non-problem [adoṣodbhavana]' explains it. Thus, what was communicated by this is also problematic. {43.24-43.29} On the other hand, in rejecting a genuine defect with the inferential reason, this miserable (Buddhist) mendicant [tapasvin] who says, "This is not a defective inferential reason and for this reason it doesn't need to be rejected. (Even) mentioning it is a point of defeat [nigrahasthāna] called 'raising a non-problem [adoṣodbhavana]'." is, according to his own view, forced to concede (the argument) in virtue of the point of defeat identified as "questioning what is not to be questioned [niranuyojya-anuyoga]." He therefore deserves pity.

{43.27-43.29} Thus, the inferential reason defined as 'being an effect' is inconclusive [aniakāntika] because given the absence of a warranted mode of awareness that refutes (the presence of the inferential reason) in places in which what is to be proved is absent, pervasion is not established and (so) there is doubt about the exclusion (of the inferential reason) from dissimilar cases [sandigdha-vipakṣa-vyāvṛtti].

[43.30-45.29] Alternative 2

{43.30-43.31} Now, the second alternative is that it is like fire and smoke, where pervasion is clearly ascertained by a special perception and non-apprehension [viśiṣṭapratyakṣānupalambhā] which is directed towards grasping [grahaṇapravaṇa] a special positive and negative concomitance [viśiṣṭānvayavyatireka].

{43.31-44.01} About this it is said, "Is pervasion grasped with an intelligence-possessor-in-general who has the additional property [upādhi] of an observable body? Or, with one who does not have [vidhura] the additional property of an observable body [dṛśya-śarīra] or is indifferent to [sādhāraṇa] (having) an observable or unobservable body? These are the two alternatives. {44.01-44.02} If it is the first alternative, the inferential reason is generally-inconclusive [sādhāraṇa-anaikāntika], like (the inferential reason) 'being knowable [prameyatva].' This is because (the inferential reason), 'being an effect [kāryatva],' is observed in trees etc., which are produced even without the property to be proved [sādhya] being like that [tathā-bhūta]."

{44.03-44.08} One may argue [nanu]: "Trees etc., are included in the subject of the inference [pakṣīkṛta]. How can there be deviation [vyabhicāra] with respect to them?

This is because [hi] the collection of existing things [bhāva-rāśi] is of three sorts. Either there is doubt about a maker [sandigdha-kartṛka], like there is for trees etc., or a maker is well known [prasiddha-kartṛka], like for pots etc., or there isn't a maker [akartṛka], as with space [ākāśa] etc. After accepting, by perception and non-apprehension, that there is pervasion with respect to pots etc., --which have a well known maker-- and having grouped together [upasaṃhṛtya] the inferential reason 'being an effect' with trees etc., --objects about which there is doubt [sandeha-pada]-- an intelligence-possessor is inferred. Again [punaḥ], that would not be a deviating object [vyabhicāra-viṣaya]. As it is said, "There definitely isn't deviation with the property to be proved [sādhya]"."[39] {44.09-44.13} This is incorrect since [hi] it is a deviating object [vyabhicāra-viṣaya] that should not be (included) in the subject of an inference [pakṣa]. This is because of the rule, "From stating that an inferential reason is in that about which there is doubt, it is destroyed since the inferential reason is without a basis [anāśraya]."[40] Because there is a deviating object, an intelligence-possessor-in-general who has the additional property of an observable body is rejected, for growing grass, through the non-apprehension of an observable [dṛśya-anupalambha]. Therefore, it is definitely proper to make the mountains etc., about which there is doubt regarding a maker, into the subject of the inference. Trees etc., however, have an insentient maker. But, (this) fourth collection of things is not accepted.

{44.14-44.16} Because of astonishment that there is deviation and for the purpose of establishing the three collections of existing things, one may argue [athah]: "It is the

[39]See NVTT [563.10-ff] ad NS 4.1.21.

[40]tasmāt sandigdhe arthe sādhaka-bādhaka-pramāna-viṣaye hetoḥ vacanāt vyastaḥ pramāṇa pratikṣiptaḥ hetoh anaśrayaḥ viśayaḥ (PV IV.91). Also see JNA [244.03] and JNA [285.01].

second alternative, pervasion is assumed with an intelligence-possessor-in-general who is indifferent to being observable or unobservable [dṛśyādṛśya] (and so) is not rejected by perception (as being present) in trees etc."[41] {44.16-44.24} In this case, since it is possible [sambhāvyamānatva] that there is an intelligence-possessor-in-general (who is the maker) of trees etc., we do not say that there is general-inconclusivity [sādhāraṇa-aniakāntikatā]. Nevertheless, because there is the absence of pervasion, we do say that there is a doubt about the exclusion (of the inferential reason from dissimilar cases) [sandigdhavyāvṛttikatva]. This is because, when pervasion is being grasped, negative concomitance is not proved by the non-apprehension of an observable since what is to be proved, an intelligence-possessor who is indifferent to being observable or unobservable, is not observed. To explain: If prior to the instrumental activity of a potter it is known that a pot is absent [vyatireka], it is (still) not possible to know in that case that the absence [vyatireka] of the pot was brought about by the absence of the property to be proved [sādhyābhāvakṛta]. For example, when trees etc., are coming up [viṭapādijanmasamaye] it is possible that an intelligence-possessor-in-general [buddhiman-m̃atra] exists, since, in virtue of his being unobservable, it is impossible to deny. This is also the case with pots etc., since when negative concomitance [vyatireka] is being ascertained the existence of an intelligence-possessor-in-general [buddhiman-m̃atra] is possible, since he is un-observed. Since it is not proved that the absence of the inferential reason [sādhana-abhāva] is due to the absence of the property to be proved [sādhyābhāva-prayukta], there isn't pervasion. How is the inferential reason not one about which there is doubt regarding its exclusion (from dissimilar cases) [sandigdha-vyatireko hetu]?[42]

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[41] RNA [43.31-44.01]

[42] See [49.23-49.26].

{44.25-44.27} What was previously said [yathoktam] was, "Just as (the statement that) 'there may be an effect without a primary cause' cannot be doubted, it is not the case that (the statement that) 'there may be an effect without a maker' cannot be doubted."[43] It should also not be said that "there may be an effect without a primary cause." {44.27-44.30} So [iti], who deceived you in this way? For if, in this case, pervasion [vyāpti] were grasped by perception and non-apprehension, how is it proved that an effect-in-general [kārya-mātra] is caused by a primary cause [upādāna-pūrvaka]? Moreover, even you didn't mention another method of grasping pervasion. This is because it is impossible to rationally arrive at [abhyuhitam] the pervasion of an effect-in-general and primary cause, both of which are indifferent to being observable and unobservable, by means of perception and non-apprehension, both of which (require) observable objects. {44.30-44.31} But this is an unwanted consequence which will destroy your position. While worrying about a warranted mode of awareness, there isn't a chance.

{44.31-45.13} Perhaps [vā], pervasion is proved in this case by a warranted mode of awareness which disproves (the presence of the inferential reason) where the property to be proved is absent [viparyaya-bādhaka-pramāṇa]. To explain: Just as an effect, such as a sprout, is pervaded by (the property) 'being spatially, temporally, and essentially specific [niyata-deśa-kāla-svabhāvatva],' it is similarly perceived to be pervaded by another universal such as 'being (a) rice (sprout).' Therefore, if the pervader [vyāpaka], a different universal [jāti-bheda] such as 'being rice [śālitvādi],' is excluded [vyāvṛtti] from 'not being caused by a primary cause [anupādānapūrvakatva],' which has the nature of a dissimilar case [vipakṣātmā], (the inferential reason) 'being an effect

[43] RNA [37.24-37.26]

[kāryatva]' will be excluded. (And) being fixed [viśrāmyat] in (that) locus, 'being caused by a primary cause' will be proved to be pervaded by it. Moreover, it is not correct that the other universal, 'being rice,' is created without a primary cause. This is because without a primary cause there would be the unwanted consequence that a different effect [kārya-bheda] would not have a cause [ahetuka] since, from a cause which belongs to one class exclusively (and) does not have a primary cause, there would be the production of an effect which belongs to that class or another class [tadatajjātīya]. As it was said, "Things which have one form or another are produced from causes which have that one form or the other."[44] If this were not so, a sprout etc., could be produced from earth etc., which definitely does not have a primary cause. Thus, people seeking sprouts would not search for seeds. Therefore, there is the rule that, "The pervasion of (the inferential reason) 'being an effect' with 'being caused by a cause-in-general' (and) even with 'being caused by a primary cause' is definitely proved by a warranted mode of awareness which disproves (the presence of the inferential reason) where what to be proved is absent. But, for 'being an effect-in-general' and 'being a maker-in-general,' it is not the case that there is a pervasion proving [vyāpti-prasādhaka] mode of warranted awareness [pramāṇa] which refutes [bādhaka] (the presence of the inferential reason) where what is to be proved is absent [viparyaya]. This is because, just before this, the previously stated group of three non-apprehensions of the pervader and the group of four extremely unwanted consequences was rejected.[45] Therefore, the opponent raises the doubt [śaṅkā] that, "It may be an effect but not one which is caused by an intelligent maker." Without crushing him with your feet, it is impossible to refute.

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[44] PV2.25

[45] See RNA [40.25-42.08].

{45.13-45.29} One may argue [nanu]: "If pervasion [vyāpti] (is proved) through perception and non-apprehension for the universals, cause and effect [kārya-kāraṇa-sāmanya], which must be observable, like there is for the universals, fire and smoke [agni-dhūma-sāmānya], which are observable, then, the inferential argument [anumāna] for (the existence of) other minds [paracitta] is ruined [kṣati]."[46] Also, it should not be said [na vācyam] that, "Perception, which has an observable object, cannot grasps pervasion [vyāpti] with a consciousness-in-general [cinmātra] that is (both) common to one's own and another's continuum [svaparasantānasādhāraṇa] (but) is observable (in one's own continuum) and unobservable (in another's continuum)." This is because [hi] if external objects are established [bahirārthasthiti] then even if a consciousness-in-general which is common to one's own and another's continuum is by its very nature unobservable, then, because it is connected [pratibandha] with an observable body through (being a part of) the same total causal complex [ekasāmagrī], there is inseparability [avinirbhāgavarti]. Therefore, just as a perceptual state of awareness which has a pot as its object only acts on one part of it, its color, (and still,) through non-deviation, establishes the entire collection [samudāya],[47] similarly, a perceptual state of awareness which grasps only the body finds the pervader [vyāpapka] of its movement [kampa], a consciousness-in-general [cinmātra] which is common to one's own and another's continuum [svaparasantānasādhāraṇa] and is inseparable from the body [dehānirbhāgavarti]. So, in this way, the pervasion of a thing [padārthah] whose nature it is to be observable or which is inseparable from what is observable is proved by an ordinary form of clear perception [vyavahārika-paṭu-pratyakṣa]. This is not the case, however, for a

[46]RNA [38.08-38.13]. For a detailed discussion of Ratnakīrti's position on this see RNA [SD: 145-149].

[47]RNA [VN: 109.19-109.22]

consciousness-in-general [cinmātra] which is common to unobservables and is separated from (observables) [tathātvādṛśyasādhāraṇa]. So [iti], the inferential argument for another continuum is correct. Therefore, if pervasion is grasped by perception and non-apprehension then it is definitely (the pervasion) of what is observable with what is observable [dṛśyenaiva dṛśyasya]. This is the rule [nyāya].

{45.24-45.28} So, this is the summary:

If in order to deny that (the inferential reason,) 'being an effect,' is present in a dissimilar case [vipakṣa] a supersensory agent is supposed, then, how is the pervasion for which negative concomitance is not (yet) established, established.

Now if an observable maker is assumed with the thought of proving negative concomitance, then, there is grass etc., even though he is absent. Thus, it is immediately manifest in a dissimilar case.

{45.29} For this reason, pervasion is not proved by perception and non-apprehension [pratyakṣānuplambha] either.

[45.30-49.12] Alternative 3

{45.30-45.33} One may now argue [athah]: "The third alternative, which is definitely ours, is that the connection [pratibandha] is known from repeated observations and non-observations [bhūyo-darśaṇa-adarśaṇa]. But, that connection is not taken to be [grahitavya] a causal one [tadutpatti], but rather, as one that is natural [svābhāvika]. And (such a connection) is definitely known through observation and non-observation."

{46.01-46.13} Vācaspati has stated the matter [artha] in this way, "We do not say that (the inferential reason) 'being an effect [kāryatva]' brings about inferential awareness [gamakatva] because it is observed in similar cases [sapakṣa] and (not observed) in dissimilar cases [asapakṣa]. Rather, (we say that) it is because of a natural connection [svābhavika-pratibandha]. And that (connection) is definitely known, in the manner to be stated, by observations (of the inferential reason) in similar cases and non-observations in dissimilar cases. Thus, referring to (observation and non-observation) is also proper [yukta]. It is correct that (when) the natural connection [svābhāvika-pratibandha] of one (thing) with another (thing) is proved to be necessary [niyata], the one (thing) is indeed the inferential reason [gamaka] and the other relata [sambandhī] the property to be proved [gamya]. {46.04-46.10} To explain [tathā hi]: There is a natural relation [saṃbandha svābhāvika] of smoke etc., with fire etc., but not of fire etc., with smoke etc. This is because it is perceived [upalabhyante] even without smoke etc. If fire etc., is put together with [anubhavati] wet fuel, however, then it is related with smoke etc. But, (this) relation of fire etc., (with smoke etc.,) is clearly brought about by the additional condition [upādhi], wet fuel etc., and is not natural. Therefore, it is not necessary [niyata]. On the other hand [tu], the relation of smoke etc., with fire etc., is natural. This is because an additional condition [upādhi] is not seen (and) deviation [vyabhicāra] is not observed anywhere since it is not proper to even imagine (the presence of) something which was not perceived. {46.10-46.11} Moreover, it is not correct [na yuktaḥ] (to say) that "because there is not a warranted mode of awareness that proves or disproves (its presence) [sādhaka-bādhaka-pramāṇa], the doubt about an additional condition which is not perceived [anupalabhyamāna] because it cannot be [darśanānarhata], prevents the relation from being natural."[48] (This is because)

[48]RNA [42.03-46.09] corresponds to RNA [VN: 106.24-107.05], NVTT [135.08-135.14] ad NS 1.1.5.

according to what was previously said, "The ghost of doubt etc."[49] {46.12-46.13} Therefore, (after) searching, with effort, for an additional condition [upādhi] we do not perceive (one). (So), understanding that there is not one, we clearly ascertain [niścinumaḥ] that (the relation) is natural."[50]

{46.14-46.19} This may be the case. But, if there could be a natural relation between one (thing) and another (thing) which is not its cause, everything could be related to everything. And so, everything could be inferred from everything. One may argue [atha]: "Since there isn't a distinction in (the property) 'being other than,' if one (thing) is the effect of an other (thing), why doesn't everything (follow) from everything?" It is because of this that it is indeed an extremely unwanted consequence. If it is said (in response) that, "The self-nature (of things) should not be questioned. So, although there is not a distinction in (the property) 'being other than,' there is definitely a specific cause for a specific effect," one may argue [nanu], "This non-questioning of self-natures is just the same for a natural relation between things which are not effect and cause.[51] Therefore, this too need not be considered [yat kimcit etad]. "[52]

{46.20-46.26} One may argue [iti cet]: "Which warranted mode of awareness grasps the pervasion in this relation?" About this it is said: "Pervasion between two universal properties [sāmānya-dharma] is known [gamya] by numerous observations [bhūyo-

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[49]RNA [42.11]

[50]RNA [VN: 107.14-107.15]

[51]See RNA [47.22-47.31].

[52]RNA [46.12-46.19] corresponds to RNA [VN: 107.14-107.21], NVTT [136.01-136.08] ad NS 1.1.5

darśanam]. This is well known."[53] This is its meaning as explained by (Sucaritamiśra) the author of the Kāśikā: "That the nature of smoke is invariably related [niyata] to fire is manifest [√cakās], upon a final observation, by the mind [cetas], assisted by latent cognitive impressions which were produced by numerous past observations [prācīna-anekadarśana-janita-saṃskāra-sahāya]. This is like the authenticity of a jewel for an expert, like the correct form of a word for someone who has a perfect memory of grammar, like 'being a Brahmin' for someone who has been helped by recalling (that person's) mother, father, and relatives, etc. This is because [hi] everything is not manifest [pratibhātam] instantly [āpātata]. Thus [iti], although being manifest subsequently it is not otherwise."

{46.27-46.31} This point [artha] was again stated by Trilocana.: "The relation between what belongs to that class [tajjātīya] is grasped, on the basis of numerous observations, by the mind which has been assisted by (those) numerous observations. For this reason, smoke does not deviate from fire. Also, if it were to deviate it would not be a relation that does not have an additional-condition [upādhi-rahita]. Thus, the warranted mode of awareness that removes doubt about the (presence of) the inferential reason [hetu] in dissimilar cases [vipakṣa] is just a perception [pratyakṣa], called non-apprehension [anupalabdhi]. This is also the means for ascertaining the absence of an additional condition which has met the requirements for apprehension [upalabdhi-lakṣaṇa-prāpta]. This is how this relation is proved to be natural [svābhāvika].[54] Similarly, for this one. So, our own position is differentially established."[55]

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[53] SVK 3.12 ad SV [anumāna, 12]

[54] RNA [46.27-46.31]

[55] RNA [VN: 106.19-106.23]

{47.01-47.02} Vācaspati also said this, "It is, for instance, just a sense faculty assisted by latent cognitive impressions which were produced by numerous observations that grasps the natural relation of smoke etc., with fire etc. This is just like (the repeated observations of a jeweler that enable him to determine) that a real jewel is different from an artificial one." This is correct.[56]

{47.03-47.10} About this it is said: If there is a difference [bheda] (between the inferential reason and property to be proved), a natural relation [svābhāvika-sambandha] that is different [anya] from a causal one [tadutpatti] is just a verbal confusion [śabdāsphalanamātra].[57] It is well known [khalu] that what is described cannot be attained. To explain: The relation of smoke etc., with fire etc., is natural [svābhāvika] because an additional condition [upadhi] is not observed for it (and) because deviation [vyabhicāra] is not observed anywhere.[58] As you have stated it, this is its definition. But [ca], this is unestablished [asiddha] since by the word 'additional condition' what is meant [abhidhātavyam] is that an entity in addition to [arthāntaram] (the relation's) own (two relata) [svataḥ] is required. But that additional entity [arthāntaram] is not necessarily observable [dṛśyatāniyata] since it is also possible for an unobservable [adṛśya] to be spatially, temporally, and essentially remote [deśa-kāla-svabhāva-viprakṛṣta]. And therefore, there could be an additional condition [upādhi], which is not observed [upalakṣyate], even in the relation of smoke with fire.[59] So, how is it that

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[56]RNA [VN: 107.23-107.24], NVTT [136.22-136.23] ad NS 1.1.5.

[57]RNA [45.30-45.32]

[58]RNA [46.08-46.09]

[59]See RNA [VN: 109.32].

from non-observation, on account of which a natural relation is (supposed to be) established, it is (supposed to) be absent?

{47.11-47.21} One may argue [atha...iti cet]: "If an additional entity [arthāntara][60] were required, how is it that only smoke [ityeva] is necessarily related to the existence of fire [pāvakasattāniyama]?" One may argue [nanu] that this too should be considered. Although there are thousands of observations, if a causal relation is not accepted, does fire necessarily [niyata] occur [sambhavī] everywhere smoke exists or not? Perhaps, relative to an additional entity, the additional condition [upādhi], there could be smoke but not fire. In such a case, how is a cause determined.[61] And the statement, "because an additional condition [upādhi] is not observed for it (and) deviation is not observed anywhere,"[62] has definitely been responded to since an additional condition [upādhi], even one which is unobservable, is possible [sambhāvyamāna]. Moreover [ca], although there may be unobstructed non-observation [ahatya-adarśana],[63] it is impossible to deny deviation [vyabhicāra] since the other causal conditions [pratyaya] may be weak [vaikalya]. For this reason, although there isn't (anything that) disproves [bādhaka] those two, doubt [śaṅkā] definitely arises since there is the absence of a warranted mode of awareness which either proves (their absence) or disproves (their presence) [sādhaka-bādhaka-pramāṇa]. Moreover [punaḥ], (this doubt) is not removed by just this confused outcry of yours. And [ca], it is not the case that as a result of this

[60]There is an obvious printing error in the text at RNA [47.11]: The text reads "yadyathāntaram" instead of "yadyarthāntaram."

[61]The text has the word "niṣtanka-" but RNA [VN: 110.09] has the word "niṣṭabdha-."

[62]RNA [46.08-46.09]; RNA [47.11-47.15] corresponds to RNA [VN: 110.07-110.10]

[63]See RNA [VN: 110.05].

the practices of people who act in accordance with warranted modes of awareness [prāmāṇikalokayātra] would be violated [atikrama].[64] This is because reasonable [nyāya-prāpta] doubt [saṃśaya] is accepted by those who act in accordance with warranted modes of awareness only when there is the absence of a warranted mode of awareness which proves or disproves. Moreover, there is not the unwanted consequence of a complete lack of positive activity. This is because positive activity is produced from a warranted mode of awareness and from doubt which is directed towards an object [artha-saṃśaya]. And it is not possible, in every case [sarvatra], to raise a doubt which is not directed towards an object [anartha-sandeha]. This is because, occasionally [kvacid], one which is directed towards an object [arthonmukhatā] is definitely observed.[65]

{47.22-47.31} And although the property, 'being other than,' is not distinct [anyatva-aviśeṣaḥ], there is "definitely a specific cause [kiñcid eva kāraṇam] and a specific effect [kāryam ca kiñcid]."[66] Just as the self-nature [svabhāva] (of a thing) is not to be questioned, the non-questioning of (its) self-nature [svabhāva] is just the same for a natural connection [svabhāva-pratibandha], even between things that not related as effect and cause [akāryakāraṇabhūta]. (This makes clear Vācaspati's ramblings which just blind ordinary folks.)[67] To explain: Although the property 'being other than' is not distinct [vastutva-aviśeṣaḥ], it is fire and not space [ākāśa] that burns. So, just as in this

[64]See RNA [42.16].

[65]See RNA [43.06-43.09] and RNA [43.12].

[66]RNA [46.17-46.19], RNA [VN: 107.19-107.21]

[67]There is a textual problem here.

case the extremely unwanted consequence does not apply [na saṅgata],[68] since this object [artha] is proved by a warranted mode of awareness, similarly, although 'difference' is not distinct [bheda-aviśeṣaḥ], there is definitely a specific cause for something and a specific effect. So, in this case too the extremely unwanted consequence does not apply [na avatāraḥ]. This is because, when there is a difference [bheda], the effect-cause relationship, which is defined by their conforming to positive and negative concomitance [anvya-vyatireka-anuvidhāna-lakṣana], is proved by a warranted mode of awareness. Moreover, there isn't an object [arthah] that is denoted by the term "natural relation" [svābhāvika-sambandha-vācya] (and) is proved by a warranted mode of awareness. This is because, as stated, its defining characteristic has not been established [asiddhatvam]. And it is not the case that if a thing [vastu] is established as a result of being stipulated (to be so) [pratijñāsiddha], an unwanted consequence is not to be discussed. This is because there is the unwanted consequence that, by merely agreeing to it having that nature, everyone would be victorious everywhere. {47.31-47.02} As the author of the (Pramāṇavārttika-bhāṣya)-alaṅkāra says: "After asserting one opinion or the other, he is made answer-less by his opponent. He (now) says, "it is because of the nature of things." It follows that if this were an answer everyone would be victorious."

{48.04-48.07} Moreover [ca], what is a "natural relation?" What does it mean? Is it (a relation that is) produced by itself [svataḥ bhūtaḥ], produced from its own causes [svahetutaḥ bhūtaḥ], or is it uncaused [ahetukaḥ]? These are the three options. Now then, it is not the first option since causing one's own nature is a contradiction [sva-

[68]RNA [42.16]

ātmani kārītra-virodhāt]. Now, if it were the second option, there would not be a disagreement since the relation would be accepted as being a causal one [tadutpatti] (but) with a different look [mukhāntara]. And if it were uncaused [ahetuka] there would be the unwanted consequence of the absence of temporal, spatial, and essential specificity [deśakālasvabhāvaniyamaprasaṇga]. Thus, a relation [sambandha] which is natural [svabhāvika] does not follow [asaṅgataḥ].

{48.08-48.13} What was said about this, "We do not say that (the inferential reason) 'being an effect [kāryatva]' brings about inferential awareness because it is observed in similar cases and not observed in dissimilar cases. Rather, we say that it is because of a natural connection [svābhavika-pratibandha] which is definitely known, in the manner stated, through observations (of the inferential reason) in similar cases and non-observations (of it) in dissimilar cases,"[69] should be understood [mantavyam] as only making clear [āviṣkaraṇam] what (it is that) one desires. For it was stated that the defining characteristic of a natural relation is that it necessarily lacks an additional condition [upādhi-nirapekṣa-niyatatva]. Since this is not proved by the stated rule nor is that sort of necessity [tathābhūtam niyatatvam] manifest in the final moment in a mind which has been assisted by latent cognitive impressions which were produced by repeated observations,"[70] it cannot be asserted even out of kindness [sadayena].

{48.14-48.19} And the two examples, "like the correct form of a word (and) like being a Brahmin,"[71] are not acceptable [asiddham] to us. Thus, it is not correct to have made

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[69]RNA [46.01-46.02]

[70]RNA [46.22]

[71]RNA [46.23-46.24]; RNA [VN: 107.23].

them examples. But, "the difference between a real jewel (and an artificial one) is manifest"[72] is correct. This is because, due to a tradition of instruction, its defining characteristic, 'radiance in the form of a rainbow' etc., [indradhanur-ākara-jyoti] is clearly ascertained, with effort, as belonging to a ruby. And given this, the defining characteristic of a natural relation, although created by your imagination [sva-kalpita-racita], is not ascertained by a warranted mode of awareness by means of which there could be a situation [vyavasthā] like this, even for it. Thus, it is irrelevant [yatkiñcidetat].

{48.20-48.27} Now then, let a natural relation be one whose form has not been ascertained [anavadhāritarūpa]. Still, grasping this by observation and non-observation is very difficult to accept. To explain: If smoke's being necessarily related to fire [agniniyatattva] is grasped by the final moment of the mind [caramacetas] which is assisted by latent cognitive impressions that were produced by numerous past observations [pracīna-anekadarśana-janita-saṃskāra-sahāya], then, by the final moment of the mind which is assisted by latent cognitive impressions which were produced by observations and non-observations that are directed, innumberable times [kotiśaḥ], towards similar and dissimilar cases, it would be grasped that something made of earth [pārthiva] is necessarily able to be inscribed upon by iron [lohalekhyatva]. Thus, from (the inferential reason) 'being made of earth [pārthivatva],' 'being able to be inscribed upon by iron' could be proved. If one argues [atha] that, "It is definitely not the case that (the inferential reason) 'being made of earth' is necessarily related to 'being able to be inscribed upon by iron' since deviation is observed in a diamond. So, how is

[72]RNA [46.23]

necessity grasped through perception?",[73] then, it would not be the case that smoke is necessarily related to fire since it is impossible to observe the absence of deviation. So, how is necessity grasped by the final moment of the mind? This is just the same.

{48.28-49.08} One may argue [iti cet]: By not observing deviation there is non-deviation. One may argue [nanu]: What is the meaning of, "By not observing deviation there is non-deviation?" Is it because deviation [vyabhicāra] is unobserved [adarśana] that there is non-devation [avyabhicāra] or because of the absence of deviation [vyabhicārābhāva]? If it is the first alternative, then, there may or may not be deviation. (The statement) "it is definitely by not observing deviation that there is non-deviation" is deep. If it is the second alternative, then, how is the absence of deviation known [jñāta]? One may argue [iti cet]: "From non-observation." Is this non-observation-in-general [adarśanamātra] or the non-observation of-an-observable [dṛśyādarśana]? The first is impossible since it is not possible to say that although there is non-observation [adarśana], deviation, like the deviation (in the character) of a female Brahmin who died a long time ago, does not exist. This is because even if there is unobstructed non-observation [āhatyādarśana], deviation may be observed after a very long interval. Moreover, the second is impossible. This is because, if the total causal complex for observing deviation exists, deviation will be observed somewhere, sometime, and by someone. But if the total causal complex for observing (it) does not exist, either because the other causal factors are weak [vaikalya] or because it occurs at a different place or time, deviation will not be observed since there is the absence of having satisfied the conditions for being apprehensible [upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptatva-abhāva]. Therefore, given

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[73] See RNA [46.30].

the absence of the total causal complex (needed) for apprehending it, even if deviation exists there would be the non-apprehension of deviation. Even by the other approach, which is defined in terms of a causal relation, when there is non-deviation there is the non-apprehension of deviation. Thus, in both ways, there is the exclusion of apprehending deviation. The observation and non-observation which you described to be connected [nibandhanam] with the awareness [pratipatti] of non-deviation is not connected with non-deviation, even in the case of smoke. This is because there is deviation in the case of (the inferential reason) 'being made of earth' etc. Thus, according to your position, the consequence of this is that there should not be confidence even with (the inferential reason) smoke. {49.09-49.12} According to our view, however, if an effect-cause relationship is proved in one locus by perception and non-apprehension, then, there isn't the possibility of a doubt about deviation. And if it is absent, by the rule --"it gives up being a cause,"-- there is no opportunity for the ghost of doubt.

{49.12} So, in this way, pervasion is not proved even by numerous observations and non-observations.

[49.13-50.04] Alternative 4

{49.13-49.16} In that case, let it just be the fourth alternative: Pervasion is clearly ascertained by a single [sakṛt] observation in a similar case [sapakṣa] and non-observation in a dissimilar case [asapakṣa]. To explain: The positive concomitance [anvaya] of (the inferential reason) 'being an effect [kāryatva]' with 'being caused by an intelligence-possessor-in-general [buddhimanmātrapūrvakatva]' is observed in a pot etc.

Negative concomitance [vyatireka] of (the inferential reason) 'being an effect' (is observed) in space etc., where there is the exclusion of an intelligence-possessor [buddhimatkāraṇanivṛtti]. And as a result, since positive and negative concomitance are (each) proven once, pervasion [vyāþti] is proved. How is there inconclusiveness [anaikānitkatā]?

{49.17-49.21} About this it is said [abhi+ √dhā], "If the connection [pratibandha] between an intelligence-possessing cause [buddhimatkāraṇa] and 'being an effect' were known through a warranted mode of awareness, then, the statement, "There is the exclusion of (the inferential reason) 'being an effect' when there is the exclusion of an intelligence-possessing cause [buddhimatkāraṇa], as in space [ākāśa] etc." would be correct. But that connection, whether it is identity [tādātmya], a causal relation [tadutpatti], natural [svābhāvika], or another [anyah] is not proved since, as was communicated immediately before, there is the absence of a warranted mode of awareness which proves it [sādhaka-pramāṇa-abhāva]. And therefore, although there may be the exclusion of an intelligence possessor in the case of space etc., it is not the case that there is the exclusion of (the inferential reason) 'being-an-effect [kāryatva]'. Thus, (the inferential reason) 'being an effect [kāryatva]' is inconclusive [aniakāntika] since there is doubt about its exclusion from dissimilar cases [sandigdha-vipakṣa-vyāvṛttika-tvam]."

{49.22-49.23} One may argue [nanu...iti cet]: "According to our view, space [ākāśa] is eternal [nityatvam] and according to your view it is unreal [asattvam]. So, as a result of this, how is there doubt about the negative concomitance of (the inferential reason,) 'being an effect'?" {49.23-49.26} It is said, "Because it is not the case that negative concomitance is just the exclusion of an effect [kāryavyāvṛttimātra] in space. Rather,

negative concomitance is an absence of the inferential reason [sādhana] which is dependent upon [prayukta] the absence of the property to be proved [sādhya]. And that is impossible to grasp with respect to space. Just as, in that case, there is the exclusion of an intelligence-possessing cause [buddhimatkāraṇanivṛtti], similarly, there is also the exclusion of a cause-in-general [kāraṇamātra]. So, negative concomitance is proved by making known that the absence of an effect is dependent upon [prayukta] the absence of what?"

{49.27-49.30} One may argue: "This is definitely true, just as there is the exclusion of an intelligence-possessing cause [buddhimatkāraṇanivṛtti] in space, there is, similarly, in that case, also the exclusion of a cause-in-general [kāraṇamātra] and (so) it is not possible to clearly ascertain that 'being an effect' is restricted to [anuvidhāyitvam] negative concomitance with an intelligence-possessing cause [buddhimatkāraṇa-vyatireka]. Still, from observing, in pots etc., the positive concomitance of 'being an effect' with an intelligence-possessor, it is known that the absence of 'being an effect' is dependent upon [prayukta] the absence of an intelligence-possessor. So, how is negative concomitance unproved [asiddhi]?" {49.30-50.03} Alas, even in pots etc., there isn't the positive concomitance of 'being an effect' in virtue of its presence alone [sattā-mātra]. Rather, it is that the real presence [sad-bhāva] of an inferential reason [sādhana] is dependent upon [prayukta] the real presence [sad-bhāva] of what is to be proved [sādhya]. And that is impossible to grasp in the case of a pot. For just as there is the presence of an intelligence-possessor [buddhimat-bhāva] there is, similarly, in that case, also the presence of a straw mat and a wall etc. So, who could know whether (the inferential reason,) 'being an effect,' is present where an intelligence-possessor is present or where the mat and wall etc., are present?"

{50.02-50.04} Therefore, in this case, a special perception and non-apprehension which are directed towards grasping a special positive and negative concomitance [viśiṣṭa-anvaya-vyatireka-grahaṇa-pravaṇa-viśiṣṭa-pratyakṣa-anupalambha] must be accepted [anusartavya].[74] If a causal relation [tadutpatti] between a definitely observable effect and cause is (so) proved, positive and negative concomitance are proved. But, a warranted mode of awareness which proves the connection [pratibandha] does not exist even in a dream. So, the fourth option is also rejected.

[50.04-50.20]

{50.04-50.06} So, in this way, given that the pervasion [vyāpti] of an effect-in-general [kārya-mātra] by an intelligence-possessor [buddhimat] is not proved, it is just a false hope to expect that from the 'principle-doctrine rule' [adhikaraṇa-siddhānta-nyāya] that a special sort of person [puruṣa-viśeṣa] who is omniscient and knows the material cause (of the created world) etc., is proved.

{50.07-50.14} Moreover, the property to be proved is different [sādhya-(a)bhinna] when (compared with) the illustrating example (where) a special instrument [karaṇa-viśeṣa], defined as the visual sense faculty, is proved through 'action-in-general' [kriyā-sāmānya] being a property of the subject of the inference [pakadharmatā].[75] This is because [hi], in that case, it is just by naming it, "visual sense faculty [cakṣur-indriyam]," that the other cause [kāraṇāntara] is proved by implication [anyathā-

[74] See RNA [43.30-43.31].

[75] See RNA [34.06-34.16].

anupapatti] from the awareness of the color (of the pot). This is because the defining characteristic, 'visual sense faculty', does not produce an awareness of color. One may argue [atha]: 'Being the visual sense faculty [cakuṣṭavya]' just is the property of producing an awareness of color [rūpajñānajanakatva]. So be it. What is the problem? This is just what we said was the other cause. Similarly, if you are applying the name "special person [puruṣa-viśeṣa]" to the general locus of an intelligence-possessor-in-general [buddhimatsāmānyāśrayamātra] then we do not have an objection. We are arguing against (the idea that) according to what is really the case [paramārthatah] the special characteristic of being omniscient is proved (to be present) in the locus of an intelligence-possessor-in-general, like the special characteristic of a visual sense faculty. This is because, in both the example and the exemplar, there is the absence of being able to prove a special characteristic.

{50.15-50.20} So this is a brief statement of the point:

If, moreover, the property to be proved [sādhya] is observable, there is definitely deviation. If it is not observable, non-deviation cannot be proved. This is either on account of (its) being common or because of doubt about (whether the inferential reason is present) in dissimilar cases. For this reason the property to be proved [sādhya] is not proved.

Thus, Īśvara is offered a handful of water (and thereby given his last rites).

[50.21-54.05] The Inferential Reason [Sādhana]

{50.21} Now, the nature [sva-rūpa] of the inferential reason [sādhana] is examined.

{50.21-50.23} An inferential reason [sādhana], an effect-in-general [kārya-mātra] which is common to mount Meru, mount Mandara, the earth, a pot, cloth etc., has been proposed. As long as its having positive and negative concomitance with an intelligence-possessor is not ascertained together [ekatra], it is not possible for it to result in an inferential state of awareness [gamakatva]. And this cannot be known even in a dream.

{50.23-50.27} To explain: Given the instrumental activity [vyāpāra] of a potter, it is known that from a lump of clay there is an effect defined as a pot. But, prior to the instrumental activity of the potter it not possible to know the negative concomitance of an effect-in-general as it is with a pot [gaṭavat]. This is because even when the potter is absent [vyatireka], an effect, defined as drying and cracking etc., is observed in a lump of clay. And since it is an extremely unwanted consequence, it is not that case that for a 'y' that is perceived without 'x,' 'y' is the effect of 'x' [yadvinābhūtam yadupalabhyate tattasya kāryam].[76]

{50.27-51.02} One may argue [iti cet]: "Like grass etc., the drying and cracking of a lump of clay is an effect-in-general [kārya-mātra] which is also made into the subject of the inference." So be it. Let it be established that when there is the absence [vyatireka] of an intelligence-possessor there is also the absence [vyatireka] of an effect-in-general [kārya-mātra] in the same locus [ekatra]. If pervasion [vyāpti] is proved through this, there could also be the inference of an intelligence-possessor from drying and cracking etc., as in the case of grass. But, the dissimilar example [vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta], space [ākāśa] etc., was previously rejected. This is because, since in that case it is not known with what the absence of "being an effect" is connected [prayukta], it is possible that it is

[76]See NS 1.1.30.

caused by a cause-in-general [karaṇa-mātra-pūrvakatva] just like it is caused by an intelligence-possessor.

{51.03-51.07} What was said about this [etena yaduktam] --"Since deviation [vyabhicāra] is apprehended by denying that each (effect) has its own special characteristic [viśeṣa] we do not regard there to be a distinguishing characteristic for pots etc., other than one whose form is 'the coming into being of what was not existent.' Through this, we establish that it is caused by a maker who is related to it."-- is attacked [prativyūḍha] by observing effects such as drying and cracking in a lump of clay even when the potter is absent. The negative concomitance of an effect-in-general, defined as 'the coming into being of what was not existent' is not proved.

{51.08-51.09} One may argue [nanu...iti cet]: "If the pervasion of 'being an effect-in-general' with 'being an intelligence-possessor' cannot be grasped by perception since negative concomitance [vyatireka] is absent, then how do even you ascertain the pervasion of 'being a product [kṛtakatva]' with 'being non-eternal [anityatva]?' {51.09-51.12} We say: "From a warranted mode of awareness which disproves (the presence of the inferential reason) in locations where (what is to be inferred) is absent and with respect to which a defining characteristic is not needed [anapekṣālakṣaṇa-viparyaya-bādhaka-pramāṇa]." And that results in proving the absence [vyatireka] of 'being a product' --i.e., that which is excluded from what does not have its form [atadrūpaparāvṛtta]-- from dissimilar cases [vipakṣa]. And it was also previously explained that it is not possible for you to assert that there is a warranted mode of awareness which disproves (the presence of the inferential reason) in locations where (what is to be inferred) is absent [viparyaya-bādhaka-pramāṇa]. {51.12-51.13} The

(inferential reason) 'being an effect-in-general' is inconclusive [anaikāntika] since there is doubt about its absence of from dissimilar cases [sandigdha-vipakṣa-vyāvṛttikatva].

{51.14-51.16} About this, there is [etena yadetat] the Naiyāyika's trick for avoiding objections [ākṣepa-parihāra-viḍambana]: "Indeed, in this case, there are two (interpretations of) 'being an effect;'[77] an effect-in-general [kārya-mātra] and one which is specified [viśiṣta]." {51.15-51.16} Among these, the first is inconclusive [anaikāntika] because the necessary connection [pratibandha] is not established. {51.16-51.17} The second is unestablished [asiddha] since it isn't possible with respect to mountains etc. This does not follow since the necessary connection [pratibandha] only applies to an effect-in-general.

{51.18-51.22} It was said that "The effect is one which is specified [viśiṣtam kāryatvam]." About this, it must be explained what it is like. If it is said: --"The effect is either one which, in virtue of being regulated by its positive and negative concomitance with a person, is seen [upalabdha] to be caused by him [tatpūrvaka] or from the observation of which an awareness of a product [kṛta-buddhi] is produced even for someone who does not see its production.[78] This effect, which is consistent [anugata] with all big buildings etc., and is excluded [vyāvṛtta] from the mountains etc., is said to be 'specified [viśiṣta].'"-- Since the alternatives are not possible, it is a mess [asundara].

{51.22-51.25} And similarly Śaṅkara says: "Is the awareness of a product [kṛta-buddhi] an awareness of what is to be proved [sādhya-buddhi] or an awareness of an inferential

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[77]See RNA [52.28]

[78]See RNA [37.28], NVTT [566.15] ad NS 4.1.23.

reason [sādhana-buddhi]? If, for someone who has grasped pervasion, there is an awareness of what is to be proved [sādhya-buddhi], it is definite. For someone who has not grasped pervasion, how is it seen to exist in another case? If it is an awareness of the inferential reason, then it is opposed to what you yourself admit [svopagama-virodha] since it is admitted that all existing things [sarvasya bhāvasya] are produced [kṛtakatva]."

{51.26-52.07} About this, Vācaspati again says: "You should consider this more carefully. Is the specific characteristic [viśeṣa] that 'it is regulated by its positive and negative concomitance with an intelligence-possessor' or is it said to be 'the observation of that which does not exist in the case of mountains etc.'[79] {57.28-57.29} If it is the first alternative, it is definitely accepted by those who believe that bodies and the earth etc., are caused by an intelligence-possessor. For for no one other than a shameless Buddhist medicant [ahrīka] says that a cause is not (invariably) regulated [anuvihita-bhāva] by its effect.[80] {57.29-57.31} If it is the final alternative, "the observation of that etc.," then the awareness of a product [kṛta-buddhi] is not possible for someone who has not seen its production. For it is only that pot which was seen by him to be regulated by its positive and negative concomitance with an intelligence-possessor [buddhimat-anvaya-vyatireka-anuvidhāyī] that is an effect and not the one in the market.

{51.31-52.02} One may argue [iti cet]: "From observing that a member of that class [tajjātīya] is regulated by positive and negative concomitance with it, another member of

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[79]See NVTT [566.21-567.09] ad NS 4.1.21.

[80]RNA [51.29] reads "na ... anyo vakty ahrīkāt." The parallel passage at NVTT [566.23-537.01] reads "na... anyo vaktum arhaty ahrīkāt."

that class --although its regulation by positive and negative concomitance is not observed-- is similar [tathā]." {52.02-52.03} Oh [hanta]! A pot etc., is produced [utpattimat] and is regulated by its positive and negative concomitance with an intelligence-possessor. Thus, it cannot be forcibly denied that another, such as a body or the earth, is also like that [tathā bhavan].

{52.03-52.04} One may argue [iti cet]: "A member of the class of pots [ghata-jātīya] which possess production [utpattimat] is caused by an intelligence-possessor [buddhimat-pūrvakam]."

{52.04-52.08} One may argue [nanu]: "A large building [prāsāda] would not be caused by him since it belongs to the class of non-pots [aghaṭajātīya]." If a member of a class [tajjātīya] is seen to be regulated by positive and negative concomitance and, although (its) positive and negative concomitance is not seen, another member of that class is definitely caused by him, then why isn't a large building etc., which belongs to the class of effects [kārya-jāti] not seen to be caused by him. By means of this, would not (also) bodies and the earth etc., which possess production [utpattimat]? As everyone knows [khalu], with respect to members of a class there is no difference [viśeṣa].

{52.08-52.21} Moreover [tu], Vittoka says: "Or, let there be some specific characteristic [viśeṣa] that has an unspecified form [anirūpitarūpa]." {52.09-52.11} Again, what is intended [abhipreta] by the one who proposes this specific characteristic? Is it that (the inferential reason), an effect-in-general [kārya-sāmānya], is unestablished [asiddha] or the specified effect [kārya-viśeṣa]? Is it that there is deviation [vyabhicāra] between an effect-in-general [kārya-mātra] and an intelligence-possessing maker? Or, is it that there

is merely dissimilarity [vaidharmya-mātra] between what is to be proved [sādhya] and the example [dṛṣṭānta]? What is the purpose of this [kiṃ cātaḥ]?

{52.11-52.12} Now then, it is not the case that (the inferential reason), an effect-in-general [kārya-sāmānya], is unestablished. This is because with respect to the all pervading etc. [viśvambhara], production through the instrumental activity of a cause is established for both. {52.12-52.14} If it is said that the specific characteristic of the effect present in pots etc., is unestablished in the subject [pakṣa], then there will not be a problem [kṣati] with it since the specific characteristic is not accepted as being the inferential reason. {52.14-52.18} If one wants to explain that there is deviation [vyabhicāra] between an effect-in-general [kārya-mātra] and a maker, it is not possible since it is not observed in dissimilar cases. This is because grass etc., is made into the subject [pakṣa] and doubt as such [śaṇkhā-mātra] cannot be denied in every case [sarvathā]. There being doubt about negative concomitance [sandigdha-vyatirekitva] and the point of defeat --called "questioning what is not to be questioned [niranuyojya-anuyoga]" by the Naiyayikas and the "arising of a non-problem [adosādhbhavana]" by the Buddhists-- was also explained. Still, warranted modes of awareness which defeat (this) were definitely stated. Therefore, it is not the case that by not establishing the necessary connection [pratibandha] there is doubt about deviation in every case. {52.18-52.21} Now, it is not the case that there is dissimilariy between what is to be proved and the example. This is because it is common to every case. If what is to be proved [sādhya] is not proved because there is dissimilarity between what is to be proved [sādhya] and the example, then even the news of inferences [anumāna] will be excluded. This is because dissimilarity is possible, in some way, even in the case of the smoke in the kitchen and in the bower. Thus, all of this is nonsense [sakalam yat kiñ cid etad].

{52.22-53.33} Now, here is the summary [saṅkṣepārtha]: "Indeed [tāvat], the (inferential reason) 'being an effect-in-general [kāryatva-mātra]' is seen in the earth etc., (and) since the necessary connection is proved in the manner stated, it results in the inference of a person." For us, what was expected to be proved [abhimata-sādhya] is definitely not proved. Moreover, even after admitting "What is the use of our further reflection," it was said that the (inferential reason is) "being a specific effect [viśiṣṭa-kāryatva]." But, it was explained, in detail, that that is definitely not the case. All of that was definitely not attended to [anavadheyam]. {52.25-52.27} To explain [tathā hi]: Now then, since, in the manner stated [uktena krameṇa], the pervasion [vyāpti] of an effect-in-general is not proved, its being inconclusive [anaikāntika] is not avoided. After imagining that the inferential reason is 'being a specified effect [viśiṣṭa-kāryatva],' we refuted it. Since we did not accept it, the only result of the narrative [prabandha] for refuting it was exertion [prayāsa]. {53.28} This is because it is not accepted that there are two kinds of effects:[81] One which is common to all effects [sarva-kārya-anugatam] and another, which applies to pots, cloth, and palaces etc., [ghaṭa-paṭa-prāsāda-ādy-anuyāyī] and is excluded from mountains etc. Rather [kiṃ tu], an effect belongs to more than one class [anekajatīyakam]. Indeed, among these, if cloth belongs to the same class [sajātīya] as palaces etc., in virtue of the properties [dharma], "being a thing [vastutva]," "having a particular structure [saṃsthāna-viśeṣa-yogitva]," and "being an effect [kāryatva]" etc., still, ordinary perception [vyāvahārikaṃ pratyakṣaṃ] does not discover [adhi+√gam] that those properties [dharma] are caused by an intelligence-possessor since (the property) 'being an effect [kāryatva]' etc., does not have negative concomitance with an

[81] See RNA [51.14-ff.].

intelligence-possessor. So how could there be the inference of an intelligence-possessor [buddhimad-anumānam] from observing (the property) "being an effect" etc., in large buildings, mountains etc. However, it is said that negative concomitance is proved for the group [cakra] of effects that belong to the class of pots (and that) its being pervaded by an intelligence-possessor is proved by perception. Therefore, at a different place and time, there is definitely the inference of an intelligent-possessor [buddhimad-anumānam] from (an effect) that belongs to the same class as a pot [ghaṭajātīya]. But, when (an effect) which belongs to the class of large buildings etc., [prāsādajātīyaka] is, in one place, separately ascertained to be caused by an intelligence-possessor [buddhimad-hetuka], then an intelligence-possessor is proved even from (an effect) which belongs to that class. Thus, the inference of an intelligence-possessor [buddhimad-anumānam] is without fault [anavadya] since the collection of effects such as a cart, cloth, bracelets, etc., which belong to their respective classes [tattajjātīya-sarāvodañcanaśakaṭapaṭa-keyūra-prabhṛti] is separately [pṛthak pṛthag] ascertained to be caused by an intelligence-possessor. {53.05-53.07} For the purpose of displaying this very meaning the Teacher [ācārya] said: "A regulator who is inferred from a configuration etc., which has been established to follow from His presence and absence, is correct."[82]

{53.08-53.20} Thus, although a pot, cloth, and mountain etc., belong to the same class, in virtue of the properties [dharma] "being an effect [kāryatva]" and "being a thing [vastutva]" etc., it is after admitting a difference between the respective [avāntaram] classes, "pots," "cloth," or "mountains," that the perception which grasps pervasion [vyāpti-grāhakaṃ pratyakṣam] operates [pravartate] for an ordinary person [loka]. In order to show this, it was said that with regard to the awareness of a worldly and wise

[82]PV2.11

person [saṃvyavahārapragalbhapuruṣa], there is the awareness of a product [kṛta-buddhi] from observing an 'x' even though one did not see its production [akrīyādarśino 'pi]. This is not the case, however, with regard to a person whose awareness is dependent upon philosophy [śāstraparavaśabuddhipuruṣa]. To explain [tathā hi]: A person, skilled in ordinary practices [vyavahāra-pragalbha] and free from the impressions of philosophy [śāstra-saṃskāra-rahita] ascertained that what belongs to the class of temples [devakula-sajātīya] is caused by a person [puruṣa-pūrvaka] and entered the forest from the city. Upon seeing a mountain and a temple there is for him, with respect to the temple and not with respect to the mountain, an awareness of a product [kṛta-buddhi] even though he did not see the production [akrīyādarśino 'pi] of either of those two. Although, in virtue of being effects, those two are of a single class [ekajātitva], he is not able to establish the presence and absence of the awareness of a product [kṛtabuddhi-bhāva-abhāva] without establishing a difference between the respective classes [avāntara-jāti] defined as "mountain-ness" and "temple-ness." And if a difference in classes is proved, then pervasion is proved by grasping pervsion with respect to what belongs to the class of temples [devakulajātīya], but not with respect to what belongs to the class of mountains [parvatajātīya] or what belongs to the class of large buildings [prāsādajātīya]. Thus, from that there is not the inference of an intelligence-possessor [buddhimad-anumānam]. But when pervasion is also separately grasped for large buildings, then there may be the inference of an intelligence possessor [buddhimad-anumānam] even for what belongs to that class [tajjātīya]. It is not the case that, even in a dream, pervasion is grasped for what belongs to the class of mountains etc. This is because, although there is a non-difference in their general name [nāma-mātra], as mountains etc., pleasure-mountains etc., invariably have different self-natures.

{53.20-53.21} And about what was asked --"What is this awareness of a product?" etc.,[83]-- we say, "it is just the awareness of what is to be proved as per one's wishes."

{53.21-53.22} What was said about this is: "If, for one who has grasped pervasion, there is an awareness of what is to be proved [sādhya-buddhi], it is definite. For someone who has not grasped pervasion, how is it seen to exist in another case?"[84]

{53.23-53.27} About this, it is said: About the words --"For one who has grasped pervasion there is an inference. For one who has not grasped pervasion there is not."[85]-- we have no objection. We only [kevalam] say, "With respect to this topic [viṣaye] one who grasps pervasion is impossible." This is because, since, as stated, negative-concomitance is not proved, it is not ascertainable through ordinary perception [vyāvahārika-pratyakṣa] that the (inferential reason) "being an effect" is pervaded. Therefore, due to the well known differences in the respective classes [avāntara-jāti-bheda-prasiddhy-artham], it was definitely said, with regard to the awareness of an ordinary person [vyavahārika-puruṣa], that there is the presence and the absence of the awareness of it. And the application, given a difference in classes, was definitely explained previously.

{53.28-53.33} What was said about this by the clever-minded Vācaspati: -- "So, why isn't a large building etc., which belongs to the class of effects [kārya-jāti] not seen to be

[83]RNA [51.22]

[84]RNA [51.22-51.24]

[85]RNA [51.23-51.24]

caused by him as a result of which bodies and the earth etc., which possess production [utpattimat], would not be like that? As everyone knows [khalu], with respect to members of a class there is no difference [viśeṣa]."--[86] does not follow [saṅgatam]. To explain: Let it be that large buildings and mountains etc., belong to the same class in virtue of "being effects" etc. But, it is still not possible to know through ordinary perception that it is pervaded by an intelligence-possessor. This is because, when pervasion is grasped it is not possible to show in the example that the negative concomitance of an effect-in-general is joined with the presence of an intelligence-possessor.

{54.01-54.04} So, this is the summary: Since there is not negative concomitance, (the inferential reason) "being an effect-in-general" is non-pervaded and does not result in inferential awareness [agamakatva].[87] And we too definitely do not accept the (inferential reason) "being an effect-in-general which is common to pots and large buildings etc." But in so far as well known inferences are differentially established by admitting many classes such as "pot-ness", "cloth-ness", etc., (they) are established without fault.

[54.05-57.10] The Property To Be Proved [Sādhya]

{54.04} Now, the nature of the property to be proved [sādhya] will be discussed.

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[86]RNA [51.26-52.07]. Note: instead of "ghaṭa-jātīya" he is now using "kārya-jātīya."

[87]There seems to be some problem with the text here..

{54.04-54.12} One may argue [nanu ...iti cet]: "When an inferential reason [sādhana] is put forth by a disputant [vādin] after rejecting proposed problems with it, considering the nature of what is to be proved is, in the opinion of the Naiyāyikas, a point of defeat [nigrahasthāna] called "questioning what cannot be questioned [niranuyogya-anuyoga]" and, in the opinion of the Buddhists [saugata], the "arising of a non-problem [adoṣodbhava]".[88] This is the chatter of a rogue. To explain: If the nature of what is to be proved [sādhya] is not completely known [apariniṣṭita], how are the subject [pakṣa], similar cases [sapakṣa], and dissimilar cases [vipakṣa] --which are dependent upon it-- differentially established? If it is not established, problems such as "being unestablished" and positive qualities [guṇa] such as "being a property of the subject [pakṣadharmatā]" are not differentially established." This is what was said. Now, there is no narrative [kathā] about the problems and good qualities of the inferential reason. Thus, the respondent is rendered speechless [mūka]. Therefore, the account of what is to be proved [sādhya-nirukti] is for the purpose of pointing out problems with the inferential reason. Thus, given his own opinion, this disputant is defeated by the point of defeat, the problem called "questioning what cannot be questioned [niranuyogya-anuyoga]. So, what is the point of persevering here.

{54.13-54.15} As the inferential reason [sādhana] is "being an effect [kāryatva]," does it prove that the entire universe is caused by an intelligence-possessor-in-general [budhimanmātra-pūrvaka] or that it is caused by an intelligence-possesor-in-general who is characterized by qualities such as being single, omnipotent, and omniscient [ekatva-vibhutva-sarvajñatva-nityatvādi-guṇa-viśiṣṭa-buddhimat-pūrvaktava]. Given the first

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[88]See RNA [43.25-43.26]

alternative, (it) proves what was proved [siddha-sādhana]. And given the second, (it) is inconclusive [anaikāntika] since pervasion [vyāpti] is absent.

{54.17-54.21} One may argue [nanu]: "Although pervasion with a general-term [sāmānya] is well known, a characteristic [viśeṣa] is proved through the force of being a property of the subject [pakṣadharmatā]. Just as fire is proved through the exclusion of a non-connection [parvata-ayogavyavaccheda] with the mountain etc. Otherwise, all inferences are destroyed, since one who hates inferences chatters as follows:

Disputants are like elephants mired in the mud of denying inferential arguments. With respect to a particular characteristic there is the absence of a connection, in the case of a general-term what is to be proved is proved."

{54.21-54.27} About this it is said: "A particular characteristic [viśeṣa] is definitely proved through the force of being a property of the subject [pakṣadharmatā-balataḥ] but not all. For, let that characteristic without which the inferential reason's location in the subject does not occur [upa+ √pad] be proved. Just as for fire, the particular characteristic is "being present on the mountain" and not the "beauty of a five-colored crest jewel [pañcavarṇa-śikhā-kalāpa-kamanīya]." And it is not the case that without a single, omnipotent, or omniscient maker, the mountains and trees are not observed as being effects. This is because of observing this even in other cases [anyathā]. Thus,

There isn't a problem [doṣa] when there is only the property [bheda], "the exclusion of a non-connection with the subject." This is because there is an absence with what is to be proved. With the others, there is a problem.

{54.27-55.02} If this is so, a maker who himself knows the self-nature [sva-sva-rūpa], the primary cause [upādāna], the instruments [upakaraṇa], the beneficiaries [sampradāna], and the purposes [prayojana] is proved. Here, "self nature [sva-rūpa]" is the effect,

diads [dyaṇuka]. Here, the "primary cause [upādāna]" is the fourfold class of atoms [pramāṇu-jāti-catuṣṭaya]. The "instruments [prayojana]" are the merit and demerit that inheres in all individual souls [samasta-kṣetrajña-samavāyi-dharma-adharma]. The "beneficiaries [sampradāna]" are the individual souls towards which this Lord directs himself [abhi+pra+√i]. The "purpose" is the individual souls' experience of pleasure and suffering [sukha-dukha-bogaḥ]. If what is to be proved, an intelligence-possessor, exists in this way, how is there the proving of what was proved [siddha-sādhana]?

{55.02-55.03} Moreover, there isn't non-pervasion [avyāpti] because there is the occurrence [sambhava] of knowing the primary cause etc., in the example of a potter. {55.03-55.07} And Vācaspati causes it to be warranted [pramāṇayati] in this way: The subject under discussion --bodies, mountains, and oceans-- has a maker who knows the primary cause etc., on account of (the inferential reason) "being an effect." Whatever is an effect has a maker who knows the primary cause etc.; just like a large building. And the subject under discussion --bodies etc.-- is like that. Therefore, it is so.

{55.08-55.16} In this way, after proving a maker-in-general who knows the primary cause etc., on account of the inferential reason "being an effect," even Vācaspati says the following in order to prove that he is omniscient etc: "Now then, let there be the proof of a maker-in-general who knows the primary cause etc. Because of a remainder-inference [pāriśeṣya], whose second name is the "excluding-inference [vyatireki]," there is proof of a particular characteristic. To explain: The maker who knows the primary cause etc., of bodies, the earth etc., does not possess awareness of not-all non-eternal objects [anitya-asarva-viṣaya-buddhimān] since there would be the unwanted consequence that the maker of an 'x' does not know the primary cause etc. of that 'x.'

This is because the one who knows the primary cause of 'x' is not of such a sort, like us etc. Moreover, this (maker) is one who knows the primary cause of 'x.' Therefore, it is so. Indeed, other than an Īśvara like this there is no other who is able to know the innumerable differences in atoms and in the balance of karma which inheres in individual souls.

{55.17-55.21} About this it is said: Does just one intelligence-possessor act [vi+ā+√pṛ] with respect to all those effects, namely, diads which are spatially, temporally, and essentially different? Or, more than one? Or, are there different intelligence-possessors who know the primary cause etc., of only their respective objects [sva-sva-viṣaya-vyāpāra], who do not know each others' activities, and who are spatially, temporally, and essentially different. These are the three alternatives.

{55.21-55.26} Now then, it is not the first alternative since a single maker for all diads, different in space, time, and self-nature, is not proved. And even the inferential argument which was suggested, "because of a non-distinction in the inferential reason, an effect" is not possible. This is because, although there is a non-distinction in the inferential reason, smoke, as with the multiplicity of fire, there is the possibility of that doubt in even this case. And the example, "because of a non-distinction in the inferential reason, existence etc.," is definitely not established for us. Therefore, just as I must state a warranted mode of awareness for proving multiplicity [nānātva], you must also designate an inferential reason for proving one-ness [ekatva].

{55.26-55.27} Now it was opined: "One-ness [ekatva] is proved by the absence of multiplicity [nānātva]." If this is so, why don't you also understand multiplicity [anekatva] from the absence of an inferential reason for one-ness [ekatva].

{55.28-56.29} What was also said: "But, with respect to one-ness another warranted mode of awareness need not be sought. If there is the absence of one-maker, the many have conflicing minds" is also to be discussed. {55.29-56.05} If there is making by many, there is the non-production of effects which are spatially and temporally different. Or, of just one great whole [mahā-avayavin] which as the form of the earth, pots etc. Among these, in the case of just one effect, we do not see an opposition in production [utpatti-virodha] when there is the making by many since for the many there are not invariably mutual differences of opinion. This is because even the two sorts of oppositions [virodha], mutual and non-obstructing, do not arise. For being a person is opposed to being a non-person but not to mutual or non-obstruction.

{56.06-56.07} Denying the activity of the many especially towards those that are different due to innumberable spatial, temporal, and essential differences is not possible. Even the second alternative is, therefore, rejected.

{56.07-56.13} And a proof of the pervasion of a maker with one-ness is not observed (or) even with the many who independently seek their respective purposes. This is because of observing a single effect such as the killing of a deer who has entered the village. If that which is supposed to be caused by a single-maker is made into the subject [pakṣa], let it be caused by the maker himself [ātma-kartṛ]. So, in this way, a single maker for all of the diads is not proved. And in this way it was said: "When a single maker [eka-kartṛ]

is not proved, what is the basis for omniscience." For this reason, even the second alternative is exhausted [kṣīṇa] since, because there is the non-activity [apravṛtti] of even a single-maker towards all of the diads, how much more [sutarām] the non-activity [apravṛtti] of the many.

{56.14-56.19} But, if it were the third alternative then even if there is knowledge of the primary cause etc., of only the objects of their respective actions [sva-vyāpāra-viṣaya-mātr-opādānādy-abhijñatva], a single omniscient person is not proved. And it is not the case that omniscience could be proved through an awareness which grasps all objects -- as (it could be proved) from seeing a few super-sensory objects by existence in general [sattā-mātra]-- by grasping everything as non-distinct like the previously mentioned atoms on account of their non-difference. For when seeing a few super-sensory objects is proved by an inference, Īśvara is ascertained to be associated with its cause but not ascertained with another such as the mere existence of awareness. Thus, whence is omniscience.

{56.20-56.24} One may argue [nanu...iti cet]: "Why is a person who knows super-sensory objects such as atoms not omniscient?" How can (you) even hope that in virtue of only seeing super-sensory objects those who do not now see everything are omniscient? If one argues: "It is just so." Alas! Indeed, (even) if you, who are confused by arguments [nyāya], imagine an omniscient person to be (tailor)-made [hasta-samāracita], still, people who adhere to warranted modes of awareness do not infer that one who looks as if (he is) blind from birth with respect to the primary causes of diads etc., which are present at very different places and times, or does not know the ultimate ends of man, is omniscient.

{56.25-56.29} For us, however, there is no aversion to one who only sees super-sensory objects. And so, if a single maker is not proved even the negative form of the inferential reason will be ineffective since, if a single-maker for the entire universe is not proved, a knower of the primary cause etc., of it will not be proved. And one who knows only 'x,' only knows the primary cause of 'x' and is not omniscient. This is because, even with multiple loci, a knower-in-general of the primary causes etc., [upādānādy-abhijña-sāmānya] is an established thing [caritārtha]. So, in this way, even when a person-in-general who knows the primary cause etc., is proved, it is not the case that a special person who is characterized by one-ness [ekatva] and omniscience etc., is proved. And it was stated that in the case of a person-in-general there is the proving of what is (already) accepted.

{56.30-57.02} One may argue [iti cet]: "For one who desires an intelligent-cause-in-general, how is there the 'proving of what is (already) accepted.' What is to be proved [sādhya] is an intelligent cause who knows the primary cause etc." We say, "Relative to that, what is to be proved [sādhya] is not produced. There is only the drawing up of what is not proved. Even if the particular characteristics that are intended are proved, the Naiyāyikas' intention is not established."

{57.02-57.10} One may argue [iti cet]: "Now then, the Buddhist's don't accept what has been proved." This is not the case because even that which the other does not accept must be proved by proving the expected (object) which is to be proved. Otherwise, there would be the proof of what is not accepted by him even by reminding him of the grief due to his mother's (death) etc. A summary of this:

If either mere consciousness or knowledge of the material causes etc., is proved then neither is what is desired by the one proved nor is what is desired by the other refuted. If the desired special person is proved there is no connection (between the observed cases and what you want to prove). Moreover, the inference allows for doubt about the existence of the inferential reason from dissimilar cases.

{57.10} This is the third section, on the investigation of the property to be proved.

[57.11-57.17] Conclusion

{54.11-54.13} So, after thinking about (it) in the appropriate manner other (inferences) must also be defective. So, in this way, the assertion of Īśvara's existence is refuted. On the other hand, in order to assert his non-existence there is the inferential reason "existence [sattā]." This (inferential reason) proves momentariness which is radically different from his defining characteristic.

{54.14-54.17} This work of Ratnakīrti is a beautiful and clear light, an obstacle to confusion and darkness. It permeates the fanciful idea that an intelligent maker should be sought. May it be forever without obstruction.

B2. An Inquiry into Inference Warranting Relations [vyāptinirṇaya]

[106.01-108.02] The Opponent's Position (with introduction)

{106.01-106.02} Here, the concomitance [vyāpti] of smoke etc., a distinct entity [arthāntaram], with fire etc., is defined by a causal relationship [tadutpatti]. And that (causal relationship) is established by specific perceptions and non-apprehensions which are directed towards grasping a specific (instance of) positive [anvaya] and negative [vyatireka] concomitance. This is the rule.[89]

{106.02-106.4} But, beginning with Kumārila, (the Mīmāṃsakas) object to this. To explain: They imagine that smoke has positive and negative concomitance as a result of [iti] observing it, numerous times, in a place in which there is fire and the not observing it, in just that way, in a place which does not have it.

{106.05-106.06} One may argue [iti...cet]: "Even though numerous observations and non-observations have taken place, deviation is seen in the case of a pot and an unchaste woman." {106.06-106.08} What is the purpose of (saying) this? Is it to let there be an inference in that case too or, like in that case, to not let there be (an inference), even in the case of smoke etc. Now then, the first alternative is rejected simply on account of deviation [vyabhicāra]. The second (alternative) is also (rejected) simply on account of deviation. This is because when there is the deviation of some other (thing) nothing (happens) to smoke. {106.8-106.12} Therefore, since there isn't the non-deviation of smoke from fire, neither a hundred reasons nor (a hundred) specific perceptions and non-apprehensions which "prove" it, are sufficient for an inferential argument.

[89] RNA [43.30-43.31]

Alternatively, if there is (non-deviation, then,) since non-deviation can be established by observation and non-observation alone, what is the point of the causal relationship (or) the special perceptions and non-apprehensions that are able to (establish it). Thus, the author of the Kāśikā says, "the necessity of smoke with fire is grasped by the final (moment of the) mind, assisted by latent impressions (saṃskārāḥ) which were produced from numerous observations in the past."[90]

{106.13-106.23} And Trilocana says, since perception and non-apprehension have specific objects, how is a relation between two universals [sāmānyam] ascertained by (either of) them?[91]

{106.14} One may argue [atha]: "A relation between that which is excluded [vyāvṛttah] from non-smoke and that which is excluded from non-fire is definitely known." {106.14-106.16} But, in what warranted mode of awareness is it an object? Now, it is not (an object) of perception because its object is a self-characterized particular [svalakṣaṇa]. Also, it is not (an object) of an inferential state of awareness because that is just preceded by it. Moreover, there cannot be a relation between two exclusions.

{106.17} One may argue [atha]: "When a difference [bhedaḥ] is seen, the constructing state of awareness [vikalpa] that immediately follows perception determines a non-difference which is, itself, the universal." {106.18-106.19} Even so, a real thing [vastu] is not an object of a constructing state of awareness. Rather, (its object is) a graspable

[90] SVK 3.16.14, RNA [ISD: 46.21-46.23]

[91] See MTBh [21.13-21.15].

facet (of awareness) and that is not a real thing. Moreover, a real thing is simply beyond its reach. So, how can even that (state of awareness) grasp the relation?

{106.19-106.23} For us, however, a relation between what belongs to those classes [tajjātīya] is grasped by the mind, assisted by repeated observations. For this reason, smoke does not deviate from fire. If it deviates, smoke would over step the relation which (must) not have an additional condition. Thus, the warranted mode of awareness that wards off doubt about the (presence of) the inferential reason [hetu] in dissimilar cases [vipakṣa] is nothing other than a perception, called non-apprehension, which is the means for (realizing) the absence of an additional condition that has satisfied the requirements (for being an observable). Thereby, it is proved that the relation is natural [svābhāvika].[92]

{106.24-107.3} Now for Vācaspati's explanation:[93] There is (he says) a natural relation [svābhāvika-saṃbandha] of smoke etc., with fire etc., But not of fire etc., with smoke etc. This is because fire etc., is perceived [upalabhyante] even without smoke etc. However, if fire etc., is put together with [anubhavati] wet fuel then it is related with smoke etc. But, the relation of fire etc., (with smoke etc.,) is clearly brought about by an additional condition, i.e. wet fuel etc., and is not natural. Therefore, it is not necessary [niyataḥ]. On the other hand, the relation of smoke etc., with fire etc., is natural. This is because an additional condition is not perceived (and) deviation is not

[92]RNA [ISD: 46.27-46.31] Note: There is a slight difference in the two passages. The word "niścaya" is printed after the word "hetu" in the compound.

[93]RNA [106.24-108.02] is taken from NVTT [135.07-136.09]

observed anywhere.[94] (And) it is not proper to even imagine (the presence of) something which was not perceived.

{107.03-107.05} One may argue: "An additional condition which is not observed because it cannot be observed or about which there is doubt because there isn't a warranted mode of awareness [pramāṇa] to prove or refute (its presence), prevents the relation from being natural." {107.05-107.11} This is not correct [na yuktaḥ] since for those who do not see the regulating criteria [niyāmaka] there will always [avaśyam] be doubt.[95] Thus, the ghost of doubt, to whom an opportunity is given by overstepping the limits of common sense, is released. Nowhere does she not exist. Thus, one cannot act anywhere since in every case, (an awareness) which does not have an object [an-arthaḥ] is, in some way, a locus of doubt. And because doubt which does not have an object is a cause for the wise to stop acting.[96] And finally, because of observing death even when there is the use of nutritious food and drink. Therefore, for someone who protects the practices of those who follow warranted modes of awareness, there should be doubt only in accordance with observation and not (in accordance with) what was not previously observed. {107.11-107.13} This is because doubt definitely depends upon a specific memory and does not exist when there isn't memory. And memory cannot exist for an object which was not experienced. This was said by the author of the *Mīmāṃsā-vārttika*, "There is no doubt without warranted awareness."[97] {107.14-107.15} Therefore, we search with effort for an additional condition and not perceiving one we, having

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[94]MTBh [41.07-41.10]

[95]PV 1.32cd, PVin 2.45cd, NVTT [130.15], NVTT [135.17]

[96]NBT 14.1, PVT fragment 9

[97]SV [codanā 60], HBT [217.08], TBV [341.10], RNA [42.12-42.20]

understood that one does not exist, clearly ascertain [niścinumaḥ] that the relation is natural.

{107.16-107.19} One may argue: "This may be (but) since there could be a natural relation between any one thing and another thing which is not its cause, everything could be naturally related with everything. Everything could be inferred from everything. If any one thing can be the effect of any other thing, (then) since the quality of being 'other than' is the same, why doesn't everything (follow) from everything? This is indeed an extremely unwanted consequence." {107.19-107.22} (In response) it is said that the self nature of things should not be questioned (and) therefore that even if the quality of being 'other than' is the same, there is (still) only a certain cause for a certain effect.[98] This questioning of self-natures (however) is just the same, even in the case of a natural relation between different things that are not related as effect and cause. Therefore, this too need not be considered [yat kimcit etad].[99]

{107.22-107.26} But, by what warranted mode of awareness is that natural relation grasped? Since the terms of the relation are (objects) of perception (the relation is grasped) by perception. It is, for instance, only a sense faculty assisted by latent impressions produced by repeated observations that grasps the natural relation of smoke etc., with fire etc. This is just like (the repeated observations of a jeweler that enable him to determine) that a real jewel is different from an artificial one. We see this as correct. In this way, if the terms of a relation are known by another warranted mode of awareness then it is, accordingly, just these other warranted modes of awareness which,

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[98]PVSV [84.19], TSP [195.10-195.14]

[99]RNA [46.14-46.19], MTBh [42.02-42.05]

assisted by repeated observations, are the warranted modes of awareness that grasp the natural relation.

{107.26-108.02} If inferential reasons which are related naturally to their own property to be proved were to exist without (these) properties to be proved, they would go against their own natures. Doubt about negative concomitance with the property to be proved is removed with the help of suppositional reasoning [tarka].[100] (So,) wherever they are observed they definitely establish (their) own property to be proved.[101]

[108.02-111.27] Ratnakīrti's Response

{108.03} About (all of) this it is said:

[108.03-109.12]

{108.03-108.05} It is well-known that since, in this case, there is a distinction (between the inferential reason, smoke, and the property to be proved, fire), a causal relationship is the only (form of) concomitance. Moreover, it is neither the case that that (relation) nor an other (relation) which is self-defined as a necessary connection [avinābhāvaḥ] can be established by numerous observations alone. To explain: Is it the case that when there are repeated observations necessity is established [niyatatva-vyavasthā] or that only when there is necessity [niyatatva] there are repeated observations?

[100] The NVTT suggests that the text should read "tarka-sahāyā-nirasta-sādhya-vyatireka-vṛtti-sandeha" at RNA [108.01]. The printed RNA text appears to break the compound.

[101] NVTT [136.22-137.04]

{108.06-108.07} If it is the first alternative , then even from a pot an unchaste woman (could be inferred) and even from the property of being (made of) earth the property of being able to be inscribed upon by iron could be proved. This is because when there are repeated observations there is supposed to be necessity [niyatatva].

{108.08} One may argue [iti...cet]: "Because deviation is observed, this cannot be the case." {108.08-108.09} But, by whom has deviation been observed? Is (he) some kind of expert [śāstra-kāra] or an ordinary inquirer? {108.09-108.13} If it is the first alternative, (then) what happened to [kim āyātam] the ordinary inquirer so that he did not make the inference? Alternatively, (if) his purpose is served by (deviation) being an object of perception for another person, then, why is it necessary that he seek an inference. Moreover, there cannot be an inference by observing non-deviation (simply) from the words of a reliable expert. This is because it is proved, elsewhere, that it is impossible to identify a reliable expert.[102] Moreover, it is unreasonable that someone who has seen the relation after asking an expert will infer fire from smoke. {108.13-108.17} But, it is not necessary [avaśyam] that when deviation exists it becomes an object (of awaraness) [gocarībhavati] for an ordinary inquirer. This is because it is not necessary that when there is deviation there is, at just that time or place, a clear perception [pratītiṃ avatarati] (of it). It is not a rule that what is not clearly perceived does not exist.[103] This is because even if deviation exists it may not be observed because the total causal complex necessary for its observation is absent. (Or) because (it may be) observed only after an extremely long time, like the deviation in the character of a female Brahmin.

[102] See RNA [PAP: 101.18-102.03].

[103] See RNA [ISD: 48.31-49.01].

{108.18-108.19} One may argue [iti...cet] : "With respect to (the inferences from) 'pot' and 'earth' etc., an ordinary inquirer alone was involved [pra+√vṛt] (in repeatedly observing the co-presence and co-absence of the inferential reason and the property to be proved). He could see deviation at just that time or in due course." {108.19-108.24} Now then, if he is somehow involved or even if he were involved, he may (still) not see deviation because the total causal complex is absent. (Thus, it could be the case that for him) a diamond is effected by iron. Evidently then, for him, it is accepted as an inference. This is deep scholarship. Therefore, if on account of not observing deviation there could be an inference , then, for an ordinary inquirer who does not observe deviation, there could be an inference even from (the inferential reason) 'pot' and the property, 'being (made of) earth.' So, the absence of deviation cannot be proved by non-observation in general. This is because only the appropriate form of non-apprehension can prove absence in every case. Therefore, there is a reason to doubt whether by (observing) many instances of co-presence and co-absence alone it can be ascertained that there is neither deviation nor non-deviation.

{108.25} One may argue: "If this were the case, there would not be the inference (of fire) from smoke since (here) too there is the non-observation of deviation." {108.25-108.26} This is not the case since this reason for doubt is possible in all cases in which there is not a causal relation. {108.26-108.27} One may argue [atha]: "If an ordinary inquirer who was involved at some time, (now) sees deviation, then it is not the case that when there are repeated observations there is necessity. {108.27-108.29} In this case, how is a necessary connection proved between (fire) and smoke? There is a lack of confidence

[anāśvāsaḥ] since in this case (too) repeated observations would be ineffective since (their) capacity to establish necessity has been undermined.

{108.30-108.31} One may argue: "If this were the case, then from (the illusion of the) two moons etc., it would be seen that visual perception is ineffective. And so, even (the existence of) a pot etc., could not be established." {108.31-109.04} This is not the case since a perceptual state of awareness is the effect of a sensory object [indriya-viṣaya]. The awareness of two moons etc., is not like this since it is not caused by an object [artha]. Therefore, since a false perception is defined differently the awareness of a pot is nothing but perception. But, there isn't a difference in the defining characteristics of the repeated observations which (are supposed to) grasp concomitance in the case of smoke and (the ones which are supposed to grasp concomitance in the inference from) the property, 'being (made of) earth.' (If there were,) there could be confidence in the one case (and not in the other).

{109.04} One may argue: "The two (properties), 'being caused by an object' and 'not being caused by an object,' are the different defining characteristics [lakṣaṇa-bheda]." {109.04-109.08} This is not the case since if there were a dispute about whether the awareness of a pot is caused by an object, it could be resolved either by another warranted mode of awareness or by showing that it performs a function [artha-krīyā-lābha], (but) not by mere assertion. Moreover, in this case there is always the co-presence of smoke with fire. If there is a doubt that like (the relationship between) two friends this (relationship too) could end, then there would not (even) be the possibility that another warranted mode of awareness could definitively prove [prasādhaka] that they are always co-present, nor could its specific effect be seen.

{109.08-109.11} Now, it should not be said that the different defining characteristics are the characteristics, 'being falsifiable ' and 'not being falsifiable.' This is because it has not been proved that the repeated observations which grasp non-deviation are falsifiable. The reason for this is that non-falsification is itself [abādhamātram] the non-implicative (form) negation and (so) is not a warranted mode of awareness. Moreover, the possibility that "there is another warranted mode of awareness" or "discovering that it performs a function" is (an example of the) implicative form of negation, which is not established. Thus, the first alternative is refuted.

{109.11-109.12} The second alternative is also not correct since repeated observations are possible even when there isn't necessity e.g., in (the inference from) 'being (made of) earth' etc. Thus, concomitance is not known through numerous observations.[104]

[109.13-109.27]

{109.13-109.27} About Trilocana's objection we say: If (Trilocana's view that) perception has a self-characterized particular [sva-lakṣaṇam] for its object is stated as excluding a non-connection [ayoga-vyavaccheda], then it proves what is already accepted [siddha-sādhanam]. But (if it is stated as) excluding connection with another [anya-yoga-vyavaccheda], it is false [asiddha]. This is because every state of awareness such as perception and inference etc, has two objects. This is a result of a difference between the grasped [grāhya] and determined [adhyavaseya] object. That which manifests [pratibhāsate] in awareness is the grasped object while that towards which there is

[104]See SV [anumāna 12-14].

activity [pravartate] is the determined object. Among these, in the case of a perceptual state of awareness, the grasped object is a self-characterized particular and the determined object, a universal i.e., a self-characterized particular in general which is excluded from those that do not have its form [atad-rūpa-parāvṛtta-svalakṣaṇa-mātra-ātmakam]. In the case of inferential states of awareness, however, it is the reverse. And therefore, (even though) for an ordinary mode of warranted awareness [sāṃvyavahārika-pramāṇa] what is grasped is only the color component in the collection of shape, taste, smell, and touch (components) that is the pot, it is the collection that is established by perception. {109.21-109.24} In this way, even though it is (only) one of what is excluded from those that do not have its form that is grasped, it is correct that pervasion is grasped between an inferential reason in general and a property to be proved in general. Both are things in general which are excluded from those that do not have its form. They become objects of awareness in virtue of excluding a non-connection. It is for just this reason that the statement, "Only a non-real thing can be an object in constructing states of awareness, a real thing [vastu] is always beyond their scope,"[105] is difficult to understand [durjñānam]. This is because, given determination, every constructing state of awareness has a real thing as its object. This is explained even in the Śāstra.[106]

{109.24-109.27}[107] Moreover, it is not possible to grasp the pervasion between things that belong to that class, by the mind. This is because the mind is dependent upon the external [bahir-asvātantryam]. If this were not so, there would be the unwanted

[105]RNA [106.18-106.19]

[106]PVin 2 [2.08-2.10]

[107]RNA [106.19-106.23]

consequence of there not being anyone who is blind or deaf etc.[108] And, it is not proper to say, "When there is deviation with fire, smoke violates the relation which is free of an additional condition."[109] This is because the self-created and imagined natural relation is (like) a much desired ornament.

[109.28-111.24] [110]

{109.28-109.30} Vācaspati's remark --"Whatever is not invariably related [aniyatah] to something else through an additional condition is naturally related to it. Just as smoke (is naturally related) to fire. This is because an observable additional condition is not seen (and) because deviation is not observed anywhere"[111]-- will be considered here.

{109.30-109.32} It is well-known that the additional condition is an entity which is different from smoke e.g., (like) wet fuel (is different from the inferential reason), fire. It is the non-observation of this that establishes that a relation is natural. Some of these different entities are observable and some are not. But it is definitely not the case that all (of them) have the quality of being observable, necessarily [niyatam]. And so, with respect to (its relation with) fire there could be an additional condition, which is not perceived, even for smoke.

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108 NVTT [136.17-136.20]

109 RNA [106.21]

110 RNA [106.24-107.3]

111 NVTT [135.09-135.14], RNA [107.02-107.03]

{109.33-110.25} Therefore, the non-apprehension [anupalabdhi] of an additional condition in general is inconclusive [anaikāntikī]. [112] So, how is it that from non-observation alone, on account of which a natural relation is (supposed to be) established, (it can be proved) that an additional condition does not exist. Now, if the proof is (based) on the absence of an observable additional condition then it proves what is already accepted [siddha-sādhanam]. But since there is possibility of doubt about an unobservable additional condition, the problem [pratirodha] with (the relation) being natural definitely remains as it is [tadavastha eva].

{110.02-110.06} "Because deviation is not observed anywhere"[113] is definitely irrelevant [asambaddham] since the absence of deviation is, like (the absence of) an additional condition, also not proved by non-observation alone. Since deviation, even observable (deviation), is possible at every place and time, it is impossible for everyone to clearly ascertain it at every place and time. This is because there (may be) the absence of the total causal complex (necessary for its observation) and because even when there is unobstructed [āhatya-adarśanam] non-observation it is impossible to deny that it (may be) observed at another place or time, like deviation in the character of a female Brahmin.[114]

{110.07-110.08} One may argue [nanu...iti cet]: "If it could be the case that an additional condition is required for smoke (to be naturally related to fire), how can it be (said) that smoke is, by itself [eva], necessarily [niyama] related with the existence of fire." {110.08-

[112]See RNA [106.23].

[113]RNA [107.3]

[114]See RNA [108.17].

110.09} One may argue [nanu...iti cet]: "It should also be considered whether or not given the presence of smoke, fire is present, necessarily." {110.09-110.11} Perhaps, relative to an additional entity i.e., an additional condition, there could be smoke but no fire. In such a case what fixes the cause?[115] Therefore, it is established that the arising of smoke is dependent upon fire. So, how could the presence (of smoke) be accepted when it is absent. This is definitely correct.

{110.12-110.13} One may argue [atha]: "How can there be doubt in this case when the deviation (of smoke) from fire is not observed in either a particular [vyakti] or a universal [jati]?" {110.13-110.19} Is the property of 'being a person,' in virtue of which there is doubt about the post, observed in a particular post or the universal? If you argue [iti...cet] that it was seen in another locus, e.g. one characterized by the property 'being vertical' then in this case too, (the property) 'deviation' is definitely observed with respect to the property 'being made of earth' in numerous other loci. Moreover, it is unreasonable that when there is doubt about some 'x' in some specific [eva] locus 'y,' 'x' must be observed in just [eva] that locus 'y'. If deviation is observed with respect to a particular (instance) of smoke, the universal 'smoke' is definitely not included [bahir-bhūta] in pervasion. So, how is there (room for) doubt (about deviation)? If it is observed in the universal then deviation is clearly ascertained, so, how is there (room for) doubt? Even if (they) are not observed in either a particular or a universal, it is impossible to deny (either the possibility of) deviation or an additional condition. This is because they may not be observable. It is, therefore, impossible to prevent the spread of doubt.

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[115]See RNA [ISD: 47.11-47.14].

{110.19-110.25} Now, doubt about an additional condition or deviation is essentially doubt about the property 'being natural.' Thus, (this doubt) necessarily prevents the certainty [niścaya] (that the relation is) natural. Therefore the fact of the matter is that what is blocked is the certainty of (its) 'being natural.' Without this certainty, the inferential reason is by itself powerless. So, the non-apprehension of an additional condition and deviation is inconclusive and cannot prove their absence, on account of which it could be proved that the relation is natural.[116] Moreover, the non-apprehension of an additional condition is not established.[117] Just as fire is not related with smoke without wet fuel so too even smoke may not be related to fire without it. Thus, in both cases, wet fuel is the same additional condition.

{110.26-110.29} One may argue: Smoke is grasped through the association of a known fire, with wet fuel. Thus, an additional condition is established. But, from the non-deviation of a known (instance of) smoke with (fire), which is its cause, a natural relation is established. If this were the case, it would just be a causal relationship [tadutpatti] and that itself would be the natural realtion. But, it is not the case that (a relation) which has the nature of togetherness-in-general [sahacāra-mātra] can be established through stipulation [pratijñāsiddha].

{110.29-110.31} Moreover, is there non-deviation in every case because of the property, 'being natural' or is there the property, 'being natural' because there is non-deviation in every case. This circularity [itaretara-āśrayatvam] is difficult to avoid. For, he who

[116]See RNA [109.33-109.34].

[117]See RNA [109.34-110.1].

knows a causal relationship (even) once, knows non-deviation in every case. For him, there is not the unwanted consequence (of circularity).

{110.32} One may argue: "If this were the case, then from my numerous observations too non-deviation would be proved." {110.32-111.03} This is not so because 'numerous' is a number whose number is not fixed. After how many observations should a person who follows this definition become satisfied? For us, however,perception and non-apprehension definitely have a fixed number. As Jñānaśrīmitra says: "If at first there is non-observation and in due course there is observation or if there is observation and in due course there is non-observation (then) one knows the cause and effect relationship. In any other case, however, there is regress."[118]

[111.04-111.17][119]

{111.04-111.07} The statement, "Since it is not proper to even imagine (the presence) of something which was not observed," is not appropriate even for a child.[120] This is because when an object [artha] is not apprehended [anuplabhyate] there is an opportunity for imagination [kalpanā]. An observed pot (however) is not said to be imagined.

{111.07-111.08} Moreover, (the statement that) "An additional condition about which there is doubt prevents a relation from being natural," is not correct [yuktah].[121] This is

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[118]JNA [169.21], JNA [319.23]

[119]RNA [107.03-107.15]

[120]RNA [107.03], NVTT [135.14]

[121]RNA [107.04-1070.05], NVTT [135.144-135.16]

because reasonable doubt is arrived at only when there is the absence of a warranted mode of awareness that can prove or refute it. And for this reason the ghost of doubt[122] does not have an opportunity in each and every case. So, why does this man not act? {111.09} One may argue: "It is also possible to raise a doubt about the object of a warranted mode of awareness?" {111.09-111.11} This is not the case since the culminating effect of an accepted mode of warranted awareness is certainty [niścaya]. Its acceptance is invariably associated with [nāntarīyaka] accepting that there is certainty about the object of that undefeated mode of warranted awareness.

{111.11-111.13} Moreover, it is not the case that one does not act simply because of doubt. This is because positive activity is not prevented by doubt about an object, like (it is not prevented by doubt about a) diet of nutritious food and drink.[123] This is because although death is occasionally observed (for those on) such a diet, life is observed an innumerable number of times.

{111.13-111.14} Moreover, the practices of those who act in accordance with warranted modes of awareness[124] are not destroyed since doubt is accepted by those who act in accordance with warranted modes of awareness when a warranted mode of awareness is absent.

{111.14-111.16} (The statement beginning with the words,) "There should be doubt in accordance with observation etc.,"[125] also proves what is already accepted. This is

[122]RNA [107.07]

[123]RNA [107.09]

[124]RNA [107.10]

[125]RNA [107.10-107.11], NVTT [135.21]

because there is only doubt about (the presence of) an additional condition or deviation when it is observed in another case.

{111.16-111.17} Moreover, given the non-observation of (a warranted mode of awareness) which refutes (their presence) and because of the absence of one which proves (their absence), there will definitely be doubt.

[111.17-111.24][126]

{111.17-111.18} That meaningless discussion beginning with the words "this may be etc."[127] is also without substance. This is because when the nature [rūpam] (of a thing) is proved by a warranted mode of awareness there is support for accepting its self-nature [svabhāvaḥ].[128] But, it is not the case that the self-nature [svabhāvaḥ] of a thing [vastu] is established just by there being support for accepting its self-nature.

{111.18-111.22} So, if the self-nature doctrine [svabhāva-vāda] is that a cause and effect relationship is proved by the warranted modes of awareness, perception and non-apprehension, which grasp the positive and negative concomitance of a specific object, what happens to the natural relation? Having ignored the total causal complex for the causal relationship, it is by some other (means), namely, by two things being co-present [sahacāra], that there is awareness of (its) descriptive characteristic. This

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[126] RNA [107.16-108.2]

[127] RNA [107.16], NVTT [136.03]

[128] The printed text at RNA [111.17] reads "svābhāva-avalambanam" instead of "svabhāva-avalambanam".

method is indeed more remote (than the causal relationship). If this (co-presence) is dependent upon that total causal complex then it is just the causal relationship. So why is it given another name? Is it out of pride?

{111.22-111.23} The method for grasping it (described in the passage beginning with) "But by what warranted mode of awareness is that natural relation grasped etc.," was just refuted.[129]

{111.23-111.24} Since the property of 'being natural' is not proved, even the conclusion that "the inferential reasons which were naturally related to their respective properties to be proved etc.,"[130] is merely a kingdom (fabricated) by the mind.

[111.24-111.26]

{111.24-111.26} Therefore, if a different entity is to be inferred (its) effect is the inferential reason and it is established that its existence is proved by perception and non-apprehension. So, the theory of a natural (relation), which completely covers the mind, must be kept at a great distance.

The venerable Ratnakīrti's "Inquiry into Inference Warranting Relations" is complete.

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[129] RNA [107.22], NVTT [136.08]

[130] RNA [107.26]. NVTT [137.02]

B3. The Proof of Exclusion [apohasiddhi]

{58.01} It is explained that exclusion [apoha] is the meaning [artha] of words [śabda].

{58.01-58.04} One may argue [nanu]: "Indeed, what is this exclusion [apoha]? What is intended [vivakṣita] by the semantic analysis [vyutpatti] "this is excluded [apohyate] from another or from this another is excluded or in this another is excluded?" Is it an external object [bāhya] excluded from those of a different class [vijāti-vyāvṛtta], a facet of awareness [buddhi-ākāra], or if exclusion [apoha] means excluding [apohana], just the exclusion from another [anya-vyāvṛtti-mātram]? These are the three alternatives.[131]

{58.05-58.08} Now then, it is neither of the first two alternatives since what was intended by the name "exclusion [apoha]" was only a positive entity [vidhi].[132] Even the final one does not follow [asaṃgata] since it is refuted through awareness [pratīti]. To explain [tathā hi]: The verbal awareness [śābdī pratīti] "There is fire on that mountain" is only observed [lakṣyate] to present [ullikhantī] a positive form [vidhi-rūpa]. It does not make evident the mere exclusion [nivṛtti-mātra][133] "There is not non-fire," and it is very well known that there is no other way of proving [sādhanāntara] what is refuted [bādhita] through sensation. [pratyakṣa].[134]

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[131]This analysis of exclusion [apoha] seems to have begun with Śākyabuddhi [PVT(s): Jb2-Jb4]. Karṇakagomin mentions it at PVST [114] as do Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla at TSP ad TS [1002-1009]. For the JNA discussion see JNA [202.12-212.14].

[132]JNA [202.13-202.14]

[133]RNA [58.07] contains an obvious printing error ["nitṛtimātram" instead of "nivṛttimātram"].

[134]For the JNA discussion see JNA [201.07-201.14].

{58.09-58.13} One may now argue [atha ... iti cet]: "Although, "I am aware of exclusion [nivṛtti]" is not what is thought [vikalpa], still, given the presentation [ullekha] of an excluded object [nivṛtta-padārtha] there is definitely the presentation of exclusion [nivṛtti-ullekha]. This is because [hi] the awareness of a characterized object [viśiṣṭa-pratīti] is not an awareness [pratīti] in which a characteristic [viśeṣaṇa] is not included [an-antarbhāvita]. Therefore, just as, even when there is the absence of the thought [vikalpa] "I am aware of a universal [sāmānya]" there is, due to the manifestion [pari+√sphur] of a general-facet [sādhāraṇa-ākāra], the awareness of a mental construction [vikalpa-buddhi] --which for others is the awareness of a universal [sāmānya-buddhi]-- in the same way, an awareness of exclusion [nivṛtti-pratīti] is implied [ākṣipta] by the awareness of what is excluded [nivṛtta-pratyaya]. (This) allows for [ā+√tan] the expression [vyavahāra] 'the awareness of exclusion [apoha-pratīti]'."

{58.14-58.18} One may argue [nanu]: "If when there is the manifestation of a general-facet [sādhāraṇa-ākāra] the awareness of a universal [sāmānya-bodha] is specifically established [vyavasthā] as having the form of a positive entity [vidhi-rūpa], what becomes of specifically establishing [vyavasthā] the awareness of exclusion [nivṛtti-pratīti] in a state of awareness [cetas] in which the facet [ākāra] is either not being manifest [asphurad-abhāva-ākāra] or is absent? Thus, if even when there is the absence of a facet [ākāra] such as "I am aware of exclusion [nivṛtti]" there could be the manifestation of the facet 'exclusion [nivṛtti-ākāra],' who could deny that an awareness of exclusion [nivṛtti] is established [sthiti]. Alternatively, when it is not manifest there (could be) the ordinary expression [vyavahāra] of its awareness. Thus, even in a state of awareness [cetas] having the facet 'cow' [gavākāra] there could be the awareness [avabodha] of a horse.

{58.19-58.22} If [atha] it is said that "the awareness of exclusion [nivṛtti] is included [antarbhūta] as a characteristic [viśeṣaṇa]."[135] Still [tathāpi], if a constructing state of awareness [vikalpa] has a facet [ākāra] such as "that which is excluded from non-cows [agava-apoḍha]" then let it be that it enters [anupraveśa] as a characteristic [viśeṣaṇa]. But the awareness is "cow." And so, how is its awareness established [vyavasthā] since in that case the characteristic [viśeṣaṇa] defined as exclusion [nivṛtti], although it exists, is not apparent [anutkalana].[136]

{58.23-58.24} If [atha] the view is as follows, "There is also the exclusion from others [para-apoha] of that which is manifest [√sphur] in the form of a positive entity [vidhi-rūpa]. Thus there is said to be the awareness of 'it' [tatpratīti]." Even then there is exclusion [apoha] only through a relation [sambandha-mātra]. It is the positive entity [vidhi] alone that is directly [sākṣāt] manifest [nir+√bhās].[137] {58.24-59.03} Moreover, if this is so [evam] it should not be denied that sensation [adhyakṣa] also has exclusion [apoha] for its object [viṣaya] especially [viśeṣataḥ] since a constructing state of awareness [vikalpa] presents [ud+√likh] one excluded thing [eka-vyāvṛtta] (and) it sees that which is excluded from everything else [akhila-anya-vyāvṛtta].[138] Like sensation [pratyakṣa], therefore, by grasping [avagraha] a facet (which has the form of) a positive entity [vidhi-ākāra], even a constructing state of awareness [vikalpa] has a positive entity

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[135]See RNA [58.10].

[136]Note: RNA [58.09-58.22] corresponds to JNA [201.15-202.04].

[137]See JNA [202.07-202.09].

[138]See RNA [60.19-60.20].

[vidhi] for its object and does not have exclusion from others [anyāpoha] as its object [viṣaya].[139] So, how is exclusion [apoha] asserted to be the meaning of a word [śabdārtha]?

[59.04-65.14]

{59.04} About this [tatra] it is said:

{59.04-59.06} By the word 'exclusion [apoha]' we do not just mean a positive entity [vidhi] alone or the mere exclusion from others [anya-vyāvṛtti-mātra] but rather that the meaning [artha] of words [śabda] is a positive entity [vidhi] characterized by its exclusion from others [anyāpoha-viśiṣta].[140] And therefore, the problems [doṣa] that have been raised [upa+ni+√pat] with respect to each of the (three) alternatives are not relevant [avakāśa].

[59.07-60.20]

{59.07-59.09} The opinion of the Positivists [vidhivādin] is that in the awareness 'cow' exclusion [apoha] is subsequently [paścāt] ascertained from the implication [sāmārthya] that "it has that nature [tadātmā] and not the nature of another [aparātmā]."[141] The

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[139]See JNA [202.09-202.11] where instead of "viddhyākārāvagrahād adhyakṣavad" which is printed at RNA [59.02] the text reads "viddhyākārāvagrahādhyakṣavad."

[140]See PS5.36d: "ayam arthāntara-vyāvṛttyā tasya vastunaḥ kaścid bhāgo gamyate, śabdo arthāntara-nivṛtti-viśiṣtān eva bhāvān āha."

[141]JNA [206.15]

opinion of the Negationists [niṣedhavādin] is that given an awareness of the exclusion from others [anyāpoha] that which is excluded from others [anyāpoḍha] is subsequently [paścāt] ascertained by implication [sāmārthya]. { 59.09-59.11} (Both) are a mess [asundaram]. This is because a sequence in awareness is not observed even for a first-timer [prāthāmika].[142] For it is neither the case that after becoming aware of a positive entity [vidhi] one subsequently [paścāt] understands exclusion [apoha] by implication [arthāpattitaḥ] nor that after becoming aware of exclusion (one subsequently understands) that which is excluded from others [anyāpoḍha]. Therefore, the awareness 'cow' is said to be the awareness of a that which is excluded from others [anyāpoḍha]. {59.11-59.13} And although it is stated without presenting [anullekha] the word 'excluded from others [anyāpoḍha],' it is still not the case that there isn't an awareness of the exclusion from others [anyāpoha] as a characteristic [viśeṣaṇa-bhūta]. This is because the word 'cow' is attached to [niveśita] that which is excluded from non-cows [agavāpoḍha]. {59.13-59.16} Just as in the awareness 'blue lotus [nīlotpala]' from the word 'Indīvara-flower' --which is attached to [niveśita] a blue lotus [nīlotpala]-- there is simultaneously [tatkāla] the manifestation [sphuraṇa] of blue-ness [nīlima], it is difficult to deny [anivārya] that in the awareness 'cow' from the word 'cow' --which is attached to [niveśita] that which is excluded from non-cows [agavāpoḍha]-- there is also simultaneously [tatkāla] the manifestation [sphuraṇa] of exclusion [apoha][143] on account of its being a characteristic [viśeṣaṇa].[144] {59.16-69.18} Just as perception's [pratyakṣa] non-grasping of the non-implicative form [prasajya-rūpa] of absence [abhāva] is just its

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[142] JNA [206.16]

[143] Following manuscript 'T', RNA [p. 59 n. 5], I am reading "apoha-sphuraṇa" instead of "ago 'poha-sphuraṇa" which is the reading at RNA [59.15].

[144] See JNA [203.19-203.21].

capacity [śakti] to produce a mental construction of absence [abhāva-vikalpa], grasping (this) absence [abhāva][145] is also just the capacity [śakti] that constructing states of awareness involving a positive entity [vidhi-vikalpa] have to produce [dāna] actions [anuṣṭhāna] which conform to it [tad-anurūpa]. On the other hand, grasping the implicative form [paryudāsa-rūpa] of absence [abhāva] is an awareness of a specific nature [niyata-svarūpa] and is not distinguished [a-viśiṣṭa] between the two. {59.18-59.20} On the other hand, if the exclusion from others [parāpoha] is not present [kalita] when there is the awareness of meaning [artha] from a word, how can there be positive activity [pravṛtti] through the exclusion of others [anya-parihāra]?[146] As a result, someone who is ordered to tie a cow could also tie horses.[147]

[59.21-60.11]

{59.21-59.25} What Vācaspati had said --"Individuals [vyakti] possessing universals [jāti] are the objects [gocara] of thoughts [vikalpa] and words [śabda]. And it is from understanding that the form [rūpa] of those (individuals) which possess them is 'excluded from those which belong to a different class [atajjātīya-parāvṛtta]' that one who is ordered to tie a cow does not tie horses"[148] -- {59.23-59.25} is refuted through this (analysis). This is because even if it is assumed [prakṣepa] that universals [jāti] are distinct [adhika], if the form of individuals is just 'excluded from those which belong to

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[145]The word "absence [abhāva]" is being used here in the sense of exlcusion [apoha].

[146]See JNA [206.05].

[147]See JNA [206.14-206.15].

[148]NVTT [443.23-444.02]

a different class [atajjātīya-parāvṛtta]' then through that very form they become the objects [viśayī+√bhū] of words [śabda] and thoughts [vikalpa]. How is the exclusion from what is not-that [atad-vyāvṛtti] rejected [parihāra]? {59.26-59.27} Now, if the form of an individual [vyakti-rūpa] is neither that it is excluded from those which belong to a different class [vijatīya-vyāvṛtta] nor that it is known as such [tathā-pratīta] then this is the gift of a universal [jāti-prasāda]. "How is it understood even by implication [arthataḥ]?" was the stated response [ukta-prāya]. {59.28-59.29} Now, if it is excluded [vyāvṛtta] from others just because of a universal [jāti][149] let it be excluded from others [anya-vyāvṛtta] either because of the universal [jāti] or because of its own causal series [sva-hetu-paramparā]. In these two cases, given an awareness of what is excluded [vyāvṛtta] there is definitely also an awareness of exclusion [vyāvṛtti].

{60.01-60.06} It is, moreover, not the case that there is a problem of circularity [anyonya-āśraya-doṣa] when that which is excluded from non-cows [agavāpoḍha] is the positive entity [vidhi] conventionally defined [saṃketa] through the word 'cow'. This is because that problem is applicable [avakāśa] even when a universal [sāmānya] or what possesses it is conventionally defined [saṃketa]. For it is not intended that "universal" [sāmānya] means [nāma] a universal as such [sāmānya-mātra] since there is the unwanted consequence that even a horse could be conventionally defined [saṃketa] through the word 'cow'. Rather, (the universal) is 'cow-ness'. And to that extent there is definitely a problem since without the awareness of a cow etc., [gavādi-aparijñāna][150] there isn't

[149] JNA [206.25-207.05]. This passage includes NVTT [443.23-444.02].

[150] RNA [60.04] reads "gavādiparijñāna." I am reading "gavādyaparijñāna." The 1957 edition of the RNA follows RNA [60.04] in reading "gavādiparijñāna." Sharma (1969) however, reads "gavādyaparijñāna."

the awareness [aparijñāna] of the universal [sāmānya] 'cow-ness' (and) without an awareness [aparijñāna] of the universal [sāmānya] cow-ness there isn't an awareness [aparijñāna] of what is denoted [vācya] by the word 'cow'. {60.06-60.07} Therefore, there is not a problem of circularity [anyonya-āśraya-doṣa] in conventionally defining [saṃketa] a facet of a constructing state of awareness [vikalpa-buddhi-ākāra] which was preceded by the observation of an individual thing [piṇḍa] (and) is externally projected [bairadhyasta] as if common [sādhāraṇa] to every individual through (the words) "This is a cow".

{60.08-60.11} And if it is agreed [abhimata] that when the word 'cow' is used it is also proper to name the remainder by the word 'non-cow' then there is neither a contradiction [viroddha] between that which is excluded from others [anyāpoḍha] and the exclusion from others [anyāpoha] nor is the relation between what is characterized and (its) characteristic [viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇa-bhāva] destroyed. This is because there is not the absence of mutual exclusion [paraspara-vyavaccheda-abhāva] (and) there is the real presence of (those two) having the same substratum [sāmānādikaraṇya], like the floor and the absence of a pot. For there is an (internal)-contradiction [virodha] through its own absence [svābhāva] (but) not with (its) absence from another [parābhava].[151] This is well known even to a child [ābāla-prasiddha].

[60.11-60.14]

[151] The word "absence [abhāva] is being used here in the sense of negation.

{60.11-60.14} It is also possible [eva] to understood exclusion [apoha] in a sentence (such as) "This road leads to Śrughna [eṣa panthāḥ śrughnam upatiṣṭate]". This is because it is easy to find exclusion [vyavaccheda] for each and every word: Relative to other incorrect [apakṛta] roads, it is only this one [eṣa eva]; Relative to an undesired place which rivals [pratyanīka] Śrughna, it is definitely Śrughna [śrughnam eva]; Because of the absence of any breaks, unlike a mountain path, it definitely leads [upatiṣṭata eva]; and by excluding [avaccheda] it from (what is used by) caravans and messengers etc., it is surely a road [panthā eva].[152]

[60.14-60.19]

{60.14-60.15} Therefore, that which has the form of a positive entity [vidhi-rūpa] with exclusion [apoha] as its property [dharma] is understood [avagati] from a word, just like from the word 'Puṇḍarīka-flower' (one understands) a lotus having the characteristic 'white' [śvetima-viśiṣṭa].

{60.16-60.18} One may argue [iti cet]: "If it is correct [ucita] to say that a positive entity [vidhi] is definitely the meaning of a word, how is exclusion [apoha] asserted?"[153] With respect to this it was said, "a positive entity [vidhi] characterized by its exclusion from others [anyāpoha-viśiṣṭa] is what is meant by the word 'exclusion [apoha]'."[154] So,

[152]See JNA [206.06-206.14], MTbh [Kajiyama (1966: 57, n. 132) where Kajiyama traces the use of this example to Dharmottara, PVinT [Peking 216b8].

[153]See RNA [59.03].

[154]See RNA [59.05].

when a positive entity [vidhi] is becoming known [pratīyamāna] there is, at just that time, the awareness of exclusion [apoha-pratīti] as its characteristic [viśeṣaṇa].

[60.19-6.20]

{60.19-60.20} And so the conclusion [vyavasthā] that even perception [pratyakṣa] has exclusion [apoha] as its object [viṣaya] is not correct [ucita].[155] This is because there is not a disagreement about whether it has a real thing [vastu] as its object [viṣaya] like there is for verbal awareness.

[60.16-66.05]

{60.20-60.26} By the word 'positive entity' [vidhi] what is meant, given determination [yathā-adhyavasāya], is an external object [bāhyo artha] which is excluded from those which do not have its form [atadrūpa-parāvṛtta], and given manifestation [yathā-pratibhāsa], a facet of awareness [buddhi-ākāra]. {60.22-60.26} Among these, it is specifically established [vi+ava+√sthā (caus)] only as a result of determination [adhyavasāya] (and) not through the manifestation [pari+√sphur] of a particular [svalakṣaṇa] that an external object [bāhyo artha] is denoted by a word [śabda-vācya] .[156] This is because there is not the manifestation [sphuraṇa] of a manifest particular [pravyakta-svalakṣaṇa] which is spatially, temporally, and structurally specified [deśa-kāla-avasthā-niyata] like there is in perception [pratyakṣa]. As (it is said) in the Śāstra:

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[155]See RNA [59.01], [59.24-59.03].

[156]JNA [208.11-208.12], Katsura (1986: 179), Woo (1999: 187).

"This is because in (verbal) awareness [buddhi] there is not the manifestation [prathibhāsana] of an object [akṣa] which is not involved [avyāpṛta] with language [śabda] like there is when observing an object [artha]."[157]

[60.26-61.10]

{60.26-61.02} One may argue [iti...cet]: "Because there is a difference between means [upāya] which have the nature of a sense faculty [indriya] and language [śabda] there is a difference in the manifestation [pratibhāsa] of one and the same object [artha]."[158] About this it was also said: "The basis [āśraya] of those states of awareness [cetas] is one [anya] or another [anya]. Of an object [vastu] there is just one form [rūpa]. So, how is there the manifestation of different facets [bhinna-ākāra-avabhāsi]?"[159]

For, it is not the case that since there could be the manifestation [prati+√bhās] of one in a sensory state of awareness [indriya-buddhi] and of another in a constructing state of awareness [vikalpa], there are two mutually opposed forms [dve rūpe parasparaviruddhe], 'clear [spaṣṭa]' and 'unclear [aspaṣṭa]' for one thing [vastu]. In this case [tathā sati] a difference [bheda] is arrived at [prāpti] for just (one) thing [vastu]. This is because [hi] it is not the case that a difference between things [vastu-bheda] is other [apara] than the difference in their natures [svarūpa-bheda]. And it is not the case

[157]JNA [208.17-208.18]. Although it is not a direct quotation see PV2.132.

[158]For interpreting the following verse, the words used at JNA [208.19] to phrase the objection are helpful: "upāyabhedad ekasyaiva pratibhāsabhedaḥ ekatra hi buddhau indriyam āśrayaḥ anyatra śabdādi iti cet."

[159]PV2.235, JNA [208.21-208.22]

that the difference in their natures [svarūpa-bheda] is other than the difference in their manifestations [pratibhāsa-bheda]. If this were not so [anyathā], the triple-world would be just one thing [vastu].[160]

{61.03-61.06} One may argue [iti cet]: "Although for two people --(one) standing far away from and (the other) close to a single tree-- there are the different manifestations [pratibhāsa-bheda] 'clear [spaṣṭa]' and 'unclear' [aspaṣṭa], there is not a difference in the tree [śākhi-bheda]." {60.04-60.06} We do not say that a difference in manifestations [pratibhāsa-bheda] is invariably related with a difference in things [vastu-bheda-niyata], but rather, that it is invariably related to the absence of there being one object [eka-viṣayatva-abhāva-niyata].[161] Therefore, when the difference in manifestations [pratibhāsa-bheda] is accompanied by a difference in their capacity to perform a function etc., [arthakrīyādi-saciva] there is then a difference in things [vastu-bheda].[162] Otherwise, there being one object [viṣaya] is denied. Thus, one manifestation is erroneous [bhrānta].[163]

{61.07-61.10} What Vācaspati says about this, --"Given that verbal and perceptual (awareness) have a thing [vastu] as their object [gocara] it is not the case that there is a non-difference [abheda] in their basis of support [pratyaya] since through a difference in

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[160] JNA [208.23-209.01]

[161] See JNA [209.02-209.06].

[162] I am following manuscript 'T' and removing the word "ghaṭavat". JNA [209.13] reads "ghaṭa-paṭa-vat".

[163] See JNA [209.12-209.14]. JNA [209.13-209.14] very helpfully reads, "tam punaḥ sahāyam vihāya pravṛtto niyamena ekaviṣayatām pariharati iti eko 'tra bhrānta eva pratibhāsaḥ śaṅkhe pītapratibhāsavat". JNA [208.16-210.02] provides a much more detailed discussion of this issue.

causes [kāraṇa-bheda] it is possible for there to be the difference between what is not and what is within the range of the senses [parokṣya-aparokṣya-bheda]."[164]-- is not relevant. This is because a non-sensory awareness [parokṣa-pratyaya] is not capable of having a thing [vastu] as its object [gocaratva]. Moreover, the difference in causes [kāraṇa-bheda] which is the basis of non-sensory-ness [parokṣatā-āśraya] is given meaning [kṛta-artha] simply by the absence of grasping a sensory object [indriya-gocara-grahaṇa-viraha].[165]

{61.10} So, in verbal awareness [śabde pratyaye] a particular [svalakṣaṇa] is not manifest [pari+√sphur].

[61.10-62.13]

{61.10-61.14} Moreover, if a thing [vastu] having the nature of a particular [svalakṣaṇa-ātman] is denoted [vācya] then because of an awareness of its entire nature [sarva-ātmanā pratipatteḥ] it is not possible for there to be positive and negative (existential) statements [vidhi-niṣedha] (about it). For if it really exists, "it exists" is meaningless [vyartham] (and) "it does not exist" is irrelevant [asamartham]. But if it really does not exist, "it does not exist" is meaningless [vyartham], "it exists" is irrelevant [asamartham]. But there is the use of the words "it exists" etc. Therefore, a verbal-manifestation [sābda-pratibhāsa], being indifferent to the existence or non-existence of an external object [bāhyārtha-bhāva-abhāva-sādhāraṇya], is not able to have it as its object [viṣaya].

164NVTT [115.08-115.10]

165JNA [210.03-210.08]

{61.15-61.20} Immediately after saying, through his very own words, that what is denoted [vācya] is a universal possessing individual [jātimat-vyakti], Vācaspati supposed [vikalpita] --"It is not the case, moreover, that it isn't possible for a universal [sāmānya], which is the meaning [artha] of a word, to be indifferent to existence and non-existence [bhāva-abhava-sādhāraṇya] since, although it is by its very nature eternal, in virtue of having many spatially and temporally scattered [deśa-kāla-viprakīrṇa] individuals [vyakti] as its loci [āśraya] it is indifferent to existence and non-existence [bhāva-abhāva-sādhāraṇī +√bhu]. Thus, it is tenable that it is related to "it exists" and "it does not exist". This is because, for a universal [jāti], existence [astitā] is the being related to present individuals [vartamāna-vyakti-sambandhitā] and non-existence [nāstitā] is the being related to past or future individuals [atīta-anāgata-vyakti-sambandhitā]. Thus, (the inferential reason) 'indifferent to existence and non-existence' is either inconclusive [anaikāntika], because there is doubt about its presence in dissimilar cases [sandigdha-vyatirekitva], or it is an indirect or incidental cause [anyathā-siddha]."[166]-- {61.20-61.24} This is irrelevant. Now then, through this, what was put forward is not rejected since after placing the burden [bharam] on the universal [jāti] he himself accepts that what is denoted is a particular [svalakṣaṇa].[167] Moreover, in every case it is thought that the existence etc., [astitva-ādi] of a thing [padārtha] is due the nature [svarūpa] of the particular [svalakaṇa]. And it is a childish trick [bāla-pratāra] to (think) that the existence etc., of a universal [jāti] is its relation to a present etc., individual [vartamānādi-vyakti-sambandhi]. Thus, there is even a problem [doṣa] with the assertion that it is an

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[166]NVTT [444.02-444.06]

[167]JNA [211.07-211.13]

individual which possesses a universal [jātimat-vyakti]. If the awareness [pratīti] of an individual [vyakti] is proved, whether there is or is not the awareness of a distinct [adhika] universal [jāti] there is no freedom from [unmukti] the problem of the awareness of an individual [vyakti].[168]

{61.25-61.28} What the followers of Kumārila have said about this is that --"It is simply because a thing [vastu] has parts [sabhāgatva] that there is not the problem of indifference [sādhāraṇya]. For it is tree-ness [vṛkṣatva], the existence and non-existence of which has not yet been ascertained [a-nirdhārita], that is understood from a word. It is related with one of those two as understood through another word."[169]-- {61.27-61.28} Even this does not follow [asaṃgata] since given the awareness of an eternal universal [sāmānya] it is not tenable that its existence and non-existence [bhāva-abhāva-tva] has not yet been ascertained.

{62.01-62.02} "But the way that words bring about the awareness of an object [artha-pratyāyana-prakāra] is not like sensation [pratyakṣa] through which there would not be a need for the words "it exists" etc., as there is for what is observed through (words).[170] This is because the warranted modes of awareness [pramāṇa] have various capacities [vicitra-śakti]"[171] {62.02-62.05} As for this, if sensory and verbal manifestations [aindriyaka-śābda-pratibhāsa] grasp one nature [eka-svarūpa] then this too is refuted

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[168]JNA [212.18-212.19]

[169]JNA [212.20-212.21]

[170]Sharma (1969: 70) reads "tad adṛṣṭa" instead of taddṛṣṭa".

[171]JNA [213.03-213.05]

through the refutation of different manifestations [bhinna-avabhāsa-dūṣaṇa].[172] And 'the various capacities [vicitra-śakti] of the warranted modes of awareness [pramāṇa]' is also satisfied [carita-artha] through direct presentation [sākṣātkāra] and determination [adhyavasāya].[173] Therefore, if there could be the presentation [prati+√pad (caus)] of an object [artha] of sensation [pratyakṣa] through language [śābda], there would be a manifestation [avabhāsa] like that, but, this not being so [abhavan] it is not possible to assert that it is it's object [viṣaya].[174] {62.06-62.08} One may argue [iti cet]: "Since the part 'tree-ness' [vṛkṣatva-aṃśa] is intended by the word "tree," the word "it exists [asti] " etc., is for the purpose of ascertaining the part 'existence' etc [satva-ādi-aṃśa]." {62.08-62.09} What is the need of another word or another warranted mode of awareness [pramāṇa-antara] for asserting or denying [vidhi-niṣedha] another property [dharma-antara] since, in being without parts [niraṃśa], a particular [svalakṣaṇa] is completely known [samadhigata] through perception [pratyakṣa]?

{62.09-62.12} One may argue [iti cet]: "Even in the case of sensation [pratyakṣa] the need for another warranted mode of awareness [pramāṇa] is observed. {62.10-62.12} Let this be so since it has a non-ascertaining nature [niścaya-ātmaka] with respect to objects [viṣaya] with unfamiliar [anabhyasta] natures [svarūpa]. Constructing states of awareness [vikalpa], however, have their own [svam] ascertainment as their nature [niścaya-ātmaka]: Where there is grasping what is the purpose of another? But there is

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[172]See RNA [60.26-61.02].

[173]See RNA [60.20-60.26].

[174]JNA [213.05-213.06]

a need for another word [sabda] or inferential reason [liṅga]. Therefore, it is not the case that it grasps the nature [svarūpa] of things [vastu].[175]

[62.13-63.09]

{62.13-62.15} One may argue [nanu]: "Properties [dharma] such as universals [jāti] are different [bhinna] from each other and from the possessors of those properties [dharmi]. Thus, even when a tree is known through one property [dharma], defined as a universal [jati], there is not the awareness of it as having other properties [dharma-antara]. So, why isn't another property [dharma] such as 'moving high in the blue sky' understood [avabodha] to depend upon a different word [bhinnābhidhānādhinaḥ]?"[176] {62.15-62.18} This does not follow [asaṁgata] since, because an observable difference [bheda] between a property [dharma] and a property-possessor [dharmi] is refuted through sensation, [pratyakṣa] there is, in sensation [pratyakṣa], the manifestation [pratibhāsa] of an indivisible [akhaṇḍa] particular [svalakṣaṇa]. If this were not so [anyathā] there would be the extremely unwanted consequence that everything would be everywhere. In the Śāstra, moreover, it is well established that the ordinary use [vyavahāra] of 'property [dharma]' and 'possessor of a property [dharmi]' is based upon a constructed difference [kālpānika-bheda].[177] {62.19-62.23} Or let it be that the difference [bheda] between the properties [dharma] and the possessors of those properties [dharmi] is also ultimately real [pāramārthika]. Even so, since the inherence [samavāya] between the two has been

[175]JNA [213.11-213.14]

[176]JNA [213.15-213.17]

[177]See JNA [212.26-213.01].

refuted, it is acknowledged that the connection [pratyāsatti] is defined as (being) merely dependent [upakāra]. And so, just as in the awareness of a possessor of a property [dharmi] through sensation [pratyakṣa] --which is a connection by a sense-faculty [indriya-pratyāsatti]-- there is the awareness of all [sakala] of its properties [dharma], for the awareness of a possessor of a property [dharmi] through a word [śabda] --which is related through the expressed-expressor relation [vācya-vācaka-sambandha]-- or through an inferential reason [liṅga] --which is necessarily connected [pratibaddha]-- there could be, in just that way, the awareness of all [niravaśeṣa] of its properties [dharma]. This is because there is a non-difference [aviśeṣa] between connections as such [pratyāsatti-mātra].

{62.24-62.26} And what Vācaspati (says) -- "But it is not the case that when what is characterized [viśiṣṭa] by one imposed property [upādhi] (such as) 'existence' is grasped, there is the grasping of it as characterized [viśiṣṭa] by another imposed property [upādhi]. For the self-nature [svabhāva] of a substance [dravya] is characterized [vi+√śiṣ] by its imposed properties [upādhi] but neither the contingent properties [upādhi] nor its being characterized [viśeṣyatvam] is its self-nature [svabhāva]"[178] -- {62.26-63.02} also definitely washes away. For it is not the case that because of a non-difference [abheda] the grasping of another imposed property [upādhi] follows.[179] This is because it is only after postulating [puras+√kṛ] a difference [bheda] that when a dependent [upakāraka] is grasped there is the grasping of that upon which it is dependent [upakārya]. And it is not proper to suppose [kalpana] as a rule [niyama] that (the relation between) a property

[178]NS 1.1.4, NVTT [115.10-115.13]

[179]JNA [215.03-215.05]

[dharma] and possessor of that property [dharmi] is ascertained [pratipatti] by its self-nature alone like the effect-cause relation [kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva] for smoke and fire. This is because those two are also proved by a warranted mode of awareness [pramāṇa]. And the rule [nyāya] is: "When proved by a warranted mode of awareness [pramāṇa] there is a description of its self-nature".[180]

{63.03-63.04} And what was said about this in the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa --"When grasping the sun etc., it follows that there is a grasping of the entire collection of objects [vastu] which are dependent on it [tad-upakārya]"[181]-- {63.04-63.07} is the result of not understanding the intention. To explain: According to your opinion, there is a difference [bheda] between a property [dharma] and the possessor of that property [dharmi]. Moreover, the connection is definitely defined as dependent [upakāraka]. Thus, when grasping a dependent [upakāraka] it follows that there is the grasping of that upon which it is dependent [upakārya] only if it is at the same place and only if it has the form of a property [dharma]. So, how does the unwanted consequence of grasping that upon which the sun is dependent [sūrya-upakāra] follow it being either at a different place or a different substance which deviates from what is observed?

{63.07-63.09} Therefore, if the nature [sva-rūpa] of a thing [vastu] is ascertained through one property [dharma] there is the awareness of its entire nature [sarva-ātmā-pratīti], what is the need of another word for a positive or negative statement [vidhi-niṣedha]. But, there is (such a need). Therefore, it is established [iti sthitam] that a particular

[180]See RNA [77.10].

[181]See JNA [215.08-215.24], NBhū [247].

[svalakṣaṇa] is not manifest in either a verbal or constructing state of awareness or through an inferential reason.

[63.10-65.14]

{63.10-63.19} It is also not the case that a universal [sāmānya] is manifest in a verbal state of awareness. From the word 'cow' etc., in the (sentence) "Cows are grazing on the far bank of the river," dewlap, horns, and tail etc., are grouped together [parikarita][182] through the facet of the letters (c-o-w) [akṣara-ākāra] (and) as a result of not considering differences from what belongs to the same class [sajātīyabheda-aparāmarśana], they become manifest as if conglomerated together [sampiṇḍita-prāya]. And that is definitely not a universal [sāmānya]:[183] "For it is stated that (the universal) 'cow-ness [gotva]' is neither the class [varṇa] the structure [ākṛti], nor the form of the letters [akṣara-ākāra]."[184] And so, although it is utterly distinct [atyanta-vilakṣaṇa] in every individual [akhila-vyakti], that collection of dewlap, horns, etc., [sāsnā-sṛṅga-ādi-mātram] is made one [ekīkrīyamāna] with a particular [svalakṣaṇa] (and) is said to be a universal [sāmānya].[185] Since an external object [bāhya] like that [tādṛśa] is not found [aprāpti] it is definitely erroneous [bhrānti], like the manifestation of hair.[186] Therefore, as a result of latent cognitive impressions [vāsanā] let this be a transformation, with that nature, of

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[182]Note: JNA [220.03] reads "parikarāh" instead of "parikarita."

[183]See JNA [220.02-220.05].

[184]PV2.147, JNA [220.05]

[185]JNA [220.07-220.08]

[186]See JNA [220.14-220.15].

awareness [buddhi] itself; or declare that its form is not real [asat]; or just let individuals be manifest differently [anyathā] by covering up their differences from those that belong to their own class [svajātīya-bheda-tiraskāra] or, because it is not available to experience [anubhava], let it be stated that it is a trick of memory [smṛti-pramoṣa].[187] In each case, this awareness [pratyaya] of a universal [sāmānya] does not have an object [nir-viṣaya]. Where is there even news of a universal [sāmānya]?

{63.20-63.22} What was said --"If there is the absence of a universal [sāmānya] the awareness of universals [sāmānya-pratyaya] would be random [akasmika]"-- is also not correct [na yukta]. This is because, through the co-operating cause of remembering the prior observation of an individual thing [piṇḍa], a causal complex [sāmagrī] produces the awareness through which particulars [viśeṣa] are surpassed [atiricyamāna] (and) brings about [ut+√pad (caus)] a state of awareness in which there is a universal [sāmānya-vikalpa] which is without an object [viṣaya].[188] So, in this way, a universal [jāti] is neither manifest in verbal awareness nor even in perception.[189]

{63.23-63.27} And it is not the case that it is proved by an inference since given that it is unobservable [adṛśyatva] there is not the observation of an inferential reason [liṅga] which is related [pratibaddha] to it.[190] Neither is it proved like a sense faculty [indriya]. This is because there is proof from the effect, awareness [jñāna], only of other

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[187]See JNA [220.21-221.01].

[188]See RNA [60.06-60.07].

[189]See JNA [221.11-221.16].

[190]For the JNA discussion see JNA [221.17].

occasional [kādācitka] causes [nimittāntara].[191] Since [yadā [hi][192]] one could observe the absence of the awareness 'cow' [go-buddhi] in another individual thing [piṇḍa] or in the space between (things) [antarāla], the absence of the awareness 'cow' is produced just from the absence[193] of all individual cows such as spotted ones etc. How could another object [arthāntara] be implied [ā+√kṣip]?

[63.26-64.06]

{63.26-63.28} Now, (one may argue [nanu][194]): "It is only because of cow-ness [gotva] that there is an individual thing called "cow" [go-piṇḍa] (since) otherwise even a horse could be an individual thing called 'cow' [go-piṇḍa]." If this is so (then) it is only because of an individual thing called 'cow' that there is cow-ness [gotva] (since) otherwise even horse-ness could be cow-ness. {63.28-64.01} Therefore, it is only because of a causal series [kāraṇa-paramparā][195] that there is an individual thing called 'cow'. Cow-ness, however, may or may not be.[196]

{64.01-64.03} One may argue [nanu...iti...cet]: If the capacity [sāmarthya] to produce the awareness of a universal [sāmānya] is non-different [abhinna] from an individual thing [piṇḍa] then another individual thing [piṇḍāntara] which is (also) excluded from what

[191]For the JNA discussion see JNA [221.18-221.19].

[192]JNA [221.20] adds 'hi'. Another manuscript of the RNA adds 'api.' See RNA [63 n. 12].

[193]Here the word "absence" is being used in the sense of exclusion.

[194]JNA [221.21] adds 'nanu'

[195]See RNA [63.21].

[196]See JNA [221.20--222.02].

belongs to a different class [vijatīya-vyāvṛtta] cannot have that capacity [asamartha]. If it is different [bhinna], then that alone is the universal [sāmānya] and the argument [vivāda] is about the name." {64.03-64.06} That capacity [śakti] is definitely non-different [abhinna] for each and every thing [prati-vastu]. Just as a single existent [bhāva] has (some) capacity [śakta] as its self-nature [svabhāva] there is also another which exists [bhavan] in that way. To what sort of a problem [doṣa] does this lead? Just as for you a universal [jāti] is, although single, a cause [hetu] for producing [prasava] the same word [samāna-dhvani][197] (and) another (universal [jāti]) does not by its very nature [svarūpa] need another universal [jāti], similarly, for us, an individual [vyakti] is also not in need of a universal [jāti]. It is a cause [hetu] which is, by its very nature, different [bhinna].[198]

[64.07-64.29]

{64.07-64.08} But as Trilocana (says) --"The inherence [samavāya] of particular universals [sāmānya-viśeṣa] such as horse-ness, cow-ness, etc. in their own loci [sva-āśraya] is the cause [nimitta] for the name and awareness 'universal [sāmānya]'."[199]-- If this is so, let that alone also be the basis for the name and awareness of individuals. For what reason then is there the madness [pramāda] of the acceptance of universals [sāmānya]. Moreover, inherence [samavāya] is not possible: "Inherence [samavāya] is

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[197]JNA [222.08] reads this as "samāna-dhī-dhvani."

[198]The printed text at RNA [64.08] reads "sāmānyam sāmānyam iti abhidhāna-pratyayayoḥ". Following manuscript 'T' {See RNA [p. 64 n. 3]} and JNA [222.11], I read "sāmānyam iti ...". See JNA [222.03-222.08].

[199]JNA [222.10-222.11]

proved from the awareness "Here (in these threads is cloth)." But, there is the awareness "Here" by observing the pair. And nowhere is there a need for that object (i.e., inherence). For this reason it is accepted merely through one's own imagination."

{64.15-64.16} Continuity of awareness [pratyaya-anuvṛtti] depends upon a continuous thing [anuvṛtta-vastu]. How could this be for utterly distinct individuals [vyakti] which follow from [anu+√pat] a state of awareness [pratyaya-bhāva] in which that which is excluded [vyāvṛtta] is the object [viśaya]? {64.16-64.17} This speculation is rejected since, as in the case of universals [jāti], with respect to (their) being individuals [vyaktīyamāna] in virtue of their being mutually excluded [paraspara-vyāvṛtta] there is deviation [vyabhicāra] with the awareness of a continuous thing [anuvṛtta]. [200] {64.18-64.19} But about this it is said that "the existence of the inferential reason in dissimilar cases [viparyaya] is refuted. The continuity of a name and awareness which having stopped for some reason (again) arises for some reason, (is said to have) a basis [nimitta] and there is no other basis." {64.19-64.23} This is not correct. Even without that which has continued the accepted continuance of name and awareness has necessarily been proved by a particular whose self-nature is excluded from what does not have its form. Therefore:[201] "Given that the difference is the same (between two members of the same class and a member of one class and a member of a different class).[202] Let just that relation through which the universal [jāti] applys to some but not to another be the reason for words and awareness."[203]

[200] JNA [222.23-222.25]

[201] JNA [223.15-223.18]

[202] PV3 [162cd]

[203] PV3 [163ab], JNA [224.06-07]

{64.24-64.26} What was said about this by the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa[204] --"For this is not so. Let it be that just that relation [pratyāsatti] through which "stick" or "thread" applies to some but not to others is the cause [nibandhana] for the ordinary use [vyavahāra] of "possessing-a-stick" or "being strung" in the context of a person or a crystal etc. What of the stick or thread?--"[205] does not follow. This is because he does not understand (our) intention [abhiprāya-aparijñāna]. {64.26-64.29} For it is not denied that the stick or thread etc., which are observed to be connected with the person and the crystal etc., are the reason [hetu] for the awareness of "possessing-a-stick" or "being strung." A universal [sāmānya], however, was not observed even in a dream. So, if it is to be imagined [parikalpanīya] then it is better to imagine that the relation [pratyāsatti] alone is the cause [hetu] of the awareness of a universal [sāmānya]. What is the purpose of this extra supposition?

{65.01-65.03} Now is stated this inference for proving universals [jāti]: "The awareness of a characterized object [viśiṣṭa-jñāna] is invariably related with [nāntarīyaka] grasping its particular characteristic [tad-viśeṣaṇa-grahaṇa]. Just as in the awareness "He has a stick" [daṇḍī-jñāna]. And the awareness "This is a cow" is an awareness of a characterized object [viśiṣṭa-jñāna]. On account of its meaning [arthataḥ] there is the effect form of the inferential reason [kārya-hetu] since, in the example, it is proved that

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[204]NBhū [261]

[205]JNA [224.09-224.11]

the effect of experiencing the particular characteristic [viśeṣaṇa-anubhava-kārya] is the awareness of the characterized object [viśiṣṭa-buddhi] ."

{65.03-65.06} With respect to this it is asked: Is what is to be proved [sādhya] that the awareness of a characterized object [viśiṣṭa-buddhi] is invariably related with [nāntarīyaka] the grasping of distinct characteristics [binna-viśeṣaṇa-grahaṇa] or that it is invariably related with [nāntarīyaka] the experience of a characteristic in general [viśeṣaṇa-mātra]?

{65.06-65.09} If it is the first alternative, since (the presence of what is to be proved in) the subject of the inference [pakṣa] is defeated [bādhā] by sensation [pratyakṣa], there is not an opportunity to attend to the inferential reason [sādhana]. This is because with respect to sensation [pratyaksa], which grasps things [vastu], there is the absence of the manifestation of both. Moreover, the awareness of a characterized object [viśiṣṭa-buddhi], which is the inferential reason for a universal [sāmānya-hetu], is inconclusive [anaikāntika] on account of observing it even without grasping distinct characteristic [binna-viśeṣaṇa-grahaṇa]. Just as "the pot has a self nature" or "cow-ness is a universal [sāmānya]".

{65.10-65.12} If it is the second alternative, however, there is the proving of what has already been proved [siddha-sādhana]. This is because since a characteristic-characterized relationship [viśeṣaṇa-vieśeṣya-bhāva] is aknowledged, after assuming an imagined [parikalpita] distinction [bheda] such as a thing [piṇḍa] has a universal [jāti], cow-ness, like a pot has a self-nature etc., the ordinary expression [vyavahāra] "This is

a cow" is produced through the experience [anubhava] of that which is excluded from non-cows [agovyāvṛtta].[206]

{65.12-65.14} So, in this way, a universal [sāmānya] is not proved. And it is well known that the defeater [bādhaka] of the collection of contingent conditions [upādhi-cakra] universal [sāmānya], quality [guṇa], action [karma], etc. is either an acute perception [paṭu-pratyakṣa] which grasps complete individuals [kevala-vyakti-grāhaka] or the non-apprehension of what is observable [dṛśya-anupalabdhi].

[65.15-66.23]

{65.15-65.24} So, in this way, a positive entity [vidhi] is definitely [eva] the meaning of a word [śabdārtha]. And that is meant [vivakṣita] to be an external object [bāhyo 'rthaḥ] and a facet of awareness [buddhi-ākāra]. Among these, it is not the case that either ultimately [tattvataḥ] or conventionally [samvṛttyā] there is a positive or negative statement [vidhi-niṣedha] about a facet of awareness [buddhi-ākāra] since it is known by self-perception [svasaṃvedana] and is without determination [anadhyavasāya]. It is also not the case that ultimately [tattvataḥ] there is even a positive or negative statement [vidhi-niṣedha] about an external object [bāhya] since it is not directly present [apratibhāsana] in a verbal state of awareness. Thus, all entities [sarvadharma] are ultimately [tattvataḥ] inexpressible [anabhilāpyatva] since there is the absence of either manifestation [pratibhāsa] or determination [adhyavasāya].[207] Therefore, it is

[206]RNA [65.01-65.12] corresponds to JNA [225.01-225.09]

[207]See JNA [230.19-230.27].

conventionally [sāmvṛtyā] of an external object alone [bāhyaviṣayaiva] that there is a positive or negative statement [vidhi-niṣedha]. Otherwise there would be the unwanted consequence of the destruction of all ordinary practices [samvyavahāra]. So, in this way: "Neither a facet [ākāra] nor an external [bahir] ultimately [tattvataḥ] establishes the positive entity [vidhi]. For conventionally [saṃvrttyā] it is the external [bahir] alone but even conventionally it is not the form [ākṛti]." [208] By this, what Dharmottara nonsensically [alaukika], nonscripturally [anāgama], and illogically [atarkikīya] says -- "Of an imposed external object [āropitasya bāhyatvasya] there are positive and negative statements [vidhi-neṣedha],"-- is also rejected.[209]

{65.25-65.26} One may argue [nanu]: "If in determination [adhyavasāya] a determined [adhyavaseya] object [vastu] is not manifest [√sphur] then what does it mean that there is the determination of it [tadadhyavasita]? What it means is that even without being manifest [apratibhāsa] it is made into an object of positive activity [pravṛtti-viṣayīkṛtam]."[210]

{65.26-66.02} One may argue [iti...cet]: "Since there are no distinctions without manifestation [apratibhāsāviśeṣa], how is it that through the exclusion of [pari+√hṛ] other objects [viṣayāntara] positive activity [pravṛtti] has a specific object [niyata-viṣaya]?" It is said that although the entire universe [viśvam] is not grasped,[211] still, the

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[208] Also quoted in JNA [443, 229].

[209] See JNA [229.14-229.15]. For a more complete and detailed critical discussion of Dharmottara's position See JNA [229.14-230.07]. For Dharmottara's view see his Apohasiddhi (AS-D).

[210] See RNA [CAPV: 138.39], JNA [AP: 226.01-226.07], and LPP (9): 6-18.

[211] See JNA [226.02-226.03], where this phrase is also used.

positive activity [pravṛtti] --towards water etc.-- is definitely specific [niyata]. This is because in virtue of being produced by a specific causal complex [niyata-sāmagrī-prasūtatva] and having a specific facet [niyata-ākāra], a constructing state of awareness [vikalpa] has a specific capacity [niyata-śakti], like smoke's producing the awareness of a fire which is beyond the range of the senses [parokṣa]. For existing things [bhāva] whose self-natures [svabhāva] are completely established through a warranted mode of awareness [pramāṇa] are specific objects [niyata-viṣaya]; it is not the case that questions about the mixing up of their capacities is relevant [sakti-sāṃkarya-paryanuyoga-bhājaḥ].[212] {66.02-66.05} Therefore, because of its association with a particular facet [ākāra-viśeṣa-yoga], 'the determination of it [tadadhyavasāyitva]' is 'the production of positive activity towards it [tadpravṛttijanakatva].' .

{66.03-66.05} Moreover, we do not say that there is positive activity through an imposition due to similarity [sādṛśyād āropeṇa] resulting from [dvāreṇa] the imposition of an external [bāhya] on a facet [ākāra] or a facet [ākāra] on an external [bāhya]: This occasions an argument. Rather, awareness [buddhi] is only produced from the ripening of its own latent cognitive impressions [svavāsanā-vipāka] (and) although it does not see an external [bāhya] it leads to [ā+√tan] positive activity [pravṛtti] towards an external [bāhya]. Thus, it is definitely erroneous.[213]

{66.05-66.07} So, in this way, the positive entity [vidhi] is an object [artha] which is characterized by its absence from others [anya-abhāva-viśiṣta] and excluded from those

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212 See JNA [266.03-266.04].

213 See RNA [CAPV: 138] where the phrase "samsāra-ātmikā" is added.

which belong to a different class [vijātīya-vyāvṛtta]. And that alone is what is expressed by the word exclusion. It is the meaning of words and the object of positive and negative activity [pravṛtti-nivṛtti-viṣaya]. This is established [sthitam].

{66.07-66.10} Here is the argument [prayoga]: Everything which is linguistically expressive [vācaka] has for its object [gocara] a thing-in-general [vastu-mātram] which is determined [adhyavasita] (and) excluded from what does not have its form [atadrūpaparāvṛtta], just as the statement [vacanam] "There is water here in this well."[214] And that which has the form of a word such as "cow" etc., is linguistically expressive [vācaka]. Thus, it is the self-nature form of the inferential reason [svabhāva-hetu]. {66.10-66.12} It is not unestablished [asiddha]. This is because, by the previously stated rule [nyāya],[215] everyone who engages in ordinary practices [sarva-vyavahāri] must accept that although the expressed-expressor relation [vācya-vācaka-bhāva] is not ultimate [pāramārthika] it is definitely created through determination [adhyavasāya] since otherwise there would be the unwanted consequence of the destruction of all ordinary practices [sarva-vyavahāra-uccheda]. {66.12} Neither is it opposed [virudha] since it is present in a similar case [sapakṣa]. {66.12-66.16} Neither is it inconclusive [anaikāntika]. To explain: Those others who do not ultimately [paramārthataḥ] acknowledge that words etc., have as their object [viṣaya] a thing-in-general [vastu-mātram] which is determined [adhyavasita] and excluded from those which belong to a different class [vijātī-vyāvṛtta] (say): "A particular [svalakṣaṇa] is denoted [vācya]; or, an property[upādhi]; what is connected with an imposed property [upādhi-yoga]; or, it may be what is with an

[214] See LPP [18.11], NBTT [10.12], NM [439.15], IPVV [(vol 2), 250.19], NVV [17.16].

[215] This seems to be referring to what precedes "iti sthitam", RNA [66.06-66.07]

imposed property [sopādhi]; or rather, it may be a product [kṛti] of awareness [buddhi]." Because there is the absence of another course [gatiḥ] and since, without an object [aviṣayatva], their being verbally expressive [vācakatva] is not possible [ayoga].

{66.16-66.18} About this [tatra]: "Of the first and the last there cannot be convention [samaya] since there is the destruction of the capacity of fruition [phala-śakti-hāni]. Also, it is not possible with the middle three since there are not any imposed properties [upādhi]."[216] So, in this way, the inferential reason, 'being verbally expressive [vācakatva],' is excluded from dissimilar cases [vipaṣa] since its pervader [vyāpaka], 'being an object [viṣayatva]' is excluded because of the absence of another denoted object. It is (therefore) pervaded by 'being a determined external object [adhyavasita-bāhya-viṣayatva]'. Thus, pervasion [vyāpti] is proved.

This text on exclusion [apohaprakraṇaṃ], composed by the venerable Paṇdit Ratnakīrti, is complete.[217]

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[216] The printed phrase "tritayena yuktaḥ" should read "tritaye na yuktaḥ"

[217] In his edition, Sharma (1969) adds the following three verses to the text. The first is JNA [203.01-203.04], the second is JNA [232.12-232.15], and the third is a concluding note by the scribe Trailokyadatta.

(1) JNA [203.01-203.04]; Sharma (1969: [19.04-19.07], p. 98): śabdais tāvan mukhyam ākyāyate 'rthaḥ | tatrāpohaḥ tad guṇatvena gamyaḥ || arthaś caiko 'dhyasato bhāsato 'nyaḥ | sthāpyo vācyas tattvato naiva kaścit ||

(2) JNA [232.12-232.15]; Sharma (1969: [19.10-19.13], p. 98): bhavatv apohe kṛtinām prapañco | vastusvarūpāsphuraṇantu marmma || tatrādṛḍhe sarvam ayatnaśīrṇam | dṛḍhe tu sausṭhyan nanu tāvataiva||

(3) Sharma (1969: [19.14-19.17]: pp. 98-99): sampūrṇarātripraharadvayena | kīrter apoho likhitaḥ sukhena || trailokyadattena parātmahetoḥ | yatnād ato 'yam parirakṣaṇīyaḥ || "In two quarters and one full night, the exclusion of Kīrti was happily copied by Trailokyadatta from effort occasioned by the great souled one. For this reason it must be well protected."

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AS — Apohasiddhi (Ratnakīrti): RNA

ATV — Ātmatattvaviveka (Udayana). *The Ātmatattvaviveka of Śri Udayanāchārya with the commentary of Śri Nārāyaṇāchārya Ātreya and the Dīdhiti commentary of Śri Raghunātha Śiromaṇi with the Bauddhādhikāra Vivṛti of Gadhādhara Bhaṭṭāchārya.* Edited with Critical Introduction, Index, and Exhaustive Footnotes by Pandit Dhundiraja Śāstri. ChSS 84: Benares, 1940.

Br — Bṛhatī (Prabhākara). Bṛhatī of Prabhākara Miśra with the Ṛjuvimalapañcikā of Śālikanāthamiśra (Tarkapāda). Edited by S.K. Ranmattha Sastri. Madras 1934.

CAPV — Citrādvaitaprakāśavāda (Ratnakīrti): RNA

HB — Hetubindu (Dharmakīrti): Ernst Steinkellner, *Dharmakīrti's Hetubinduh Teil I. Tibetischer Text und rekonstruierter Sanskrit-Text.* Wien 1967.

HBṬ — *Hetubinduṭīkā of Bhaṭṭa Arcaṭa with the Sub-Commentary Entitled Āloka of Durvekamiśra.* Ed. Sukhlalji Sanghavi and Shri Jinavijayaji. Baroda 1949.

IPVV — Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī. Ed. Madhusudan Kaul. *The Īśwarapratyabhijñā of Utpaladeva with the Vimarśinī by Abhinavagupta,* 2 vols. Srinagar: KTST 22-23.

JNA — Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvali (Buddhist Philosophical Works of Jñānaśrīmitra). Ed. Anantalal Thakur. Patna 1987.

KSA — Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi, Anvayātmika (Ratnakīrti): RNA

KBA (1) — *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi-Anvayātmika: An Eleventh-Century Buddhist Work on Existence and Causal Theory.* Ed. Jeson Woo. Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1999.

KSV — Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi-vyatireka-ātmika (Ratnakīrti): RNA

KTBh — Tarkabhāṣā (Keśavamiśra). *The Tarkabhāṣā of Keśavamiśra. Edited with an Introduction, Translation into English, and notes (explanatory and critical).* A.B. Gajendragadkar and R.D. Karmarkar. Poona: 1934.

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NKaṇ (1) — Nyāyakaṇikā: VV

NB — Nyāyabindu (Dharmakīrti): DhPr.

NBT — Nyāyabinduṭīkā (Dharmottara) DhPr.

NBhū — Nyāyabhūṣaṇa: *śrīmadācārya-Bhasarvajña-praṇītasya Nyāyasārasya svopajñam vyākhyānaṃ Nyāyabhūṣaṇam.* Ed. Swami Yogindranandah. Varanasi 1968.

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NMGB — Nyāyamañjairgranthibhaṅga. *Chakradhara's Nyāyamañjarigranthibhaṅga.* Ed. Nagin J. Shah. Ahmedabad 1972.

NR — Nyāyaratnākara (Parthasārathimiśra). *The Mīmāṃsāślokavārttika of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. With the Commentary Nyāyaratnākara of Śrī Pārthasārathi Miśra.* Edited and Revised by Svami Dvarikdasa Shastri. Varanasi: Tara Publications 1978.

NVTT — *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā of Vācaspatimiśra.* Ed. Anantalal Thakur. New Delhi 1996

NVTTP *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkāpariśuddhi* of Udayanācārya. Ed. Anantalal Thakur. New Delhi 1996.

NVV *Nyāya Viniścaya Vivaraṇa of Śri Vādirāja Sūri, the commentary on Bhaṭṭākalaṅladevas Nyāya Viniścaya.* Ed. M.K. Jain. (2 vols) Kashi 1949, 1954.

NS Nyāyasūtra: *Gautamīyanyāyadarśana with Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana.* Ed. Anantalal Thakur. New Delhi 1997.

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SS	Sarvajñasiddhi. (Ratnakīrti): RNA
SS	Sthirasiddhidūṣaṇa (Ratnakīrti): RNA
SV	Ślokavārttika (Kumārila): *Mīmāṃsāślokavārttikaṃ Sucaritamiśra-praṇītayā Kāśikākhyayāṭīkayā sametam.* Ed. Sāmbaśiva Śāstri, V.A. Rāmasvāmi Śāstri. [3 vol.] Trivandrum 1926-1943.
SVK	Ślokavārttikakāśikā (Sucaritamiśra): ŚV
TS	*Tattvasaṅgraha of Acārya Shāntarakṣita with the oommentary, Pañjikā of Shri Kamalashīla. Ed. Dvarikdas Shastri. [2 vol.] Varanasi 1968.*
TSop	Tarkasopana (Vidyākaraśānti). Giuseppe Tucci: Minor Budhdist Texts, Part I. Rome 1956: 275-310.
TSP	Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā: TS
TSP (1)	*Tattvasaṅgraha of Śāntarakṣita with the commentary of Kamalaśīla.* Ed. Embar Krishnamacharya. [2 vol] Baroda, 1926.
VC	Vyāpticarcā (Jñānaśrīmitra): JNA
VN	Vyāptinirṃaya (Ratnakīrti): RNA

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